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Preface 
In two successive waves, 2004 and 2007, a total of ten Central and East-
ern European countries, together with Cyprus and Malta, joined the Eu-
ropean Union. One consequence of the enlargement was the dismantling 
of barriers between national labour markets with substantial differences 
in working- and living conditions. Following the enlargement the Nordic 
labour countries proved to be attractive for many job seekers from the 
new EU member states. According to statistics more than 600,000 work-
ers from Central and Eastern European countries found their way to the 
Nordic labour markets during the period 2004–2011.  
In the spring of 2009 the original suggestion for this study was put 
forward as part of the globalization project initiated by the Nordic Coun-
cil of Ministers. The main objective of the study was to obtain a better 
understanding of recruitment processes of foreign labour in the Nordic 
countries – in order to improve these processes. One additional objec-
tive was to understand the extent and character of “social dumping” 
with a special focus on migrants from Eastern Europe. In the spring of 
2011 the Norwegian research organization Fafo Institute for Labour and 
Social Research was appointed to coordinate the project which now has 
resulted in the present report. Contributions to the report have also 
come from CIRRA (MIRRA) – Center for Immigration Research Reykjavik 
Academy (Iceland), CMR – Centre of Migration Research, University of 
Warsaw (Poland), FAOS – Employment Relations Research Centre, Uni-
versity of Copenhagen (Denmark), SOFI – Swedish Institute for Social 
Research, Stockholm University (Sweden). 
The first part of the report aims to provide explanations for patterns, 
directions, and composition of the emerging flows of migrant workers, 
especially from Central and Eastern European countries, to the five Nor-
dic countries. The influx of labour migrants that we have seen over the 
last years have unquestionably benefited the economies of the Nordic 
countries. At the same time we also see some new challenges. It is in this 
context that we notice discussions in some of the host countries regard-
ing “social dumping.” The second part of the report aims to identify key 
challenges policy makers face when trying to uphold labour standards 
and protect migrant workers from being exploited. The report’s third 
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and final part focuses on the question of temporary staffing and recruit-
ment of migrant workers.  
The Nordic countries face many common challenges to become attrac-
tive countries for future labour migration. Given the economic hardship in 
large parts of Europe we may expect that mobile workers still will look to 
the north for new opportunities. Although the new labour migration has 
been welcomed in the Nordic countries, it has also become evident that a 
huge influx of migrant workers can have unforeseen effects on the stabil-
ity and sustainability of the Nordic labour market models and welfare 
states. Even if the possibilities for controlling the flows of migrants within 
the common European labour market are scarce, there is still a considera-
ble room for national policies and regulations. The experience so far is 
that when it comes to recruitment of labour migrants and enforcement of 
decent working standards for all, the Nordic countries face joint challeng-
es – and Nordic exchange of experiences and solutions have proven to be 
particularly useful within this area.  
I look forward to follow how the conclusions from this report will be 
used in the future policy development in the field.  
 
 
Copenhagen, December 2013 
 
 
 
 
Dagfinn Høybråten  
Secretary General  
Nordic Council of Ministers 
 
Introduction and summary 
Jon Horgen Friberg and Line Eldring 
 
 
In the wake of two consecutive eastward enlargements of the European 
Union in 2004 and 2007, which triggered the largest mass movements of 
people on the European continent since WWII, the Nordic countries have 
attracted considerable numbers of labour migrants from the new EU 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe. This has substantially 
changed the migratory landscape in the Nordic countries, as well as the 
functioning and parametres of migrant intensive labour markets. After 
being dominated by humanitarian flows of migrants from outside Eu-
rope, labour migration is once again a dominant feature of migration 
flows to all the Nordic countries, giving rise to new challenges as well as 
opportunities for Nordic labour markets and societies. The purpose of 
this report is to analyse the patterns of labour migration from Central 
and Eastern Europe to the Nordic countries, the factors that shape their 
working conditions and working environment in the different receiving 
country labour markets – including the extent and nature of social 
dumping – and in particular the role of recruitment agencies in the in-
troduction of labour migrants to the Nordic labour market. 
The analysis is separated into three parts, each using different sets 
of data and methodologies. The first part is based on administrative data 
on the overall flows of migrants to all the Nordic countries. It aims to 
provide some explanations for the different patterns, directions and 
compositions of flows. The second part is based on an in-depth compari-
son of wages and working conditions among Polish labour migrants in 
Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik, using migrant survey data. By linking 
the analyses of wages and working conditions among migrant workers 
to institutional and regulatory features of the Nordic labour markets, the 
analysis aim to identify key challenges which policy makers face when 
trying to protect migrant workers from exploitative treatment and up-
hold labour standards in exposed markets. The final part is dedicated to 
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the specific issue of temporary staffing and recruitment of migrant 
workers, based on an analysis of the business of recruitment and tempo-
rary staffing in the different Nordic countries as well as in Poland.1 The 
development of this emerging migration industry is key to understand-
ing not just the economic and institutional dynamics of labour migration 
flows, but also the challenges of incorporating migrant workers into 
existing labour market structures of host countries. Each part of the 
report may be read separately and contains an introduction, specifying 
research questions and methodology, empirical analysis and a conclu-
sion. In the following pages we will nevertheless provide a brief sum-
mary of the main findings and conclusions. 
A changing migratory landscape 
The first part of the report is the least extensive and serves as back-
ground and context for the two other parts. We show that more than 
330,000 citizens from the new member states have registered moving to 
the Nordic countries between 2004 and 2011, but when including work-
ers on temporary stay, the number is approximately twice as high, sug-
gesting that well over 600,000 Central and Eastern European workers 
have entered the Nordic labour markets over a period of seven years. 
This places the Nordic region as one of the main destinations for west-
bound labour migrants since the EU accession, after the British Isles. 
Poland and Lithuania are the main sending countries to the region, ex-
cept for Finland, where Estonians rank as number one. Most of these 
new labour migrants have been recruited to work within a relatively 
narrow set of industries, including construction, manufacturing, agricul-
ture and low skilled services. In all the Nordic countries we find a chang-
ing migratory dynamic over the years since 2004. While flows have been 
dominated by men – who often leave their families behind while work-
ing abroad – increasing numbers of women are arriving. Many of them 
come to join their male spouses already working in the Nordic countries. 
Although significant parts of this new mobility have been temporary and 
transient in nature, many settle down in the host countries, and labour 
────────────────────────── 
1 The Norwegian study on recruitment and staffing agencies is partly based on data from a research program 
on labour migration, financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Labour.  
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immigrant populations in the Nordic countries are becoming increasing-
ly settled, giving rise to new challenges relating to social integration.  
While these migration trends apply to all the Nordic countries, 
there are considerable differences with regard to the volume, composi-
tion and direction of flows. In relative terms Iceland stands out, first by 
receiving far greater numbers of migrants per capita than any other 
Nordic country in the period up to 2008, then by a sudden drop and par-
tial reversal of immigration flows to the country after the financial crisis 
which hit that year. In absolute terms, however, Norway stands out as 
the main destination for Central and Eastern European labour migrants 
among the Nordic countries throughout the period, having received an 
approximately equally number of new labour migrants as all the other 
Nordic countries combined. Several factors can explain why Norway has 
become the largest Nordic magnet for mobile workers. First of all, Nor-
way has had the highest wage levels and lowest unemployment in the 
region throughout the last decade, suggesting that not only are the 
chances of finding employment better there, the rewards will also be 
greatest for those who do. With continous growth and expansion in a 
period of economic uncertainty and crisis elsewhere in Europe (and to 
some extent in other Nordic countries), Norway has sustained a high 
demand for labour in several industries such as construction, manufac-
turing and services. In a context of increasing welfare throughout the 
population, employers have found it increasingly difficult to recruit do-
mestic workers to fill the least desireable jobs, giving rise to extensive 
foreign recruitment. A labour market that in some respects stand out as 
being less regulated than the other Nordic countries – with lower collec-
tive agreement coverage – may also have eased the absorbtion of work-
ers in the “fringes” of the regulated labour market. Initiated by these 
root causes, the growth and expansion of migratory networks – which 
lower the risk and highten the rewards of going abroad – as well as the 
establishment of a “migration industry” consisting of brokers, firms and 
agencies who invest in the mobility and employment of workers, have 
constituted powerful positive feedback mechanisms, giving migration 
flows a self sustaining character.  
Labour market challenges 
Although largely welcomed as a profitable and necessary contribution to 
the domestic labour forces, policy makers and trade unionists have been 
concerned that the recruitment and arrival of so many new migrant 
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workers will cause “social dumping” in the receiving countries. It seems 
clear that if the Nordic countries are to enjoy the benefits of this addition 
to their labour forces and societies, it is necessary to avoid low wage 
competition and deteriorating labour standards, as employers are given 
the opportunity to recruit workers in relatively poorer countries. How-
ever, serious concerns have been voiced on whether the Nordic national 
labour market institutions are able to uphold labour standards, prevent 
segmentation and avert the spread of precarious and exploitative work-
ing conditions, as so many migrant workers from countries with radical-
ly different wages and working conditions flow freely into the labour 
market. This concern is also related to the long term sustainability of the 
Nordic welfare states, which operate in a fine tuned balance with domes-
tic labour markets. In the second part of this report we place the issue of 
migrant incorporation in relation to the general debate on “social dump-
ing”. Using institutional and survey data from Norway, Denmark and 
Iceland, we compare the labour market situation for the largest group of 
labour migrants from the new EU countries – namely Poles – in Oslo, 
Copenhagen and Reykjavik and analyse how labour market outcomes for 
Polish migrant workers are related to the institutional framework of 
labour market regulation in these three countries. We focus in particular 
on the risk of receiving very low wages on the one hand, and the risk of 
other types of precarious and exploitative treatment on the other. 
The analysis shows that all three capital cities are faced with serious 
challenges regarding the institutional ability to incorporate new migrant 
workers into existing labour market structures and protect them from 
exploitative and precarious conditions. Despite varied educational and 
occupational background, Polish migrants are primarily recruited to 
perform work requiring few formal skills within a quite narrow set of 
industries. They are usually found low on the status ladder of domestic 
labour markets, earning significantly lower wages than natives, and en-
joying far more precarious and in many cases exploitative working con-
ditions. This general trend seems to be the result of segmentation into 
specific low wage and low status sectors combined with an overrepre-
sentation in the use of temporary and atypical forms of employment, 
which provides little security. Workers within low skilled services and 
parts of the construction industry appear to be particularly at risk com-
pared to those working in other parts of the labour market.  
However, we find differences between the three cities, in terms of 
how risks and rewards are structured among the new migrant workers, 
as well as in how these challenges have been met. In both Oslo and Co-
penhagen, the labour market for Polish migrant workers is structured 
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into different segments, where casual employment relations, temporary 
staffing, transnational subcontracting and household service provision 
function as drivers of low wage competition and precarious working 
conditions. In Oslo, employees of Polish subcontractor firms are particu-
larly vulnerable to low wage dumping, while workers with different 
kinds of temporary and atypical employment are the most vulnerable to 
exploitative treatment and bad working environment. In Copenhagen we 
find a similar pattern. Here however, being inside or outside the system 
of collective bargaining (measured by having a trade union representa-
tive at the workplace) has a much stronger bearing on outcomes than in 
Oslo, providing better protection for those inside while leaving those 
outside much more exposed to substandard conditions. The differences 
between Oslo and Copenhagen in terms of working conditions reflect 
institutional differences in how the two countries have met the challeng-
es of increasing migration. While Norwegian policy makers and social 
partners have recognized the inability of existing collective institutions 
to cope with this new influx, and implemented a series of new statutory 
measures to re-regulate exposed parts of the labour market, Denmark 
has mostly relied on measures based on the traditional model of collec-
tive bargaining. Both strategies can claim some success, but neither ap-
pears to be “water-tight”. In Reykjavik, outcomes are structured quite 
differently, and few of the variables which explain wage variation in 
Copenhagen or Oslo have any significant effect. Instead, it seems that the 
relatively flexible and universal Icelandic regime has placed Polish mi-
grants more uniformly in the bottom of the wage scale, although with far 
better protection against exploitative conditions. Regarding the outcome 
for Polish migrants in terms of wage levels and risk of precarious condi-
tions, these two factors appear to be inversely correlated at the city level; 
Oslo being the most rewarding destination in monetary earnings, but also 
the place where migrant workers are most at risk of exploitative and ille-
gal treatment, and Reykjavik being the least profitable destination in earn-
ings, and at the same time where migrants are least at risk of exploitative 
treatment. Which of the two should be considered the most successful in 
protecting migrant workers, depends on what is considered more valua-
ble: high wages or secure and orderly terms of employment?  
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The rise of the “migration industry” 
Temporary staffing and recruitment agencies have been heavily in-
volved in recruiting migrant workers to the Nordic countries and many 
migrant workers continue to be employed through temporary staffing 
agencies in their receiving labour markets long after their arrival. In the 
third part of the report we take a closer look at how the business of tem-
poarary staffing has become a “migration industry” in many Nordic 
countries. The mapping of temporary staffing and recruitment agencies 
operating in Poland shows how these agencies are part of an industry 
involving chains of actors facilitating and promoting the mobility, con-
sisting of everything from individual brokers and small firms located in 
either sending or receiving countries, to large transnational corpora-
tions, sometimes investing in recruitment training camps and infrastruc-
ture in sending regions. From the initial recruitment of workers in Po-
land, to their placement with clients and employers in one of the Nordic 
countries, complex networks and numerous links of mediators, subsidi-
aries and subcontractors are typically involved. By providing support 
and information, and relieving client firms of employer responsibility, 
they reduce the risks and costs involved for both migrants and employ-
ers, and thereby contribute to boosting migration flows. However, alt-
hough temporary work agencies can provide necessary support and 
services to both mobile workers and employers, they may also render 
migrants in a vulnerable situation on the host country labour market. 
Depending on country specific regulations agency work typically yields 
far less stability and financial rewards than regular employment, as mi-
grant temp workers in many industries tend to function as a flexible 
buffer to the regular workforce, leaving their work situation character-
ized by uncertainty and short-sightedness. Temporary staffing agencies 
have thus not only boosted the transnational mobility of workers, but 
also promoted increasingly flexible and casual labour relations in mi-
grant intensive industries.  
There are some common themes when looking at the histories of 
temporary staffing in the Nordic countries: from having relatively strict 
regulations a couple of decades ago, a wave of liberalization swept the 
Nordic countries, from 1990 and onwards. This was first followed by 
growth and expansion of the industry, more or less connected to the 
recruitment of migrant workers, and then by more or less successful 
national attempts to re-regulate the industry, either through law or col-
lective bargaining – ending in the on-going national applications of the 
EU Directive on Temporary Agency Work (2008/104/EC). These devel-
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opments roughly echo the global development in the temporary staffing 
industry. When we look in more detail at the development in the Nordic 
countries and in particular how and to what extent the industry is in-
volved in recruitment and staffing of migrant workers in the aftermath 
of the EU enlargements, significant differences emerge.  
In Sweden, the staffing industry experienced a period of growth early 
in the 1990s, and became incorporated into the Swedish framework of 
collective bargaining, providing agency workers in Sweden stronger 
protection than elsewhere. A new period of growth in the 2000s was not 
related to the recruitment of migrant workers, and there is no evidence 
of staffing agencies actively recruiting migrant workers abroad in any 
significant numbers.  
In Iceland the industry was not even present before well into the 
2000s, but then it exploded onto the scene, based on large scale recruit-
ment of migrant workers from Poland and other new EU member states, 
as well as southern Europe. Spearheaded by large international corpora-
tions who would supply foreign labour to, among others, a large scale 
hydroelectric power-plant in the country’s interior, this development 
quickly spread to other parts of the economy. Largely outside the scope of 
Icelandic regulations, the industry was closely associated with low wages, 
substandard working conditions and social dumping. By 2008, however, 
the introduction of new regulations and the onslaught of the financial 
crisis led to the complete breakdown and disappearance of the industry. 
The Norwegian temporary staffing industry has followed a quite dif-
ferent trajectory. Banned outside the so-called “traditional office sector” 
until the 2000, the industry made several attempts to expand into new 
sectors, but these efforts mostly failed due to difficulties in finding will-
ing workers. With the EU accession in 2004, the industry grew rapidly 
and expanded into construction, ship-yards, food-processing and oil-
refineries using active recruitment of migrant workers from Poland and 
the Baltic states. This development was closely related to changing la-
bour strategies in sectors where a high demand for cheap and flexible 
labour was combined with a reluctance to employ migrant workers. The 
financial crisis was only a temporary setback for the Norwegian tempo-
rary staffing industry, and today, immigrant workers comprise more 
than half the workforce of the industry, which displays a clear cut na-
tional division of labour, as native Norwegians are almost exclusively 
hired to the “office sector”, Swedes dominate the health sector market, 
while Poles and Baltics make up the bulk of workers hired to construc-
tion and manufacturing. Largely outside the scope of Norwegian collec-
tive bargaining structures the industry has been subject to quite liberal 
18 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
regulations. The implementation of the EU Temporary Worker Directive 
thus entailed a stronger regulation of the industry.  
The Danish temporary staffing industry displays some similarities 
with the Norwegian case, but also the Swedish. Restrictions were re-
moved earlier than in Norway, but its growth in recent years have nei-
ther been as strong as in Norway nor as clearly connected to the re-
cruitment of migrant workers. As in Sweden, it has to a larger extent 
been incorporated into the general framework collective agreements, 
but terms of employment are less rigorously regulated than in Sweden. 
Parts of the industry have been actively involved in recruitment of mi-
grants, much to the same type of industries as in Norway, and the number 
of CEE migrant workers within the industry has increased sharply since 
2004. It is likely that Danish statistics underrepresent the number of tem-
porary migrant workers within the industry, and there are significant grey 
areas between temporary staffing and other forms of subcontracting.  
 Our analysis of the situation in the different Nordic countries sug-
gests that the emergence and growth of temporary staffing as a signifi-
cant “migration industry” has been dependent on the concurrence of: 1) 
relatively liberal regulations of the temporary staffing industry allowing 
for flexible adaptations; 2) economic expansion and demand for flexible 
semi- and low skilled labour; 3) tight domestic labour market with difficul-
ties in recruiting native workers; and 4) access to willing and potentially 
“cheap” migrant workers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I: 
New patterns of migration from 
Central and Eastern Europe to the 
Nordic countries 
Kristian Rose Tronstad and Pernilla Andersson Joona
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
────────────────────────── 
2 Eskil Wadensjö has contributed to the editing and finalisation of this chapter, while Klaus Pedersen has 
contributed with input on Denmark.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the wake of two consecutive eastward enlargements of the European 
Union in 2004 and 2007 the Nordic countries have attracted considera-
ble numbers of labour migrants from the new EU member states in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (EU8+2). However, the magnitude and composi-
tion of migration flows have varied considerably between the different 
Nordic countries. The aim of this first part of the report is to describe 
these new patterns of migration to the Nordic countries and provide 
some explanation for the differences between the Nordic countries. As 
background and contextualisation for the overall project, we will com-
pare and analyse the composition, volume and direction of macro flows 
as well as the dynamics and driving forces behind these new patterns of 
international mobility. 
Migration research has identified a wide range of factors that con-
tribute in shaping the macro patterns and flows of migration (Massey 
1989). In order to understand the highly different patterns and volumes 
of labour migration to the Nordic countries after the opening of borders 
to new EU member states in Eastern and Central Europa, several of 
these factors need to be taken into account. First of these are the huge 
economic differentials in the levels of wages and unemployment between 
sending and receiving countries. Better opportunities for employment 
and higher wages are undoubtedly the primary motive for mobile work-
ers coming to the Nordic countries. Second, we need to look at the struc-
tural changes within immigrant intensive industries which generate a 
specific demand for migrant labour. These changes are often related to 
the concept and process of labour market segmentation, and the associ-
ated difficulties of staffing low status jobs with domestic workers (Piore 
1979). Furthermore, once established, migration patterns tend to be 
reinforced through the expansion of social migrant networks, which in-
crease the likelihood of further mobility by providing access to infor-
mation and material and social support for new migrants, reducing the 
risks and cost of migration and increasing its expected returns. While 
state policies obviously shape international migration flows, the signifi-
cance of border control has diminished within the enlarged EU/EEA area. 
The multidisciplinary approach that dominates today’s migration research 
highlight the need to supplement economic perspectives with institutional 
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analyses of how labour markets function. This is particularly pertinent in 
the Nordic countries where labour markets are strongly regulated either 
by state policies or negotiations between social partners.  
1.1 Data, variables and methodology 
In order to analyse the new patterns of migration from CEE countries to the 
Nordic countries after the EU enlargement in 2004/2007 we need compa-
rable data. Ideally we would like to have data on movements and stay for all 
who come from CEE countries to a Nordic country to work. In addition it 
would be preferable to have employment data on the same group, settled 
and non-settled immigrants from CEE countries, and that identical defini-
tions of these populations were used in all Nordic countries.  
However, large scale labour migration from the new EU countries is a 
rather recent phenomenon and differs from other immigration flows to 
the Nordic countries. Since many of the new labour migrants come to 
work and live in a Nordic country for a shorter or longer period, official 
statistics is not calibrated to analyse these flows. In some Nordic coun-
tries data on permits is available and gives valuable information on the 
reason for immigration or intention behind the immigration to that par-
ticular country. However, these data are not available in all the Nordic 
countries. Therefore, to obtain comparability we needed to settle for 
second best. We will use immigration by foreign citizenship from one of 
the new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe to analyse the im-
migration flows. Many immigrants who came from CEE-countries to the 
Nordic countries before 2004 have stayed for severeal years and some 
have been naturalized and are not considered foreing citizens. To ana-
lyse the development in the stock of immigrants we have chosen to use 
country of birth instead of foreign citizenship. 
Eurostat produces statistics on a range of issues related to interna-
tional migration flows, non-national population stocks and acquisition of 
citizenship. Data are collected on an annual basis and supplied to Euro-
stat by the national statistical authorities of the Member States. Since 
2008 the collection of data has been based on Regulation 862/2007. 
Also the OECD manages several databases dedicated to international 
migration. One challenge with the data from OECD and Eurostat is that 
the figures for the Nordic countries vary between the databases. One 
possible explanation for these differences is that the criterion for entry 
into the registers differs, with an expected stay of three months in Den-
mark, six months in Norway and one year in Finland, Iceland and Swe-
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den. Based on the Regulation 862/2007, Eurostat aims at harmonizing 
data to enhance comparability. However, the adaption of the data is not 
consistent, and for the Nordic countries it could actually blur the picture. 
Denmark can serve as an example. The Eurostat data for Denmark in 
2007 coincide with the figures published by Denmark Statistics, but in 
2008–2010 the figures differ. In fact they are considerably lower than 
the figures published as offcial statistics by Denmark Statsitics. Concern-
ing OECD data, Denmark started producing a series for the OECD, based 
on a one-year actual stay in the country that consists of persons who 
entered Denmark in a particular year and were still there one year later. 
Instead of using either OECD or Eurostat data, we decided to use the 
data provided by the national statistical offices in the five Nordic coun-
tries and made available through a Nordic statbank.3 These data are 
produced with the national differences in the criterion of entry into the 
registers, as mentioned above, but these data are consistent with the 
figures already published as official statistics and covers the relevant 
time span for this project from 2000 until 2012 (or latest year available). 
What characterizes the Nordic countries with regard to administra-
tive register sources is that they cover many aspects of society where 
the quality of the registers is relatively high, and where there is a contact 
between registers that enables a certain degree of coordination. Howev-
er, population registers includes only people who are settled and who 
have obtained a personal identification number (PIN). To investigate the 
magnitude of labour migrants in the Nordic countries migrants we also 
need to explore how many non-settled migrants are employed in the 
Nordic labour markets. These figures are not found in the population 
registers, but tax-data for non-settled immigrants in some of Nordic 
countries give some information on the influx of both settled and non-
settled CEE immigrants in the Nordic labour market. 
To analyse the total inflow from EU8+2 to the different Nordic coun-
tries over the last decades we have extracted data on annual inflow from 
ten sending countries to the five Nordic countries. Data are analysed to 
find out which of the Nordic receiving countries attracts most immigrants 
in absolute and relative numbers. To compare the impact of immigration 
in each country over time we have calculated a gross migration rate. Gross 
migration rate for each Nordic country is calculated by dividing the total 
inflow from CEE countries in a given year by the population in the country 
────────────────────────── 
3 Nordic Statistics >> http://91.208.143.50/pxweb/pxwebnordic/dialog/statfile1.asp 
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the same year. The number for each year is multiplied by 1,000, indicating 
migration from CEE countries per thousand inhabitants. 
1.2 Who are the migrants and why do they come? 
After the enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 the 
inflow of citizens from the ten new members in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE) increased substantially to the Nordic countries. In total there 
were 336,000 citizens from CEE countries who migrated to the Nordic 
countries from 2004 until 2011. These figures include citizens who 
moved to a Nordic country with the intention to stay for a longer peri-
od.4 Figure 1.1 illustrates that the number of citizens from CEE countries 
immigrating to the Nordic countries before 2004 were less than 10,000 
per year.5 Over a period of four years the inflow from the new EU mem-
ber states increased six fold and peaked in 2008 with an inflow of close 
to 59,000 foreign citizens from these countries. From 2008 until 2009 
the inflow dropped to 47,000, but already two years after the financial 
crisis the number of people migrating from CEE countries to the Nordic 
countries again reached 2008 inflow level with close to 60,000 immi-
grating to Nordic countries in 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
────────────────────────── 
4 This figure include persons who obtain a residence permit or a work permit for a period exceeding three 
months in Denmark, six months in Norway and twelve months in Finland, Iceland and Sweden. 
5 EU expanded 1 May 2004.  
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Figure 1.1 Gross inflow from EU8+2 to the Nordic countries 2000–2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nordic Statistics 
 
It is important to note that these are the official figures of foreign citi-
zens who migrate to the Nordic countries from EU8+2 and who are reg-
istered as immigrants. That means that they have been registered and 
have stated an intention to stay for more than three, six or twelve 
months depending of receiving country.6 In addition to these flows many 
migrants who come to the Nordic countries in this period were labour 
migrants on short term stay or posted workers who never registered. 
Preliminary results from a Norwegian study estimate that the number of 
foreign citizens who came to Norway after 2004 was twice as high if 
labour migrants on short term contracts and posted workers were add-
ed to official flows (Bratsberg and Raaum forthcoming).  
Where do they go? 
As showed in previous section, inflow from the new EU member states 
increased six fold after the labour market was opened in 2004. All the 
Nordic countries experienced large increase, but how has the composi-
tion of these flows changed before and after 2004? 
Before 2004, when migration from CEE countries was low, Denmark 
and Sweden were the two top destination countries of the Nordic coun-
tries. Since 2004, when migration from CEE countries boosted Norway 
has gained importance and by 2006 it became the top receiving country 
────────────────────────── 
6 See more detailed information in the following paragraphs. 
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(Figure 1.2). Almost half of all the migrants from CEE countries who 
came to the Nordic region in 2011 went to Norway. 
Figure 1.2 Share of gross inflow from EU8+2 to the Nordic countries 2000–2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nordic Statistics 
 
Finland share of the inflow decreased from pre 2004 until 2008, but since 
2008 Finland has gained importance as a receiving country in the Nordic 
region. Many are arriving to Finland from Estonia. For Iceland it is the 
other way around. Inflow to Iceland from CEE countries increased rapidly 
from 2004 until 2007, and constituted 13% of the total inflow to Nordic 
countries in 2006–2007. But Iceland was the country in the Nordic region 
which was hit hardest by the financial crisis, and since 2008 Iceland’s 
share of the total inflow to the Nordic countries has decreased. 
Iceland is a small country with 320,000 inhabitants, compared to 
Sweden with more than 9 million. If we adjust for population size (in-
flow per thousand inhabitants) and calculate an annually gross migra-
tion rate for the Nordic countries, we find (in table 1.1) that Iceland has 
experienced the most dramatic rise in inflow of CEE migrants compared 
to the other countries. 
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Table 1.1 Gross migration rates from EU8+2 adjusted for population (Inflow per thousand 
inhabitants) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Iceland 
 
2,0 2,4 1,6 0,8 1,5 6,6 14,2 22,1 16,1 5,7 4,2 3,7 
Norway 
 
0,2 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,6 1,1 2,2 4,1 4,4 3,7 5,0 5,4 
Denmark 
 
0,5 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,6 0,9 1,2 1,8 2,7 2,1 2,1 2,3 
Nordic 
total 
 
0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,8 1,4 2,2 2,3 1,8 2,1 2,2 
Sweden 
 
0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,5 0,6 1,0 1,5 1,5 1,2 1,1 1,1 
Finland 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,8 0,9 0,8 0,9 1,2 
Source: Nordic Statistics 
 
The gross migration rates reveal that the inflows have been smallest to 
Finland and Sweden and highest to Iceland and Norway. Denmark is in 
the middle, close to the Nordic average. 
Population and foreign born population in the Nordic countries 
In 2012 there were roughly 25.7 million residents in the Nordic countries, 
with Sweden the largest (9.5 million), Iceland the smallest (320,000), and 
Norway, Finland and Denmark in the middle (4.9 to 5.5 million). 
The foreign born population in the Nordic countries counted in total 
2.8 million in 2012 equalling 11% of total population. 1.4% or 350,000 
of the population was foreign born from one of the ten new EU countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. This was more than double the figure in 
2004. Of the Nordic countries Iceland (3.9%) and Norway (1.9%) has the 
highest share of settled population from CEE countries and Denmark 
(1.1) and Finland (0.7) the lowest. 
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Figure 1.3 Stock of foreign born by region of origin, Proportion of total popu-
lation 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nordic Statistics. 
 
In 2012 the foreign born population in Sweden counted for 15% of the 
population, whereas immigrants in Finland only counted for 4.9% of the 
total population. Denmark, Norway and Iceland are placed closer to the 
Nordic average with foreign born population counting for 9.5, 11.6 and 
10.8%, respectively. While Finland and Iceland only recently have be-
come immigrant destinations, labour migration to Sweden started in the 
1940s and to Denmark and Norway in the late 1960s. Labour migration 
to these three countries continued until the early or mid-1970s, followed 
by family and refugee migration in the late 20th and early 21st century. 
Since many from CEE countries are posted workers or temporary work-
ers on short term contracts they are not in the population registers. 
Some countries have information in registers on temporary or short-
term immigrants through register based employment statistics.  
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Figure 1.4 Employed EU8+2 in Norway, 2000–2010, registered settled migrants 
and registered non-settled workers on temporary stay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blue: Employed EU 10 (settled). Red: Employed EU 10 (non-settled) 
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB). 
 
Figure 1.5 Employed EU8+2 in Sweden, 2000–2010, registered settled migrants 
and registered non-settled workers on temporary stay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blue: Employed EU 10 (settled). Red: Employed EU 10 (non-settled) 
Source: Statistics Sweden (SCB). 
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Figure 1.6. Employed EU8+2 in Denmark, 2000–2010, registered settled mi-
grants and registered non-settled workers on temporary stay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blue: Employed EU 10 (settled). Red: Employed EU 10 (non-settled) 
Source: Statistics Denmark. 
Where do they come from? 
All Nordic countries have experienced a significant increase in the mi-
gration from the ten New EU-members in Central and Eastern Europe, 
with Norway as the numerically top receiving country. Figure 1.7 shows 
that Poland, by far, outnumber the other CEE countries as top sending 
country. From 2004 until 2011, more than 167,000 Poles entered the 
Nordic countries, with 2007 and 2008 being the top years with 33,000 
respectively 34,000 Poles migrating to the Nordic countries. 
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Figure 1.7 Immigration from EU8+2 to the Nordic countries in total, by citizen-
ship and year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nordic Statistics. 
 
Lithuania is the largest of the three Baltic States, but with a population of 
3.2 million it is a relatively small country even in a Nordic context. Since 
2004 more than 47,000 Lithuanians have migrated to Nordic countries 
and numbers have been growing every year. In 2011, more than 11,000 
Lithuanians migrated to a Nordic country. After Poland and Lithuania, 
Estonia, Romania and Latvia followed as top sending countries. Although 
the number of migrants from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slo-
vakia, and Slovenia has increased since 2004, flows from these countries 
are small compared to the other (figure 1.7). 
If we compare the flows between different sending and receiving 
countries, we find (table 1.2) differences between the Nordic countries. 
Migration to Finland differs significantly from the other countries. In the 
period from 2004 until 2011, there were more than 24,000 Estonians 
migrating to Finland. Three out of four Estonians who migrated to a 
Nordic country went to Finland in the period 2004–2011. Finland and 
Estonia are neighbouring countries and the two majority languages are 
closely related.  
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Table 1.2 Rank of EU8+2 sending countries, by receiving Nordic country, 2004–2011 
Receiving country   Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Top sending country 1 Poland Estonia Poland Poland Poland 
2 Lithuania Poland Lithuania Lithuania Romania 
 3 Romania Hungary Latvia Latvia Lithuania 
Source: Nordic Statistics. 
 
For the other Nordic countries, except Finland, Poland is the largest 
sending country. In Sweden, immigration from Romania is ranked sec-
ond after Poland, while Lithuania is the second largest sending country 
to Denmark, Iceland and Norway. 
Before the EU enlargement women dominated the flows from CEE 
countries. Between 2004–2007 men’s share of the inflow to the Nordic 
increased and by 2007 two out of three who migrated to a Nordic coun-
try were males. After 2008 the composition of the inflow changed and 
became less male dominated. There are probably several explanations 
for this development. One plausible explanation is that demand for la-
bour in male dominated industries like construction and manufacturing 
fell during the financial crisis. Another explanation is that some of the 
men who moved to work in one of the Nordic country in the early stage 
after 2004 decided to stay more permanent in the receiving country and 
brought their wives and children. The Polonia studies from Copenhagen, 
Reykjavik and Oslo support this explanation, showing that many Poles 
after some time brought their family. 
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Figure 1.8 Male share of gross inflow from EU8+2 to the Nordic countries 
2000–2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nordic Statistics. 
 
The gender balance in gross inflow differs somewhat between the Nor-
dic countries. Gender ratio in migration in Iceland was 60% women 
against 40% men until 2003 when it started to shift. Migration to Iceland 
has been male dominated the last decade, and peaked in 2005–2006 
when 80% were males. In post expansion period it has gained a almost 
equal balance with women exceeding slightly around 52% and men 
48%. The gender composition of the inflow to Finland has been close to 
50–50 over the last decade; while Norway has experienced a huge shift 
from female to male dominated migration flows after 2004. 
Changing age structure 
In 2011 approximately 350,000 people born in one of the CEE countries 
lived in the Nordic region. Not all of them were labour migrants, some 
were children and elderly. How many of the migrants from these coun-
tries were in the working age population (15–64 years), and how have 
the immigrant population changed since 2004? Many had also arrived 
earlier as refugees from Estonia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.  
Comparing the age structure in 2004 against 2011, figure 1.9 shows 
that the growth has been strongest in the age cohorts 20–44. In the 
working age population (15–64 years) the number of CEE migrants 
more than doubled from 114,000 in 2004 to 279,000 in 2011. 
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Figure 1.9 Age structure of CEE migrants in the Nordic countries in 2004 and 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nordic Statistics. 
 
To analyse the development in different Nordic countries we have also 
made the age structure comparison in each country (see appendices 1–5). 
The analyses reveal huge differences and changes in age and gender struc-
ture in the stock of CCE immigrants between different Nordic countries. 
In Norway the working age population from CEE countries was six 
times bigger in 2011 than in 2004. In Denmark and Iceland it was almost 
three times bigger, and in Finland it more than doubled. In Sweden the 
change was less dramatic. The growth of the working age population 
from CEE countries was 55% in the period 2004 until 2011. Many had 
already before 2004 immigrated to Sweden from these countries, many 
of them being refugees from Estonia, Hungary and Poland in the post-
war periode. 
1.3 Driving forces of labour migration to the Nordic 
countries? 
Based on statistics from Nordic Statistics, we concluded in the previous 
section that migration in total numbers has been highest from Poland to 
Norway and Denmark, while it has been lower to Sweden in spite of 
Sweden not imposing any transitional rules for new member states in 
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2004 and 2007. Judging from the inflow of labour migrations from EU10 
measured as a percent of the total population, Iceland was the largest 
receiving country where the inflow was as high as 2.2% of the popula-
tion in 2007. Since Sweden, Norway and Denmark are the three Nordic 
countries receiving the largest proportion (in real numbers) of migrants 
from Central and Eastern Europe, the following comparison will focus on 
these countries. 
Statistical analysis of the determinants of migration between east and 
west in Europe have found that the opening up of labour markets in 2004 
and 2007 not surprisingly had a significant effect on migration flows. So 
do employment rates and wage levels – higher unemployment in the des-
tination country decreases migration while higher unemployment in the 
country of origin increases migration, and higher wage differentials posi-
tively affect migration. Finally geographical distance and social networks 
affects migration – the larger the geographical distance between the coun-
tries the smaller the migration flows will be, and the larger the stock of 
immigrants already living in the destination country the larger the migra-
tion flows will be (see Pytlikova 2012 and Bratsberg et al. 2012). 
Differences in employment and wages between sending and receiv-
ing countries have by economists been assumed to be the main factor 
behind explaining migration flow of labour migrants. Previous studies of 
labour migration flows have found that the labour market situation in 
the destination country is more important than the situation on the la-
bour market in the home country (Wadensjö 1976; Lundborg 1991). 
Another finding is that the unemployment and the number of vacancies 
are more important than differences in the wage level (Nyberg 1980). 
Using data at the individual level, Røed (1996) finds that those with low 
education primarily move to get employment while highly educated 
workers move abroad to get a higher wage. According to these hypothe-
ses, lower employment, higher unemployment and a lower wage level 
contribute to explain the large outflows of workers from Central and 
Eastern European countries after 2004 when it became possible to move 
abroad due to the EU-membership. The indicators on wages and unem-
ployment in table 1.3, show that migration flows have been in accord-
ance with what one might expect: Norway, with the highest wages and 
lowest unemployment, have been top receiver, while far fewer have 
found their way to Sweden, having significantly lower wage levels and 
higher unemployment. 
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Table 1.3 GDP per Capita, hourly gross wage, and unemployment in the EU and EEA countries 2007 
 
GDP per capita PPS Hourly gross wage Unemployment rate 
 
Euro In % of EU 15 Euro In % of EU 15 
Denmark 31.4 114 24.23 166 3.7 
Finland 29.6 107 15.46 106 6.9 
Sweden 31.3 113 17.68 121 6.1 
Norway 45.7 166 26.14 179 2.6 
Iceland 32.0 116 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
EU 10 13.2 48 3.03 21 8.9 
Poland 12.9 47 3.34 23 13.8 
Estonia 16.7 61 3.51 24 4.9 
Latvia 13.9 50 2.92 20 5.9 
Lithuania 14.3 52 2.95 20 4.3 
Czech R. 18.7 68 3.71 25 5.3 
Hungary 14.8 54 4.16 29 7.2 
Slovak 16.4 59 3.42 24 11.3 
Slovenia 22.0 80 8.31 57 4.7 
Bulgaria 9.3 34 1.11 8 6.9 
Romania 9.6 35 1.76 12 n.a. 
 
EU-15 27.6 100 14.56 100 7 
EU-27 24.6 89 12.12 83 7.1 
Source: OECD. 
 
In the beginning of the period, unemployment was substantially higher in 
Central and Eastern Europe than in the Nordic countries. However, the level 
of unemployment decreased significantly, foremost in Poland; from 20% in 
2002 to 9.6% in 2007. As we previously saw, there has also been a large 
increase in migration from Lithuania after 2008 which partly could be ex-
plained by the deep recession of the Lithuanian economy. In 2008 unem-
ployment was still relatively low, around 5.8%, and one reason for this is 
that there has been a large out-migration of workers from the country 
(www.swedenabroad.com).7 By 2010, unemployment had increased to 
17.8%. While the downturn in the economy might explain the general trend 
of increased outmigration it does not explain why the individual Nordic 
countries received such different numbers of Lithuanian migrants. 
Unemployment rates were relatively low in the Baltic region during 
the period 2006–2008 but increased in 2009 as a result of the global 
economic crisis. The decrease in unemployment in both Poland and the 
Baltic countries up to 2008 can partly be explained by the large outflow 
of workers. See Figure 1.10 for description of unemployment rate levels 
in Poland and the Baltic countries. 
────────────────────────── 
7 www.swedenabroad.com, 27.1.2012. 
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Figure 1.10 Unemployment (percent) in Poland and the Baltic states, 2002–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Figure 1.11 shows unemployment in the Nordic countries. Up to 2008, 
unemployment was lowest in Iceland, Norway and Denmark while it was 
higher in Sweden and Finland. In 2008, unemployment levels rose 
sharply in Denmark and Iceland but were only mildly affected in Nor-
way. At a country level, there appears to be a strong positive correlation 
between the level of unemployment and the inflow of migrant workers: 
countries with lower unemployment have received more migrants from 
Central and Eastern European countries. We also see a correlation over 
time: in years when unemployment is higher, the inflow of migrant 
workers decreases. 
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Figure 1.11 Unemployment in the Nordic countries, 2002–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Another way of describing and comparing the national labour markets is 
to look at annual net earnings. Figure 1.12 displays annual net earnings 
for a single parent household without children working 100% of the 
average working time in the Nordic countries as well as in Poland. Po-
land is presented together with the Nordic countries since it is the larg-
est sending country. Since many labour migrants travel alone the first 
time and at least have the intention of working full-time, this is the in-
come that labour migrants are likely to have as a reference when com-
paring the income levels between countries (even though most migrants 
must expect somewhat lower earnings than the average). Among the 
EU10 countries, annual net earnings are highest in Slovenia followed by 
the Czech Republic and Estonia. Lowest are wages in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Lithuania (Eurostat, 2012). 
Looking at earnings, we see that earnings have increased at a fairly con-
stant rate in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, but that Norwegian 
earnings have been higher than in the other countries. Even after the crisis 
in 2008, wages are basically unaffected although earnings in both Norway 
and Sweden decreased slightly. In general, adjustments on the labour mar-
ket to demand side changes are made through employment rather than 
wages. In Iceland the pattern looks a bit different since the earnings level 
decreased dramatically after 2008. The financial crisis seems to have affect-
ed both employment and earnings. Not surprisingly, we see that the earn-
ings level in Poland is much below that of all Nordic countries. 
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The observed differences in unemployment and earnings between 
the Nordic countries and the sending countries, as well as between the 
Nordic countries, can be seen as indications of that better employment 
opportunity and higher incomes explain part of the migration flows. The 
fact that Norway stands out as the country with the labour market yield-
ing the highest expected employment rates as well as expected wages 
could be part of the explanation for why Norway has been receiving 
more labour migrants than the other Nordic countries. 
Figure 1.12 Annual net earnings (Euros), single parent without children, 100% 
of average worker, 2002–2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Although basic economic indicators, such as wages and unemployment, 
seem to be able to account for much of the variation in migration flows to 
different Nordic countries, other factors may be taken into account when 
trying to understand the causes and process of migration. One such factor 
is the existence of social networks between the sending and host country. 
If many countrymen already are present in a country and have positive 
experiences, they might recommend it to family and friends at home, as 
well as provide them with economic and social support. According to the 
Polonia survey that was conducted in Norway among Polish immigrants 
living in the Oslo area in 2009, only 25% of male immigrants stated that 
the main reason for coming to Norway was that friend or family already 
was in Norway. Among women 65% stated this as the main reason mak-
ing it the most common answer among women (Friberg and Eldring, 
2011). This is not surprising since labour migration from Poland since 
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2004 has been dominated by men and if they decide to settle in the coun-
try of destination it is not uncommon that their families reunite with 
them. However, even among the men, more than 80% reported that they 
knew someone staying in Norway before arriving themselves. So even if 
economic motives were primary for the decision to migrate, knowing 
someone at the destination may have reduced the risk and cost of doing 
so. In statistical analysis, social networks as an explanation for migration 
flows is usually measured by estimating the effect of the stock of migrants 
from a particular country already settled in the country of destination on 
the size of the migration flows from this country. Pytlikova (2012) does 
exactly this and finds that the larger the stock in the previous year, the 
larger is the inflow of new migrants. This result has also been found in 
other studies (e.g. Bauer et al. 2005, Pedersen et al. 2008b, Bratsberg et al. 
2012). However, migrant networks primarily work to reinforce and per-
petuate migration flows once thay have started; they are not a root cause 
in themselves. Otherwise we would expect to see more migrants going to 
Sweden, which had a larger population of immigrants from the new EU 
member states before 2004. 
Institutional regulations may also shape migration flows, but the dif-
ferent application of transitional restrictions on migration in the period 
after 2004 does not appear to have affected migration flows in any deci-
cive way. For example, Sweden did not impose any transitional rules for 
accession countries, while Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway im-
plemented transitional restrictions in 2004. In Norway, workers from 
EU 8 were obliged to have contracts for full time work at Norwegian 
wage level in order to obtain a work permit. There were also some re-
strictions on access to welfare benefits. These restrictions were phased 
out in 2009. For workers from Bulgaria and Romania, who joined EU in 
2007, transitional restrictions were repealed in May 2012. Iceland had 
restrictions for EU 8 citizens until May 2006 and later for Bulgaria and 
Romania until January 2012. In Denmark, similar restrictions were in-
troduced, but were relaxed from 2006, easing the access for Danish em-
ployers with collective agreements to hire EU-10 migrants administered 
trough prior approval of relevant employers. In May 2009 Denmark 
renounced its transitional legislation, opening up the Danish labour 
market for EU10 citizens. However, having experienced that the unre-
stricted EU-transnational service provision and posting of workers were 
to a larger extent challenging than individual migrants, in 2008 a regis-
tration scheme was put in place to monitor and to serve as a control 
measure towards the foreign companies. Like Iceland, Norway and 
Denmark, Finland also imposed transitional rules for the new member 
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states in 2004, but these were based on quotas and labour market test-
ing rather than minimum standards of working conditions, but these 
rules were revoked in 2006. If only considering differences in migration 
policies and differences in how the countries choose to implement the 
idea of free movement of labour, we would expect that Sweden should 
have received a larger proportion of EU10 migrants than what they ac-
tually did. But as we have seen, more migrants have chosen to move to 
Denmark or Norway instead, suggesting that the prospects on the host 
countries labour markets are more important than the formal rules that 
apply to migration. 
1.4 References 
Bauer, Thomas, Gil Epstein and Ira Gang. 2005. “Enclaves, Language, and the Loca-
tion Choice of Migrants.” Journal of Population Economics 18(4): 649–662. 
Bengtsson, Erik (2010), “Fackliga strategier gentemot arbetskraftsinvandring från 
EU-länder”, rapport LO-Göteborg, http://www.lo-goteborg.se/utredaren.html, 
7.2.2012 Dagens Arbete, “Övergångsregler klen hjälp”, 11.3.2005. 
Bratsberg, B, J.E. Dølvik og O. Raaum (2012). “Economic shocks, the Legal Environ-
ment and Work-related Migration. Paper presented at Inside-Move”, NORFACE, 
CReAM: VI Workshop on Migration and Labor Economics (IAE-CSIC),Barcelona, 
18–19 October 2012.  
Doyle, Nicola, Gerard Hughes and Eskil Wadensjö (2006), “Freedom of Movement for 
Workers from Central and Eastern Europe: Experiences in Ireland and Sweden”, 
SIEPS Report 2006:5. 
Eurostat, 2012, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
labour_market/earnings/database 28.5.2012. 
Friberg, Jon Horgen and Line Eldring (2011), “Polonia i Oslo 2010: Mobilitet, arbeid 
og levekår blant polakker i hovedstaden”, FAFO-rapport 2011:27. 
Friberg, Jon Horgen, Kristian Rose Tronstad and Jon Erik Dølvik (2011), “Central and 
Eastern European Labour Migration to Norway: Trends, conditions and challeng-
es”, paper presented at the conference “Growing Free Labour Mobility Areas and 
Trends in International Migration”, November 2011. 
Longhi, Simonetta, Peter Nijkamp and Jacques Poot (2005), “A Meta-Analytic As-
sessment of the Effect of Immigration on Wages”, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 
19(3), pp 451–477. 
Longhi, Simonetta, Peter Nijkamp and Jacques Poot (2008), “Meta-Analysis of Empir-
ical Evidence on the Labour Market Impacts of Immigration”, IZA DP 3418. 
Okkerse, Liesbet (2008), “How to measure labour market effects of immigration: a 
review”, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol 22(1), pp 1–30. 
LO-tidningen, “Svältande lettiska arbetare stämmer svensk arbetsgivare”, 
30.12.2011. 
Lundborg, Per (1991), “Determinants of Migration in the Nordic Labor Market”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 93, pp. 363–376. 
42 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
Nyberg, Peter (1980), Emigration, ekonomisk tillväxt och stabilitet: en teoretisk 
undersökning kring emigrationens orsaker och effekter på medellång sikt, dok-
torsavhandling, Åbo Akademi, Helsingfors: Finlands bank. 
Pedersen, Peder J., Marianne Røed, and Eskil Wadensjö (2008a), The Common Nor-
dic Labor Market at 50, TemaNord 2008:506, Copenhagen. 
Pedersen, Peder J., Mariola Pytlikova and Nina Smith. (2008b). “Selection and Net-
work Effects – Migration Flows into OECD Countries, 1990–2000.” European Eco-
nomic Review 52(7): 1160–1186. 
Pytlikova, Mariola (2012), “The Effect of EU-enlargements and labour market open-
ings on migration”, paper presented at the workshop “Moving for work – tempo-
rary and permanent labour migration”, Oslo 23–24 April 2012. 
Røed, Marianne (1996), “Educational background and migratory behaviour in the 
Scandinavian labour market”, in Peder J Pedersen (ed), “Scandinavians without 
Borders – Skill Migration and the European Integration Process”, in Eskil Wadensjö 
(ed.), The Nordic Labour Markets in the 1990’s, Part 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Sweden abroad, www.swedenabroad.com, 27.1.2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II:  
Labour market regulation,  
migrant workers and varieties  
of “social dumping” in Oslo, 
Copenhagen and Reykjavik 
Jon Horgen Friberg, Jens Arnholtz, Line Eldring, Nana Wesley Hansen  
and Frida Thorarins  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Introduction 
The Nordic countries have in the years since the eastward enlargements 
of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 attracted considerable num-
bers of labour migrants from new EU member states, and particularly 
from Poland. The recent inflow of migrant workers to the Nordic coun-
tries has raised a number of questions and challenges regarding work 
and welfare in those sectors to which the labour migrants have been 
recruited. The term social dumping has featured high on the political 
agendas in all the Nordic countries in the years since 2004, usually re-
ferring to low wage competition, exploitative working conditions and 
the fear that migration and labour recruitment from low wage countries 
would undermine national systems of collective bargaining and labour 
market regulation. Although concerns over wage levels and working 
conditions apply to all new migrant workers, migration in the form of 
service mobility and posting of workers has been perceived to be a par-
ticularly difficult area for the enforcement of national labour standards. 
All of the Nordic countries – although to varying degree – have experi-
enced these challenges, but the institutional responses to them have 
diverged. For example, Norwegian efforts by government and social 
partners to combat social dumping have entailed a significant shift to-
wards stricter legal regulation and enforcement of wages and labour 
standards through industry-wise legal extension of collective agree-
ments and regulations on so-called chain liability. The Danish responses, 
on the other hand, have to a greater extent followed established historic 
traditions of collective bargaining between social partners. In Iceland, 
the impact of the financial crisis overshadowed emerging discussions 
about social dumping among migrants, as the economic downturn was 
met by devaluation of the Icelandic Krona and austerity measures affect-
ing the living conditions of all Icelanders. 
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2.1 Social dumping – what is it and why is it 
considered to be a problem? 
The mechanisms of “social dumping” are well known: Employers looking to 
reduce their costs may opt for strategies based on recruiting foreign work-
ers and offering them wages and working conditions that undercut estab-
lished standards (McGovern, 2007, Lillie, 2010, Woolfson et al., 2010). La-
bour migrants from countries where wages, welfare and living conditions 
are substantially lower might be willing – or have little other alternative 
than – to accept wages and working conditions substantially below host 
country standards, simply because their alternative options are worse than 
for native workers. With large differences in wages and working standards 
– like those found between the Nordic countries and the new member 
states – labour migrants may even be quite satisfied with sub-standard 
conditions in the host country – at least for a while – because recent mi-
grants tend to compare their situation to others back home rather than to 
their colleagues who are native to the host country. This is often referred to 
as the “dual frame of reference” (Waldinger & Lichter 2003). 
Among policy makers and trade unionists in particular – but also 
among some employers and employer associations – there has been a 
wide spread fear that low wage competition and deteriorating labour 
standards as a result of the free movement of workers will undermine 
the regulatory framework upon which essential parts of the Nordic so-
cial model rests. The Nordic social model – usually defined by highly 
regulated labour markets with strong trade unions and employers or-
ganizations, wage formation through centralized or two-tier collective 
bargaining between the social partners, a generous universal welfare 
state and a high level of social equality – is often perceived to be particu-
larly vulnerable to the negative effects of social dumping. In all the Nor-
dic countries there is now a general consensus that the ability of gov-
ernments and social partners to continually uphold labour standards, 
prevent segmentation, precariousness and people falling out of the so-
cial model, have come under pressure from the continued liberalisation 
of the European labour market in general and increasing cross border 
labour mobility from low cost countries in Central and Eastern Europe in 
particular. On closer inspection we find that the debate regarding “social 
dumping” seems to be driven by at least four slightly different concerns.  
First, it is driven by the immediate self-interest on behalf of native 
workers, because wage dumping may weaken their negotiating position 
and drive down the price of labour, thus undermining labour standards 
in the affected labour markets. This is in particular, thought to affect 
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those workers who already are in a weak position on the labour market 
and those who have competing sets of skills as those of migrant workers. 
Second, the debate on “social dumping” is driven by a concern for the 
labour migrants themselves. Very often immigrants and natives do not 
compete for the same jobs. Instead immigrants tend to take those jobs 
that are shunned by natives (Piore 1979, McGovern 2007), and if the 
newcomers are systematically offered what is considered to be exploita-
tive and unacceptable working conditions, unchecked labour migration 
may lead to new forms of inequality between natives and immigrants. In 
societies with high ambitions of social equality – like the Nordic coun-
tries – such class differences along ethnic boundaries are considered 
problematic in and of themselves. Third, although closely related to the 
first two, the debate on “social dumping” is driven by a concern for the 
long term functioning and legitimacy of the labour market institutions 
themselves, in particular their ability to prevent unfair competition, 
exploitation of migrant workers and protect the standards of native 
workers under conditions of free movement. Fourth, the concern over 
“social dumping” is related to a concern over the long term sustainability 
of the Nordic welfare states. This issue goes beyond the concerns of “so-
cial tourism” raised by the EU coordination of social security. Although 
labour migrants initially – and for obvious reasons – display high rates 
of employment and place few burdens on welfare expenditure, there is 
no guarantee that they will do so in the long run. This is a lesson learned 
from former immigrant waves of guest workers to western European 
countries during the 1960s and 1970s (Bratsberg et al. 2010). If unregu-
lated labour migration leads to the establishment of secondary immi-
grant intensive niches of the labour market, where employers offer only 
harsh conditions, low wages and insecure employment, it is not unrea-
sonable to assume that workers confined to these segments may end up 
having relatively short careers (Friberg 2012b). If that is the case, to-
day’s cheap and flexible workers may become tomorrow’s marginalized 
welfare dependents.  
Labour migration and free mobility of workers affect the relationship 
and bargaining power between labour and capital, by increasing – and 
changing – the supply of actual and potential workers in the labour 
force. Thus it is not surprising that political controversy over social 
dumping to some extent follow the traditional axis between left and 
right, and traditional divisions between the interests of trade unions and 
workers on the one hand and businesses and employers on the other. To 
some extent it would be fair to say that political parties on the left and 
the trade union movement have been the ones most concerned about 
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social dumping, while political parties on the right and the interests affil-
iated to business, have tended to emphasize the economic gains from 
increasing flexibility in the labour market, and to be more skeptical to-
wards anti-dumping measures, which are seen as inappropriate intru-
sions on the private corporate governance. But this issue is not always 
as straight forward as this presentation suggests. While most workers 
and trade unions are concerned with increasing competition from work-
ers from poorer countries, others have experienced that the access to a 
cheap, flexible and complementary reserve labour force has in fact 
helped to increase productivity and safeguard jobs – and may thus be 
less inclined to push for anti-dumping measures. And while many em-
ployers regard low wage competition as a welcome way of reducing 
their costs, other employers are squeezed by increasing competition 
from new low-cost transnational service providers, and see the benefit 
in regulations that can “level the playing field”. This has for example 
been the case in the Norwegian construction industry, where the em-
ployer’s organizations allied with the trade unions in support of legal 
extension of minimum wage provisions in collective agreements (El-
dring et al. 2012). Adding to the confusion is the fact that there is no 
general consensus in any of the Nordic countries regarding the defini-
tion of social dumping and where to draw the line between acceptable 
and unacceptable low wages. In other words – discussions about social 
dumping and how it might affect labour markets and societies tend to be 
obscured by political controversy, vested interests and a lack of com-
monly accepted definitions.  
In this report, we do not seek to resolve these issues, but to provide a 
factual basis for further discussions. We accept the premise that low 
wage competition and exploitative working conditions can be problem-
atic, not just for the workers themselves but also for native workers and 
the host society. Our aim is to provide reliable information about the 
actual labour market situation and working conditions of labour mi-
grants, rather than to define what social dumping is or what conse-
quences it might have. However, by describing these conditions and by 
analyzing which factors are particularly associated with low wages and 
precarious working conditions, we aim to provide a better basis for poli-
cy makers and social partners.  
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2.2 Institutional context and wage setting mechanisms 
The incorporation of immigrants into their host societies is shaped by 
the institutional context of reception in host societies (Portes, 1995; 
Anderson 2012). Under conditions of free movement of labour to coun-
tries which have highly institutionalized and regulated labour markets, 
labour market institutions constitute the primary framework and oppor-
tunity structure facing both mobile workers and the employers who 
wish to recruit them.1 While Norway, Denmark and Iceland are marked 
by the characteristics of the so-called Nordic social model – usually de-
fined by a regulated labour market with strong trade unions and em-
ployers’ organizations, wage formation through centralized collective 
bargaining, a generous universal welfare state and high levels of social 
equality (Dølvik, Goul Andersen and Vartiainen, 2011) – there are im-
portant variations between the three. In the following we will explore 
the variation between them with regard to their labour market frame-
work and how it might affect wage levels and working conditions among 
migrant workers.  
Most national European labour markets are heavily regulated 
through legislation, including minimum wages, but this is not the case in 
the Nordic countries. Although many aspects of work are regulated 
through working environment acts, wages are primarily regulated 
through voluntary collective agreements negotiated between trade un-
ions and employer organizations. High union density, extensive worker 
representation and centralized agreements embedded in close interac-
tion between working life policies, the welfare state and macro-
economic policies are central features associated with the Nordic model 
of labour regulation (Dølvik, 2011). While these traits are considered to 
be common Nordic features, there are nonetheless considerable differ-
ences between our three case countries regarding the level of organiza-
tion and collective agreement coverage. Table 2.1 gives an overview of 
the situation in Denmark, Iceland and Norway when it comes to trade 
union density, collective agreement coverage and the use of extension of 
collective agreements.  
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Table 2.1 Trade union density, collective agreement coverage and extension of collective agree-
ments in Denmark, Iceland and Norway (2009) 
 Denmark Iceland Norway 
Trade union density 68% 85% 52% 
Collective agreement coverage 80% 99% 72% 
Legal extension of collective agreements? No Yes, widespread Yes, some 
Sources: Nergaard (2010), Eldring & Alsos (2012). 
 
The Nordic countries have had – and still have – high unionisation rates, 
but these rates vary across the different Nordic countries, and over the 
last 15 years the trade unions have lost some of their strength. Iceland 
stands out even in the Nordic context with a trade union density at 85%, 
and a collective agreements covering close to 100% of all employees. 
Despite some decline, the Danish trade unions also have a very strong 
position; 67% of the workforce is unionized, and 80% covered by collec-
tive agreements. Norway stands apart with a lower union density – but it 
is still high compared to the majority of European countries. However, 
“only” 52% of employees in Norway are members of a trade union and 
“only” 72% enjoy protection of collective agreements. Those industries 
where most new migrants have found employment, do however, display 
much lower rates. 
None of the Nordic countries has a statutory national minimum wage, 
and it is unlikely that any of these countries will introduce such schemes 
in the near future. The Nordic trade union organisations vehemently 
oppose a statutory minimum wage, and the employers have provided 
only occasional support for such solutions. The main argument is that a 
statutory minimum wage represents a strong interference in the free-
dom of the partners to bargain for wage levels and wage growth (Eldring 
and Alsos, 2012). 
Instead, the social partners have the main responsibility for wage 
regulation in all the Nordic countries. In principle, the collective agree-
ments will be binding only for those parties that have signed them (as 
well as non-unionized workers in companies with agreements), but only 
Denmark and Sweden apply this arrangement exclusively. A very dis-
tinct difference between the countries is the use of statutory mecha-
nisms in the regulation of minimum wages. In Iceland the wages and 
labour conditions negotiated between the social partners are automati-
cally applied as a minimum to all employees. In Norway, the existing 
erga omnes mechanism for making collective agreements generally bind-
ing had never been used prior to 2004. However, the inflow of workers 
from the accession countries exposed already existing weaknesses in the 
regulatory system, with large sections of the labour market being left 
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more or less open for low wage competition and “social dumping” (Alsos 
and Eldring, 2008). After some consideration and internal debates The 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) decided to apply for 
extension of the collective agreement in construction, and as of today 
parts of the collective agreements in construction, ship-building, agricul-
ture and cleaning has been made generally applicable nation-wide. 
Denmark (and Sweden) has met similar challenges related to low wage 
competition in the wake of the EU enlargement, and there has been in-
creasing debate about the need for extension mechanisms or statutory 
minimum wages. However, so far the unions still want to rely on main-
taining their traditional autonomous regime.  
Whether legally binding or not, minimum wage requirements in collec-
tive agreements are usually far below the average wage level within the 
industry, but there are considerable differences between the three coun-
tries with regard to such wage flexibility. Iceland, in particular, appears to 
have more wage flexibility within collective agreements, with minimum 
wage provisions for unskilled workers relatively lower compared to aver-
age earnings than in the two other countries. The Icelandic labour market 
is also considered to have more flexible regulations on hiring and firing. 
There is also significant variation both in terms of what kinds of condi-
tions are regulated through statutory measures, and in terms of the capa-
bility of national labour authorities to actually enforce these conditions.  
In sum, despite great similarities, there are considerable variations in 
the scope for low wage competition and flexibilisation within the three 
countries systems of wage regulation, as well as variation in opportuni-
ties to bypass regulations by competing outside of the organized labour 
market. If we presuppose that regulations are followed, we should ex-
pect to find that almost all migrant workers in Iceland are receiving 
wages according to collectively agreed wages, and the same being the-
case for those working in sectors covered by extended agreements in 
Norway. In Denmark, workers employed in companies without collec-
tive agreements should have larger risks of earning sub-standard wages, 
as would be the case in Norway (unless there is a generally binding 
agreement in the sector). However, knowing that the ratio between min-
imum wage levels in the collective agreements and average sector wage 
levels, as well as the general wage levels differ considerably between the 
Nordic countries (Eldring & Alsos 2012), the actual wage outcome for 
the migrant workers may have a different pattern. And of course, regula-
tory standards are not always observed, and there might be significant 
variation in the extent to which the rules are being followed depending 
on the institutional ability to enforce regulations.  
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2.3 What do we know about the wages and working 
conditions of migrant workers in the Nordic 
countries? 
Since 2004, several studies have been carried out in Europe in order to 
measure the effects of labour migration on labour markets and societies in 
the host countries. Most studies relying on aggregate data have found that 
the migratory flows after the enlargements have had little or no negative 
impact on host country labour markets in general (Barrell et al., 2010; EU-
Commission, 2008; Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2009). Nevertheless, stud-
ies, using more qualitative data, have found plenty of reasons to fear such 
developments. They have highlighted the poor conditions offered to the 
new migrants, and have argued that this may challenge labour market 
institutions in host countries (Friberg & Tyldum 2007; Friberg & Eldring 
2011; Alsos & Ødegaard 2008, Andersen and Arnholtz Hansen 2008; 
Dundon et al. 2007; Fitzgerald and Hardy 2010; Lillie and Greer 2007; 
Woolfson and Likic-Brboric 2008). It should be noted that those studies 
which conclude that labour migration have had little or no effect on labour 
markets are marked by certain methodological problems of measurement. 
These problems include poor data quality, high level of aggregation and 
difficulties in taking cyclical effects into account. 
Nevertheless, findings that show little or no impact on general labour 
market outcomes on the one hand, and findings that highlight poor condi-
tions among new migrants on the other, are not necessarily in conflict 
with each other. Drawing on classical segmentation theories of labour 
migration (Piore, 1979) it may be argued that the labour migrants are 
allocated into specific jobs and sectors, with a complementary rather than 
competitive relationship to native workers. According to this theory, they 
can be exposed to relatively poor conditions in these jobs without imme-
diately affecting the overall host country labour market or the condition of 
native workers. In such a scenario, the impact of migration will not occur 
instantaneously and affect labour markets uniformly, but rather unfold as 
a slow, long term and sequential processes of adjustment affecting differ-
ent sub-segments of labour markets and society in highly different ways, 
and therefore quite difficult to measure on an aggregate level. It is there-
fore important to measure and explore the actual working conditions of 
the migrant workers themselves – not just for the sake of the migrant 
workers, but also in order to understand how labour migration over time 
may affect labour market structures in general. 
Despite ample anecdotal evidence and media reports about migrant 
workers receiving exceptionally low wages and experiencing bad work-
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ing conditions, it has traditionally been difficult to obtain reliable infor-
mation about the actual situation in the labour market for the vast ma-
jority of recent labour migrants in the Nordic countries. And there is 
even less knowledge about the ways in which different policies and insti-
tutional frameworks affect their situation. The so-called Polonia surveys 
– first conducted in Oslo in 2006, then in Copenhagen in 2008, and then 
replicated in Oslo and conducted in Reykjavik in 2010 – represents the 
only statistically representative in-depth data on these issues. The Oslo 
studies have been reported in Friberg & Tyldum (2007) and Friberg & 
Eldring (2011), and the Copenhagen study was reported in Hansen & 
Hansen (2009). The Reykjavik study has been reported in Þórarinsdóttir 
and Wojtynska (2011), Wojtynska (2011) and Þórarinsdóttir (2011). 
The aim of the present report is to systematically analyze and compare 
the information obtained in these three cities, and to explore how the 
wages and working conditions of migrant workers are related to institu-
tions and policies in the three countries. 
2.4 Research questions and structure of analysis 
In this report, we provide a systematic in-depth analysis of the labour 
market situation for the Polish migrant population in the metropolitan 
areas of Copenhagen, Oslo and Reykjavik. Polish citizens are the largest 
group of labour migrants coming to the Nordic countries from the new 
member states and all of the three cities have a significant population of 
post-2004 Polish labour migrants. Our primary objective is to compare 
wages and working conditions among Polish labour migrants in the 
three cities, to identify those groups that are most at risk of low wages 
and exploitative conditions, and to relate the labour market situation of 
migrant workers to the general institutional and policy context in each 
country. However, because so little reliable and comparable information 
exists about labour migrants and their conditions of work, this report 
will explore a wide range of questions, including:  
 
 Who are the migrants – in terms of demographic, educational and 
labour market background – and do their characteristics differ 
between the three different cities of destination? To what kinds of jobs 
are Polish migrants in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik recruited? 
What kind of employment contracts do they have? How, and to what 
extent do they acquire language skills in the host countries?  
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 Which wage levels and working hours are generally offered to Polish 
migrants in the different Nordic countries? To what extent do they 
experience exploitative and illegal working conditions? To what 
extent do they have access to and make use of social benefits?  
 How do these factors vary between industries, between legal 
categories of migrants and between migrants in different countries? 
Is their labour market situation significantly different from that of 
native workers or other groups of immigrants?  
 How do different institutional configurations within the Nordic 
labour markets shape the outcomes of migrant workers, and to what 
extent are the different variations of the Nordic labour market regime 
able to protect workers in an open, unequal and mobile European 
labour market? 
 
Instead of looking at how labour migration affects the receiving society – 
for example in terms of general wage levels, labour market structure or 
welfare expenditure – we turn the question around and ask how and to 
what extent the Nordic societies are able to incorporate new migrant 
workers into existing labour market structures and protect them from 
wage dumping and exploitative working conditions. In asking this ques-
tion, however, we need to distinguish between a number of different 
factors that may influence the wages and working conditions that Polish 
migrants receive in their host country. Their individual characteristics 
(gender, age, education, etc.), their mode of recruitment and type of em-
ployment, their integration into the labour market regulation system 
(trade union membership, collective agreement coverage, etc.) and a 
number of other factors.  
This part of the report is divided into eight chapters. Following this 
introduction, chapter two presents the data and methodology that has 
been employed. In chapter three we direct our attention towards the 
migrants and compare their characteristics in terms of demographic and 
educational background, as well as their residency status, their family 
situation and their plans for the future. Chapter four presents the mi-
grants location in the labour market in terms of which sectors they work 
and what types of employment relations they have to their employers 
and clients in the three cities. In chapter five, we compare the language 
skills of migrants, their access to and use of language training in their 
host countries, and the way that language skills and language acquisition 
is related to their placement in the labour market. In chapter six we ex-
plore the general wage levels of Polish migrants in the three cities, in-
cluding their relative position vis-à-vis native workers, and the factors 
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that are associated with receiving low wages. Chapter seven describes 
their more general working conditions, and explores the factors particu-
larly associated with precarious, exploitative and illegal working condi-
tions. In chapter eight we sum up the analysis and provide a more com-
prehensive picture of the situation for Polish migrants in the three cities 
and some of the underlying causes for the differences we find between 
cities and industries. 
2.5 Data and methodology 
The central research question in this part of the report is related to the 
actual labour market conditions of migrant workers and how variations 
in their situation are related to variations in labour market regulations 
among three Nordic countries. The principal data sources are three 
more or less identical surveys conducted in the three capital cities, 
where in total more than 1,500 Polish migrants were interviewed in 
depth about their situation – about 500 in each city.8 Our challenges in 
designing the study in a way that would help us answer these questions 
were located at two distinct levels.  
The first challenge was to establish representative data on the actual 
wages and working conditions among recent labour migrants. Travelling 
and working under conditions of free movement, makes recent labour 
migrants from Poland not an easy population to target in quantitative 
research. Administrative data based on official registers cover only parts 
of the migrant population and provides only limited information about 
their conditions. Survey data can provide much more in-depth 
knowledge, but for a number of reasons, including lack of sampling 
frame, high levels of mobility and unconventional housing, long hours, 
and privacy concerns related to legal status or employment relations, 
ordinary sampling techniques will only produce data with limited validi-
ty. As a response to these challenges a sampling technique called Re-
spondent Driven Sampling (RDS) was employed in order to study Polish 
migrants living in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik. RDS was developed 
and refined by Heckatorn and associates (Heckathorn, 1997; Salganik 
and Heckathorn, 2004; Heckathorn, 2007; Wejnert and Heckathorn, 
────────────────────────── 
8 This means that unless otherwise stated, the total number of cases in the following tables and figures is 
1 500, or 500 in each city. 
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2008; Volz and Heckathorn, 2008; Wejnert, 2009) as a method to pro-
duce statistically unbiased estimates from samples of hidden and hard to 
reach populations where no sampling frame exists. The RDS method 
consists basically of two elements: 1) a structured way of collecting a 
broad sample covering the entire variation within the target population 
using a type of chain referral sampling based on specific procedures; and 
2) mathematical estimators which take account of the bias which occurs 
as a result of the network-based sampling procedure. By applying RDS we 
were able to give a representative and comprehensive picture of the 
migrant population at a given point in time in each city, irrespective of 
the migrants’ legal status or registration. The first such survey was con-
ducted as a pilot study in Oslo in 2006, but these data are not included in 
this report (see Friberg 2010, Friberg & Tyldum 2007). In 2008, a simi-
lar study was conducted in Copenhagen. In 2010, the study was replicat-
ed in Oslo and a survey was conducted in Reykjavik. In each survey, 
about 500 Polish migrants were interviewed face to face by a team of 
Polish-speaking interviewers. These three surveys from Oslo, Copenha-
gen and Reykjavik form the basis of our analyses.  
It has been common in RDS studies to take into account a design ef-
fect of 2, meaning that an RDS sample would have to be twice as large as 
an ordinary random sample in order to produce estimates of equal accu-
racy (Salganik 2006). However, recent developments in RDS computa-
tion have enabled more accurate calculation of design effects based on 
the degree of homophily (tendency for in-group recruitment) within the 
RDS sample (Wejnert et al. 2012). These calculations have shown that in 
some cases RDS samples may have substantially larger design effects. 
However, we applied the same technique to the Oslo survey, and found 
design effects on key variables to vary be between 1.28 and 2.35. This 
leaves us with 95-percent confidence intervals of 3–5 percentage point 
on each side of our estimated values. In addition, we have compared our 
data to available registry data on key indicators, and found that the sur-
veys provide quite accurate estimates on key variables. The statistical 
uncertainty of our estimates is thus somewhat larger than in ordinary 
random samples, but not very much larger. For an in-depth discussion of 
data validity in the RDS samples, see Friberg (2013: 57–64). 
The second challenge was to causally relate this information about 
wages and working conditions among Polish migrant workers in three 
capital cities, to the institutional frameworks of labour market regula-
tion in each country. At this level the study was designed as a compara-
tive case study using each city as a case. There are two obvious problems 
related to such a design. The first has to do with the fact that our data on 
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institutional configuration, average wages and policy responses are lo-
cated at the national level. Our data on working conditions among Polish 
migrant workers on the other hand only covers the capital city in each 
country. Capital cities tend to have quite distinct labour market struc-
tures, and there are many sectors that employ migrant workers in the 
Nordic countries, such as agriculture, ship-yards, oil refineries, hydro-
electric power plants and some types of industrial manufacturing, that 
are not present in these cities. The specific situation in the capital city 
therefore cannot easily be generalized to the entire country. We never-
theless maintain that the situation for migrant workers in the capital city 
can in some ways reflect institutional features at the national level, and 
that comparing each capital city can provide some indication on how 
national systems function. The second problem has to do with the ratio 
of variables to cases, and the influence of external factors. The issues we 
want to explain – labour market outcomes for Polish migrants – is meas-
ured through several different indicators along different dimensions, 
including absolute and relative wages, type of employment and risk of 
experiencing different forms of precarious, exploitative and/or illegal 
treatment at work. The independent variables thought to affect these 
outcomes include overall wage differentials to Poland, collective agree-
ment coverage and unionization rates, the extent and use of statutory 
regulation and enforcement of wages and labour standards, and the in-
stitutional flexibility in terms of how minimum wage rates compare to 
average rates and the ease with which employers can hire and fire 
workers, and the extent to which employers are able to bypass regula-
tions through practices such as subcontracting and labour hire. In addi-
tion, there are several exogenous factors not related to any particular 
institutional feature that nevertheless may affect these outcomes. Differ-
ences in labour market outcomes might for example be related to the 
selection of migrants going to the three countries. However, the survey 
showed that in terms of gender, age and education level – these differ-
ences were negligible. A more serious problem is raised by the fact that 
the three countries were in a somewhat different economic and cyclical 
context at the time of the surveys. The Norwegian economy was in 2010 
almost fully recovered from a mild uncertainty which followed the in-
ternational financial crisis one and a half year earlier, while Iceland was 
in the midst of a full blown crisis. The Danish survey was conducted in 
2008, just as the economic shock was starting to affect the Danish econ-
omy. In a three way case study, there is no way of controlling for the 
effects of such external factors. Therefore, the regression analysis has 
been performed on a city-by-city basis and the comparison between 
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these models cannot determine the exact causal relationship between 
any specific set of institutional variable and actual outcomes. However, it 
helps us construct a descriptive typology of how particular institutional 
features are combined with particular outcomes in each city, which re-
veals important similarities and differences. 
 
3. Polish migrants in the three 
cities – who are they? 
Before embarking upon the analysis of the employment and working 
conditions, this section offers a brief presentation of the Polish migrants 
in the three cities. The section describes central individual characteris-
tics of the Poles concerning gender, age, family arrangements, educa-
tional level and their length of stay in the Scandinavian cities.9 It is im-
portant to emphasize that the aim of this section is not to give a full ac-
count of the characteristics of the Poles who travel to the Scandinavian 
cities, but only to give information on a few of the main background var-
iables that characterises the groups residing in the three cities.  
3.1 Age and gender 
Although more Polish men than women have entered the Nordic labour 
markets, the tendency for a masculinization of the migration cannot be 
unilaterally confirmed (Fihel and Okolski 2009). Indeed the Polish popu-
lation in Oslo is dominated by 64% male workers as opposed to 36% 
female workers, but the gender distribution is less male dominated in 
Copenhagen – with 60% male workers and 40% female workers – and 
close to a gender equal distribution in Reykjavik with 55% male and 
45% female workers.  
 
────────────────────────── 
9 In previously published data on the Poles living and working in Copenhagen, data was weighted differently 
depending on whether the individual Pole was part of the labour force or not, whereas in this reporting all 
data is weighted similarly without such discrimination. Thereby parts of the populations who have never had 
any employment are weighted down to zero producing better precision in the analysis of the working and 
employment conditions, but less precision in the data on the general individual characteristics. As a result, 
the figures presented in this chapter on the individual characteristics which are independent from the 
employment status differ up to 5 percentage points from previously published data on the Polish population 
in Copenhagen (Arnholz Hansen and Wesley Hansen 2009).   
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Figure 2.1 The age distribution of the Polish migrants in Copenhagen, Oslo and 
Reykjavik. N=1,500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the strong tendency found in other major migration desti-
nations of increasing youth migration (Fihel and Okolski 2009) cannot 
be found to the same degree in the three Nordic cities. Compared to the 
national populations, the Polish population in all three cities can be 
characterised as being rather young, with a large group being below 30 
years of age, but compared to other major Polish migrant destinations, 
such as the UK and Ireland as well as pre-enlargement migration groups, 
a mean age of 36 years in Oslo and Reykjavik is rather high. However, 
the Poles in Copenhagen are significantly younger than the Poles living 
in both Oslo and Reykjavik. It is difficult to point to exactly which selec-
tion mechanism might account for this. As will be demonstrated in later 
chapters, the Poles are recruited into certain kind of jobs and obtain 
certain kind of employment situations in the three cities, and this might 
to some extent account for why more young migrants have been attract-
ed to Copenhagen than to Oslo and Reykjavik but other factors might 
equally be important. 
The female part of the populations in all three cities is younger than 
the male, yet the age does not seem to produce differences in family 
circumstances to the same extent as the skewed gender distribution 
when comparing the three cities.  
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3.2 Transnational family arrangements 
Among the predominantly male population in Oslo it is quite common 
to have a spouse in Poland whereas this is less so in Copenhagen and 
Reykjavik. 
Figure 2.2 Family situation of the Polish migrants in Copenhagen, Oslo and Rey-
kjavik. N=1,443 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, in Reykjavik very few Poles engage in this type of transnational 
family arrangements though almost 60% of the Poles have a partner 
(Polish or otherwise) living in the host country. The same goes for as 
many as 42% of the Poles in Oslo and 45% in Copenhagen. This means 
that the majority in all cities have their spouses with them in the host 
country. The kind of transnational commuting between work in the Nor-
dic countries and family life in Poland that has often been associated 
with Polish migrants is not (any longer) the norm. About a third of the 
Poles in all three cities were single at the time of the interviews.  
3.3 Education 
Disregarding the fact that the groups going to the three Scandinavian 
cities is mainly labour related, and less related to for instance studying, 
they must in general be termed a rather well educated or at least skilled 
group. A minority of about 20% or slightly more report to have only 
general secondary education or no education at all, while another 20% 
or slightly less report to have completed higher education. The majority 
in all three cities report to have some kind of vocational or technical 
college training and thus fall in the middle group. 
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Figure 2.3 Educational levels among Polish migrants in Copenhagen, Oslo and 
Reykjavik. N=1,443 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the above description of the Poles main characteristics a pat-
tern seems to be identifiable across the three different cities. The Polish 
populations are quite similar in terms of educational levels, being rather 
young and the fact that a majority have partners. The population in Oslo 
is characterised by having a large group of male workers who often have 
partners back home, while the population in Reykjavik is more evenly 
gender distributed and tend to have their partner residing with them in 
Iceland. The Polish population in Copenhagen is somewhat younger than 
the populations in Oslo and Reykjavik, but this does not seem to effect 
the family situation which is quite similar to that found in Oslo though 
fewer have partners residing in Poland.  
3.4 Length of stay 
However, this pattern should not be regarded as a static phenomenon. 
Rather, migration is essentially to be understood as a process involving 
not only various selection mechanisms but also a number of individual 
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decisions made by the migrants themselves. Although migrants might 
tend to be “selected” initially, research has demonstrated that they be-
come less or differently “selected” over time during successive waves of 
migrants (Massey 1987). It is therefore of equal importance to consider 
the length of stay of the various populations as this might account for 
some of the differences in the characteristics among the groups and 
quite possibly be of importance for later analysis of their working and 
employment conditions.  
Figure 2.4 Length of stay among Polish migrants in Copenhagen, Oslo and Rey-
kjavik. N=1,443 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the length of stay may also be an indicator of general dif-
ferences in migration patterns found across the cities. In Oslo we found a 
large group mainly of men with spouses back home in Poland which 
might indicate the tendency for some groups to practice short term or 
circular migration. Some of these could be found among the 30% who 
have only stayed in Oslo for less than two years. In Reykjavik this ten-
dency is somewhat different with more Poles having stayed longer and 
more having partners living in the host country. Circular migration 
might still be a possibility, but it is also possible that this is an indication 
of a movement towards more permanent residency. 
The data on the Poles in Copenhagen was collected in 2008 whereas 
the data on the Polish populations in Oslo and Reykjavik are both col-
lected in 2010. Accordingly, it is no great surprise that the population 
with the largest group of Poles staying less than two years is found in 
Copenhagen. Had the data been collected later this might very well have 
looked very different, i.e. more in line with the other two cities. Howev-
er, this fact does not alter any successive analysis of the effect of the 
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length of stay on working conditions and language. In fact, by introduc-
ing this as part of the reason why differences in working conditions are 
found we include this very dynamic perspective of migration into the 
analysis in the later chapters.  
4. Where do they work? Polish 
migrants’ placement in the 
labour market 
In this chapter we will take a brief look at where the Polish labour mi-
grants tend to be placed within the labour markets of each city. In what 
kind of occupations and sectors are they employed? What kinds of em-
ployment relations and contracts do they have with their employers and 
clients? Is there a market for undeclared work? Do they perform work 
for private households as well as for regular firms? These are some of 
the questions that will be addressed in this chapter. 
4.1 Industries and sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labour shortages in modern industrial societies typically arise in the top 
end labour market for highly educated specialists, and in the bottom end 
labour market for low skilled work which native workers tend to avoid 
because of low status and unpleasant working conditions (Baghanta et 
al. 2006). Polish labour migrants to the Nordic countries are usually 
recruited to perform the latter, and they are typically found in a relative-
ly narrow set of industries and occupations. Nevertheless, when compar-
ing the sector-wise and occupational distribution of employment among 
Polish migrants in the three cities, we find significant variation. Oslo, 
Sectors and occupation are divided into: 
 Construction: Building and construction, including work for private clients 
 Manufacturing: Industrial manufacturing, including warehouses and storag-
es etc. 
 Low skilled services: Cleaning for business and household clients; low skilled 
work in hotels and restaurants; kitchen work in canteens; newspaper deliv-
ery etc. 
 Other work: Health care; kindergartens; drivers; cooks etc. 
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which has the largest population of Polish migrants, also has the strong-
est concentration of employment. The construction sector stands for the 
employment of 85% of male Polish migrants in Oslo, thus making it by 
far the most important sector of employment accounting for almost 60% 
of all employment among Poles in Oslo. Among the women, 76% are 
employed within low skilled services. This includes a few hotel maids 
and restaurant workers, but cleaning makes up the largest bulk. Many 
are employed in the regular cleaning industry, but Oslo also has a large 
market for domestic cleaning services, which provide an important la-
bour market for Polish women. Only a small minority of women are em-
ployed in other kinds of work, such as kindergartens and health care.  
Polish migrants in Reykjavik are found in slightly more diverse types 
of work. Like in Oslo, the construction sector is the most important la-
bour market for Polish men, but many of them also work in the fish pro-
cessing industry or other kinds of work. Polish women in Reykjavik are 
usually found in low skilled services, but this includes a more varied set 
of jobs than in Oslo. One major difference is that Poles in Reykjavik are 
often found in customer related services, such as waiting tables and sit-
ting in the cash register and working in hotels, suggesting that lack of 
host country language skills does not exclude applicants from this type 
of work in the same way as it does in Oslo (where Swedish labour mi-
grants are an important source of labour within low skilled customer 
related services). 
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Figure 2.5 Occupation/sector of employment. Polish migrants in Oslo, Reykjavik 
and Copenhagen. N=1,443 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The occupational distribution of Polish workers in Copenhagen is more 
similar to Reykjavik than Oslo. Manufacturing is less important here, but 
both men and women are found in different kinds of low skilled services. 
A particular feature of the labour market for Polish migrants in Copen-
hagen is that many men are employed as news paper deliverers. But in 
Copenhagen as in the other two cities, it is the construction sector which 
employs the largest share of Polish men. Cleaning is the main occupation 
for Polish women in Copenhagen, but Polish women are also found in 
some types of customer related services and public health care. 
Table 2.2 Sector/occupation according to gender. N=1,443 
 Oslo Reykjavik Copenhagen 
 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Construction 85 1 43 0 44 2 
Manufacturing 6 1 28 17 17 10 
Low skilled services 6 76 20 69 30 74 
Other work 4 22 10 13 9 13 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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All in all, we find the largest concentration of employment in Oslo, and the 
biggest variation of employment in Reykjavik, with Copenhagen in the mid-
dle. As we shall see, a similar pattern is found along many central variables. 
4.2 Types of employment 
Within each sector of employment we may distinguish between different 
types of employment. Some forms of employment indicate that the 
workers are part of the core production within the industry. Other forms 
of employment indicate that their position within the production is more 
peripheral – they have a weak attachment to the labour market and they 
are primarily recruited to fill labour needs in peak periods or to perform 
work that does not require much on-the-job training or any strong con-
nection to the firm. One common way to distinguish between core and 
periphery is to see whether they have permanent or temporary em-
ployment. The use of temporary employment is restricted in all the Nor-
dic countries, although there are significant variations. The flexible firm 
model, developed by Atkinson (1984), can be a useful model for under-
standing different positions within the workforces of individual firms. 
This model distinguishes between a firms’ internal workforce and its 
external workforce. According to Atkinson, flexible firms seek two main 
kinds of organisational flexibility – which gives rise to a dual labour 
market within firms. First, functional or internal flexibility refers to the 
ability to redeploy workers from one task to another. This type of flexi-
bility is accomplished through strategies which empower workers to 
participate in decision making, enable them to work in teams, and en-
hance their commitment to the organization by, among other things, 
permanent employment, and access to training, and by linking their 
compensation to organizational performance. Second, numerical or ex-
ternal flexibility refers to the organization’s ability to adjust the size of its 
workforce to fluctuations in demand by using workers who are not their 
regular, full-time employees. These peripheral workers have relatively 
weak ties to the organization, are generally hired for finite periods on an 
as-needed basis, e.g. through different forms of temporary employment, 
temp agency work, self employment and subcontracting. In the case of 
EU labour migrants it is also relevant to distinguish between workers 
depending on the nationality of their employer, because several aspects 
of their employment situation – such as taxes, wage determination, 
working conditions and employer responsibilities – are subject to differ-
ent sets of regulations depending on whether they are regarded as indi-
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vidual labour migrants (employed in host country firms) or posted 
workers (employed in foreign companies on temporary service assign-
ments). In our analyses we will therefore differentiate between the fol-
lowing main kinds of employment:  
 
1. Permanent employment within a host country firm. 
2. Temporary employment within a host country firm. 
3. Employment by a temporary staffing agency who hires its workers 
out to host country firms. 
4. Employment by a foreign (usually Polish) subcontractor providing 
services to host country firms. 
5. Self employment. 
 
Permanent employment within a host country firm (1) is regarded as a 
standard form of employment, while the rest can be considered to be 
atypical in some way, and usually part of a firm’s external workforce. Fur-
thermore, employment by a foreign company (4) will usually entail that 
the employee is considered to be a posted worker. A temporary staffing 
agency may be based in the host country – in which case the employee is 
considered to be a regular labour immigrant – or in a foreign country – in 
which case the employee is considered to be a posted worker. In the fol-
lowing we have grouped foreign and domestic agencies together, since 
there are very few workers who are employed by foreign agencies in any 
of the three cities. Employees in temporary staffing agencies and foreign 
subcontractors may have either permanent or temporary employment. 
For all practical purposes, however, their employment can be regarded as 
temporary, since they usually only provide temporary assignments and no 
financial obligations to the workers in between, even if they have a so-
called “permanent” contract with the agency.  
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Figure 2.6 Type of employment among Polish workers in Oslo, Copenhagen and 
Reykjavik. N=1,380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When comparing the three cities we find that the Polish migrants have 
very different patterns of employment. In Reykjavik 80% of the Polish 
workers are permanently employed within Icelandic firms. Only a small 
minority have some form of atypical employment. About 11% have tem-
porary employment, while very few are employed in temporary staffing 
agencies or Polish subcontractors, or work as self employed. Temporary 
employment is most common within low skilled services, but even here, 
permanent employment is the norm for Polish employees. In Copenhagen, 
the pattern is very different: 36% have permanent employment within a 
Danish firm, while both temporary employment, employment through 
temporary staffing agencies and Polish subcontractor firms and self em-
ployment is common. There are some variations between industries. Em-
ployment through temporary staffing agencies is particularly common 
within manufacturing and warehouses, while Polish subcontractor firms 
are particularly common in the construction industry. In Oslo, even fewer 
among the Polish migrants have standard forms of employment: 26%. The 
construction sector employs Polish migrants through different kinds of 
atypical affiliations, while only 19% have standard employment. Self em-
ployment is particularly common among the Polish women who perform 
services in the domestic sector. In both Copenhagen and Oslo, however, 
those who are employed in “other kinds of work” are more likely to be 
permanently employed. 
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Table 2.3 Type of employment within different industries/occupations in Reykjavik, Copenhagen 
and Oslo. N=1,380 
Industry/occupationType of employment Construction Manufacturing Low skilled 
services 
Other work 
Reykjavik     
Permanent employment in hostland firm 84 88 72 91 
Temporary employment in hostland firm 6 7 17 4 
Employment in temporary staffing agency 1 4 0 0 
Employment in foreign company 7 2 6 0 
Self employment 3 0 5 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Copenhagen     
Permanent employment in hostland firm 34 22 37 49 
Temporary employment in hostland firm 16 26 25 27 
Employment in temporary staffing agency 1 38 12 8 
Employment in foreign company 32 14 15 12 
Self employment 17 0 10 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Oslo
10
     
Permanent employment in hostland firm 19 - 28 43 
Temporary employment in hostland firm 26 - 24 23 
Employment in temporary staffing agency 23 - 3 0 
Employment in foreign company 26 - 12 20 
Self employment 7 - 33 14 
Total 100 - 100 100 
4.3 Legal status of employment 
Finally, we may distinguish between those who work in the legal economy 
and are thereby included in social protection schemes and acquire basic 
social rights in their host country, and those who are found in the illegal or 
informal economy, and thereby usually remain excluded from any form of 
social protection. There are different ways of trying to measure the extent 
to which work is performed within the law but we chose to look at two 
basic sets of requirements: Whether or not the workers pay tax on their 
income and whether or not they have a written contract. Using these two 
basic criteria give us three categories. Those who pay tax and have a writ-
ten work contract are defined as having a legal job (although this doesn’t 
mean that all other aspect of the employment is legal). Those who don’t 
pay tax and don’t have a written contract are defined as having an illegal 
job, while those who either have a written contract or pay tax but not 
both, are defined as having a job in the “grey area”. It should be noted that 
even if someone pays tax and has a written contract, there may still be 
────────────────────────── 
10 Manufacturing: This category includes too few observations to make reliable estimates.  
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plenty of legal irregularities with their work situation. Not paying tax and 
not having a written contract is at least a definite sign that the worker is 
found in the illegal labour market. 
Figure 2.7 Legal status of employment (having a written contract/paying tax) of 
Polish workers in the three cities. N=1,380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal job: Has a written contract and pays tax. 
Grey area: Either has a written contract or pays tax, but not both. 
Illegal job: Does not have a written contract and does not pay tax. 
 
Once again we find significant differences between the three cities. Oslo 
has a substantial illegal labour market which employs between one 
fourth and one third of all Polish labour migrants. In Reykjavik on the 
other hand, hardly anyone report that they neither pay tax nor have a 
written contract. There are a few who report one but not the other, but 
we cannot be sure if this means that they work in the informal sector or 
not (there may be legal reasons why someone are exempted from paying 
tax and the lack of written contract may be temporary). Copenhagen 
does have a substantial informal labour market employing a number of 
Polish migrants, but their share is significantly smaller than in Oslo. In 
Copenhagen, illegal work is common in construction and to a much less-
er extent in low skilled services. In Oslo, illegal work is also quite com-
mon in the construction sector, but even more so among those perform-
ing low skilled services – this is particularly related to a large market for 
cleaning services for private households. 
There is also a strong connection between type of employment and 
legality, and despite the large overall differences between the three cit-
ies, this connection between type of employment and legality follows a 
similar pattern. In Reykjavik there is hardly any illegal work, except 
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among a small minority of those working as self employed. In Copenha-
gen, about one fifth of those employed in Polish firms and more than half 
of those working as self employed do so without paying tax or having 
any written contracts. In Oslo similar, although slightly higher numbers 
apply to employees in Polish firms and self employed, but in addition to 
those groups, more than a third of everyone who is temporarily em-
ployed by Norwegian firms work without paying tax or having written 
contracts. The illegal labour market of Oslo includes both individual 
workers, Polish and Norwegian firms.  
Illegal work is strongly correlated to whether or not the worker pro-
vides services forprivate households or not. And as figure 2.8 shows, 
Reykjavik does not have much of a household sector to which Polish 
migrants can perform services, while both Copenhagen and Oslo do. 
Figure 2.8 Share of workers who mainly do work for private household clients. 
N=1,380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The connection between work for the household sector and illegal work 
is not the same in Oslo and Copenhagen, however. In Oslo, 62% of the 
workers who perform services in private households (57% of the con-
struction workers and 71% of the cleaners) do so without paying tax 
and without having any written contract. In Copenhagen the corre-
sponding number is only 34%. Unlike in Oslo where construction work 
for private households is often performed illegally, construction work 
for private households is no more likely to be performed illegally than 
other types of construction work in Copenhagen.  
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4.4 Characteristics of each sector in the three cities 
Based on the indicators presented above as well as on other questions 
about the firms in which they are employed, their colleagues and the 
working environment, we present a brief overview of the typical charac-
teristics of employment among Polish migrants in the three main indus-
tries in the three cities. As this overview shows, there are both similari-
ties and differences across both cities and industries. 
The construction sector: In Reykjavik, most Polish construction work-
ers have regular permanent employment in Icelandic firms and they 
primarily work alongside Icelandic colleagues. The household sector is 
not an important market for Polish construction workers and there is 
hardly any informal market for construction work. In Copenhagen Polish 
construction workers have several different kinds of employment rela-
tions, and they work both alongside Danish and other Polish colleagues. 
Although regular permanent employment is quite common, the majority 
has some kind of atypical work arrangement, including work through 
Polish subcontractors and temporary staffing agencies. There is a signif-
icant market for construction services to private households, and there 
is also a significant market for undeclared informal work. In Oslo atypi-
cal employment dominates among construction workers and they usual-
ly work alongside other Polish workers rather than with Norwegian 
workers, indicating a more strict ethnic segregation of the workforce. 
The private household market is an important source of employment for 
Polish construction workers in Oslo and there is also a large informal 
sector. In all three cities, the construction sector employs almost only 
male Polish workers. 
Manufacturing: Fish processing in particular is an important labour 
market for Poles in Reykjavik, and employs both men and women. In 
manufacturing, Poles in Reykjavik have regular permanent employment, 
but they work separately alongside other Poles to a larger extent than in 
construction. In Copenhagen, Polish manufacturing workers – predomi-
nantly male – usually have some kind of atypical employment, but they 
work more often alongside Danish or non-Polish immigrants. There is no 
market for undeclared work in manufacturing in either city. In Oslo, 
manufacturing employs very few Polish workers. 
Low skilled services: In Reykjavik this includes several different kinds 
of occupations, including cleaning, customer related services and hospi-
tality. Most workers have regular permanent employment, although 
temporary contracts appear to be slightly more common here than in 
other sectors in Reykjavik. Polish workers in low skilled service tend to 
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work in a mixed environment. In Copenhagen, low skilled services also 
include several different occupations, but customer related services 
appears to be less common here than in Reykjavik. Low skilled services 
employ both men and women – quite a few men have found employment 
in news paper delivery and similar postal and distributions jobs. There 
is no substantial market for domestic services in this sector in either 
Reykjavik or Copenhagen. In Oslo, low skilled services are dominated by 
cleaning which mostly employs women and there is a large market for 
informal domestic services. 
As this brief overview shows, most Polish migrants are recruited to 
perform semi- or low skilled work in all the three cities. However, it 
appears that Poles in Oslo to the largest extent are concentrated into 
specific sectors and segments of the labour market, usually working only 
alongside other Poles, and they also have the weakest connection to 
their employers in terms of predominantly atypical and widespread 
informal employment. The same pattern can be observed in Copenha-
gen, although to a somewhat lesser extent, while Poles in Reykjavik are 
found in more regular and more varied types of occupations and more 
regular terms of employment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The language of work 
When immigrant integration is discussed in the Nordic countries, 
knowledge of the host country language is often pointed out as a key 
factor, and weak language skills are often seen as one of the main obsta-
cles to employment for immigrants. It may therefore appear as some-
what of a paradox that since 2004, hundreds of thousands of citizens 
from the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe have 
managed to find employment in the Nordic countries – usually without 
knowing a single word of the host country language. And unlike the case 
for other immigrant groups, language acquisition is rarely emphasized 
as a policy goal in relation to new labour migrants in any of the Nordic 
countries. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that language skills are im-
portant for the opportunities and adaptations of recent labour migrants 
in host country labour markets and societies. In this chapter we will take 
a closer look at the language skills of the Polish workers, what language 
they usually speak in the workplace, and whether or not they have ac-
cess to language training.  
5.1 Language skills 
As a linguistic group, the Nordic languages are relatively small. Very few 
Polish migrants will have any knowledge about the Nordic languages 
before migration, and any knowledge that Polish migrants staying in the 
Nordic countries may have, they will usually have acquired after arrival. 
The respondents in the survey were asked to rate their own language 
skills in either Danish, Norwegian or Icelandic, on a scale from 0 to 5, 
where 0 means “not at all”, 1 means you understand some basic words, 
and 5 is being able to speak and write freely without problems. As could 
be expected, most of them rate their language skills to be very limited or 
non-existent. Only a minority of about 20% in Oslo and Reykjavik and 
10% in Copenhagen rate their skills in the host country language to be 
three or better on this scale. 
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Figure 2.9 “On a scale from 0 to 5, where 0 means “not at all”, 1 means you un-
derstand some basic words, and 5 is being able to speak and write freely, how 
well would you say you know Danish/Norwegian/Icelandic?” N=1,443 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But there are significant differences. Poles in Reykjavik generally rate 
their skills in Icelandic language to be slightly better than Poles in Oslo 
do their skills in Norwegian, who in turn rate their skills better than the 
Poles in Copenhagen. The explanation for this difference lies in the fact 
that the Polish migrants have substantially different length of stay in 
Denmark, Norway and Iceland. The Copenhagen survey was conducted 
in 2008, when large scale Polish labour migration to Denmark was a 
relatively new phenomenon, so at the time of the survey, the majority of 
respondents had been in Denmark for less than two years, as shown in 
figure 2.10 Both the Oslo and Reykjavik surveys were conducted in 
2010, when more workers had gained longer experience in Norway and 
Iceland. However, in Reykjavik very few have arrived after the financial 
crisis in 2008, so Polish migrants in Reykjavik had on average stayed 
there longer than they have in Oslo. 
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Figure 2.10 Length of stay among Polish migrants in Copenhagen, Oslo and Rey-
kjavik. N=1,443 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, when we compare language skills according to length of stay, we 
find – as one would expect – that the Polish migrants generally rate their 
own language skills to be better the longer they have stayed in the host 
country. When we take account of the fact that the migrants at the time of 
the survey on average had stayed longer in Reykjavik than in Oslo and 
even longer than those in Copenhagen, there are practically no differences 
in self reported language skills in the three cities, once length of stay is 
controlled for. So far, there are few surprises in our findings. When we 
look at the total score according to length of stay, we find that those with 
less than two years in the host country on average rate their skills to be 
0.5. Those with between two and four years in the host country rate their 
skills to be on average 1.4, while those with four or more years score 2.0. 
However, when we compare language skills across industries, we find an 
interesting pattern. There seems to be systematic differences in language 
skills between workers in different sectors – even when we take account 
of the time they have stayed in the host country. Figure 2.11 shows the 
average score reported by workers in different industries grouped accord-
ing to how long they have resided in the host country.  
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Figure 2.11 Average scores on self reported language skills according to indus-
try and length of stay. Polish workers in Copenhagen, Oslo and Reykjavik com-
bined. N=1,441 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Construction workers with four years or more in the host country only 
rate their skills at 1.5. Workers in manufacturing with the same length of 
stay score 2.0, while low skilled service providers rate their skills at 2.2 
and those in the “other work” category rate their skills at 3.1. This effect 
is systematic, and it seems to be even stronger than the effect of length 
of stay. There are two different ways of explaining these differences. 
There may be a selection effect: Those who have better language skills 
tend to seek employment in different industries than those with more 
modest language skills. Or there may be a learning effect: Those who 
work in some industries have better opportunities for practicing and 
learning the language – either through formal language courses or on-
the-job practice. The selection effect is difficult to measure using our 
data, but it is reasonable to assume that both mechanisms are in opera-
tion and will tend to work mutually reinforcing.  
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5.2 English skills 
Language skills in the host country language are of course not the only 
language skills that matter. Many Polish migrant workers know some 
English, reflecting the fact that Poland started teaching English as a sec-
ond language in the early 1990s, rather than Russian which was taught 
during communist rule. Here we find slight differences between the 
three cities. 
Figure 2.13 Self-reported language skills in English, on a scale from 0 to 5. 
N=1,443 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polish migrants in Copenhagen appear to have slightly better English 
skills than Polish migrants in Reykjavik, who in turn have slightly better 
language skills than Polish migrants in Oslo. This, however, primarily 
reflects differences in the sectoral and gender distribution of Polish 
immigrants in the three cities. Women report to have slightly better 
English skills than men – reflecting that they often have higher 
education. And those working in traditional male occupations, such as 
construction in particular and manufacturing to a lesser extent, report to 
have less English language skills than those working in service 
occupations or in other industries. That almost 40% of Polish migrants 
in Oslo – compared to less than 25% in Copenhagen – report to have no 
or only rudimentary understanding of English reflects the fact that male 
construction workers (who often have less education and who typically 
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work in segregated Polish nishes) make up a larger share of the 
population in Oslo, and that Poles in Copenhagen tend to be a little 
younger than those in Oslo.  
5.3 A linguistic division of labour? 
Recent Polish labour migrants to the Nordic countries may lack the basic 
Nordic language skills often thought to be needed in order to enter the la-
bour market, but they usually have another resource: connections to other 
migrants who can help them. Almost every respondent in the three surveys 
reported that they knew someone staying in the host country before arrival, 
and many of them used these connections to find employment. As the mi-
gration process moves forward, transnational networks of friends, family 
members and colleagues expand, giving increasing numbers of potential 
migrants in sending countries a gateway into jobs in receiving countries. 
Such migrant networks are powerful because they also serve the interests 
of employers. In the absence of secure knowledge about how to recruit the 
best workers they must often rely on their existing employees to vouch for 
the suitability of their friends and relatives. As long as there is a demand for 
labour, migrants therefore tend to cluster in certain niches of the labour 
market. Over time this may give rise to segments in the workforce where 
everyone speaks the same foreign language – thereby effectively excluding 
other groups from entering (Waldinger & Lichter 2003). Employers may 
respond by organising work through separate teams according to language, 
using bi-lingual foremen and translators. Such a process may give rise to a 
linguistically segregated working life, where natives and migrants work in 
different teams, in different kinds of jobs and perform different kinds of 
tasks depending on their national background, and where opportunities for 
on-the-job language training and socialisation across ethnic boundaries 
remains limited. The language most commonly used at work may indicate 
how far this process has evolved. 
When asked which language they primarily speak at work, we find that 
between 30 (in Reykjavik) and 40% (in Copenhagen) of the respondents 
only speak Polish at work: a clear indicator that many work in what we 
may call Polish employment niches – since natives in the Nordic countries 
rarely know Polish. Most of the remaining respondents report that they 
usually communicate in English at work – suggesting that they interact 
more with non-Polish co-workers or clients, but that there may still be 
some limitations to the types of work they can perform. Only a minority 
say that they use the host country language at work. 
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Figure 2.14 Which language do Polish migrants primarily use at work in Reykja-
vik, Oslo and Copenhagen. N=1,093 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The three cities are quite similar in this pattern – except for the fact that 
very few Poles in Denmark report to speak Danish at work. However, 
when we compare different industries we find more significant differ-
ences in the extent to which the migrants rely on communicating in 
Polish, English or the host country language. In the construction indus-
try, more than half only speak Polish at work, indicating highly segregat-
ed work organisations. The exception is Reykjavik, where most con-
struction workers rely on English. In manufacturing, a significant minor-
ity of more than 35% rely on speaking Polish at work (once again 
Reykjavik stands out but this time by having more workers relying on 
Polish at work than in the other cities). In low skilled services, English 
speakers outnumber those who speak Polish at work in all three cities. 
In other industries, however, more than half report that they use the 
host country language (here, Copenhagen is the exception: most em-
ployees in other industries speak English at work). 
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Figure 2.15 Which language do Polish migrants primarily use at work, according 
to industry? N=1,093 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fact that many migrant labour intensive industries have adapted by 
establishing niches of employment where migrants can get by only using 
their native tongue or at best English, can help explain why it has been 
possible to absorb such huge numbers of Central and Eastern European 
labour migrants in the Nordic labour markets in such a short period of 
time. It can also explain the concentration of employment among the 
migrants found in most of the Nordic countries, because there are only 
some types of work where such adaptations are possible. In construction 
and manufacturing, as well as many non-customer related low skilled 
services, it is possible to organize separate teams of Polish workers as 
long as they are plenty in numbers. In customer related services, public 
care, different kinds of support functions and many other types of work, 
this is far more difficult to accomplish, which in turn makes it difficult to 
recruit large numbers of migrant workers.  
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There seems to be some interesting differences between the three 
cities in this regard. The low skilled services category includes both cus-
tomer related services and non-customer related services. However, in 
Oslo, very few Polish migrants are employed in customer related ser-
vices. Hotels, restaurants and retail shops employ tens of thousands of 
Swedish youth, whose language is similar to Norwegian, and it is rea-
sonable to assume that Polish migrants are unable to compete with them 
as long as they do not master a Scandinavian language. The situation 
seems to be quite similar in Copenhagen where very few Poles work in 
customer related services. In Reykjavik, on the other hand, quite a large 
number of Poles work in customer related services in hotels, restaurants 
and retail shops, and they usually report that they speak English at work. 
This pattern is probably best explained by the economic boom years 
before the crisis, when labour shortages in the low skilled service indus-
try led to an acceptance for the use of English in customer related ser-
vices in shops and restaurants. Once customers and employers had ac-
cepted English as a working language in the services industry, a whole 
new range of occupations were open to Polish migrants who were fluent 
in English. This may help explain why Poles in Reykjavik generally seem 
to have a more diverse employment pattern than in the other cities 
5.4 Language training 
Language training for immigrants has over the last decade become a 
pillar in the integration policies towards refugees and humanitarian 
migrants in all the Nordic countries. In all three countries, newly arrived 
refugees have both the right and a duty to participate in state financed 
language training. EU labour migrants, however, do not have similar 
rights regarding state sponsored language training in Norway, while 
they can attend municipal language training courses in Denmark.11 In 
────────────────────────── 
11 At the time the survey was conducted in Copenhagen all foreigners above the age of 18 with a personal 
registration number in Denmark had the right to three years of Danish language training according to the law 
on Danish language education for adult foreigners from 2006. The training modules was to be provided by 
the local municipalities. In 2008 it was estimated that about a third of the municipalities had offered lan-
guage training to foreigners (Rapport fra arbejdsgruppe omdanskuddannelsefor voksne udlændinge 2009). 
During 2009 the law on Danish language education for adult foreigners was debated and changed. Thus, from 
July 2010 all foreigners above 18 have the right to a labour market oriented introductory Danish language 
course of 250 hours in addition to the three years already established. This right also includes commuting 
labour. The courses are free of charge when offered by the municipalities. 
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Norway, Polish migrants may take language classes from private or pub-
lic courses, but they will usually have to pay for it themselves. In Iceland 
likewise, Polish migrants can attend language classes at both private and 
public language schools but the employer may pay partially for the lan-
guage course as well as the trade unions. Language courses are, howev-
er, free of charge for those who are registered unemployed. In all three 
countries public documents emphasize the responsibility of employers 
to provide any language training they see necessary.  
Figure 2.16 Share of Polish migrants who have participated in language training – 
combined and according to provider – in Reykjavik, Oslo and Copenhagen. N=1,447 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As figure 2.16 shows, Polish migrants in Reykjavik are much more likely 
to have participated in some kind of language training than Polish mi-
grants in the other cities. Poles in Copenhagen are least likely to have 
taken courses. This pattern remains significant even after controlling for 
length of stay (except for one little quirk: Poles who arrived in Reykjavik 
after the crisis haven’t taken courses at all...). This may be a result of 
selective return migration: many Polish migrant workers left Iceland 
after the crisis, and it seems reasonable that those who had invested in 
language training would be overrepresented among those who stayed.  
 
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 87 
Figure 2.17 Share of workers participated in language training according to 
industry of employment in Reykjavik, Oslo and Copenhagen. N=1,380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But there is also a clear pattern when we compare language training to 
industry of employment. Construction workers are generally the least 
likely to take courses, while those in other work are generally most likely.  
5.5 Conclusions 
Regarding language acquisition there seem to be some general differ-
ences between the three cities. Polish migrants in Reykjavik appear to 
have the best host country language skills as well as being most likely to 
have participated in courses, while Poles in Copenhagen appear least 
likely to take courses and have less host country language skills. Howev-
er, this pattern is primarily explained by differences in length of stay.  
There are, however, differences between industries that cut across 
the three cities. In construction and industrial manufacturing, there is a 
high degree of linguistic segregation where Poles work with other Poles 
and speak Polish at work. This is in turn related to lower rate of lan-
guage learning, and lower rates of participation in training courses (ei-
ther because of low motivation or low availability). Low skilled services 
is a kind of linguistic hybrid niche, as most workers have to speak Eng-
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lish at work, and their host country language acquisition is also better. 
Workers outside the main Polish segments – those in the “other” catego-
ry – are to a far greater extent linguistically integrated into the host 
country working environment in all three cities.  
The establishment of linguistically segregated employment niches, 
such as in construction and some parts of industrial manufacturing, has 
some implications which may shed light onto the process of labour mi-
gration itself. First of all, linguistically defined niches in the labour mar-
ket make access to jobs much easier for new migrants. If workers had to 
communicate in the host country language it would obviously be much 
more difficult for new migrants to access employment. Once a “Polish” 
niche in the workforce exists, and everyone in it speaks Polish, a Polish 
worker can be recruited directly from Poland and start working the next 
day. His colleagues will all be Polish and they will have a foreman who 
can convey orders and communicate with clients and other work-teams. 
Without such organisational accommodation large scale labour migra-
tion would be impossible. However, our findings show that work within 
such niches may slow down the process of language acquisition, because 
they will have less opportunities and incentives to practice their lan-
guage skills. Lack of language skills obviously narrows down the range of 
possible opportunities in the labour market, which in turn may make 
them very vulnerable in times of economic turmoil. This may explain 
why Polish migrant workers in general have displayed relatively high 
rates of unemployment in the period after the financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Wages 
Wages are of central importance for the assessment of the overall work-
ing conditions of Polish labour migrants in Oslo, Copenhagen and Rey-
kjavik, and they have been at the forefront of political debates about the 
effects of labour migration and of “social dumping”. The willingness of 
Eastern European workers to accept wages far below the normal stand-
ards of the countries they travel to – simply because their alternative 
options are far worse than for natives – is the most perhaps tangible 
indicator of the potential gain for employers engaging in social dumping. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the general wage levels re-
ceived by Polish migrant workers in the three cities and explore factors 
that are associated with particularly low wages. However, the average 
wage levels differ considerably between the Nordic countries, with 
Norway on top with an average wage level double that of Iceland, and 
with Denmark somewhere in the middle. This has several implications 
for labour migration. First of all, higher wage levels make countries 
more attractive as destinations for labour migrants. Second, higher wage 
levels leave greater scope for wage dumping, because employers can 
offer terms which are substantially below national standards but still 
remain attractive to migrants. Third, higher wage levels – and thereby 
also price levels – increase the migrants’ incentive for trans-border ac-
tivities, such as temporary and circular mobility, commuting and send-
ing remittances, and at the same time increase the relative fall in eco-
nomic status experienced by migrants who settle down more perma-
nently. These general differences in wages and price levels between 
different destination countries are therefore important for understand-
ing the different adaptations of both migrants and employers. In the 
following we analyse the self-reported wages of the Poles in the three 
surveys. First we briefly report the average wage levels of the Polish 
workers in the currencies of the country they work in, as well as the 
distribution. As the currencies are different between cities, these figures 
have little comparative value. Therefore, we proceed by computing and 
reporting measures that make comparison more accessible. This in-
cludes measuring the hourly wages in absolute terms (Zloty), in relative 
terms (in percent of national average wages), and in terms of purchasing 
power. By applying this approach, we can compare how attractive the 
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different destinations appear as seen from Poland, how Polish migrants 
are placed within the wage hierarchy of the host labour market, and how 
profitable work in the different cities is in terms of the absolute living 
standards it can provide. We then proceed to analyse the specific wage 
levels within the construction industry in the three cities, in order to get 
a better grip on how the wages of Polish migrants are related to specific 
industry standards. We perform this final analysis for the construction 
industry only because the other sector categories we are using are much 
more heterogeneous and constructed in a way that makes it very diffi-
cult to obtain data on general industry standards to compare with. Table 
2.4 reports the average, minimum and maximum wages found in the 
three cities.12  
Table 2.4 Average wages in national currency 
 Reykjavik Oslo Copenhagen 
Average hourly wage 1,203 ISK 142 NOK 116 DKK 
Minimum 532 ISK 30 NOK 24 DKK 
Maximum 3,721 ISK 372 NOK 257 DKK 
Cases (N) 231 289 442 
 
These figures are, however, only of limited use for cross country com-
parison due to differences in currencies, wage levels and price levels. 
Thus three other variables have been calculated to make comparison 
more meaningful.  
────────────────────────── 
12 In the survey respondents had the possibility of reporting their wages in either the currency of the country 
they work in or zloty, depending on how they were paid. In the same way, respondents have had the oppor-
tunity of reporting their wages in hourly or monthly wages. In all three surveys most respondents have 
reported their wages in the currency of the host country and in hourly wages. However, there are a number 
of respondents that have been paid in monthly wages, in zloty or both. Thus, to compare wages we have tried 
to calculate the hourly wages for all respondents in the currency of the country they worked in and several 
transformations have been produced. First, wages paid in zloty were converted into the host country curren-
cy by using the average exchange rate (with two decimals) for the year of the survey (40.64 Icelandic Krona 
for 1 Zloty in 2010, 2 Norwegian Kroner for 1 Zloty in 2010 and 2.13 Danish Kroner for 1 Zloty in 2008). 
Second, monthly wages have been transformed to hourly wages by dividing the monthly wage with 4.3 (the 
approximate average number of weeks in a month) as well as the number of hours the respondent reported 
to have worked the week before the survey. This transformation may introduce a bias, as the number of 
hours worked per week may vary. Especially when respondents have just returned from holiday, they may 
report very few hours last week but a salary that corresponds to a full working week. In one case this was 
clearly the situation, as a respondent reported a working week of 4 hours and a monthly salary of 60.000 
Norwegian Kroner. Yet one other example of an enormous hourly wage due to the way of calculating was 
found, and both were changed to non-responses, but generally it did not cause systematic biases. Apart from 
the two cases mentioned, the wages reported in monthly wages do not seem to deviate from those reported 
by respondents getting hourly wages. 
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6.1 The Poles’ position in the Wage Hierarchy  
A major theme in discussions about social dumping is whether or not 
migrant workers are paid (substantially) less than native workers. Be-
cause native workers have substantially different wage levels in the 
three countries, we had to compute the wages of Polish migrants as 
measured in percentages of the national average hourly wages of the 
country they work in. We have used Eurostat data on mean net income 
(ilc_di05) in the selected years and average working hours per week 
(lfsq_ewhun2) – both for employed people. As Eurostat provides only 
annual mean income, we have divided this by 47 working weeks and the 
average number of hours worked per week in the respective countries. 
Clearly, this calculation does not provide us with a perfect estimate of 
the relation between the wages of Poles vis-à-vis national workers. 
There are a number of issues regarding variability of sectors, working 
time, geography, etc. But it has the virtue of giving us a comparable 
measure across time and country, which serves as an indicator of the 
Polish workers position in the national wage hierarchy.  
Table 2.5 Wages of Polish migrant workers as percentage of national average 
  Reykjavik Oslo Copenhagen 
Average wages in % of national average  57% 65% 85% 
Confidence 95% 54–59 63–67 84–88 
Minimum % 24 14 18 
Maximum % 171 174 196 
Cases (N) 231 289 442 
 
Calculated in this way, the data shows that there is a substantial and sig-
nificant difference between the positions of Polish workers in the wage 
hierarchy depending on the city they live in. Table 2.5 shows that on aver-
age Poles working in Reykjavik receive only 57% of the average wage of 
native wage earners, whereas the same number is 65% for Poles working 
in Oslo and 85% for Poles working in Copenhagen. These are major differ-
ences, and should immediately call for reservations.13 Nevertheless, the 
────────────────────────── 
13 First, we need to emphasize that the way the data is calculated has potential pitfalls and that these num-
bers should not be taken as exact estimates of the percentages that the Poles are receiving. For example, an 
analysis comparing the Danish Polonia data with national wage statistics found slightly different estimates 
(Arnholtz and Hansen, 2013) Second, the same analysis showed that comparing the average wages of Poles 
with the wage levels within the sector they were working in reduced the difference between Poles and Danes 
– at least in some sectors. The same trend would properly be true for the other cities. Thus, the wage gap 
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data is calculated in a similar way for all three cities allowing them to be 
used as a means of comparison, and they are important because they are 
the best indicator we have of the potential for wage dumping.  
The results show clearly that Poles working in Copenhagen are 
placed far better in the wage hierarchy than Poles working in Oslo, and 
that Poles working in Reykjavik receive particularly low wages com-
pared to native workers. We will return to the potential explanations for 
these differences later. It is, however, worth mentioning at this point 
that their perceptions about their placement in the wage hierarchy does 
not differ significantly. When asked whether or not they thought that 
they earned wages equal to native workers in similar jobs, the majority 
responded no in all three countries. 
6.2 Wages measured in Zloty 
Polish migrants who send or intend to spend their money in Poland ra-
ther than in their host country may be less concerned with their relative 
wages vis-a-vis natives, or the purchasing power it brings in the host 
country, than with how much their earnings will buy them in Poland. A 
second useful measure is to convert all wages into Zloty. This is done by 
using the same exchange rate as used to transform wages in Zloty into 
national currencies – that is, the average exchange rate for the year of 
the survey. This gives a good indication of the value of wages for Polish 
workers planning to go back to Poland. The result of this conversion is 
reported in table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Average wages in Zloty  
 Reykjavik Oslo Copenhagen 
Average hourly wages in Zloty 30 Zl 71 Zl 54 Zl 
Confidence 95% 28–31 Zl 69–73 Zl 53–55 Zl 
Minimum 13 Zl 15 Zl 11 Zl 
Maximum 92 Zl 186 Zl 121 Zl 
Cases (N) 231 289 442 
 
Measured in Zloty, Poles are definitely worst of when working in Rey-
kjavik. It is also interesting to note that the relation between Oslo and 
Copenhagen has changed. Poles working in Copenhagen were signifi-
cantly better placed in the Danish wage hierarchy, but the Poles working 
                                                                                                                                         
 
between Poles and native workers would most likely be reduced if we had data that to a greater extent 
allowed us to take the types of jobs into account. 
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in Oslo get the highest amount of money. This shift is caused by the 
much higher average wage in Norway, which places the Poles lower in 
the wage hierarchy even though they actually receive better wages. 
The conversion to Zloty allows us to compare the wages which the 
Poles receive in the three cities with those they received at home. We have 
calculated the hourly wages that the Poles obtained at home. The results 
are reported in table 2.7. The figures have been calculated in the same 
way that we did for the wages obtained when working abroad, converting 
monthly wages into hourly wages by using their self-reported working 
hours. Thus the same sensitivity to the reported working hours applies. 
However, there is an additional issue in comparing the wages received in 
Poland with those received abroad. Some of the Poles have been working 
abroad for some time, and the difference in wages can in part be explained 
by increasing seniority and increasing skill levels. However, the differ-
ences in the wage in Poland and the actual wage they receive in the three 
cities do give a clear impression of the improvement in wages that the 
Poles experience by travelling abroad for work.  
Table 2.7 Wages while working in Poland (before emigration to current host country)  
  Reykjavik Oslo Copenhagen 
Average wages in Zloty 15 18 12 
Confidence 95% 13–17 16–21 10–13 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 80 130 116 
Cases (N) 231 289 442 
 
The results show that moving abroad has ensured most Polish workers a 
far higher salary than they could hope for in Poland, as the average wag-
es of the Poles in all the three host country capitals is much higher than 
what they received in Poland. The differences between the three cities 
nevertheless remain. To be precise, while getting “only” twice as much 
when working in Reykjavik, Poles working in Oslo and Copenhagen get 
average wages that are around four times as high as in Poland.  
Finally, it is also interesting to observe that there are slight, but sig-
nificant differences in the average wages obtained in Poland before trav-
elling abroad. On average Poles working in Oslo received higher wages 
in Poland than Poles working in the other cities. Some of this may be 
explained by the time displacement of the survey (those being surveyed 
in Oslo in 2010 having on average experienced two years extra wage 
increases before leaving than those in Copenhagen), but it may also tell 
us something about the qualifications and expectations that these 
groups bring with them. In sum, the comparison between wages earned 
in Poland and wages earned abroad clearly shows the monetary benefits 
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that the Poles obtain. However, this benefit is in part conditioned on the 
Poles using their earnings in Poland. The wages they earned in Poland 
should be compared with Polish price levels, whereas this is only true 
for wages earned abroad if the money is saved and spent back in Poland. 
Not all Poles, however, want to return home and even if they do, they 
still have to get by while living in their host countries. Therefore yet 
another measure is needed: the purchasing power they obtain by work-
ing and living in the three different cities. 
6.3 Wages measured in Purchasing Power 
While their absolute wages tell us something about the value of their 
earnings in Poland and their placement in the national wage hierarchy 
may tell us something about their position in the host countries’ econo-
my, their wages measured in purchasing power can tell us what they can 
actually buy when living and working in the new country. To get an es-
timate of this, we have used OECD data on the comparative price level to 
develop a factor that allows us to take differences in price levels into 
consideration. We use OECD data for the years the surveys were con-
ducted (2008 for Copenhagen, 2010 for Oslo and Reykjavik).  
Table 2.8 Purchasing power – comparable with Polish wages 
 Reykjavik Oslo Copenhagen 
Hourly wages in purchasing power 16 29 27 
Confidence 95% 15–17 28–30 26–27 
Minimum 7 6 5 
Maximum 50 77 59 
Cases (N) 231 289 442 
 
The factors to divide the wages with are 2.04 for Denmark, 2.42 for Nor-
way and 1.83 for Iceland. The results are reported in table 2.8. Compared 
with tables 2.6 and 2.7, it clearly shows that the monetary benefits of 
working abroad are dramatically reduced the more the Poles settle in and 
spend their money in the city they work in. In fact, when working and 
living in Reykjavik the Poles obtain no significant increase in purchasing 
power compared to their situation in Poland before they left. This has to 
do with the crises that hit the Icelandic economy very hard. Thus before it 
struck, the Poles might easily have obtained better purchasing power than 
in Poland, but the economic downturn has reduced the economic ad-
vantage to one that is statistically insignificant. However, the crisis cannot 
explain everything. Both in Copenhagen (where the survey was conducted 
before the full onset of the crises) and in Oslo (where the effect of the cri-
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sis has been moderate), the economic advantage of living and working 
abroad is reduced significantly by the introduction of price levels. Thus, in 
these two cities the Poles still have a significant economic advantage, and 
in all three cities, the minimum level in purchasing power has increased 
compared to the one they had at home. At the same time we can observe 
that those earning the most in Poland have actually taken a cut in their 
purchasing power by going abroad. This corresponds well with the more 
egalitarian wage structures of the Nordic countries: the rich do not get 
quite so rich, while the poor do not get quite so poor.  
All in all, the analysis of purchasing power shows that more than half 
of the economic advantage the Poles obtain by working in the three cit-
ies is the result of the differences in price levels (as opposed to real wag-
es), and that this larger part of the advantages is dependent upon some 
form of trans-border or migratory behaviour (i.e. “target earning”, “cir-
culatory migration”, remittances or some other form of economic strate-
gy). There are, however, substantial differences between the three cities 
regarding the degree to which differences in price levels and purchasing 
power creates economic incentives for this kind of trans-border activity. 
Higher cost level in their host country means larger incentives for cross-
border activities. This may help explain why there are so many more 
Polish migrants in Oslo who have left their families behind in Poland 
compared to Copenhagen and in particular Reykjavik (where higher 
travel costs also may discourage long distance commuting). 
As we have seen there are significant differences between the wages 
of Polish migrants in the three cities. Because there are also significant 
differences in price levels and general wage levels, our comparison of 
the overall wage levels of Polish workers in the three cities looks quite 
different depending on which measure we use. In terms of absolute 
wages Oslo stands out by being the most attractive destination, with 
average hourly wages for Polish workers of over 70 Zloty, compared to 
54 in Copenhagen and only 30 in Reykjavik. But because Norway also 
has the highest general wage level and also the highest prices, Poles in 
Oslo are less well off when we look at their relative wages and purchas-
ing power. When controlling for price differences the wage gap between 
the cities is reduced both in absolute and relative terms, and it almost 
disappear between Oslo and Copenhagen. The labour market in Copen-
hagen stands out as the most egalitarian, with average hourly wage lev-
els of Polish workers at 85% of the national average. In both Oslo and 
Reykjavik, migrants are placed much lower in the wage hierarchy. Rey-
kjavik also stands out as the place which offers the lowest purchasing 
power to its Polish migrant workers. 
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Figure 2.18 Average hourly wages of Polish migrants in Oslo, Copenhagen and 
Reykjavik measured in absolute wages (Zloty), relative wages (percent of na-
tional average) and purchasing power (OECD standard). N=962 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Wages according to industry and type of 
employment 
Although providing a general overview of the attractiveness and egali-
tarianism of the labour markets in the three cities, these numbers are 
not a precise indicator of how Polish migrants are placed within the 
labour market. Because Polish migrants are concentrated within a few 
sectors of employment, and because their pattern of employment looks 
slightly different in the three cities, it is difficult to know exactly how 
much of the differences – between Polish workers in the three cities and 
between Polish migrant workers and native workers – is due to their 
different sector-wise placement in the labour market. It is for example, 
difficult to know if Polish migrants receive lower wages than natives in 
the same occupations, or if their low placement in the wage hierarchy is 
merely a result of their overrepresentation in low wage occupations. 
When comparing the wages of Polish migrants across sectors in the 
three cities we find some differing patterns. In Oslo, those working in 
“other sectors” stand out as having significantly higher hourly wages. 
Aside from this group, construction workers are best off, and low skilled 
service workers are the least well off. A similar pattern is suggested by 
the figures for the other two cities (except for construction in Copenha-
gen, which appear to be relatively less well paid compared to construc-
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tion work in the other cities), but these differences are far less pro-
nounced, and not statistically significant.  
Figure 2.19 Average hourly wages of Polish migrants in Oslo, Copenhagen and 
Reykjavik measured in absolute wages (Zloty), according to industry of employ-
ment. N=962 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.9 Average hourly wages of Polish migrants in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik measured 
in local currency, according to industry of employment. N=962 
 Oslo Copenhagen Reykjavik 
Construction, etc 152 NOK 113 DKK 1,309 ISK 
Manufacturing, etc 138 NOK 120 DKK 1,248 ISK 
Low skilled services, etc 125 NOK 114 DKK 1,122 ISK 
Other work 171 NOK 124 DKK 1,340 ISK 
Total 144 NOK 116 DKK 1,203 ISK 
N 439 290 231 
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Figure 2.20 Mean hourly gross wages compared for workers with different types 
of employment in the three cities. Zloty. N=96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is also a significant association between the type of employment 
of the workers and their wages as well, although this association looks 
slightly different in the three cities. Figure 2.20 shows the mean hourly 
gross wages in Zloty for workers with different types of employment in 
the three cities. In Reykjavik, very few workers have any form of atypical 
employment, but those few who do actually appear to earn more than 
those who have standard permanent employment. In Copenhagen, 
where a much larger proportion of the workers have some form of atyp-
ical employment contract, the relationship is reversed. Those employed 
by Danish firms – either permanent or temporary – are at the top of the 
wage hierarchy, while workers in temporary staffing agencies, Polish 
subcontractor firms and self employment earn progressively less. In 
Norway, permanent employees in Norwegian firms also earn substan-
tially more than workers in most forms of atypical employment. Tempo-
rary workers, workers employed in Polish subcontractor firms and self 
employed workers are generally paid about ten Zloty less per hour than 
those in regular permanent employment. Those employed by foreign 
subcontractor firms are by far the ones with the lowest pay in Oslo. This 
confirms the general notion that social dumping and low wage competi-
tion is particularly common among posted workers.  
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6.5 The case of construction 
For the majority of Polish workers in this study, it is difficult to know if 
their wages are in accordance with minimum wage regulations in the 
particular industries where they work, since respondents have a variety 
of different job descriptions and these regulations differ between and 
within sectors and countries. However, in the construction industry – 
which is also the main employer of Polish migrants in the Nordic coun-
tries – it is possible to obtain both reliable numbers on average wages as 
well as minimum wage provisions that should apply to everyone. In the 
following we will therefore use the construction sector as a case of illus-
tration. Readers should be aware that the number of respondents is rela-
tively low, especially in Reykjavik. These analyses provide some inter-
esting results, which to some extent deviate from the results we get 
when comparing Polish migrants’ wages in all sectors to the overall 
wage levels in the host country. 
Table 2.10 Minimum wages for skilled and unskilled workers as specified in national collective 
agreements, average hourly wages within the sector, and the average wages of Polish migrants  
within the sector (counted in local currency and Zloty) 
 Reykjavik Copenhagen Oslo 
Industry average 1,875.04 ISK 172.76 DKK 209.50 NOK 
 
Minimum wage unskilled workers  
(in % of average wages) 
990.12 ISK 
(53%) 
106.90 DKK 
(62%) 
128.50 NOK 
(61%) 
 
Minimum wage skilled workers  
(in % of average wages) 
1,359.00 ISK 
(72%) 
106.90 DKK 
(62%) 
133.50 NOK 
(64%) 
 
Av. wage Polish migrants in local currency  
(in % of average wages) 
1,309 ISK 
(70%) 
113 DKK 
(65%) 
152 NOK 
(73%) 
 
Av. wage Polish migrants (Zloty) 32 Zl 53 Zl 74 Zl 
 
N 33 110 151 
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Table 2.11 The share of Polish construction workers who earn less than the min-
imum wages for skilled and unskilled workers as specified in national collective 
agreements, in Reykjavik, Copenhagen and Oslo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous section we saw that Poles in Reykjavik in general earn 
only 57% of the average wages of Icelandic wage earners, placing them 
lower in the relative wage hierarchy on Iceland than Poles in the other 
two cities. However, when wage comparison is confined excusively to 
construction i.e. when the wages of Polish construction workers is com-
pared to those of the average Icelandic construction worker, the differ-
ence is somewhat reduced, as Polish construction workers in Reykjavik 
earn about 70% of the overall average for Icelandic construction work-
ers. How does this fit with the collectively bargained minimum stand-
ards in the Icelandic construction industry, which are routinely extended 
by law to apply to all workers in Icelandic construction? First of all we 
should notice that there is considerable difference between minimum 
wages for unskilled and skilled workers within the collective agreement 
for the Icelandic construction industry. With minimum wages for un-
skilled workers at only 53% of the average wage level, this provides 
considerable wage flexibility – and thus scope for low wage competition 
– within the collective agreement. Polish construction workers (although 
we must take account of relatively few observations) are on average 
paid slightly more than the minimum wage for unskilled workers but the 
majority is paid less than the minimum wage for skilled workers. Here 
we should note that a majority of the construction workers do have 
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some form of vocational training or skills from Poland, suggesting that 
they rarely get recognition for their skills in the Icelandic labour market. 
While only 9% earn less than the minimum wage for unskilled workers, 
as much as 60% earn less than the minimum wage for skilled workers.  
In Denmark and Copenhagen the situation is quite different. Danish 
collective agreements in the construction sector do not separate be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers in their minimum provisions, and 
Polish workers are on average paid slightly above minimum wage. How-
ever, four out of five are actually paid below this level. It should be not-
ed, however, that unlike the case in the construction sector of Norway 
and Iceland, the minimum wages set in Danish collective agreements in 
the construction sector are not legally binding to all workers, but only 
apply to firms that are bound by the agreements. Compared to Poles 
working in other sectors, Polish construction workers in Copenhagen 
appear to be less well off compared to Danish colleagues, earning on 
average only 65% of the overall average in the industry. In other words, 
the Danish construction industry appears to be significantly less egali-
tarian than the previous overall analysis suggested.  
 In Oslo, Poles working in construction appear to be relatively better 
off than Poles in general, although not very much – earning about 73% of 
the industry average. About 19% earn less than the legally extended 
minimum wage for unskilled workers, while 26% earn less than the 
minimum wage for skilled workers.  
Summing up the findings from the construction industry so far, we 
find that the wage gap between Poles and native workers is widest in 
Copenhagen and smallest in Oslo. In Reykjavik the wage gap is related to 
the relatively large wage flexibility within the existing collective agree-
ments, allowing for relatively low wages for unskilled workers. In Oslo 
and Copenhagen, the wage gap is only to some extent explained by wage 
flexibility within existing collective agreements, and to some extent ex-
plained by wages below minimum wages. This is in particular the case in 
Copenhagen, where a considerable share of the Polish construction 
workers earned less than minimum wage. This is to some extent also the 
case in Oslo, where these minimum standards are legally binding.  
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6.6 Explaining variation in wages: Who are most “at 
risk” of receiving low pay? 
In terms of hourly wages, the average deviation from the mean is about 
20% in every city. This means that most of the workers actually earn 
either considerably more or considerably less than the estimated aver-
ages. Since this report has a particular focus on “social dumping” and 
low wage competition, we are particularly interested in those who re-
ceive the lowest wages. In order to explain why some migrants are 
placed low in the wage hierarchy and other higher up, we have per-
formed a multivariate regression analysis that makes it possible to con-
trol for several different factors, and estimate their significance in ex-
plaining variation in wages. This analysis allows us to point towards 
those groups of workers and those segments of the labour market where 
the risk of social dumping is the greatest. We use a standard linear re-
gression model without interaction, for all three cities first, which means 
that those factors that are found to have an impact on the wages of 
Polish workers are factors that appear to affect wages irrespectively of 
which city, industry and segment of the labour market or group of work-
ers we are dealing with (first column). Then we perform a similar analy-
sis for each city separately in order to see if the factors which affect 
wages differ between cities (last three columns). 
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Table 2.12 Linear regression model predicting hourly wages for Polish migrants in Oslo, Copenha-
gen and Reykjavik. N=962 
 Total Oslo Copenhagen Reykjavik 
 B (Zloty) Sig. B (Zloty) Sig. B (Zloty) Sig. B (Zloty) Sig. 
(Constant) 86.1 0.000 101.0 .000 68.2 .000 31.0 .000 
 
City         
 
Copenhagen -15.6 0.000       
 
Reykjavik -44.5 0.000       
 
Industry         
 
Construction -3.4 0.124 -13.7 .014 -2.8 .323 -0.5 .888 
 
Manufacturing -4.5 0.042 -25.1 .000 1.3 .624 -1.5 .593 
 
Low skilled service -6.9 0.000 -21.4 .000 -1.6 .451 -5.8 .024 
 
Individual factors         
 
Woman -2.6 0.062 -2.0 .658 -4.6 .004 0.4 .787 
 
No additional 
schooling after 12 
years 
-3.1 0.004 -4.4 .057 -3.7 .009 0.0 .993 
 
 
 
Stayed less than 2 
years 
-5.6 0.000 -12.5 .000 -4.0 .004 1.6 .483 
 
 
Structural factors         
 
Employed by 
Polish firm 
-7.6 0.000 -9.8 .001 -7.0 .000 7.9 .018 
 
 
No trade union 
rep in firm 
-3.6 0.001 -6.1 .043 -6.1 .000 1.9 .217 
 
 
Perform work for 
household clients 
-8.3 0.000 -5.7 .034 -7.4 .001 0.7 .837 
 
 
Adjusted R square 0.61 0.30 0.28 0.04 
 
Each B-coefficient suggests how many Zloty the predicted average hour-
ly wage changes when the value of the independent variable changes. If 
we focus on the overall analysis in the first column, the constant coeffi-
cient represents a male Polish worker in Oslo, working in sectors “other” 
than construction, manufacturing or low skilled service, who has addi-
tional schooling beyond 12 years, who arrived in the host country more 
than two years ago, who is not employed by a Polish subcontractor, who 
has a trade union representative at his workplace and who does not 
perform work for household clients. This is the group in our sample that 
by far receives the highest wages. We then introduce variables that have 
a negative impact on hourly wages. Aside from the already mentioned 
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fact that wages are considerably lower in Copenhagen and especially in 
Reykjavik, the analysis show that all else being equal, wages are signifi-
cantly lower in low skilled service professions compared to the “other” 
category. It also suggests that workers in construction and manufactur-
ing earn less than those in the “other sector” category, although this ef-
fect is not significant in our model. 
Taking other variables into consideration and starting with gender it 
turns out, that women generally earn less than men, but this is primarily 
related to their overrepresentation in low skilled service occupations 
which are generally low paid. When comparing men and women within 
the same sectors we find no significant difference in pay. Education ap-
pears to have a small but significant effect, meaning that workers with 
no additional schooling beyond 12 years earn slightly less than those 
who do have more than 12 years of schooling. Interestingly, length of 
stay turns out to have, much greater effect upon wages than education.. 
Those with less than two years of residence earn on average 5.6 zloty 
less, indicating that the migrants have some scope for improving their 
earnings over time.  
Yet, although these individual level characteristics such as education 
and particularly length of stay, can to some extent explain variation in 
income, structural factors related to the characteristics of employers 
appear to have a much stronger impact on their earnings. First of all, 
being employed by a Polish firm has a strong significant negative effect 
on wages, suggesting that transnational service mobility and subcon-
tracting is an important driver of low-wage competition. A somewhat 
smaller, but still significant, effect is related to the presence of trade 
union representatives in the firms where they work, suggesting that 
local enforcement of labour standards by the social partners work as a 
protection against wage dumping. Finally we find a strong effect of doing 
work for the private household client market, suggesting that this mar-
ket – largely outside the scope of labour regulations enforcement – pro-
vides significantly lower earnings for migrant workers than more regu-
lated parts of the labour market.  
In other words, we find that the following factors – listed according to 
their relative strength – are significantly associated with low wages:  
 
 Working for private household clients. 
 Working for a foreign company. 
 Working in a firm without trade union representation. 
 Short stay. 
 Low education. 
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So far we have assumed that the relationships between the variables and 
earnings are uniform across the three cities, and the effects mentioned 
here are effects that hold true when analysing all three populations. 
There are, however, variation between the three cities in the relative 
strength and directionality of these causal effects. This variation can be 
read from the differences between coefficients in the three columns to 
the right of the table. For example, in Oslo we find a particularly strong 
effect of length of stay, indicating that the potential for wage improve-
ment is greater here than in the other two cities. At the same time, edu-
cation does not have a significant effect in Oslo, suggesting that Poles in 
Oslo are rewarded very little for their formal skills. Having a trade union 
representative at the workplace does appear to affect earnings in Oslo, 
but this effect is not statistically significant, suggesting that firm repre-
sentation does not necessarily play a very central role in protecting the 
wage level of Polish migrants in Oslo. What does have a very strong im-
pact in Oslo is whether they work for a Polish firm or not. The results 
show that both posted workers and those catering to the household 
market are at particular risk of receiving very low wages in Oslo.  
Copenhagen shares many similarities with the Oslo labour market, 
but there are some differences which can be derived from the statistical 
analysis. First of all, it seems that trade union representatives may play a 
more central role in Copenhagen, as those working in firms with trade 
union representation earn significantly more than those working in 
firms which do not have such representation. However, the fact that this 
effect is significant in Copenhagen but not in Oslo may just be a result of 
more missing values in Oslo, and thus a larger sample in Copenhagen. 
Length of stay appears to be less significant in Copenhagen than in Oslo. 
Being employed by Polish subcontractor firms has a significant negative 
effect in Copenhagen, but this effect is not as strong as it is in Oslo. Per-
forming work for the private household market, on the other hand, ap-
pears to have an even stronger effect in Copenhagen than in Oslo.  
The labour market for Polish migrants in Reykjavik appears to be 
structured very differently from both Oslo and Copenhagen. Although 
there is considerable variation in wages here as well, this variation is not 
structured along the same lines as in Oslo and Copenhagen. In fact those 
very few Polish migrants who are employed by Polish firms in Reykjavik 
have higher earnings than other workers. There is no household market 
to speak of in Reykjavik, so this cannot explain wage variation. More 
surprising are the results showing that individual characteristics do not 
have any significant impact, and neither do structural factors relating to 
characteristics of their employers. 
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There are other variables that are correlated to the workers wage 
levels that are not included in the regression analysis above. On the one 
hand there are limits to how many variables the model can handle (and 
still produce significant results). On the other hand, some independent 
variables are so closely correlated to each other that it is difficult to dis-
tinguish the effects of one from the other. One of the most important 
factors that we have excluded from the analysis is language skills and 
language training. The reason is that this is so closely related to other 
variables that including them in the analysis will obscure the effect of 
both. These other variables which are closely related to language skills 
are particularly length of stay and type of job – people who have stayed 
longer have better language skills, and people with better language skills 
have better jobs (i.e. not work for Polish subcontractors etc.). When we 
do a simpler analysis of the effect of language skills, controlling for just 
city and sector, we find that having better language skills has a strong 
significant positive effect on their wage level. It is interesting to note, 
however, that this effect appears to be much weaker in Reykjavik than in 
Oslo and Copenhagen. One reason may be that the effects of the financial 
and economic crisis on Iceland has left limited scope for individuals try-
ing to better their economic situation through for example improving 
their language skills. Another reason may be that English is more com-
monly accepted as a working language on Iceland, and knowledge of 
Icelandic is therefore less required. 
6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has focussed exclusively on the hourly wages of Polish mi-
grant’s workers in the three cities, as they have been reported by our re-
spondents, in different currency measures and compared between differ-
ent groups. The comparison of absolute wages measured in Polish curren-
cy – and thus indicative of the value their earnings will buy them in Poland 
– show that there is a considerable difference between the three coun-
tries. Norway – and Oslo – is by far the most attractive destination, where 
Polish migrants earn by far the highest wages: on average almost four 
times their income back home in absolute terms. Reykjavik appears as the 
least attractive destination: being paid on average about twice their aver-
age income back home. The relatively low value of the Icelandic wages is 
not least a result of the financial and economic crisis, which reduced the 
value of the Icelandic Krona by half in the years after 2008. Polish mi-
grants in Copenhagen find themselves earning somewhere in between 
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those in Oslo and those in Reykjavik. Not surprisingly, these results con-
firm why Norway has been and continues to be the number one destina-
tion for labour migrants among the Nordic countries. Norway’s attractive-
ness as a destination for Central and Eastern European labour migrants 
depends to quite some extent, however, on their engagement in some kind 
of transnational pattern of consumption, such as temporary/circular mi-
gration, sending remittances or investing money back home. Because of 
Norway’s high price levels, Polish migrants in Norway have no higher 
purchasing power than those working in Copenhagen, as long as they 
spend their money at their place of residence.  
The analysis, however, also shows that Polish migrants on average 
earn considerably less than the average wage earner in the three coun-
tries (even despite the fact that Capital city jobs tend to pay more). 
There is, in other words, no doubt that labour migration to all three cit-
ies is closely related to low wages among the migrants. How much less 
than the average native worker the Polish migrants earn, varies however 
between the three cities. Once again Polish migrants in Reykjavik find 
themselves in the least fortunate position, earning only 57% of the aver-
age wage earner on Iceland. Oslo and Copenhagen, however, switch their 
positions when we measure the earnings of Polish workers in relative 
terms. While Polish migrants earn wages that are not very low compared 
to Danish workers (85%), the difference between the Poles and the av-
erage wage earner is quite a bit larger in Oslo (65%). When discussing 
the – in relative terms – lower wages of Polish migrants it is important to 
differentiate between two distinct effects. On the one hand migrant 
workers may have low earnings because they are disproportionately 
recruited to fill positions in low-wage sectors of the economy. On the 
other hand, migrants may be paid less than other workers within the 
same sectors (although this may be the same effect on a smaller scale: 
that migrants are recruited to perform the lowest paid work within sec-
tors). Although we do not have comparative data on all the different 
sectors where Polish migrants work, our analysis of the construction 
sector suggests that both mechanisms are in operation. Poles do earn 
less than the average within this sector, but the difference is less than 
the overall differences across sectors.  
The analysis of the construction sector provides different results re-
garding relative wages. Earning on average 70% of the industry average, 
the wage gap experienced by Polish construction workers in Reykjavik 
vis-a-vis native workers is still considerable, but significantly smaller 
than the overall analysis suggested. This analysis allows us to suggest 
one possible reason for the relatively low wages of the Icelandic Poles – 
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not just in absolute terms (which to some extent can be accounted for by 
the crisis), but also in relative terms. The Icelandic collective agreements 
– which are legally binding for everyone on Iceland –stipulated quite low 
wages for unskilled workers, both compared to the minimum wage for 
skilled workers and compared to the average wages of Icelandic con-
struction workers. In other words, as long as Polish migrants are defined 
as unskilled workers, there is plenty of scope for low wage competition 
within the existing system of extended collective bargaining. This, of 
course, means that Polish workers very often do not get recognition for 
their skills, education and experience from Poland.  
Polish construction workers in Copenhagen receive only 65% of the 
industry average – leaving them relatively less well off than the overall 
analysis suggested. As much as 42% of them earn less than the minimum 
standard of the collective agreement, suggesting that the Danish system 
of voluntary collective agreements is less able to protect the standards 
of migrant workers than the legally binding ones in Oslo and Reykjavik.  
Polish construction workers in Oslo earn 73% of the industry aver-
age, and 19% are paid below the legally extended minimum wage. That 
Polish construction workers in Oslo are better off in relative terms than 
both Polish construction workers in the other two cities as well as Polish 
workers in other sectors in Oslo, is probably related to the fact that the 
construction sector has been at the centre of attention of Norwegian 
anti-dumping policies and efforts launched by the government and Nor-
wegian trade unions. 
The multivariate analysis provides some further insight into the 
mechanisms of low wage competition. In general, and although our anal-
ysis does not allow us to measure all aspects of the human capital of the 
individuals, it seems that the structural placement of the labour mi-
grants into different segments of the labour market, has a stronger effect 
on their earnings than their individual characteristics (although length 
of stay does have a strong impact on wages – particularly in Oslo). Those 
working in low skilled services are generally paid less than those work-
ing in other industries. Individual factors such as gender (women are 
paid slightly less) and education do have an impact, although not very 
large. Most importantly we find that posting of workers (e.g. being em-
ployed by a foreign subcontractor) and the household sector are the 
main drivers of low wages in Oslo and Copenhagen. There is some varia-
tion between these two cities – posting of workers seems to have a 
stronger impact on wages in Oslo, while the household sector is particu-
larly low paid in Copenhagen. Furthermore, we find that not having a 
trade union representative in the workplace has a significant negative 
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 109 
effect on wages, but this effect appears to be more pronounced in Co-
penhagen than in Oslo. However, neither posting of workers nor the 
household market constitute any drivers of low wage competition, simp-
ly because both of these phenomena remain marginal. Language skills 
are positively correlated with higher wages, although much of this corre-
lation has to do with length of stay and having better jobs. Interestingly, 
this effect is much weaker in Reykjavik than in Oslo and Copenhagen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
7. Precarious working 
conditions 
In the sociological literature on work, the concept of precariousness – 
defined as employment that is uncertain, unpredictable and risky from 
the point of view of the worker – has become a central concept describ-
ing developments in parts of modern industrial labour markets over the 
last few decades (Kalleberg 2008). This concept can also be useful for 
describing certain aspects of the employment situation for many recent 
labour migrants, which may be considered to be problematic in the Nor-
dic labour market. Precarious working conditions may be defined in a 
variety of ways, and it is difficult to create any single measure which 
captures different aspects of uncertainty and risk in employment. In this 
chapter we will try to measure precariousness along three closely inter-
related dimensions. First of all, we can relate precariousness to lack of 
protection from dismissal and fear of losing one’s job. Workers who do 
not have a permanent contract are obviously in a much weaker position 
vis-a-vis their employers and do not enjoy the same protection against 
dismissal as workers with a permanent contract. As we saw in chapter 
five, as few as 26% of the Polish migrants in Oslo, and 36% of Polish 
migrants in Copenhagen, but as much as 80% of the Poles in Reykjavik, 
had regular permanent contracts with a host country firm. However, 
there are also other more direct – and more acute – ways of measuring 
the uncertainty which workers may experience, for example if they fear 
that they will get in serious trouble with their employers or lose their 
job if they talk to labour authorities or trade unions, or if they actually 
have received threats of dismissal from ones employer. Precariousness 
can also be related to the payment of wages. For example, workers may 
in reality receive lower wages than their direct hourly payment would 
indicate because they are cheated at some point. For example they may 
not get compensated for overtime work or they may in some other way 
be barred from receiving their entitled wages. If that is the case, our 
questions regarding the migrant’s direct hourly wages may not give an 
encompassing picture of their real wages. Even if being cheated out of 
pay that one is entitled to does not necessarily have a huge impact on 
one’s overall earnings, employers who arbitrarily can withhold parts of 
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the workers’ wages represents a form of uncertainty related to income. 
Finally, precariousness in the workplace may be related to workers ina-
bility to claim rights that they are entitled to either from their employers 
or from the public welfare system. This is for example the case for work-
ers who lack a written contract, and thereby do not have any legal pro-
tection from arbitrary treatment. Another measure is their ability to 
claim sick leave with pay in case they fall ill – a social right which all 
workers in the Nordic countries are entitled to by law, but which in real-
ity may be difficult to claim for some workers. To sum up, precarious-
ness is related to lack of stability, security and control in ones employ-
ment situation rather than lack of income. In this chapter we will meas-
ure and compare the prevalence of precarious, exploitative and illegal 
working conditions. We do this by comparing the respondents’ answers 
to several different questions about whether or not they had experi-
enced different kinds of situations at work in the host country, and their 
evaluation of their own situation.  
7.1 Fear of dismissal 
Our first dimension of precariousness is related to lack of protection from 
dismissal and fear of losing one’s job. Respondents in all three cities were 
asked the following question: “Do you think that you would risk losing 
your job or face other serious problems at work in [host country] if you 
talk to labour inspectors or other authorities?” They were then asked the 
same question about talking to trade unions. Note that this question is not 
necessarily related to actual experiences, but to their perception of possi-
ble risks. They were also asked if they had ever experienced actually being 
threatened with dismissal by their employers. Figure 2.21 shows how 
many answered yes to these questions in each city.  
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Figure 2.21 Fears and threats of dismissal among Polish migrants in Reykjavik, 
Copenhagen and Oslo. N=1,081 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results show that there is a substantial minority among the workers 
who think that they will get in serious trouble if they talk to labour authori-
ties or trade unions. These fears appear to be almost equally common in all 
three cities. They are expressed by workers in construction, manufacturing 
and low skilled services alike, but less common among workers in other 
sectors. Interestingly, there are no significant differences between workers 
with different types of affiliation to their employers. Workers with regular 
permanent employment as well as workers with temporary and atypical 
employment express these concerns. As we shall see later, this stands in 
contrast to most other measures of precariousness which are more closely 
related to the type of employment of the workers. One possible reason for 
this apparent lack of correlation between types of employment and fear of 
dismissal, is that although the real threat of dismissal is greater in “less de-
sireable jobs”, the workers fear of losing their job is greater among those 
with “better jobs”. When asked whether they have actually been threatened 
with dismissal by their employers, their answers suggest that this is most 
common within low skilled services and construction and among those with 
atypical and temporary employment. It is also worth to note that this ap-
pears to be most commonly reported in Copenhagen and least commonly 
reported in Reykjavik, despite the fact that the survey was conducted in 
Copenhagen before the onslaught of the financial crisis, while it was con-
ducted in a much more difficult economic climate in Reykjavik in 2010.  
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7.2 Not getting paid in full  
Our second dimension of precariousness is related to payment of wages 
– or to be more exact the lack of payment of wages. We asked our re-
spondents separately whether they had experienced not being paid at all 
for a piece of work, and whether they had experienced being paid less 
than what was agreed upon beforehand. For each question, respondents 
were asked if this happened in their current job or in a previous job in 
the host country. In figure 2.22 we have combined the answers to these 
two questions into a single variable, while distinguishing whether or not 
this occurred in their current or in a previous job (this distinction is 
important when we try to relate their answers to the kinds of jobs they 
hold). Although slightly less commonly reported in Reykjavik than in 
Oslo and Copenhagen, the answers show that a significant minority of 
the Polish workers in all three cities claim that they have been cheated 
out of pay while working in the host country. We do not know exactly 
what these occurrences mean. In some cases, it may be the case that the 
workers have misunderstood what they are entitled to or the host coun-
try tax regulations, and thus wrongly think that have been cheated. 
However, qualitative evidence as well as numerous media reports have 
shown that many migrant workers experience difficulties related to the 
payment of their wages, and that many employers either speculate in 
holding (back parts of) their employees’ wages or are not capable of 
fulfilling their financial obligations to their employees. Our analysis 
show that this is most common in construction and low skilled services, 
less common in manufacturing, and very rare in other sectors. 
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Figure 2.22 Share of workers who claim to have been cheated out of pay in their 
current or previous job. N=1,081 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A significant group of Poles work quite long weeks, and this is especially 
the case among construction workers in all the three cities. This raises 
the question of whether they are compensated for these extra hours or 
whether their flexibility is unrewarded. In figure 2.23 we have identified 
those that have positively indicated they have had the experience at 
some point during their stay to not be compensated for working over-
time. All others, who might have either said “no” or that they “do not 
know” if they have not been paid, have been collected in the “no” catego-
ry and not been analysed further. As in the previous figure, we distin-
guish between those who have experienced this in their current job and 
those who have experienced this in an earlier job in the host country. 
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Figure 2.23 Share of workers who claim to have worked overtime without pay in 
their current or previous job. N=1,081 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In regard to working overtime without receiving overtime payment, the 
differences between the three cities is much more striking than in the 
case of other forms of unfulfilled payments. In Reykjavik 12% of all 
Polish workers report that they have worked overtime without pay, 
whereas this has happened to 27% of the Poles working in Copenhagen 
and as much as 45% in Oslo. Not paying for overtime work may be a way 
for employers to cut labour costs in a context where hourly wages are 
relatively high and strictly regulated by law or collective agreements. 
This corresponds to the fact that not getting paid for overtime is much 
more common in Oslo, where wages are the highest (and in the case of 
construction – regulated by law), and least common in Reykjavik where 
Polish workers earn the lowest hourly wages in both absolute and rela-
tive terms. In Reykjavik – where only a small minority reports to have 
experienced working overtime without compensation – there are no 
significant differences between industries, although it appears that this 
is even less common in manufacturing than in the other industries. In 
Copenhagen, not getting paid for overtime work is also quite equally 
distributed between the three sectors where the Poles are overrepre-
sented while few cases are found within other work. In Norway, con-
struction stands out with as much as 60% reporting to have worked 
overtime without pay, while 36% of the Poles employed in low skilled 
service in Oslo are similarly exposed. Very few cases have been reported 
within the “other work” category. There is a strong connection between 
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type of employment and probability of not getting paid for overtime 
work. Having a standard type of employment (i.e. a permanent job in a 
host-land firm) reduces the chance of not getting paid for overtime work 
in both Copenhagen and Oslo. In Oslo, temporary agency workers are 
most likely to report working overtime without pay, while it is the self 
employed who top the list in Copenhagen. It should be noted, however, 
that self employed workers are usually not covered by regulations on 
overtime work and it is not entirely clear what these respondents actual-
ly refers to when saying they work overtime without compensation. 
When self employed workers, have been excluded, temporary agency 
workers top the list in Copenhagen as well.  
Summing up our questions regarding payments we find that both 
having been cheated out of pay and having worked without receiving 
overtime payment is most common in Oslo and least common in 
Reykjavik. Furthermore this is most often reported by workers within low 
skilled services and construction work. It is also far more common among 
those who have some type of atypical employment than among those who 
are permanently employed. This difference is not so pronounced in 
Reykjavik, where most workers are permanently employed.  
7.3 Inability to claim basic rights 
Access to paid sick leave in case one falls ill is an indication of to what 
extent migrant workers enjoy the full benefits of the different forms of 
national welfare and labour regulation. Through national legislation 
and collective agreements the general right to sick leave is secured in 
Iceland, Norway and Denmark. We asked the respondents whether 
they thought they would be able to take a few days sick leave in case 
they would become ill. In their answers, we find large differences be-
tween the cities. Only 9% of the Poles in Reykjavik claim they cannot 
get paid for sick leave, whearas 38% and 37% of respondents in Co-
penhagen and Oslo respectively said they could not get paid forsick 
leave. Copenhagen and Oslo differ, as a larger group of Poles in Copen-
hagen expect to get leave without pay, while more Poles expect to lose 
their job if they become sick in Oslo. In Reykjavik there are no signifi-
cant differences between the different industries. In Oslo, however, 
half of the workers in low skilled services and almost one in three con-
struction workers report that they do not expect to get sick leave with 
pay if sick, while this applies to only very few in other sectors. In Co-
penhagen it is the construction workers who stand out by not having 
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access to paid sick leave while between one fourth and one fifth of 
workers in other industries report the same. 
Figure 2.24 Workers expectations on the question of whether they would be able 
to claim sick leave if they become ill, across cities. N=932 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the same time, type of employment seems to have a strong impact on 
the right to take sick leave. In both Oslo and Copenhagen, where the 
majority of workers have some kind of atypical employment, these 
workers are significantly more prone to say that they do not have access 
to paid sick leave than those in permanent standard employment. The 
difference is largest in Oslo where almost everyone with regular em-
ployment can take paid sick leave, but only half of those with atypical 
employment. In Copenhagen there are also many among those in regular 
employment who do not expect to get paid sick leave, although it is far 
more common among those with atypical employment.  
 
 
 
 
 
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 119 
Figure 2.25 Percentage of workers who do not expect that they can get sick leave 
with pay if they become ill. Regular and atypical forms of employment compared 
for each city. N=899 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4 Who are most at risk of arbitrary and exploitative 
treatment? 
In the following we will use five of the above mentioned phenomena as 
indicators of precarious working conditions: 
 
 Having been cheated out of pay (receiving no pay at all or less than 
what was agreed upon). 
 Having worked overtime without receiving overtime payment;  
 Having received threats from their employers that they would be fired. 
 Not having a written work contract; 
 Not being able to take sick-leave with pay if they fall ill for a 
couple of days.  
 
Figure 2.26 summarizes the analysis so far in this chapter, clearly show-
ing that Polish migrants working in Oslo are more at risk than those 
working in Copenhagen, who in turn are more at risk than those who are 
working in Reykjavik. Except for workers reporting to have received 
threats by their employers – which is most prevalent in Copenhagen – 
we find that every indicator of exploitative conditions is most commonly 
reported in Oslo, and least commonly reported in Reykjavik. 
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Figure 2.26 The share of Polish workers in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik who 
report to have experienced each of the following five indicators of precarious, 
exploitative and illegal working conditions at least once during their stay. 
N=1,081 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.27 The share of Polish workers in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik who 
report to have experienced one or more of five indicators of precarious, exploita-
tive and illegal working conditions. N=1,081  
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In other words, when we compare the prevalence of precarious, exploita-
tive and illegal working conditions, we find the complete opposite rela-
tionship between the three cities from what we found when we measured 
hourly wages. In terms of precariousness, Oslo is the least attractive des-
tination, while Reykjavik is the most attractive. While each individual indi-
cator is reported to have occurred by somewhere between 13 and 45% 
among Polish workers in Oslo, as much as 76% of the Poles in Oslo have 
experienced at least one of them (64% if we only count those who have 
experienced it in their current job). In Reykjavik, only 38% report having 
experienced any of these things (26% in their current job). Copenhagen 
lies somewhere in the middle – 62% have experienced at least one of 
these things during their stay in Denmark (52% in their current job).  
In order to find out which factors are associated with exploitative 
working conditions, we have performed a similar multivariate analysis 
of how different variables affect the risk of experiencing at least one of 
the exploitative working conditions mentioned above. Since the depend-
ent variable this time is dichotomous, we use a logistic regression model 
predicting the odds of having experienced any of the mentioned indica-
tors of exploitative working conditions in their current job. We first per-
form an analysis of all cities combined (“Total” column). This time the 
constant is set to be a male Polish worker in Reykjavik, working in sec-
tors “other” than construction, manufacturing or low skilled service, 
who has attended additional schooling beyond 12 years, who arrived in 
the host country more than two years ago, who is permanently em-
ployed by a host country firm which has a trade union representative 
and who does not perform work for household clients. According to our 
model, such a person has the lowest probability amongst the Poles of 
having experienced any of these exploitative working conditions. We 
then introduce variables that have a negative impact on working condi-
tions, in the sense that they increase the likelihood of experiencing ex-
ploitative working conditions. Next we performed the same analysis for 
each city separately. We only show the Exp(B)-coefficients and the sig-
nificance level for each variable.  
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Table 2.13 Logistic regression model predicting the probability of having experi-
enced at least one indicator of exploitative working conditions in their current 
job for Polish migrants in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik.N=1,081 
  Total Oslo Copenhagen Reykjavik 
    Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. Exp(B) Sig. 
  Constant 0.035 0.000 0.191 0.02
1 
0.023 0.000 0.091 0.000 
 
City Copenhagen 2.07 0.002       
 
  Oslo 2.637 0.000       
 
 Industry Construction 3.295 0.002 2.326 0.247 5.028 0.012 2.264 0.291 
 
 Manufactu-
ring 
1.81 0.136 0.769 0.786 4.124 0.026 0.529 0.372 
 
 
  Service 4.234 0.000 4.753 0.012 7.585 0.000 2.006 0.229 
 
Individual 
factors 
Women 1.345 0.173 0.787 0.682 0.776 0.465 2.414 0.026 
 
 
  No schooling 
after 12 years 
1.074 0.662 1.044 0.885 1.562 0.120 0.883 0.683 
 
 
  Stayed less 
than 2 years 
1.411 0.064 0.665 0.255 2.393 0.003 1.192 0.679 
 
 
Structural 
factors 
Atypical 
employment 
2.07 0.000 2.860 0.001 2.260 0.004 1.362 0.384 
 
 
  No trade 
union rep in 
firm 
2.12 0.000 1.239 0.561 3.967 0.000 1.349 0.383 
 
 
 
  Perform work 
for private 
households 
1.831 0.005 4.539 0.000 0.883 0.764 0.713 0.727 
 
The Exp(B)-coefficients show how the probability of having experienced 
the indicators changes when the value independent variable change. An 
Exp(B)-coefficient of 1 means that the odds do not change at all. An 
Exp(B)-coefficient of less than 1 indicates that the probability is reduced 
once the independent variable is changed, while Exp(B)-coefficients of 
more than 1 indicates that the odds increase. For example, having atypical 
employment has an Exp(B)-coefficient of 2.07, meaning that the odds of 
experiencing one of our exploitative work indicators are twice as high for 
those with atypical employment as for those with regular permanent em-
ployment. As with hourly wages we find significant differences between 
the cities, with Reykjavik at the bottom end and Oslo on top in terms of 
risk of experiencing exploitative conditions. We also find significant dif-
ferences between different industries. Working in manufacturing almost 
doubles the risk of exploitative conditions compared to the “other” cate-
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gory, while this risk is tripled in construction and quadrupled in low 
skilled services. Following this model, a male construction worker who 
has lived in Oslo for less than two years, working in some kind of atypical 
employment, with no trade union representative in the firm, often per-
forming work for household clients, will have about 77% likelihood of 
having experienced one or more of these things. If we look at the odds-
ratio (listed in the Exp(B) column), we find that individual factors such as 
gender, schooling and length of stay has no substantial effect (odds-ratio 
close to 1 mean no effect) the structural factors – atypical employment, 
lack of trade union representation and working for household clients – 
each approximately double the odds of experiencing exploitative working 
conditions. This time – in contrast to the chapter on wages – we have 
changed employment in Polish firms with atypical employment in general. 
Being employed in Polish firms had a negative impact on wages, but when 
we look at experiences of exploitative conditions we find that this is 
strongly associated with atypical work in general, including temporary 
employment, staffing agencies and self employment.  
Once again we find differences between the cities in terms of which 
variables have the greatest impact. Lack of trade union representation 
has a much bigger impact in Copenhagen than in Oslo or Reykjavik. 
Atypical employment on the other hand is most consequential in Oslo in 
terms of increasing the likelihood of experiencing precarious conditions. 
The analysis also suggest that individual factors such as education and 
length of stay has a more significant impact on the probability of experi-
encing precarious working conditions in Copenhagen than in Oslo. And 
once again we find that the working conditions of Poles in Reykjavik are 
not structured along the same lines as in the two other cities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
In the following analysis we will present an empirical description of 
each city, in terms of institutional context and labour market outcomes 
for Polish workers. We then conclude by discussing some of the key 
dilemmas facing Nordic labour markets in a context of increasing 
transnational mobility.  
8.1 Oslo: Weak collectivism, ad-hoc universalism and 
precarious incorporation 
Norway has been the primary destination among the Nordic countries 
for Polish migrants since Poland’s accession to the EU, and although 
Polish migrants are found in all parts of the country, Oslo has attracted 
the largest share. According to our survey, Polish migrants in Oslo are on 
average 36 years old; the men being slightly older than the women. In 
terms of education the majority of migrants are skilled workers – 62% 
have some kind of vocational education, while only 17% have completed 
university level education, although this share is higher among the 
women. The selection of migrants going to Norway thus differs from 
other large destinations such as the UK and Ireland – where Polish mi-
grants tend to be much younger, and often have higher education (Ka-
czmarczyk, 2010) – reflecting the relative inaccessibility of Nordic lan-
guages as well as large demand for manual labour. As Norway is one of 
the most expensive countries in Europe, considerable economic gains 
can be achieved for migrant workers by engaging in some kind of trans-
national activities in order to maintain parts of their consumption in 
Poland, for example through remittances, transnational family arrange-
ments or circular mobility. Our survey shows that the Polish population 
in Oslo has been dominated by male workers, who often leave their 
families behind in Poland in order to work temporarily in Norway. In 
recent years, however, this pattern appears to be changing as increasing 
numbers of women and children have arrived.2 In terms of sectors and 
occupations, the labour market for Polish migrants in Oslo is highly con-
centrated and gender segregated: 85% of the men are employed in the 
construction sector, and the majority of women are employed in low 
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skilled services. This includes some hotel maids and restaurant workers, 
but consists primarily of cleaning – quite often catering to domestic 
households. Some women but very few men are found on other types of 
work, such as public health care and kindergartens.3  
Norway has the highest wages among the Nordic countries and thus 
the largest scope for low wage competition. It also has the lowest levels 
of collective agreement coverage, leaving large parts of the labour mar-
ket unregulated in terms of minimum wages. In many key industries, the 
institutional basis of collective bargaining and enforcement is much 
weaker than in the other Nordic countries. Facing increasing labour mi-
gration flows after the EU accession, Norwegian policy makers and social 
partners quickly realized that if basic labour standards were to be up-
held in the most exposed industries, the existing institutional framework 
would be insufficient. Largely based on legislation that was introduced 
when Norway joined the EEA, but had lay dormant until EU enlarge-
ment, Norwegian labour market regulation policies have since then 
gradually moved from a system based on voluntary collective arrange-
ments towards what can be labelled ad-hoc universalism marked by in-
creasing state involvement in wage regulations. This move included the 
now dismantled transitional restrictions (which basically took the form 
of minimum wage laws for migrant workers), but has since then come in 
the form of industry-wise universal legal extensions of minimum provi-
sions in collective agreements (so far in construction, ship-yards, agri-
culture and cleaning), new chain liability legislation and increased con-
trol and enforcement by the state, as well as a number of other new stat-
utory regulations regarding registration and control requirements. 
When it comes to enforcement of the generally binding collective 
agreement, the introduction of liability that is at once both joint and 
separate (chain liability) has been a landmark. It means that all contract-
ing entities in the chain of subcontractors are “jointly and severally” 
liable to employees further down in the chain who does not receive gen-
erally applicable wages from their employers (Eldring et al., 2011).  
Our survey results suggest that these new measures, introduced 
through two consecutive government action plans against social dump-
ing, have had some success in establishing a relatively high wage floor 
among new migrants: In terms of hourly wages, Oslo stands out as 
being the most attractive among the three cities. Polish migrants in 
Oslo earn an average of 71 Zloty per hour in Oslo – quadrupling their 
average prior earnings from Poland. In relative terms, their reported 
hourly earnings amount to about 65% of the average hourly earnings 
of wage earners in Norway in general, but if we look only at the con-
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struction industry the wages of Polish migrant workers relative to the 
national average increase to 73%. The wage gap to native workers is 
thus partly – but not entirely – explained by their concentration in low-
income occupations. There is, however, considerable variation in earn-
ings among Polish migrant workers (standard deviation is approx. 
20%). For example, one in five Polish construction workers still re-
ceived less than minimum wage for unskilled workers, five years after 
this had been legally extended to all workers.  
A regression analysis suggests which factors are most closely related to 
receiving low wages. We find that low skilled services, when controlling 
for all relevant factors, provide significantly lower wages than construc-
tion work, which in turn provide lower wages than work outside these 
two main sectors. There is no significant effect of gender, although women 
generally earn less because they tend to work in low income sectors. Hu-
man capital in the form of schooling beyond the obligatory 12 years only 
has a weak and non-significant positive effect on hourly wages. There is, 
on the other hand a positive and significant effect of length of stay, indicat-
ing some wage improvement over time. There is also a strong negative 
effect of being employed through Polish subcontractor firms, confirming 
that transnational service provision and posting of workers have been 
main drivers of low-wage competition in Norway (Alsos and Eldring, 
2008; Dølvik and Eldring 2008). Working in a firm that does not have 
trade union representation, or working for firms that cater to the private 
household market are also both associated with low wages.  
Compared to the other two cities (to which we will turn shortly), Oslo 
is by far the most attractive destination in absolute monetary terms, but 
it is also the destination where Polish migrant workers are least likely to 
access what can be described as regular employment. Only 26% in total, 
and even fewer in the main industries of construction and cleaning, had 
accessed regular permanent employment within Norwegian firms. In-
stead, the majority had what we describe as atypical employment. They 
were hired on temporary basis, usually through temporary staffing 
agencies or Polish subcontractors – which is particularly common within 
the construction industry – or as self-employed workers sometimes 
operating in the informal economy. Oslo also stands out by having a sig-
nificant market for domestic household service provision, employing 
31% of Polish workers. This is particularly common among cleaners, but 
there is also a substantial number of construction workers who provide 
building and maintenance services to private households. Their relative 
weak links to the labour market meant that Polish workers in Oslo were 
particularly vulnerable to labour market exclusion and unemployment 
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in the period of economic uncertainty after the international financial 
crisis (Friberg, 2012).  
Oslo is also the city where Polish migrants are most likely to experi-
ence different kinds of precarious and illegal working conditions. For ex-
ample, 34% of the sample report that they have been cheated out of pay 
by their employers; 45% report that they have worked overtime without 
getting additional pay; 13% have received threats from their employers 
that they would be fired; 28% do not even have a written work contract 
and 33% say that they would not be able to take sick-leave with pay if 
they were to fall ill for a couple of days. Each of these experiences indi-
cates a rather precarious situation in the workplace, and it´s not just con-
centrated on a small group. Overall, 76% of the Polish workers in Oslo 
report to have experienced at least one of these things during their stay in 
Norway, and 64% report to have experienced one of them in their current 
job in Oslo.  
In order to find out which factors are associated with precarious 
working conditions, we performed a logistic regression model predicting 
the odds of having experienced any of the mentioned indicators in their 
current job. Not surprisingly, we find that many of the same factors that 
are associated with low wages are also associated with precarious work-
ing conditions: Workers in the service industry are more at risk than 
construction workers, who in turn are more at risk than workers outside 
these two industries. There is no effect of gender, education level or 
length of stay. There is, however, a strong connection between atypical 
work and precarious working conditions. And while low wages were 
primarily related to work for Polish subcontractor firms, precariousness 
is related to all kinds of atypical work, including fixed time contracts, 
temporary staffing agencies, and self-employment. Working in firms 
without trade union representation does not significantly affect the like-
lihood of experiencing precarious and exploitative conditions. There is 
however, a strong effect of providing services to private households, 
suggesting that workers in this market are particularly vulnerable to 
arbitrary treatment. 
The results show that transnational service provision and posting of 
workers remains a powerful driver of low wage competition in Oslo (We 
will return to the results in Copenhagen and Reykjavik shortly). Given 
the relatively high wage level in absolute terms, it seems however quite 
likely that new statutory policies of minimum wage regulation have had 
at least some success in imposing collectively agreed minimum wages on 
migrant intensive labour markets. However, they do not appear to have 
had much success in incorporating migrant workers into the existing 
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institutional framework of employment relations. Instead, new forms of 
atypical, temporary and insecure employment have become the norm in 
migrant intensive labour markets, leaving migrant workers exposed to a 
wide range of precarious and often illegal conditions at work, including 
lack of written contracts, unpaid overtime, outright fraud and inability to 
claim basic rights at work. 
8.2 Copenhagen: Insiders and outsiders in  
the Danish model  
In absolute numbers Denmark has been the second most important des-
tination for Polish migrant workers among the Nordic countries after 
2004. Our data suggests that the selection of migrants working in Co-
penhagen is quite similar to Oslo, although we find some significant dif-
ferences. Polish migrants in Copenhagen are on average four years 
younger than in Oslo. And even though we find an overrepresentation of 
male workers in Copenhagen as well, this trend is less pronounced than 
in Oslo. There are also slightly fewer Polish migrants in Copenhagen who 
report to have a spouse in Poland. In terms of education, there is no sig-
nificant difference in selection compared to Oslo: most have some sort of 
vocational training, while a minority of about 20% have completed uni-
versity level education. Compared to Oslo, Polish migrants in Copenha-
gen are found in somewhat more diverse sectors and occupations. The 
construction sector is the most important employer for the male Poles, 
but less dominating than in Oslo, employing “only” 44% of the men. Low 
skilled services is an equally important employer with 48% of the total 
Polish population being employed in this sector, but this category in-
cludes a more varied set of occupations in Copenhagen, including news-
paper delivery, kitchen work and some types of customer related ser-
vices. Unlike Oslo we also find a significant share of both men and wom-
en working in industrial manufacturing and related work in warehouses 
and storages.  
While political debates over social dumping and low wage competition 
have been quite similar in Denmark and Norway, the social partners and 
policy makers in Denmark have sought to maintain a more “pure” frame-
work of voluntary collective bargaining, and the social partners have op-
posed any moves towards increasing state regulation in response to in-
ternational labour mobility (Andersen and Pedersen, 2010; Malchow-
Møller et al., 2009). This is probably related to the fact that, Denmark has 
a much higher level of collective agreement coverage, trade union organi-
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sational rates and unions have easier access to take industrial action 
(Eldring et al., 2012). But has this stronger Danish framework been suffi-
cient to resist low wage competition and worker exploitation in the face of 
recent years increasing labour migration flows?  
At first glance the answer appears to be yes. Although Copenhagen is 
a somewhat less attractive destination for Polish migrant workers in 
absolute monetary terms (Polish workers earn on average 54 Zloty per 
hour), their earnings relative to the average Danish worker are far high-
er than in Oslo – standing at about 85% of the national average. When 
controlling for price level, their purchasing power in Copenhagen is on 
par with that of Polish migrants in Oslo. This picture however looks 
quite different when we examine the construction sector in isolation. 
Polish construction workers in Copenhagen earn only 65% of the aver-
age Danish construction worker, and as much as 40% earn less than the 
minimum wage stipulated in the Danish collective agreements for the 
construction sector. Paradoxically, we find that Polish workers on aver-
age are better off relative to native workers in Copenhagen than in Oslo, 
but the situation in the construction industry is reversed, and there are 
more than twice as many construction workers who receive less than 
minimum wage in Copenhagen as there are in Oslo. This reflects the 
troubles Danish construction unions have had in securing the terms and 
conditions of Eastern European workers (Andersen and Arnholtz 
Hansen, 2008). 
Our regression analysis of hourly wages shows that most of the same 
factors associated with low wages in Oslo also apply in Copenhagen. Like 
in Oslo, transnational service provision and posting of workers are sig-
nificantly associated with low wages, although this connection is strong-
er in Oslo than in Copenhagen. Gender has a slightly stronger effect on 
wages in Copenhagen than in Oslo, while length of stay has a much 
weaker impact. We also find that working in firms without trade union 
representatives and working for private household clients has a strong-
er negative impact on wages in Copenhagen than in Oslo.  
The differences between Oslo and Copenhagen in terms of labour 
market outcomes for Polish workers in the construction industry com-
pared to other industries illustrate the institutional differences between 
the two countries. In Oslo, Polish migrant workers primarily work in low 
wage sectors with very low organisational rates and collective agree-
ment coverage. The construction sector is no exception, but having been 
the main target for recent years’ statutory anti-dumping policies the 
construction sector has during the post 2004 period had much stronger 
minimum wage regulations than other affected sectors. Thus the relative 
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strong position of Poles vis-à-vis native workers in this sector. In Copen-
hagen, the Poles work in low wage sectors as well, but with relatively 
higher organisational and collective agreement coverage rates than in 
Oslo (Arnholtz Hansen and Hansen, 2009). This secures a more egalitar-
ian wage structure. Construction, however, is not a low wage sector in 
the same sense. Rather it is marked by strong trade unions, a fairly 
strong wage development, but also a high degree of wage flexibility be-
tween minimum levels and the average wage (Arnholtz and Hansen, 
forthcoming). Local wage setting plays an important role in Danish con-
struction, and Polish migrants are in poor bargaining positions. As a 
result they end up being relatively more disadvantaged than their coun-
trymen in Oslo. 
Like in Oslo, we find that the majority of workers have some type of 
atypical employment, with both fixed-term contracts, work through 
temporary staffing agencies and Polish subcontractors and self-
employment being common. Compared to Oslo, however, there is a 
greater share of workers – 36% – who have accessed regular permanent 
employment within Danish a firm. Polish migrants in Copenhagen are 
also at risk of experiencing the same kind of precarious and exploitative 
working conditions as in Oslo, although to a slightly lesser degree. 33% 
of the Copenhagen sample report that they have been cheated out of pay 
by their employers; 27% report that they have worked overtime without 
getting additional pay; 20% have received threats from their employers 
that they would be fired; 14% do not have a written work contract and 
32% say that they would not be able to take sick-leave with pay if they 
were to fall ill for a couple of days. 62% of the Polish workers in Copen-
hagen report to have experienced at least one of these things during 
their stay in Denmark, and 52% report to have experienced one of them 
in their current job in Copenhagen. The logistic regression model pre-
dicting the odds of having experienced any of the mentioned indicators 
of exploitative working conditions in their current job shows similar 
patterns as in Oslo. Low skilled service workers and construction work-
ers are more at risk than others, while individual factors such as gender 
and education have little effect. As in Oslo, structural factors related to 
their placement in different segments of the labour market are more 
important for understanding the risk of arbitrary treatment. As in Oslo, 
precariousness is strongly related to atypical employment. But once 
again we find that whether or not the workers have a trade union repre-
sentative in the firm appears to have a much stronger effect on working 
conditions in Copenhagen than in Oslo.  
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Although there are many similarities between the labour market sit-
uation for Polish migrant workers in Oslo and Copenhagen, it appears 
that the Danish model of labour market regulation based on encompass-
ing collective agreements and collective action has been slightly more 
successful in ensuring a relatively egalitarian wage structure. However, 
there is a substantial minority who does not enjoy the protection and 
benefits associated with the Danish organized labour market. The com-
paratively stronger effect upon wages and working conditions of having 
a trade union representative at the workplace illustrate a particular fea-
ture of the Copenhagen context of labour market incorporation – those 
who are “inside” the organized labour market enjoy stronger protection 
than in Oslo, but those who are outside enjoy less (Larsen, 2011; 
Arnholtz and Hansen, 2011). 
8.3 Reykjavik: Flexible universalism and low wage 
incorporation  
In absolute terms, the number of Polish migrants who have entered the 
Icelandic labour market cannot rival that of the other Nordic countries, 
but relative to the island’s small overall population, Iceland was in fact the 
number one receiver of Polish migrant workers among the Nordic coun-
tries in the years between 2004 and 2007. Iceland was, however, severely 
affected by the financial crisis of 2008, leading to a crash in the country’s 
booming construction industry, devaluation of the Icelandic Krona and a 
subsequent halt (and to some extent reversal) in migration flows. Reykja-
vik nevertheless still boasts a substantial population of Polish migrant 
workers. In terms of age and education levels they do not differ signifi-
cantly from Polish migrants in Oslo or Copenhagen. However, in contrast 
to the male dominated populations of Oslo and to a lesser extent Copen-
hagen, their gender distribution is almost equal (55/45), and transnation-
al family arrangements are far less common here, as only 10% report to 
have a spouse in Poland (It should be noted that these results would have 
looked different a few years earlier, since many commuting males re-
turned in the wake of the crisis). Reykjavik is also the place where Polish 
migrant workers are found within the most diverse set of sectors – includ-
ing construction work, industrial manufacturing and fish processing in 
particular and a wide range of low skilled services including several types 
of customer related services. This distribution reflects a partial acceptance 
of English as the working language of many services occupations – espe-
cially up until the crisis. In contrast to Oslo and Copenhagen, this opened 
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up several customer related service occupations to migrants who were 
unfamiliar with the native language.  
Icelandic debates over social dumping was until the financial crisis 
centred around the operations of a growing unregulated industry of 
international temporary staffing agencies, who among other things sup-
plied thousands of Central and Eastern European workers to the con-
struction of a large hydroelectric power plant in the country’s remote 
interior. The conflict ended with the passing of a number of new regula-
tions that would bring these operations in line with Icelandic labour 
regulation, which in combination with the crisis led to the virtual disap-
pearance of temporary staffing agencies after 2008. Since then, the issue 
of social dumping has been overshadowed by the severe economic crisis. 
However, Iceland appeared to have a much stronger framework for deal-
ing with social dumping than any of the other Nordic countries. First of 
all it has one of the highest rates of unionization and collective agree-
ment coverage in the world. Secondly, much of the new statutory regula-
tions imposed in certain Norwegian sectors as a response to social 
dumping were already commonly applied in Iceland, as minimum provi-
sions of collective agreements are routinely made legally binding for all 
workers. Low wage competition outside the existing regulatory frame-
work is thus much more difficult in Iceland than in the other Nordic 
countries. As we shall see, however, there was ample scope for low wage 
competition within the existing framework.  
Up until the crisis, Iceland was among the most attractive destina-
tions in Europe in terms of nominal wages, but since the devaluation of 
the Krona, the value of Icelandic wages against foreign currency has 
plummeted by 40–50%. Our respondents report to earn on average the 
equivalent of about 30 Zloty – a meagre income compared to those 
earned by Poles in Oslo or Copenhagen, but still almost twice as much as 
their average earnings before leaving Poland. However, the earnings of 
Polish migrant workers in Reykjavik are not only meagre in terms of 
foreign currency; they are also substantially lower than those of native 
Icelandic workers. On average Polish migrants earn about 55% of the 
average Icelandic wage earner measured in hourly wages – well below 
the relative wages compared to natives of Poles in Oslo and Copenhagen. 
The purchasing power provided by their earnings in Iceland is also sub-
stantially lower (55–59%) than that of Poles in Oslo and Copenhagen. 
But why do migrant workers in Iceland earn relatively less compared to 
natives, when Iceland apparently has a much stronger and more encom-
passing framework of wage regulation than the two other countries? 
Once again the construction sector provides a key to understanding the 
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specific situation in Iceland. Less than one in ten Polish construction 
workers in Reykjavik earn less than the minimum wage for unskilled 
workers – as one would expect when almost every firm is organized and 
minimum standards are made legally binding for everyone. However, 
there is a lot more wage flexibility in the Icelandic collective agreement 
for the construction sector than in the two other countries. Minimum 
provisions for unskilled workers in the Icelandic collective agreement in 
construction are set at only 53% of the average wages in the Icelandic 
construction industry, compared to 61% in Norway and 62% in Den-
mark. This relatively low wage floor appears to have become the norm 
for Polish migrant workers. Only a minority receives wages equal to the 
minimum provisions for skilled workers, even though the majority of 
construction workers do have skills. This means that as long as migrant 
workers are defined as “unskilled” and receive the minimum wage, the 
relatively low wage floor within the Icelandic collective agreement has 
enabled considerable wage differences between native and migrant 
workers, without breaching collectively bargained and legally binding 
minimum provisions. 
While the Reykjavik Poles are worse off in terms of earnings than 
their compatriots in Oslo and Copenhagen, they are far better off in 
terms of access to regular employment and reduced risk of arbitrary and 
exploitative treatment. Unlike their counterparts in Oslo and Copenha-
gen, the vast majority of Polish migrants in Reykjavik – about 80% – are 
permanently employed within Icelandic companies. Fixed-term con-
tracts are rare, and the use of temporary staffing agencies, Polish sub-
contractor firms and various forms of self-employment, which have be-
come so popular with Norwegian and Danish employers, are almost non-
existent. Neither do we find any significant market for domestic service 
provisions or undeclared work – which both (usually in combination) 
provide an important labour market for Polish migrants in Oslo and 
Copenhagen. As a result, they have much lower risk of experiencing any 
of our indicators of precarious and exploitative conditions. 27% of the 
Reykjavik sample report that they have been cheated out of pay by their 
employers (a result which may be accounted for by the sudden devalua-
tion of the Icelandic Krona); 12% report that they have worked overtime 
without getting additional pay; 9% have received threats from their 
employers that they would be fired; 10% do not have a written work 
contract and 8% say that they would not be able to take sick-leave with 
pay if they were to fall ill for a couple of days. 38% of the Polish workers 
in Reykjavik report to have experienced at least one of these things dur-
ing their stay in Iceland, and 26% report to have experienced one of 
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them in their current job in Reykjavik. All of these indicators are signifi-
cantly lower than in the two other cities, where such occurrences are 
clearly related to the widespread use of atypical forms of employment. 
Another result of their incorporation into regular employment was that 
when the crisis hit Iceland and unemployment among migrant workers 
sky-rocketed, they had access to public unemployment benefits. In Nor-
way, this was only partially the case, because of their high rates of atypi-
cal and informal employment. It is difficult to say exactly why Poles in 
Reykjavik have been incorporated into regular employment and enjoy a 
certain protection against arbitrary treatment, while this is not the case 
in our two other cities. It should be noted that had we collected our data 
a couple of years earlier, we might have found more workers affiliated 
through temporary staffing agencies and transnational subcontractors, 
but these operations all but disappeared after the introduction of new 
registration requirements bringing them into the existing legal and regu-
latory framework. A reasonable hypothesis is that the relative flexibility 
within Icelandic wage setting institutions, as well as flexible rules on 
hiring and firing, means that the incentives for trying to bypass regula-
tions or avoid employer responsibility through the use of intermediaries 
and subcontractors are lower than in our two other cities. It is also more 
difficult to do so, given the universal and encompassing nature of Ice-
landic labour regulations. At the same time, this flexibility has allowed 
considerable low wage competition within the regular labour market. 
8.4 Discussion and conclusions 
Each Nordic country has its own historical traditions of regulating work 
and welfare, and there is no universal answer to how the challenges of 
an increasingly mobile and unequal European labour market will be met 
by national states. However, the comparative analysis presented here 
may shed some light on the particular challenges facing each of these 
three Nordic countries.  
In Oslo, our results suggest that the Norwegian turn from a system 
based on voluntary collective arrangements towards ad-hoc universalism 
in the form of legal extensions of collective agreements, new statutory 
regulations regarding employer responsibilities and increased control and 
enforcement by the state has been highly warranted. Our data suggest that 
this move has been a partial success in terms of upholding a relatively 
high wage level among migrant workers, but not in terms of protecting 
migrant workers from arbitrary treatment. This development has taken 
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the form of a “race” between the government and social partners’ at-
tempts to fill regulatory loop-holes on the one hand and strategic circum-
vention on behalf of employers seeking to minimize costs and risks 
through subcontracting and various forms of atypical and precarious em-
ployment on the other. As political discussions slowly move from a simple 
focus on wage dumping, towards a long-term concern for welfare state 
sustainability in a context of record high levels of labour related immigra-
tion, questions regarding employment security and labour market protec-
tion and incorporation may move to the forefront of the debate.  
The Danish response to international mobility has been a continua-
tion of its historical traditions of collective bargaining. Considerable 
concern about social dumping has raised the issue of state regulation to 
the public agenda, but so far the majority of trade unions and employer 
organisations are against political regulation of wage levels. Our analysis 
shows that Poles in Denmark are relatively better off compared to native 
workers than their compatriots in Oslo. Nevertheless, they face many of 
the same risks, but in a system that is legally less clear. Our results sug-
gest the development of a two-tier system of inclusion. Despite having the 
overall most egalitarian wage structure, there are still higher shares of 
migrant workers who are paid below the minimum wages set in the 
collective agreements compared to the other two cities. It seems that 
while those inside the organized labour market enjoy more protection 
than their counterparts in the other Nordic countries, those who are left 
outside enjoy less. However, the distinction between inside and outside 
is less clear, with both legal provisions, collective agreements and the 
presence of local trade unionists playing their part.  
Reykjavik and Iceland’s system of flexible universalism, where statu-
tory regulations automatically apply to everyone, but with considerably 
more leeway for low wage competition within the existing regulatory 
system, has in some ways “succeeded” in incorporating migrant workers 
into the existing framework of employment – although only after a fierce 
battle against the temporary staffing industry. It has done so, however, 
at the cost of extensive low wage competition within the system. In the 
midst of pressing economic challenges, Iceland’s ability to incorporate 
new migrants may well be more related to applying systems of approv-
ing foreign educational credentials, and providing language training, in 
order to enable migrant workers to escape their position at the bottom 
and move up the wage ladder.  
The analysis shows that all three capital cities are faced with several 
challenges regarding the institutional ability to incorporate new migrant 
workers into existing labour market structures and protect them from 
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exploitative and precarious conditions. Some of these challenges are 
related to certain broad patterns that are similar in all three cities. Alt-
hough education level from Poland has some bearing on their labour 
market outcomes in their Nordic host countries, our analysis suggest 
that labour market outcomes are much less related to their individual 
characteristics and human capital than to their structural position on the 
host country labour market. Despite having varied backgrounds in terms 
of educational and occupational experiences, Polish migrants are pri-
marily recruited to perform work that requires relatively few formal 
skills within a quite narrow set of industries. They are usually found low 
on the status ladder of domestic labour markets, earning significantly 
lower wages than natives, and enjoying far more precarious and in many 
cases exploitative working conditions than what is common within the 
Nordic labour markets. This general trend seems to be the result of the 
intersection of segmentation into specific low wage and low status sec-
tors combined with an overrepresentation in the use of atypical forms of 
employment. Thus, workers within low skilled services and parts of the 
construction industry appear to be particularly at risk compared to 
those working in other parts of the labour market.  
At the same time, however, we find significant differences between 
the three cities, in terms of how risks and rewards are structured among 
the new migrant workers, as well as in how these challenges have been 
met. Regarding the outcome for Polish migrants in terms of wage levels 
and risk of precarious conditions, these two factors appear to be in-
versely correlated at the city level; Oslo being the most rewarding desti-
nation in monetary earnings, but also the place where migrant workers 
are most at risk of exploitative and illegal treatment, and Reykjavik be-
ing the least profitable destination in earnings, and at the same time 
where migrants are least at risk of exploitative treatment. Which one of 
the two should be considered the most successful in protecting migrant 
workers, depends on what is considered more valuable: high wages or 
secure terms of employment?  
There are also significant differences in terms of what produces these 
outcomes. In both Oslo and Copenhagen, the labour market for Polish 
migrant workers is structured into different segments, where casual 
employment relations, temporary staffing, transnational subcontracting 
and household service provision function as drivers of low wage compe-
tition and more precarious working conditions. In Copenhagen, howev-
er, being inside or outside the system of collective bargaining (measured 
by having a trade union representative at the workplace) still has a 
much stronger bearing on outcomes than in Norway, leaving those out-
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side much more at risk of substandard conditions. In Reykjavik, out-
comes are not structured in the same way, and few of the variables 
which explain wage variation in Copenhagen or Oslo have any significant 
effect in Reykjavik. Instead, it seems that the relatively flexible and uni-
versal Icelandic regime has placed Polish migrants more uniformly in 
the bottom of the wage scale, although with far better protection against 
exploitative conditions. 
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9. Introduction and research 
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Parallel to the growth of labour migration from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope to the Nordic countries over the last eight years, there has also 
been a significant growth in the business of temporary staffing and re-
cruitment in the Nordic countries. These trends are by no means unre-
lated. Temporary staffing agencies are heavily involved in recruiting 
migrant workers to the Nordic countries and many migrant workers 
continue to be employed through temporary staffing agencies in their 
receiving labour markets long after their arrival. But the link between 
them remains less than clear cut. Native workers still constitute the ma-
jority within the temporary staffing industry in most countries, and the 
majority of recent labour migrants are recruited through other channels. 
Furthermore, the strength of the link between the two phenomena var-
ies between different countries, and depending on client sectors. In 
some sectors in some countries (such as shipyards and construction in 
Norway), the temporary staffing industry is now a pure “migration in-
dustry” based solely on the recruitment and employment of migrant 
workers. In other sectors and other countries temporary staffing does 
not have any particular connection with labour migration. Temporary 
staffing has also become the focus of significant political controversy 
over the last few years. Although these controversies are not solely re-
lated to migration, they often are – with concerns over “social dumping” 
and exploitative working conditions playing a key role. At the same time, 
substantial efforts to re-regulate the industry has been launched in many 
of the Nordic countries – at the national level, but also through the im-
plementation of the EU Temporary and Agency Workers Directive 
(2008/104/EC). In this part of the project we will explore the develop-
ment in the temporary staffing industry in the Nordic countries and the 
ways in which these developments are connected to migration. By ana-
lysing not just the market for temporary staffing of migrant workers in 
destination countries but also the market for recruitment of workers in 
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Poland, we will focus on this link from both the sending and receiving 
end of the chain. By comparing the situation and development in the 
Nordic countries we will further explore how the business of temporary 
staffing is institutionally embedded and shaped by the general systems 
of labour market regulation as well as particular regulations of the tem-
porary staffing industry in different countries.  
9.1 The global growth of the temporary staffing 
industry 
The growth of the temporary staffing industry in the Nordic countries is 
part of an international trend which has seen the temporary staffing 
industry expand rapidly over the last few decades to become a signifi-
cant feature of many national labour markets throughout Europe, the 
Americas, East Asia, Australia and South Africa. In just over a decade, the 
global annual sales revenue of the temporary staffing industry has in-
creased by 310%, from 83 billion EUR in 1996 to 257 in 2007. A few key 
global corporations such as the three largest – Adecco, Manpower and 
Randstad – play an important role in several countries, accounting for 
almost 20% of global revenues in 2009 (CIETT 2012). The industry felt 
the impact of the financial crisis in 2008, with declining sales revenues 
in 2009. In 2010 and 2011, however, the business started recovering in 
many places. Moreover, temporary staffing has changed from simply 
meeting the ad hoc needs of employers for small numbers of workers, to 
a form of work that has become “integral to business strategy” across a 
wide range of client sectors, both public and private (Nollen 1996, Coe et 
al. 2010). One way of capturing the growing relative significance of the 
temporary staffing industry is to measure its penetration rate in differ-
ent countries, meaning the percentage of the total workforce constituted 
by workers employed in temporary staffing. 
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Table 3.1.1 Agency work penetration rates in selected countries between 1998 and 2010 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
UK 2,6 2,8 3,7 3,7 3,7 3,9 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,7 4,1 3,7 3 
Netherlands 2,4 2,4 2,3 2,2 2,1 1,9 1,9 2,2 2,5 2,8 2,9 2,4 2,5 
France 2 2,2 2,5 2,5 2,3 2,2 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,5 2,3 1,7 2 
Germany 0.7 0,7 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 1,1 1,2 1,5 1,9 1,9 1,6 2 
Luxembourg 1,2 1,7 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,1 1,2 2 2,5 2,4 1,9 1,9 1,9 
Ireland 0,6 0,6 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,3 1,5 1,7 1,7 0,9 1,9 
Belgium 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,6 1,8 1,8 2,1 2,2 2,1 1,6 1,9 
Hungary     0,8 1 1,3 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,2 1,8 
Portugal 0,7 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 1,6 1,6 1,7 
Austria 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,8 1 1,2 1,2 1,5 1,6 1,6 1,4 1,6 
Switzerland 0,8 0,9 1 1 0,9 0,9 1 1,2 1,5 1,7 1,7 1,4 1,6 
Sweden 0,4 0,6 1 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,8 1,3 1,3 1 1,3 
Finland 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,7 1,1 1,3 0,8 0,9 
Norway 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,6 1 1 1 0,8 0,9 
Denmark 0.3 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,8 
Italy 0 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,8 1 0,9 0,7 0,9 
Spain 0,8 0,9 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,5 
Poland      0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,7 
Slovakia           0,6 0,6 0,8 
Czech Repub-
lic 
          0,7 0,7 0,7 
Rumania           0,3 0,3 0,5 
Bulgaria           0,1 0,2 0,3 
Greece          0,2 0 0,1 0,1 
Source: CIETT Economic Report 2012.  
(http://www.ciett.org/fileadmin/templates/ciett/docs/Stats/Ciett_econ_report_2012_final.pdf) .  
 
It should be noted that these numbers which are based on CIETT nation-
al federations underestimate the real penetration rate of temporary 
work agencies, since many agencies are not affiliated with any federa-
tion. For example, the real penetration rate of temporary staffing in 
Norway in 2008 was estimated to be 2.3% rather than 1 (see chapter on 
Norway in this report). But if we focus on the relative differences be-
tween countries and the changes over time, we may nevertheless derive 
several important things from this table. First of all, European countries 
differ in terms of the maturity and size of the temporary staffing indus-
try. In countries such as the UK in particular, but also the Netherlands, 
France and Belgium the temporary staffing industry was already a sig-
nificant part of their labour markets in the late 1990s, and temporary 
staffing today makes up more than 2% of the workforce (according to 
CIETT numbers). In the other end of the spectrum we find emerging 
economies in Central and Eastern European countries where the market 
for temporary staffing is not very developed and constitute a relatively 
small part of the workforce, but where the industry seems rapidly ex-
panding. The Nordic countries are all found around the middle of this 
scale. The temporary staffing industry was present, but relatively small 
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in the 1990s and has over the course of the last decade grown to encom-
pass about 1% of the total workforce. Within the Nordic countries, how-
ever, Sweden represents the country with the most mature market for 
temporary staffing. Most European country have experienced significant 
growth in the relative importance of the temporary staffing industry. 
However, the growth has been substantially higher in some countries – 
such as UK, Ireland, Germany and Austria – than in others – such as Por-
tugal, Spain and France (who actually experienced contraction). While 
some of those countries with the highest growth rates are found in the 
mature category, others are newly developing markets, such as Poland 
and the Czech Republic. Once again the Nordic countries represent a 
middle ground. All having significant growth rates, but not among the 
highest in Europe. Finally, the market for temporary staffing was severe-
ly affected by the financial crisis, as almost every country in Europe ex-
perienced significant drops in the relative share of workers found in 
temporary staffing. Note that this reduction does not only reflect a gen-
eral economic decline, but a decline in relative importance of the indus-
try. In other words, the temporary staffing industry was affected much 
more than the general economy in almost every European country. 
However, the industry was quick to recover and by 2010, it had bounced 
back to pre-crisis levels and continues to grow. In fact, the temporary 
staffing industry appears to be thriving in many otherwise crisis-
stricken economies (CIETT 2012).  
When analysing the development of the temporary staffing industry 
in the Nordic countries we have to take account of the fact that these 
developments are part of a much larger global trend, and that the ques-
tions raised in the Nordic countries as a result of this development are 
not unique. Furthermore, they are not uniquely related to migration – 
even though migration in many places has played an important role. 
Before we move to explore the specific link between migration and tem-
porary staffing, we will therefore take a closer look at the international 
research of the business of temporary staffing in general.  
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9.2 Research on temporary staffing – the main topics 
Figure 3.1.1The triangular relationship between agencies, clients and workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The business of temporary staffing and recruitment is primarily defined 
by the triangular relationship between the worker, the client firm and 
the temporary staffing agency. According to Coe et al. (2010), research 
on temporary staffing has usually focussed on either the perspective of 
client firms or on the workers, while their own research also focuses on 
the agency of the staffing agencies themselves.14 Most research into the 
activities of temporary staffing agencies does not focus on agencies as 
mediators and employers of migrant workers in particular. However, the 
general questions and perspectives raised in this literature are no less 
relevant for understanding agencies that employ migrants. But the mo-
tives, processes and consequences involved may play out differently for 
migrant workers than other groups of workers, and the transnational 
links involved in facilitating the employment of migrant workers adds 
several new aspects into the equation.  
The client firm perspective: Research into the rationale of client firm 
who use temps have identified a number of reasons why some firms pre-
fer to hire workers through temporary staffing agencies rather than em-
ploying them directly within their own firms. Traditionally, many firms 
use temporary agency workers to obtain numerical stability (Nesheim 
────────────────────────── 
14 http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/geography/research/gotsu/  
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2003). These firms typically hire temps to fill temporary vacancies, as a 
result of sickness, maternity leave etc. The main rationale is then to main-
tain the stability of its workforce in the face of variations in labour supply.  
The “flexible firm” approach, dating back to Atkinson (1984), argues 
that employers also use temporary agency workers in order to obtain 
numerical flexibility (Kalleberg 2000). In this case, the rationale for using 
temps is the complete opposite – not to maintain the stability of the work-
force in the face of variations in labour supply, but to adjust the size of the 
workforce in the face of variations in labour demand. Client firms divide 
their workforces into a core workforce, consisting of their internal staff, 
and a peripheral workforce, consisting of externally affiliated workers 
such as temps and subcontractors. While core workers perform the kinds 
of tasks which require complex skills, firm-specific knowledge and the 
ability to perform different kinds of task, external or peripheral staff is 
used for low skilled routine tasks which require less firm loyalty. This 
enables them to reduce turnover of the trained staff, while making rapid 
adjustments of the size of the workforce, as a response to seasonal or cy-
clical changes in labour demand using their temporary staff as a buffer.  
Another reason for using temporary agency workers is to reduce la-
bour costs. Usually – depending on national regulations – temporary agen-
cy workers are paid less than permanent employees, but once the agen-
cies have charged their “mark-up” fee the actual wage cost are not neces-
sarily lower. However, reduced liability for holiday pay, maternity cover 
and sick pay entitlements, can still lead to considerable savings for client 
firms. Furthermore, using temp agency workers can reduce costs involved 
in recruitment and administration of employees. By outsourcing these 
functions, firms can concentrate on their core activities. A fourth reason 
why firms use temporary agency workers is a form of recruitment. Hiring 
temps can be a way of “screening” the market for potential permanent 
employees. Recruiting permanent staff from a pool of temporary agency 
workers enables businesses to monitor their on-the-job performance and 
“try them out for size” before making any commitments. This allows firms 
to employ “riskier” workers – such as migrants – on extended probation 
periods and “skim the market” for the best candidates.  
Finally, client firms can use temporary staffing agencies to external-
ize the risks associated with directly employing workers on a permanent 
basis (Connell and Burgess 2002; Houseman et al. 2003; Purcell et al. 
2004; Van Breugel 2005). By outsourcing the contractual employment 
relationship to external agencies, client firms can avoid the social, legal 
and contractual responsibilities and risks associated with in-house em-
ployment, and even avoid compliance with standard employment regu-
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lations, occupational health and safety regulations and “unfair dismissal” 
legislation (Autor 2000; Befort 2003; Gray 2002; Hall 2006). It is obvi-
ous that these different rationales for using temporary staffing agencies 
are not mutually exclusive in any way, and actual firms may have a com-
bination of overlapping motives. Nevertheless, the weight given to each 
specific rationale may vary considerably between different client firms 
and between client firms in different industries and sectors, depending 
on the structure and variation in labour demand. The importance given 
to these different motives may also play out differently for client firms 
hiring predominantly migrant labour than for those hiring native work-
ers, partly because migrants and natives in the temporary staffing indus-
try are hired to perform different kinds of work in different industries, 
and partly because hiring migrant labour in itself presents certain spe-
cific challenges and risks.  
The workers perspective: According to Coe et al. (2010), the literature 
exploring the temporary staffing industry from the perspective of the 
workers is centered on two main topics. The first has to do with why 
some workers “choose” to work through a temporary staffing agency. On 
the one hand, the human capital approach argues that certain groups of 
workers are overrepresented in temporary staffing agencies as a result 
of rational economic decisions. Some workers – such as married women 
with children, young people, older people (or temporary migrants for 
that matter) – may prefer to work through an agency because they have 
a marginal commitment to work and prefer a more “flexible” attachment 
to the labour market than standard employment (Druker and Stanworth 
2004). Furthermore, agency workers may choose this kind of work as a 
gateway into permanent employment. By getting experience and famili-
arity with several different employers before making any commitments, 
agency employees can gain work experience, job leads and improved 
employability (Van Breugel 2005).  
The labour market segmentation approach argues the exact opposite; 
that most agency workers – particularly in the bottom end of the labour 
market – would prefer permanent employment but are forced to accept 
temporary agency work because they have limited options (Connell and 
Burgess 2002; Purcell et al. 2004; Storrie 2002). The overrepresentation 
of certain groups in temporary agency work stems, according to the 
segmented labour market approach, not from preferences but from 
these groups lack of social and educational capital in order to access 
more stable and rewarding employment. Furthermore, many writers 
within this approach claim that temporary agency work is not necessari-
ly a gateway into permanent employment, but may constitute a dead-
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end (Anderson and Wadensjo 2004; Booth et al. 2002; Gray 2002; Korpi 
and Levin 2001). A second strand of literature focuses on how tempo-
rary staffing, through the tripartite employment relationship, changes 
the regulation and control of labour within the production process (Gott-
fried 1992; Smith 1998). A number of empirical studies emphasize how 
temporary agency workers are subject to the “dual control” of overlap-
ping sanctions of the agency and the client firm (Gottfried 1991; Smith & 
Neuwirth 2008). According to some of these studies the belief that 
strong work performance may lead to a permanent job (the “stepping 
stone thesis”), combined with the uncertainty and risk is intrinsic to 
temporary agency work, is first and foremost a tool for disciplining and 
regulating workers. 
The agency perspective: Relatively less research has been devoted to 
the agency of the agencies themselves in engaging in a variety of activi-
ties which contribute in shaping labour markets and labour relations 
(Coe et al. 2010). By actively promoting particular forms of flexibility, 
agencies are actively engaged in reshaping the norms and expectations 
of both workers and employers in increasingly diverse industries and 
occupations (Peck and Theodore 2002). On the one hand, this has been 
part of corporate strategies of internationalization and diversification on 
behalf of the major global players in the industry who have sought to con-
tinually expand their businesses into new markets – be that new coun-
tries, new sectors and occupations or new functions within existing mar-
kets (Peck et al. 2005). These global corporations are also the dominant 
actors on the Nordic national markets. On the other hand, the agencies 
and those who represent them, such as the International Confederation of 
Temporary Work Businesses (CIETT) or national employers’ associations 
organizing temporary staffing firms, are actively engaged in the political 
sphere trying to restructure both the regulation of their own industry and 
of the mainstream employment relationship. This is not least evident in 
the contemporary struggles over the national implementations of the EU 
Temporary and Agency Workers Directive (2008/104/EC) 
9.3 Temporary staffing and migration 
There is no doubt that temporary staffing and recruitment agencies can 
play an important role as mediators of migration, by matching supply 
and demand for labour in a context of risk, uncertainty and limited in-
formation, and because access to migrant labour give temporary staffing 
agencies opportunities to expand in markets that otherwise would be 
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off-limits. From the point of view of client firms, temporary staffing and 
recruitment agencies can offer a way to employ migrant workers with 
less risk, administration, responsibility and (sometimes) labour costs 
and more flexibility. As a result, firms who would otherwise not have 
taken the chance of employing migrant workers directly within their 
own organization may still choose to hire them through agencies. From 
the point of view of potential migrants in sending countries, temporary 
staffing and recruitment agencies may contribute in reducing risks and 
costs involved in migration. Through institutionalized procedures for 
recruitment, provision of housing accommodations, facilitating language 
or other kinds of training, and by having procedures for taking care 
work permits, registrations etc, temporary staffing and recruitment 
agencies can facilitate the migration of people who otherwise would not 
have considered the option or taken the chance of going abroad. Re-
search has shown that while labour migration is usually a network-
driven phenomenon, the activities of temporary staffing and recruitment 
agencies can act as a substitute for informal networks.15 At the same 
time, migrant workers who have limited language skills and lack access 
to high quality job-search networks in the receiving country are often 
forced to accept jobs at substandard working conditions. Since many 
firms prefer to employ migrant workers through temporary staffing 
agencies, migrants may have to take temporary agency jobs even if they 
would prefer permanent employment.  
From the point of view of the temporary staffing and recruitment 
agencies, migrant workers are a valuable resource. Because temporary 
jobs usually offer fewer rewards and less status than permanent in-
house employment, agencies will often have difficulties in recruiting 
workers to certain kinds of temporary jobs. With access to migrant la-
borers – who usually have fewer alternative options due to limited lan-
guage skills, who often may see work in the receiving country as just a 
temporary source of income, and who are often less concerned with 
status hierarchies in the host societies – agencies are provided with the 
opportunity to expand their business into new sectors and segments of 
the labour market which otherwise would be difficult or impossible to 
staff. As a result of these mechanisms, the business of temporary staffing 
────────────────────────── 
15 This hypothesis is supported by findings from the Polonia-survey in Oslo. In general, 86 percent of the Polish 
migrants in Oslo reported that they knew someone in Norway before migrating. Among those who had their first 
job in Norway in a staffing agency, however, this was reported by only 49 percent. This suggests that the agen-
cies can work as a substitute for informal network connections (Friberg & Eldring 2011). 
152 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
and recruitment can contribute in boosting migration flows, or in chang-
ing their patterns. At the same time, migration may contribute to the 
expansion of the temporary staffing industry, in terms of sheer numbers 
and in terms of new sectors and industries.  
This means that the questions raised in the general research on tem-
porary staffing are no less relevant in the context of migration. The an-
swers to them, however, may differ. The rationale of client firms for hir-
ing migrant workers through temporary staffing agencies rather than 
employing them directly may or may not be different than what would 
be the case for native workers. Similarly, the reasons why migrant 
workers “choose” to work for temporary staffing agencies – or the de-
gree to which they have a real choice – may or may not be different than 
for other groups of workers. The degree to which temporary agencies 
function as stepping stones into regular permanent employment may be 
very different for migrant workers than for other groups of workers, and 
this may also vary depending on the different motives which client firms 
in different sectors have for hiring them in the first place. Finally, the 
way the agencies themselves work in order to promote their business 
and expand into new markets may or may not be influenced by the ex-
tent which their operations are based on hiring out migrant workers.  
9.4 Political controversy  
The growing significance of the temporary staffing industry – and in 
particular its role as a facilitator of labour migration – have spurred po-
litical controversy all over Europe, and the dividing line of the debate 
tend to follow traditional fault lines with employers and political parties 
on the right (as well as the EU commission) on one side, and unions and 
parties to the left on the other.  
According to the EUs Lisbon Strategy, temporary staffing agencies 
can play an important role in facilitating more flexible, dynamic and 
sustainable transnational labour markets in Europe, by matching supply 
and demand, and reducing information asymmetries and transaction 
costs usually associated with cross-border labour mobility. National 
boundaries and language differences constitute significant hurdles to the 
optimal utilization and allocation of human resources across the com-
mon European labour market (EU 2010), but temporary work agencies 
can play an important role by providing necessary training, helping out 
with of legal papers, housing and matching workers in sending countries 
with several different client firms in destination countries, lowering the 
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risk and cost of work temporarily abroad. In the process of establishing 
a flexible labour market, the temporary staffing industry is seen as “a 
purveyor of flexibility not just at the “micro” level (in meeting the needs 
of individual enterprises), but also at the “macro” level – mediating mac-
roeconomic pressures and socio-economic risks across the labour mar-
ket as a whole” (Peck and Theodore 2007: 171–2).  
In line with this perspective, the organizations representing the in-
dustry, such as the European Confederation of Private Employment 
Agencies (EuroCIETT), have argued that a well regulated staffing indus-
try accommodates the needs of both workers and employers in an in-
creasingly flexible economy, by giving firms access to a flexible work-
force, while at the same time securing the interests of the temporary 
migrant workers through orderly and legal terms of employment and 
the provision of information and practical support. By providing access 
to consecutive assignments with several different employers, agencies 
can satisfy both the labour markets’ need for flexible temporary labour 
and for the workers need for stable income. By providing an opportunity 
to acquire country specific skills and access to temporary assignments 
for different employers, staffing agencies can help migrant workers ac-
cess a broader range of employment opportunities. For those who de-
cide to stay, temporary staffing agencies are therefore often thought to 
serve as a temporary stepping stone into regular permanent employ-
ment in the host country.  
More skeptic observers, on the other hand, tend to see the growth of 
the temporary staffing industry and its involvement in moving workers 
across borders as part of a global trend of neo-liberal restructuring of 
labour forces and the erosion of traditional employment relations 
through subcontracting, temporary employment, casual work and grow-
ing informal economies (see e.g. Castles 2010). According to the struc-
turalist perspective, migration plays a key role in this process, as both a 
cause (employers can undercut labour standards by employing less de-
manding migrants) and effect (demand for cheap and flexible workers is 
a “pull” factor driving migration flows). The result is a process of ethnic 
labour market segmentation whereby workers are divided into primary 
and secondary segments based on characteristics such as ethnicity, na-
tionality and gender, rather than individual human capital. The growing 
significance of temporary staffing agencies as employers of migrant 
workers, is just one way of dividing the workforce into a core of stable 
jobs and a hyper-flexible buffer of externally affiliated workers, and with 
few opportunities for mobility between them (Meardi et al. 2012).  
154 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
Labour unions have argued that the (TWAs temporary work agen-
cies) promote social dumping and precarious working conditions, and 
undermine the right to permanent employment and collective bargain-
ing. A 2012 report published by IndustriAll argues that “agencies, labour 
brokers, dispatchers and contractors is being used to wholesale replace 
permanent, direct employment. Its use goes way beyond any legitimate 
need to fill genuinely temporary vacancies” and that the “triangular rela-
tionship between the user enterprise, the agency and the worker, [is] 
isolating the worker from the enterprise that effectively controls their 
work, their pay and their conditions so that the worker has no say in any 
of them and has no mechanism to negotiate improvements” (Industry-
ALL 2012). From the perspective of unions, the growth of temporary 
staffing undermines collectively bargained rights and nationally regulat-
ed employment protection. Some version of this controversy has mani-
fested itself in all the Nordic countries. But as we shall see the context of 
these controversies is quite different from one country to another.  
9.5 Research questions and structure of report 
This study is not designed to test any single specific hypotheses derived 
from earlier research. Instead we have adopted a qualitative explorative 
and mostly descriptive research design, based on available statistical 
information, case studies of specific agencies and interviews with key 
actors and social partners. We focus on describing the growth and com-
position in temporary staffing over the last ten years in the Nordic coun-
tries; variations in how temporary staffing agencies operate in different 
countries and industries; how the business of temporary staffing is 
linked to migration; and the ways in which temporary staffing is shaped 
by and in turn shapes labour markets in the Nordic countries. More spe-
cifically we will focus on three main research questions:  
 
 How and to what extent is the business of temporary staffing related 
to the growth in labour migration to the different Nordic countries, 
and how do temporary staffing agencies contribute in shaping 
migration flows to the Nordic countries?  
 How do temporary staffing agencies contribute in shaping working 
conditions and working environment for immigrant workers in 
receiving countries?  
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 How are the activities and modes of operation within the temporary 
staffing industry institutionally embedded in the different national 
regimes for regulating labour markets in general and temporary 
staffing in particular?  
 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two describes the general 
regulatory framework for temporary work agencies in the Nordic coun-
tries as well as in Poland. Most of the remainder of the report is struc-
tured into country specific case studies (chapter 3–7). The first of these 
country case studies deals with a sending country perspective, exploring 
the recruitment market in Poland. The remaining country studies then 
describe and analyse the development and operations of the temporary 
staffing industry in each Nordic receiving country. These chapters can be 
read separately, but will form the basis of a comparative analysis in the 
concluding chapter eight.  
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10. The regulatory framework of 
temporary agency work  
Kristin Alsos, Fafo 
 
 
This chapter will describe and analyse the development in the regulato-
ry framework for temporary staffing in the Nordic countries and Poland, 
as well as on a supranational European level. 
Until the adoption of the EU Directive on temporary agency work 
(2008/104/EC) in the autumn of 2008, the regulatory framework for 
this industry had mainly been left to the Member States.16 The sector 
was first addressed in regulatory way by the national states in the 1960s 
and 1970s when some countries introduced restrictions on this kind of 
work.17 In the late 1980s and 1990s deregulation of the sector took 
place, especially in the Northern part of Europe. Denmark removed their 
restrictions in 1990, Sweden in 1991, while Norway had a major revi-
sion of the legal framework in 2000.18 Poland and Iceland on the other 
hand did not have any regulations recognising temp agency work until 
the first decade of the 2000s (Unterschütz 2009, CESCR 2011).  
Regulations on temporary agency work around Europe cover diverse 
aspects of the triangular relationship between the worker, the tempo-
rary work agency and the user undertaking. On the one hand we can find 
regulations addressing the agency by putting down obligations for run-
ning this kind of business. This could for instance be a duty to register or 
obtaining a license. Secondly there are regulations addressing the rela-
tionship between the employer and the employee, e.g. a principle of 
equal treatment or fixing minimum wage and working conditions for 
────────────────────────── 
16 With exception for health and safety issues as were regulated in 1991 (Directive 91/383/EC). 
17 In Arrowsmith (2006) this is described as the ‘first wave’ countries. The Netherlands was the first country to 
regulate temp agency work in 1965. Other countries included in this group were among others, Germany, 
Denmark, Ireland, France, UK, Belgium and Norway. In Sweden a legislative amendment in 1942 of the 1935 act 
on the Ban of Private Employment Exchange was interpreted to prohibit temp agency work (Ahlberg et al. 2008). 
18 See Arrowsmith (2006) for an overview of the introduction of regulations and deregulation in EU 
member states. 
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this kind of work. Thirdly there are regulations putting restrictions on 
the relationship between the user undertaking and the temp agency, 
limiting situation sectors where hiring in or out are allowed or limiting 
the duration of assignments.19  
The first discussions on the need for an EU regulation in this field 
started almost 30 years before the final text was adapted. It proved diffi-
cult to get the Member States to agree on a draft proposal, and neither 
did the social partners manage to find a common view on this topic. The 
negotiations between social partners at EU level failed in 2001, and the 
task to draft a directive that could be accepted by Member States was 
then sent back to the Commission. After two drafts and years of stand-
still the directive was finally adopted 19 November 2008.20  
There are several reasons for why it took so long to reach an agree-
ment at EU level. One is the diverse regulations within this field among 
the EU Member States (Ahlberg et al. 2008). While the Nordic countries, 
Great Britain and Ireland have few or none restrictions on temporary 
agency work, the situation is the opposite in many central and southern 
European countries (Kvasnicka 2005). This made it difficult for both 
social partners and the Member States to come to an agreement. Fur-
thermore, trade unions have been quite ambivalent when it comes to 
temp agencies, i.e. whether they want to contribute to increasing em-
ployment within this industry (Ahlberg et al. 2008). 
The purpose of the directive can be said to be two-headed. On the one 
side it seeks to protect the temporary agency worker, and on the other 
side it aims to create more jobs within the industry. Two articles in the 
directive seem to be particularly important to fulfil these purposes. Arti-
cle 5 introduces a principle of equal treatment, where it says that “The 
basic working and employment conditions of temporary agency workers 
shall be…at least those that would apply if they had been recruited di-
rectly by that undertaking to occupy the same job.” “Basic working con-
ditions” are defined by the directive as conditions duration of working 
time, overtime, breaks, rest periods, night work, holidays, public holi-
days and pay, see article 1. However, this covers conditions that are laid 
down by legislation, regulations, administrative provisions, collective 
────────────────────────── 
19 The user undertaking may also have some obligations as regards the hired agency worker, e.g. responsibil-
ity as regards health and safety.  
20 COM(2002) 149 final and COM(2002) 701 final. In the end it was the idea of connecting the process of 
adopting the directive with the amendment of another problem area – the working time directive (Heuvel 
2011). For a description of the EU process see Ahlberg et al. (2008). 
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agreements and/or other binding general provisions in force in the user 
undertaking, only, indicating that conditions in individual contracts are 
not to be taken into account.  
Secondly, in article 4, it says that prohibitions or restrictions on the 
use of temporary agency work shall be justified only on grounds of gen-
eral interest relating in particular to the protection of temporary agency 
workers, the requirements of health and safety at work or need to en-
sure that the labour market functions properly and abuses are prevent-
ed. All Member States are, in accordance with this article obliged to re-
view any restrictions in order to verify whether they are justified. The 
directive addresses agency work that takes place within the national 
borders of a Member State. If an agency worker is posted from one state 
to another, the Posting of Workers Directive (96/71/EC) will prevail 
over the temporary agency work directive. 
The temporary agency work directive  was to be implemented by 5 De-
cember 2011, but the Nordic countries exceeded this deadline.  In Finland 
the directive was implemented from March 2012, in Sweden from January 
2013 and in Denmark from July 2013. Norway and Iceland are bound to 
implement the directive through the EEA agreement. The Norwegian par-
liament finally passed the new legislation in June 2012, and the Icelandic 
parliament in December 2012. In this part we will look at the regulations 
in Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Sweden prior to the directive, in 
order to see how these regulations can facilitate or restrict posting or 
migration of agency workers between EEA countries, as well as discus-
sions related to the EU legislation in this area. 
10.1 Statutory law or collective agreements? 
Even though the Nordic countries are known for strong collective 
agreements and high coverage of collective bargaining, regulation mod-
els vary widely within the temp work agency industry. Denmark and 
Sweden hardly have any statutory regulations within this field. The sec-
tor is regulated through collective agreements. Iceland has a combina-
tion of both instruments. Norway has some statutory regulations, but 
the absence of collective bargaining, due to low union density, has until 
recently been striking. Poland, not having the same tradition for collec-
tive bargaining, has statutory regulations, but no collective agreements 
covering this industry. 
There are mainly three approaches for regulating temp work in 
Denmark. There are collective agreements that are concluded by social 
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partners within the temp industry, which covers temporary agency 
workers, e.g. Vikaroverenskomsten between the Danish Chamber of 
Commerce and 3F (United Federation of Danish Workers) (2010–2012). 
Secondly, temp agencies can be bound by agreements that cover other 
industries. According to Danish law companies affiliated to an employer 
organisation is bound by the collective agreements entered into by this 
organisation. Thus if a temp agency becomes a member of another em-
ployer organisation like the Confederation of Danish Industry, the com-
pany will be bound by agreements concluded by this employer organisa-
tion, eg Industriens overenskomst regardless of whether it is a manufac-
turing company or a temp agency. Consequently, if the temp agency 
hires out a worker that conducts work that is covered by the scope of 
this collective agreement, the temp agency will have to comply with reg-
ulations within this agreement. Finally, Danish collective agreements 
that bind the user undertaking can be held to cover agency workers 
hired by the user company, either by attachments to the agreement 
where it is explicitly stated that the agreement covers all employees 
working under the supervision and direction of the user company, or 
where the agreement by nature is meant to cover all workers in an area, 
including temp workers.21 Temp workers are for instance explicitly cov-
ered by Industriens overenskomst between the Confederation of Danish 
Industry and CO-Industri, and Bygge- og anlægsoverenskomsten between 
The Danish Construction Association and 3F (United Federation of Dan-
ish Workers), while the same scope is ascribed to the collective agree-
ment for electrical work between Tekniq/ELFO and the Danish Union of 
Electricians by arbitration.22  
As in Denmark, Swedish regulations on temporary agency work are 
solely based on collective agreements. Agreements are concluded be-
tween the employer organisation for temporary work agencies, the Swe-
dish Staffing Agencies, which is part of Almega (the employer organisation 
────────────────────────── 
21 In Denmark there are two kind of collective agreements, namely area agreements and member agree-
ments. The first covers all employees that are covered by the scope of the agreement, while the latter only 
covers those that are members of a trade union (Kristiansen 2004). 
22 The Danish models of regulation can be seen as a result of trade unions responding differently to the 
challenge of regulating the temp industry. In the service sector trade unions lacked members and representa-
tives that could ensure that hired employees were covered by existing agreements. To make sure that temp 
agency workers had their wage and working conditions protected by a collective agreement, they concluded 
agreements directly with the temp agency industry. Within the metal working industry the situation was 
quite the opposite. Their strategy was to make sure that hiring companies had an obligation to secure temp 
workers equal conditions compared to the employees of the hiring company (Andersen 2007). In this way 
they have also the tools to ensure that temp workers are not used to undermine existing working conditions. 
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for the Swedish service sector), and the respective trade unions. There is 
one agreement between the employer organisation and LO that covers 
blue collar workers (the Staffing agreement). For salaried employees 
there exist two parallel agreements with Unionen and the Swedish Uni-
versity Graduate Unions respectively.23 The agreements for blue collar 
and white collar workers differs in their way of regulating this industry, 
where the principle of equal treatment has a strong standing in the 
agreement for blue collars workers. There are hardly any statutory regu-
lations that are directly pointed at temp work. However, trade unions may 
under certain circumstances veto a decision to enter into an agreement 
between the using undertaking and the agency. 
Due to low union density within the temp agencies, collective agree-
ments have so far had little influence on temp workers’ working condi-
tions in Norway. An agreement between the Norwegian Confederation of 
Trade Unions (LO) and the Enterprise Federation of Norway (Virke) in 
2000 was never put into practice. In the aftermath of the EU enlarge-
ment, the construction divisions of the temp agencies Adecco and Job-
zone recruited a large number of Eastern European workers, especially 
within the construction sector. The LO affiliated trade union Fellesfor-
bundet recruited several members within these companies and man-
aged to get the companies bound by the collective agreement for the 
construction sector. However, the Confederation of Norwegian Enter-
prises (NHO) initially preferred an industry agreement for the temp 
agencies, and in 2010 LO and NHO entered into an “agreement of princi-
ples” while they were awaiting the implementation of the EU directive.24 
In 2012 NHO did a complete turnaround and agreed with Fellesforbun-
det and LO to terminate this agreement, and decided that temporary 
agency workers should be covered by collective agreements of the in-
dustries they were hired in to. Unlike the Danish model, the Norwegian 
agreement requires that the temp agency is bound by this agreement. If 
not, the worker is entitled to the same conditions but not covered by the 
agreement as such. 
Iceland does not have industry collective agreements for this sector. 
However, the general collective agreement between Samtök atvinnulífsins 
(SA) and Alþýðusamband Íslands (ASÍ) are made generally applicable for 
all sectors, and is thereby putting down wages and working conditions for 
────────────────────────── 
23 There also exist supplements to the agreement on health and long-term care. 
24 The agreement put down how wages and working conditions were to be fixed within temp agencies bound 
by the agreement. 
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employees also within this sector. Regulations, mainly administrative 
requirements on agencies, are also put down by legal acts. 
Unlike the other countries in this study, Norway and Poland have stat-
utory law listing admitted grounds for using temp agency workers. Poland 
has furthermore regulations limiting the length of an assignment. As men-
tioned before there are no collective agreements in Poland covering this 
kind of work, but as most other European countries, except the Nordic 
countries and a few others, Poland has a statutory minimum wage. 
The Finnish model consists of a combination of legal regulations and 
collective agreements. Statutory law determines which collective 
agreements should apply, while wages and working conditions are most-
ly determined by collective agreements. The system can be said to put 
down an order of regulation sources giving priority to collective agree-
ment binding temp agencies. If a company is not bound by a collective 
agreement, it will be obliged to follow conditions set down in an agree-
ment made generally applicable for the industry. If neither one does 
exist the agency will have to comply with the collective agreement bind-
ing the user undertaking, either directly or through an erga omnes deci-
sion. Finally statutory law has regulations on the right to fair wages. 
Some of the major temp agencies in Finland has however entered into 
company agreements with the trade union. 
10.2 Wages and working conditions – the principle of 
equal treatment 
None of the Nordic countries have had statutory regulations that put an 
obligation on temp agencies to treat their employees equally to those in 
the hiring company when it comes to wage and working conditions. Such 
a principle can however be found in the Polish labour law covering those 
employees that are protected by the labour code.25 According to this 
regulation the agency worker may not be treated less favourably as re-
gards working conditions and other employment conditions than work-
ers of the hiring company. 
Similar principles are also laid down in collective agreements in 
Sweden and Denmark, and lately in Norway. In Sweden the collective 
agreement for blue collar workers states that temp workers are entitled 
────────────────────────── 
25 Act of 9 July 2003 on the Employment of Temporary Workers article 15. 
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to the same pay and working conditions as those in the user undertak-
ing. However, this principle cannot be found in the agreements for white 
collar workers. Equal treatment is also part of the Danish model. Firstly, 
a principle of equal treatment can be found in the collective agreement 
for the temporary work agencies between Danish Chamber of Commerce 
and 3F. Secondly, agreements for blue collar workers, like the manufac-
turing industry, construction and electrical work also have such a prin-
ciple, either directly or implicit. However, as in Sweden equal treatment 
for white collar workers is not widespread.  
Unlike the other states a principle of equal treatment has been absent 
in Icelandic and Norwegian regulations on temp agency work. Erga om-
nes measures in Iceland gives the employees certain minimum rights, 
but this cannot be considered as equal treatment. Until recently there 
have been no regulations on equal treatment in Norway. In sectors 
where collective agreements are made generally applicable, temporary 
agency workers hired out to these industries are covered by the mini-
mum wage made generally applicable. However, this only covers a few 
industries like construction, agricultural work, shipbuilding industry 
and cleaning. In Norway the now abolished “Agreement in principle for 
job-recruitment agencies” between LO and NHO from 2010 said that the 
fixing of wages shall be based on the National Collective Agreement that 
applies to the industry concerned, but the agreement has so far been 
binding for a handful number of agencies only. However, the same prin-
ciple is now stated in industry agreements in most industries; In the 
collective bargaining round in 2012 the social partners agreed that 
agency workers should be given the same conditions as those laid down 
in the collective agreement of the hiring company. The implementation 
of the EU directive, and thereby a principle of equal treatment into Nor-
wegian law will still bring increased protection to the temp agency 
workers within Norway where the hiring company is not covered by a 
collective agreement. 
10.3 Restrictions 
As mentioned above, only restrictions that are justifiable can be upheld 
in accordance with the EU directive. However, some restrictions are 
explicitly allowed. That is the principle of equal treatment as mentioned 
above, but also national requirements with regard to registration, licens-
ing, certification and so on is accepted. In Norway discussions have 
mainly been related to whether the link between the regulation on fixed 
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time contracts and temporary agency work could be upheld or should be 
considered to be an illegal restriction on the freedom to provide ser-
vices. This kind of restriction cannot be found in the other Nordic coun-
tries, but Poland has similar regulations. Employer organisations in 
Norway have argued that the regulations are in breach of the directive, 
and trade unions fear that implementing the Directive will mean that 
this restriction has to be removed. The position of the Ministry of Labour 
has so far been that the restriction can be justified, and no amendments 
will be made when implementing the directive. The regulation includes 
an exemption from the main rule; Employers of hiring companies can 
enter into an agreement with shop stewards to use temporary agency 
workers even though the need is not considered temporary in accord-
ance with the regulation mentioned above. Such agreements are com-
mon both within the construction sector and parts of the metalworking 
industry. In these cases restrictions on temporary agency work in Nor-
way is limited. 
The Polish regulations limiting the situations where temporary agen-
cy work can be used have many similarities to the Norwegian ones. 
Temporary work agencies are allowed to cover seasonal, periodic, ad 
hoc tasks, tasks which timely performance by the workers of the user 
company would not be possible, or to cover up for an absent person.26 
Additionally, Polish law limits the length of assignments to user compa-
nies; an employee cannot be hired out for more than 18 months (12 
months up to 2010) to a user company within a period of three years.27  
Regulations as concerns registration of agencies can be found both in 
Iceland and in Norway. To provide services as a temporary work agency 
Norwegian law requires that the company is registered by the Labour 
Inspectorate. User companies are only allowed to hire personnel from 
companies listed in the register. The Labour Inspectorate enforces the 
regulation. One of the requirements for registering is that the agency 
needs to have a permanent representative in Norway. Iceland had a re-
quirement in their regulation on temporary work agencies that required 
foreign agencies to register eight days prior to their arrival in Iceland. 
This was regarded by the ESA to be in breach of the EEA agreement, and 
the law was therefore amended in autumn 2011. Now, the regulation 
only requires notifying the Labour Inspection on the first day of the as-
────────────────────────── 
26 See Article 2. 
27 Unless this is to cover up for an absent employee, then the assignment should not exceed 36 months, see 
Article 20. 
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signment. The notification should include documentation proving that 
the agency operates legally in the home country, i.e. information on VAT 
registration. Registered agencies are to be listed in a registry that is 
made publicly available.28 
Denmark has hardly any statutory restrictions. Some restrictions 
can be found in collective agreements. Those are mostly related to a 
duty for the user company to negotiate before it enters into a contract 
with an agency.29 In Sweden the trade unions have a possibility to veto 
a decision on outsourcing work to a temporary work agency. The rea-
son for this is to prevent that the employer does not evade the collec-
tive agreement by outsourcing work to a subcontractor. The duty to 
negotiate occurs when the employer plans to set out work that is cov-
ered by the collective agreement. If it is not, there is no duty to negoti-
ate. If negotiations have taken place, and the trade union finds the sub-
contracting to be in breach of the collective agreement or statutory 
law, the trade union may veto the decision to subcontract. The employ-
er will then be precluded from entering into an agreement with the 
agency. However, if the veto is wrongly put down, the trade unions will 
be liable for damages. So far, this restriction has been considered to be 
justifiable (SOU 2011: 5).  
There also exist restrictions in Swedish collective agreements. E.g. 
provisions in agreements binding user companies that set limits for the 
share of temp agency workers (e.g. 20%) that can be hired into a com-
pany (Arrowsmith 2009). 
10.4 The implementation of the EU Directive 
While the EU Directive on temporary agency work was seen as a victory 
for European trade unions, the regulation was met with scepticism in 
Norway.30 Through 2011 and the beginning of 2012 a major campaign 
against the directive was undertaken, led by the organization No to the 
EU and trade unions. The fear among the trade unions was that the re-
striction, that says that temporary agency work can only be used where 
there is a temporary need, would be regarded as an unjustifiable re-
striction according to the Directive. However, the Government finally 
────────────────────────── 
28 Act 139/2005 article 2. 
29Industriens overenskomst 
30 See http://www.etuc.org/a/5471 for reactions from ETUC. 
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decided to send a proposal for new regulation to the Parliament in 
March 2012.31 As a part of the implementation, the Government pro-
posed a package of measures that shall combat social dumping within 
the sector. This includes joint and liable responsibility for the user com-
pany as regards wages, duty to give information on the conditions to the 
user company and a right for shop stewards of the user company to re-
quire information on wages and working conditions for agency workers 
hired into their company. 
In Denmark social partners within the manufacturing industry have 
entered into an agreement concerning implementation of the directive 
agreeing that agency workers should receive equal conditions as employ-
ees of the hiring company. This is in accordance with regulations that are 
already to be found in the collective agreement.32 By June 2013, all the 
Nordic countries have finally implemented the directive. 
10.5 Summary 
Table 3.2.1 Overview of regulations on temporary agency work in the Nordic countries and Po-
land prior to the implementation of the EU directive on temporary agency work 
 Main source of 
regulations 
Equal treatment Limitations on 
assignments 
Registrati-
on/licencing 
Denmark Collective  
agreements 
For blue collar 
workers 
No No 
 
 
Finland Mixed model If no collective 
agreement exists 
No No, but an obliga-
tion on the user 
undertaking to 
require information 
from the agency 
 
Iceland Mixed model No No Yes 
 
Norway Legislation Mixed 
model / 
No Yes, reasons for 
hiring 
Yes 
 
 
Sweden Collective  
agreements 
For blue collar 
workers 
Some in collective 
agreements. 
No 
 
 
Poland Legislation Yes, if protected by 
the Labour Code 
Yes, reasons for 
hiring and duration 
Yes 
────────────────────────── 
31 Prop. 74 L (2011–2012) om endringer i arbeidsmiljøloven og tjenestemannsloven (likebehandling ved 
utleie av arbeidstakere og tiltak i den forbindelse). 
32http://www.coindustri.dk/Lists/Nyheder/DispForm.aspx?ID=274&ContentTypeId= 
0x0100DEBA9AF9F486EC4A996762EC196684FF00C0C3C3DD7D84B6429889C30D3094EA23 
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As shown in table 3.2.1, regulation models for temp agency work in 
Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Poland and Sweden show some of the di-
verse approaches that can be found, even in countries with many simi-
larities as to how the labour market is regulated. However, the situation 
for workers posted form one country to another is also regulated by the 
EU Posting of Workers Directive (PWD, 96/71/EC). According to this 
directive a host country can only place limited obligation on which wag-
es and working conditions that should apply to workers posted from 
another EEA country. The rights of the employees could therefore de-
pend on whether he or she is employed by a company situated in the 
country where the work is performed or not.  
As Polish law has a principle of equal treatment for agency workers, a 
Polish worker posted to another country should be granted the same 
wage and working conditions as he or she was employed directly by the 
hiring firm. However, this does not apply to temporary agency workers 
hired on civil law contract i.e. half of temporary agency workers in Poland 
(Unterschütz 2009).33 Employees of Polish companies will however not be 
protected by collective agreements established in the host country, unless 
the Polish agency signs such an agreement. If a Polish worker on a civil 
contract is posted to Sweden, wages and working conditions will depend 
on whether the agency signs a collective agreement with the Swedish 
trade unions that covers this worker.34 The situation is very much the 
same in Denmark, however if posted to Denmark the worker could also be 
covered by the agreement of the hiring company and thereby be entitled 
to the same wages and working conditions as is applied in the hiring com-
pany. Both Iceland and Norway have made collective agreements general-
ly applicable. In Iceland this covers all industries, meaning that an em-
ployer posting a worker to Iceland has to take this into account. In Norway 
only a few industries are covered by extended agreements and posting a 
worker to outside the scope of these agreements can be done without 
having to take any minimum wage into account. 
If a Polish worker himself travels to one of these countries to take up 
work at a temp agency established in one of these countries, the situa-
tion will be somehow different. If he takes up work in a Swedish agency 
bound by a collective agreement, these conditions will apply. The same 
will count for Denmark; however the agreement for the hiring company 
────────────────────────── 
33 This can be a contract to perform a specific task or work, see Eiro (PL0210109F): Forms of employment 
contract reviewed, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2002/10/feature/pl0210109f.htm 
34 This could be the case even though the worker is not considered to be an employee under Polish law.  
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must also be taken into account. In Iceland and Norway the situation 
would not differ that much from what is the case for posted workers. 
Only a few Norwegian temp agencies are covered by collective agree-
ments, and outside the scope of general applicable collective agree-
ments, there exist no minimum wage, and still no principle of equal 
treatment. Furthermore, the Norwegian regulation limiting which situa-
tion temporary work agencies can be used seems to have limited impact, 
especially in industries like construction and manufacturing. 
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The free movement of workers within the “European Common Market” 
is one of the four basic economic freedoms of the European Union. How-
ever, actual mobility level within European countries tends to be rela-
tively low within native populations (EU 2010). One of the reasons be-
hind it could be that the process of matching on the labor market that 
takes place across the national borders is much more complicated and 
costly when compared with the one of natives (Martin 2005). The lan-
guage and cultural barriers and, above all, absence of internationally 
recognized job descriptions and worker credentials make it difficult for 
employers to recruit foreign labor, as they need to evaluate the skills and 
abilities of potential new employees. The recent OECD report confirms 
that the automatic recognition applies only to seven out of more than 
800 professions (OECD 2012). To some extent the migration networks 
play an important role in the process of matching as friends or relatives 
abroad can recommend to their employers those who are willing to mi-
grate. Moreover, members of migration network channel the infor-
mation and provide members of sending communities (which also are 
the members of the same network) with information about the employ-
ment opportunities and on the situation on the labour markets in receiv-
ing countries. They also may convince those who are reluctant to move 
by offering them help in adaptation (i.e. offering accommodation for the 
period of searching for job abroad).  
However on the labour markets where migration networks are 
scarce, and where employers’ contacts with Polish workforce are a new 
phenomenon, the cost of job matching between them is relatively high. 
Hence, the demand for services of intermediaries such as employment 
agencies could emerge. They (intermediaries) in turn, by channeling 
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information between sending and receiving countries, by motivating 
people to migrate (by providing job counseling), could help to mold mi-
gration process (Findlay, Li 1998). The importance of recruitment agen-
cies in shaping the regional patterns of migration by the existence of 
patterns of contacts established by recruitment agents was already iden-
tified by Prothero (1990). The aim of this project was to comprehend 
the role that employment agencies play, both in the migration process 
and the matching process of Polish workers with foreign employers, 
from the perspective of sending country, with long migration traditions 
and well established migrant networks. The analysis is based on the 
twenty in-depth interviews conducted for this project with the repre-
sentative of employment agencies35, preceded by the description of 
some basic facts about the development of Polish employment agency 
market within few last years based on the registry data on licensed em-
ployment agencies which is gathered by the Polish Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy. 
11.1 The regulation on the market of employment 
agencies in Poland  
Based on the Polish legislation, employment agencies are allowed to 
operate on the Polish labour market next to the public employment 
agencies. All activities provided by these institutions (provision of re-
cruitment services, career and personal counseling and temporary em-
ployment) are regulated and it is required to register each employment 
agency to receive the certification from the local authority.  
Although the market of employment agencies in Poland has a rela-
tively long history,36 in 2002 some new rules were introduced that sig-
nificantly affected the operation of employment agency market. To be 
more precise, with the Act on the Employment and Counteracting Unem-
────────────────────────── 
35 In the group of 20 agencies we contacted, 9 were recruitment agencies, and another 6 were recruiting 
workers for the temporary work agencies abroad, 4 were temporary work agencies, and remaining 1 was 
were of both kinds – temporary and recruitment agencies. Among those 20 were 2 seafarers agencies who 
were to give a glimpse on a market that has been globalised already as Polish seafarers were working for 
foreign employers long before Poland entered the EU. 9 of them do have strong focus on recruiting the 
manpower to clients from Nordic countries, mostly coming from Norway, Sweden and Finland. The inter-
views were conducted according to semi-structured interview scenario. 
36 Private employment agencies could start to operate in Poland in 1990. Before, it was only public employ-
ment services. 
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ployment Act and Act on Education System (Dziennik Ustaw from year 
2003 No. 6, item 65) the concept of employment agencies understood as 
the agencies which either act as a providers of recruitment services, 
career and personal counselors or temporary employers was introduced 
in Polish law. With this act37 the previously unknown institutions – 
Temporary Employment Agencies – has been incorporated into Polish 
law. These entities were allowed to provide service of outsourcing the 
workers for assignments in other companies (MPiPS 2004).  
The entry to the registry38 was simplified in 2009 and now the certi-
fication for operating is given for unlimited period of time.39 This, how-
ever, required another change in law which in turn was introduced as a 
mechanism to strengthen the protection and safety of the agency cus-
tomers, as since 1 February 2009 the employment agencies are also 
obliged to sign a contract both with the person who is sent to work 
abroad and with the company that sent person will work for (PIP 2009). 
11.2 Polish employment agencies in numbers 
The registration system in Poland began operating in 2003 under the min-
istry of labour, which also supervises employment agencies. All certified 
employment agencies are required to submit detailed report of placement 
activity to the local authorities which are later gathered and published by 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy on annual basis. 
Those reports include the information about the number of people 
who have been matched with the foreign employers through employ-
ment agencies and the number of people who were temporarily em-
ployed by the employment agencies and were sent to work abroad. This 
data is broken down by occupation, duration of the contract {to 3 
months, 3–12 months, more than 12 months}, sex and a country of des-
tination. However, this data does not allow for the recognition of mi-
grants’ region of origin for several reasons. Firstly, in case of agencies’ 
regional branches, the data about their services is jointly collected and 
shown in the report of the “mother” employment agency, regardless of 
────────────────────────── 
37 It has entered into a force on 6 February 2003. 
38 Since 2005 the information about certificated employment agencies are available through webpage 
www.kraz.praca.gov.pl 
39 Untill then it was a two stage process. During the first year of services’ provision the agency received 
preliminary certification, which after one year of activity was changed at the request of the agency for a one 
year or indefinite period of time. 
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the localization of the branch (voivodship of service provision). Second-
ly, it is common that the agencies use facilities such as internet in re-
cruitment process, which enables them to access not only local workers 
(region of service provision could differ from the region of origin of ser-
vice takers).  
The data is also biased by the fact that some employment agencies 
neglect the requirement of sending the report to the local authorities. 
The inspections of National Labour Inspectorate (NLI various years) 
have shown that this is problem of every fifth controlled employment 
agency (see table 3.3.3). Another weakness of this data is the lack of 
information about the number of the employment agencies operating on 
the black market. The National Labour Inspectorate applies the screen-
ing procedures of the webpages in order to sample all employment 
agencies which activities will be controlled. Based on these inspections it 
has been proven that there could be up to seven per cent of employment 
agencies that operates illegally (compare table 3.3.3), there are still in-
termediaries that provide services (one-person firms) whose activity is 
out of this picture. In 2010, the inspection of the compliance by Em-
ployment Agencies to the Act on Promotion of Employment and Labor 
Market Institutions identified only one case of a foreign entrepreneur 
that provided his services on the Polish territory without previously 
given the required notice to the Marshal (PIP 2011). 
11.3 Types of employment agencies 
All activities of employment agencies in Poland, as was mentioned be-
fore, are regulated, moreover, the certification entitles each entity to 
provide one, few or all of services envisioned by law: provision of re-
cruitment services, career and personal counseling and temporary em-
ployment. The information about the kind of activity the employment 
agency was involved in during the previous year (whether it is recruit-
ing workers to go abroad or not), is only revealed to the authorities in 
the annual report delivered to the Ministry at the end of each year of its 
activity. At the end of 2010 there were 2,998 officially registered em-
ployment agencies in Poland out of which only 799 (26%) were provid-
ing services of matching Polish workers with foreign employers. Taking 
into account only the employment agencies that reported provision of 
cross-border services in 2010 the majority of them (66.8%) were in-
volved in provision of recruitment services to the foreign companies, 
another 21.6% offered the service of temporary employment and 11.6% 
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had both of these services in their offer. The possible factor that may 
determine the kind of services provided by the employment agencies is 
their size. In comparison to job brokerage the provision of staffing ser-
vice is much more precarious as the agency needs to take the responsi-
bility of the employer and is obliged to pay all social benefits and do 
taxation. In case of encountering any unpredictable problems such as i.e. 
not receiving payment from the principal, the agency bears the risk of 
losing the financial liquidity which is even much more probable when 
the entity is small. It is worth to underlien that by the law the agencies 
can lose their certification when falling behind with any payments to the 
employees.  
11.4 Size of the market  
The market of job brokerage services has been developing dynamically 
in the recent seven years. The number of employment agencies which 
provide cross-border services quadrupled. However, when the recent 
crisis hit most of European countries, the number of actively operating 
labour agencies in Poland was been reduced. The economic downturn 
resulted in a significant drop in the general demand for workers and 
hence the decrease in demand for services provided by the intermediar-
ies, such as help in the job matching process.  
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Figure 3.3.1 No. of registered employment agencies in Poland that provided 
services of job brokerage with foreign employers (left-hand axis) and no. of 
Polish citizens who has been matched per one registered employment agency 
(right-hand axis) in the period of 2003–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on employment agency reports published by the Polish Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy. 
 
Until 2008, the observed increase in the number of employment agen-
cies that were providing services of job brokerage was not proportional 
to the number of potential agency customers. Therefore the number of 
people who were sent abroad through the employment agencies was 
decreasing and in 2008 fell to the level of approximately 60 person per 
one unit. Partly, the potential outflow was stopped by the dynamic 
growth of Polish economy, what was reflected in the increase in the 
number of workplaces on the Polish labour market. Knowing that in the 
recent two years the number of employment agencies were on the de-
crease due to the economic crisis, the level of the units operating on the 
market is still much higher than before EU accession.  
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11.5 Scale and dynamic of outflow and main 
countries of destination 
In the period 1993–2007 the number of Polish citizens who found em-
ployment abroad with the help of employment agencies was increasing, 
however this trend was stopped when the financial crisis has started.  
Figure 3.3.2 Number of people who found job abroad either as temporary agency 
workers or matched with foreign employers in years 1990–2010* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*the data on 2003 is biased as some agencies that were operating before 6.02.2003 were not 
obliged to apply for certificates until 1 January 2004.  
Source: own elaboration based on employment agency reports published by the Polish Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy. 
 
If one compares the number of people who migrated with help of em-
ployment agencies with the estimates of the Polish Central Statistical 
Office on the size of temporary outflow of Poles40 one has to admit that 
the role of employment agencies as facilitators of migration of Poles is 
rather small. However, when putting together data on the major destina-
tions of labour migrants, it is clearly visible that if not for employment 
────────────────────────── 
40 CSO estimated that in 2004 there were a 1 mln of Poles stayong temporarily abroad, 1.45 mln in 2005, 1.95 
(2006), 2.27 (2007), 2.2(2008), 1.87 (2009) and 1.99 mln in 2010. 
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agencies active role, the outflow to i.e. Netherlands or Iceland would not 
be that dynamic.  
Figure 3.3.3 Polish migrant workers staying abroad for longer than two months 
(LFS 2nd quarter)(left-hand chart) and Polish citizens sent to work abroad by 
temp agencies by country of destination (right-hand chart) (in ths.) (2008–
2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on LFS data and employment agency reports published by the Polish 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. 
 
In 2010, similarly to previous years, the majority of employers who used 
Polish employment agencies services to recruit new workers were lo-
cated in Netherlands (they have gained 39.7 ths. new employees), Ger-
many (11.6 ths.)and Great Britain (7 ths.). In turn (as shown in figure 
below), Polish employment agencies that provided services of temp 
workers sent their workers to Netherlands (3.6 ths.), France (3.2 ths.) 
and Germany (2.3 ths.). 
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Figure 3.3.4 Number of people who found job abroad either as temporary agency 
workers or matched with foreign employers in years by the type of employment 
agency and country of destination (2010)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on employment agency reports published by the Polish Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy. 
 
Among the Scandinavian countries, Poles were finding work through 
employment agencies mainly in Norway – in the recent five years more 
than 10 thousand every year (except for the last year). In comparison, in 
the second receiving Scandinavian country – Denmark – in the peak year 
(2007) only about 4 thousand Poles have found employment through 
employment agencies. Taking into consideration the size of the Swedish 
labour market, the labour migration with the help of the recruitment 
agencies is rather of minor significance. In Iceland, employment agencies 
participated in matching the process of Polish workers with Icelandic 
employers after the opening of its labour market to Polish workers in 
2006. In the year 2007 Polish employment agencies matched more 
workers in both Iceland and Finland than in Sweden, although both 
these labour markets are smaller. Significant drop in the number of 
matchings of Polish workers and Icelandic employers in the recent two 
years was the effect of financial crisis. The worsening economic situation 
in Iceland had major impact on the reduction of work places in the con-
struction sector, which was the main sector of employment of migrant 
workers. 
 
 
 
 
178 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
Table 3.3.1 Scandinavia as a destination region for people who found job abroad through em-
ployment agencies (2003–2010) 
Year/Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Norway 9,470 1,2326 8,715 12,456 12,969 13,622 11,016 6,887 
Denmark 1,853 1,330 1,144 2,699 4,004 2,929 1,758 1,162 
Sweden 484 107 71 319 759 764 160 607 
Iceland 52 42 617 1,192 954 358 20 5 
Finland 117 0 31 252 1,292 799 250 113 
Source: Own elaboration based on employment agency reports published by the Polish Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy. 
 
There is a significant difference between the distribution of main coun-
tries where Poles found employment through the employment agencies 
and the group of main countries where they were sent to work as tem-
porary agency workers. This difference is not only related to the labor 
market size of receiving countries, but also conditioned by the employ-
ment agency penetration rate of the labor market, which is much higher 
in the UK – 3.6% or Netherlands – 2.9% and lower in Norway 0.8% and 
Denmark 0.6% (Ciett 2011). Hence, in 2010 the employment agencies 
have sent more than 5 thousand temporary workers to work in the 
Netherlands and only 150 to Norway or Denmark. On the other hand in 
some countries such as UK the overall employment agency penetration 
is high, nevertheless the employers’ interest in using the services of 
Polish employment agencies is rather small. This could be explained by 
the better knowledge of the British labour market within the group of 
Poles that want to migrate to UK. Those potential migrants are in better 
position in comparison to those who plan to go to any Scandinavian 
country as they have better command of receiving country language 
(more people in Poland learn at school English than French, German or 
Norwegian), secondly there are also longer migration traditions to UK 
than i.e. to Norway or Netherlands. That means there is some common 
knowledge spread out through migrant networks between them and the 
members of sending societies about the employment possibilities in the 
receiving countries. Last but not least, the migrants’ networks work not 
only as information channels but also members of this networks help 
newcomers to find work and accommodation. Also, as many thousands 
of Polish nationals already reside in UK, British employment agencies 
already have some reservoir of potential migrant workers in the coun-
try, so they do not have to search for them in Poland. All together these 
factors enable workers to search for employment in the receiving coun-
try without the help of formal intermediaries from Poland.  
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Table 3.3.2 Scandinavia as a destination region for temporary agency workers (2005–2010) 
Year/Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Norway 265 697 1,685 1,428 749 154 
Denmark 16 82 67 118 234 157 
Sweden 0 82 149 326 127 158 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 13 153 221 14 4 0 
Source: own elaboration based on employment agency reports published by the Polish Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy. 
 
Another aspect that determines the use of national temp employment 
agency services rather than foreign ones is the national labour law. A 
good example of this could be the absence of temporary Polish agency 
workers on the Icelandic labor market though there was a high interest 
in labour brokerage between both countries. This probably came out as 
a result of the application of a legal anti-social dumping protections. 
Icelandic labour law, including the Act on Temporary work agencies, 
provide workers employed by TWA’s established or operating in Ice-
land, with an entitlement to receive minimum working conditions, 
which are applicable by collective agreement and Icelandic labour law 
irrespectively of nationality (ICL 2006). Since the temporary employ-
ment agencies are not able to pay wages according to the sending coun-
try regulations, the temp workers services are less profitable for them. 
(Karlsson 2006).  
11.6 Gender of workers 
In general, during recent years, employment agencies had more male 
than female customers. Male domination is explained mainly by the de-
mand for foreign labour force which in some receiving countries is gen-
der specific and, hence is reflected in the gender structure of the labour 
migration streams. Moreover, from country to country, differences in 
gender balance in agency work are determined by the particular socio-
economic fabric and economic history of each country, as well as by the 
sectors allowed to use agency work (CIETT 2011).  
On average women constituted only up to 5% of the total stream of 
labor migration to Norway, Iceland and Finland which is caused by high 
demand in the male dominated sectors such as construction or mari-
time. On the other hand, in the recent years as a consequence of demand 
in sectors such as: medical and in-home care sector, and services (espe-
cially cleaning industry, hotels and restaurants have observed feminine 
dominated streams of migration to countries like Spain or Italy, where 
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women constituted more than a half of group of migrants). It is said that 
more service-oriented markets tend to employ more women, which 
seem to converge with these findings (CIETT 2011).  
11.7 Timing of assignments 
Short term contracts are rather usual when the companies outsource 
workers in order to remain competitive on the market. Hiring workers 
with help of employment agencies enables them to adjust their need for 
staff during the output fluctuations. The use of agency workers supports 
companies to deal with unexpected increase in demand or to face sea-
sonal fluctuations. The other frequent reason to use the agency workers 
is to cover for short-term staff leave as during maternity or paterni-
ty/sick/holiday leave. Generally the use of employment agencies covers 
specific flexible requirements that cannot be covered by permanent con-
tracts (CIETT 2011). Having this knowledge, there is no wonder why in 
the last 8 years the majority of people who signed a contract with for-
eign employers with a help of Polish employment agency, have been 
employed only for a short period of time – more than 90% up to one 
year – out of which more than a half for only up to 3 months.  
11.8 Legality of activity 
Despite that employment agencies that are caught on breaking the law 
are fined with being deleted from the official registration and with pro-
hibition for three years from getting new certification for such services, 
the controls conducted in the recent years showed that the proportion of 
employment agencies which violate the law are quite stable (compare 
table below) (PIP 2011).  
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Table 3.3.3 Proportion of inspected employment agencies which committed law-breaking provi-
sion of services with the Act on Promotion of Employment and Labor Market Institutions  
Violation of the law 2007 r. 2008 r. 2009 r. 2010 
No. of inspected agencies  240 454 388 427 
 
No. of inspected agencies which provide cross-border services  n.a. 168 146 124 
 
Haven’t reported to the local authorities 23% 15% 16% 17% 
 
Operating without the required certification  7% 4% 5% 4% 
 
Incorrect content of the contract with people who were sent 
to work abroad  
n.a. 16% 18% 21% 
 
 
Incorrect content of contract with foreign employer to whom 
agency sent people to work  
n.a. 14% 17% 24% 
 
 
Lack of contract with foreign employers to whom agency 
plans to sent workers 
9% 11% 3% 
Source: Reports of National Labour Inspectorate various years 
 
In 2010 the major problem with incorrect functioning of employment 
agencies, revealed by the inspectors was related to the content of con-
tracts between the employment agency and both sides of agency service 
takers – employers searching for workers and people searching for em-
ployment. This was mainly explained by the lack of knowledge of law in 
force, that has changed recently in Poland. Also, differences in labour 
law between country of origin and destination and the problems (even 
by the lawyers) with interpretation of the binding rules as the person 
working for employment agency explains (Agency no. 20) contribute to 
this situation. It also happens that agencies fail in delivering annual re-
ports to the local authorities. One of the reason for this situation could 
be an attempt to hide agencies’ activity on the black market. If there is 
no or just partial information about employment agency activity it is 
more difficult to judge whether the unit under control has violated the 
law or not. It is worth mentioning that by Polish law employment agen-
cies are not allowed to charge their customers, who are searching for 
employment, for the fact of helping them in this process. When people 
are sent to work abroad by a employment agency, they could only be 
charged for the actual cost related to sending them, only if it was previ-
ously specified in the contract between them and the agency. These 
could include: cost of transportation, cost of working visas, travel insur-
ance, cost of medical examination, translation of necessary documents, 
training in accordance to the requirement of foreign employer. However 
if other costs have been incurred during the matching process of worker 
and employer, then it can only be claimed from the employer.  
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11.9 The modus operandi of employment agencies in 
Poland  
As mentioned before, market of employment agencies has experienced 
considerable growth in Poland during recent years. It is interesting 
however, to get to know the reasons behind setting up a business of this 
kind and some of the testimonies gave an interesting insight as to why 
and how particular agencies were established, what influenced the mode 
of operating, and at least – why and how the choice of country was made. 
During the fieldwork, among other respondents, we managed to reach 
persons who were either heads of the agencies themselves, or were in 
close contacts with such, so they knew the beginnings from their rela-
tions. These were mostly small and medium size agencies.  
In a few cases the business starts simply because the idea was con-
ceived between people, from whom one was Polish and second party 
was from another country. This was often linked to those persons work-
ing together and recognizing the significant rise of demand for foreign 
workers, especially in the climate of an enlarging European Union. The 
importance of these links with the country of destination is hard to 
overestimate, as it gives good ground for starting a business of this kind 
– with a good knowledge of a Polish market and specialists that are 
available here and with contacts to potential clients, which the agency 
then matches with the workers.  
Agency no. 2: “at first my boss has worked in Dutch office [of the employment 
agency – eds.] for a few years, for the big boss, she was a coordinator then 
(…) and while being there she has decided to come back to Poland, it was in 
2006.” 
About the respondent from this agency said that it was strongly related 
to the professional experience of her boss, who upon return started run-
ning Polish branch of Dutch agency and recruit temporary workers spe-
cifically for the Dutch agency, who then work in hotels in Netherlands. 
Another example comes from Agency no. 8, where a person who 
started setting up the business had spent a few years abroad. After ob-
serving her own difficulties of obtaining a job as a Polish national, she 
then decided that there is a scope for potentially successful business of 
matching workers with employers. Especially as the country was in need 
for foreign workers, however not many have the opportunity to work 
there due to lack of contacts with the employer:  
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Agency no. 8: “as I was a good employee their trust in me grew, (…) so later I 
recruited few more people for them. (…) then in my little surrounding I started 
noticing that they really need workers, however they are still reluctant, but 
there is for sure a space for Poles in their labour market. (…) we met the boss of 
the agency there, now he is our close friend. And I told him that I always want-
ed to start this kind of business in Poland, he thought about it, and as they op-
erate in typically manufacturing industry, in metallurgy, and so on, and that 
they do not have that many employees to satisfy the needs of his clients, so the 
idea came into reality, that there will be a Polish branch of his agency.” 
Another interesting insight about the agency that recruit manpower 
specifically for Scandinavian clients was a Polish national who grew up 
in Sweden. Due to this, he understands the specificity of the market, 
speaks the language and, thanks to his previous experience of work for 
another agency, is able to run his own project – setting up an agency in 
Poland to recruit Polish workers for his Swedish business partners:  
Agency no. 13: “it is very much related to my person because since my child-
hood I lived there and in 2006 I came to Poland to recruit workers. (…) So I 
came here to do recruitment and training of workers before their departure 
and initially it was related only to the building industry. (…) We work on the 
basis of cooperation with other agencies there. (…) At the moment we have 
an exclusive cooperation with one of the biggest agencies in Sweden.” 
These are only few examples of personal relationship to either a person 
or a country where the agency operates. From our respondents we 
heard few more such examples, which in our opinion is an important 
factor in understanding their beginnings and see how the idea of setting 
up a business like this came into existence. It is also helpful in under-
standing how it influenced the profile of agency, the country to which 
they send workers and what chances or constraints it gives in their daily 
work. What is also important, as some respondents mentioned, those 
direct links with clients or time period spent in the particular country 
helped them to understand the business culture there. Also in recruiting 
new client firms this enabled them to be more effective in professional 
relations, as the word of mouth marketing built up on trust and personal 
relationships was more effective than search of clients as an unknown 
business partner.  
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11.10 Temporary work or recruitment agency? 
The statistics confirm that the majority of employment agencies are in-
volved only in the provision of job brokerage and that temporary work is 
still not a well developed service in Poland. Therefore in this part of the 
report we want to shed light on what perspective do the agencies have 
regarding the way they work, and what assets it gives them in their opin-
ion, as well as what risks may have come out as a result. From the re-
search we recognized few important factors that determine whether 
agencies prefer to recruit workers for the clients or to provide them with 
temporary workers. This decision often also depends on the preferences 
of the client – whether the client can afford to employ worker directly, for 
permanent position, or is in need for temporary staff to accomplish a par-
ticular project.  
Our interviews reveal that jobs requiring high qualifications (such as 
many positions  within medicine, engineering, and IT) are usually based 
upon permanent or long term contracts, since finding the right match 
requires greater efforts (often linked with providing language training 
required for performing the job) than recruiting low skilled workers. 
Also, for the company which employs such workers, it is more beneficial 
to have this person on permanent basis, since the work often requires 
in-depth knowledge about particular company.  
As for the agencies which recruit qualified workforce for the industry 
and construction sectors and low skilled labour (especially for agricul-
ture) it seems to be more common to cooperate with other temp agencies 
in the country of destination, who then employ recruited workers. One 
reason for this situation is that the responsibility of Polish agency is re-
cruitment only the agency in country of destination is responsible for con-
tacting clients and for temporary workers who they send to user compa-
nies. In the case presented below, the respondent explains why they pre-
fer to work with one agency abroad who deals with their clients directly, 
over few little companies with whom his agency would have to cooperate:  
Agency no. 10: “we are recruitment agency that cooperates with temporary 
work agency there (…). It is one of my experience, that cooperating with too 
many small companies might be really troublesome, secondly it is also risky, 
because you never know whether they are financially solvent, if they have 
money at all.” 
The risk, but in this case regarding to functioning as temporary work 
agency, was mentioned by another respondent from the recruitment 
agency:  
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Agency no. 3: “we are small agency and this is not very safe for small agen-
cies. But if we develop further for sure we will expand also into the tempo-
rary work sector. (…)It is dangerous to hire temp workers for us, because if 
the client user will not pay us, we still have to pay the workers, so if the com-
pany is big, that hire few hundreds of persons, they have big capital, in our 
case, we have few employees in our office, and capital stock is rather small.” 
Having those two quotes, one can see that for recruitment agencies in 
Poland to cooperate with temporary agencies from abroad is of great 
help – they do not have to be bothered with contacting the client firms, 
hence it eliminates the risk of them being cheated. Similar concerns ap-
pear in the second quote – for medium size and small agencies it might 
be risky to operate as temporary work agency and recruitment also min-
imize risk of losing solvency in case client firm goes bankrupt. Knowing 
that many recruitment agencies cooperate with another employment 
agency in a country of destination, they are not burdened by all the pa-
per work and responsibility for the workers, at the same time the re-
sponsibility of finding new clients is on the side of agency in the country 
of destination.  
Agency no. 13: “so we only recruit, we do not employ them, it is not tempo-
rary work, what I meant to say is they eventually end up as an agency work-
ers, but the Swedish agency and it is quite a difference, because they sign 
Swedish contracts – those people who go there thanks to our agency.” 
On the other hand, quite different perspective is presented by the tem-
porary work agencies, who stressed different aspects of recruitment, 
and importance of longstanding relation with employees:  
Agency no. 11: “Because it is always better to cooperate with specialist from 
any field for a longer time, rather than just send him away and forget. Those 
men… for example mister Andrzej, who lives not that far away from here (…) 
he is a retired miner with an experience of working in a tunnels, but also a 
carpenter and has some certificates for welding.” 
As the respondent said – people with many skills in manual labour, with 
good experience are not that easy to find, therefore for his kind of ser-
vices it is better to have this person in hand in case of incoming projects. 
Moreover, this situation give a glimpse on the temporary workers situa-
tion, as not everyone is interested in permanent emigration to the coun-
try of destination and short term contracts (lasting for few months per 
year) are convenient for them to top up their monthly incomes:  
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Agency no. 11: „so he came and said that he is newly pensioner, and he does not 
have a pressure to earn a lot, but his daughter is at the university so he just 
wants to spend abroad few months every year. So we got this idea that there 
are lot more persons like him in Silesia. And because there were reductions in 
mining industry we stand up and said, gentlemen, there is work to do for a few 
months in France, for this and this money, and we weren’t short in candidates.” 
Another respondent from temporary work agency also stressed this 
issue, but also mentioned the benefits that this kind of employment 
gives both to worker and to user company:  
Agency no. 9: “recruitment is for sure an interesting business, however one must 
remember that it is only one time contact with someone and later the agency 
doesn’t know what happens with this particular person. Because it only matches 
employer with an employee and then their role is over (…) if we would want to 
work like this then Polish workers would have to be employed directly by the 
companies from France and the fact is that companies don’t want to hire, even the 
workers don’t want it much, because then they would have to rely on themselves. 
Obviously, the surroundings there are different, foreign language, they would 
have to find accommodation on their own, pay taxes, and so on. So first they don’t 
want, secondly companies don’t want, that is why they use temporary workers.” 
So the agency takes the responsibility off the shoulders of both – an em-
ployee and a user firm for all the paper work, taxation, wages, etc. at the 
same time taking care of the accommodation and social benefits of the 
worker. This is understood as one of the strongest incentive to use the 
service offered by temporary work agencies.  
11.11 Contacting client firms 
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, contacting the client firms very 
often depends on personal contacts and already established relations 
with partners abroad. Mostly respondents stressed the power of word of 
mouth marketing and recommendations as one of the most effective 
method of finding new clients. This was important for severak reasons, 
mainly that personal recommendation implies reliability of potential 
agency but also as some other mentioned, the business culture is some-
how based on personal relationships, which is important especially for 
middle size and smaller agencies, or those new on the market. 
Agency no. 8: “when it comes to business it is much different from the way 
we do it in Poland (…). There everyone knows everyone, they cherish those 
acquaintances… how to put it, over a pint of beer (…) so these relations are 
sometimes very friendly. So if someone meets a representative of our partner 
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there, it is obvious he will use our services rather than super established big 
company, it is because we are known there, we are the trusted ones, and I am 
the co-worker of the boss in this country.” 
Of course not every agency can enjoy this kind of recommendations, also 
using only one method would not be effective in the very competitive 
reality of the market of work agencies. This means that apart from word 
of mouth marketing work agencies also use set of different ways to 
reach potential clients abroad. How challenging it could be, was experi-
enced by the respondent from agency no. 3.  
Agency no. 3: “I am personally responsible for contacting clients in Scandina-
via, but this is already very saturated market by Polish workers and it is diffi-
cult to open up a business relation there. I was in Norway for some time so I 
have an idea of what the market looks like over there. And in some compa-
nies there are already people from Poland, or with Polish roots, so they can 
directly recruit someone from Poland.” 
As another person mentioned, her duty was to find business partners in 
Germany, and in doing so she had to put some serious effort in finding 
what is really needed on the German labour market:  
Agency no. 14: “I started from reading different articles about what kind of 
specialists would be needed. But it was overtime work, which I considered as 
equipping myself with knowledge of what do they really need there, apart 
from few tens of thousands of engineers. Best effects resulted from searching 
on the job websites where the companies were looking for employees.” 
Hours spent on doing research and contacting potential clients paid off 
and eventually the agency managed to enter German labour market of-
fering qualified Polish workers to their clients. Direct search is a very 
popular method of finding clients, however not always successful. As one 
of the respondents said, many times emails go to the spam box, or mes-
sage is delivered to the secretary desk and no further. Another way is to 
take part in events, such as meeting the representative of national eco-
nomic chambers or other gatherings:  
Agency no. 7: “it is crucial to meet the clients directly, to have a conversation 
with them, to set up a meeting and offer our services. We make use of some 
events, situations that give us chance to reach higher number of clients. We 
actually do not use typical adverts in the media.” 
Nevertheless, after spelling out all possible methods respondents most 
of the time turned to recommendations: 
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Agency no. 11: “recommendations from previous clients works best when 
one want to sell his service. Nothing works better, especially among untrust-
ing towards foreigners French (…) only when another French employer will 
tell them “take Poles, because they are great, very effective, work very well, 
then only. That is why I think if we would have invested some money in some 
marketing action, a direct coming out to potential clients, this money would 
be lost in large.” 
Some of the agencies can afford to employ local coordinators in particu-
lar countries, who do not only take care of the workers and in case of 
emergency are there to help out, but their role is also to contact new 
clients, gather information, take part in important events that may pro-
mote the work of the agency.  
11.12 Recruitment of workers 
Generally agencies use similar methods of reaching potential employees, 
regardless of the fact whether they are temporary work agencies or re-
cruitment agencies. Obviously agencies store all the incoming CV’s of suc-
cessful and prospective candidates who could be contacted in the future 
recruitment projects. Therefore, most of the time they first look through 
their own base of potential employees or among those they have already 
hired or recruited. Then, if the base offers a good candidate the job advert 
does not need to be placed on the agency website. If otherwise, then such 
advert goes to the website of the agency and internet job portals and 
branch webpages (most popular are i.e. www.infopraca.pl, www. 
szybkopraca.pl). Simultaneously many agencies contact their previous 
workers or already have some contacts from them to persons who they 
recommend. This means, that networking among potential employees is 
as good strategy for recruiting the right employee as well as it is for find-
ing potential client (vide: contacting with the client). 
Agency no. 2: “A lot of workers which we have recruited have been recom-
mended to us by other employees of ours. The fact that someone recom-
mends a person is making it lot easier for us and also it works in favour of a 
candidate. We also know, that our employee would not recommend someone 
who is not reliable, who doesn’t care about the work.” 
Also, it often happens that potential employees are coming to the agency 
having heard the positive information about their services from friends 
or acquaintances and ask if they would have found something for them. 
This kind positive opinion that is spreading around potential employees 
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is also very important, as in Polish reality agencies are often considered 
as untrustworthy:  
Agency no. 9: “we also have these situations where they [potential employ-
ees] are very suspicious, read this fifteen pages status of ours, come with 
their wives who are their spokespersons and they have list of questions (…) 
this distrust comes from somewhere, but we really try to do our job in most 
solid, reliable way.” 
Having a good reputation among potential customers is also important 
especially when there are still situations of some middlemen asking for 
money for finding a job to someone, or even pretending to be a repre-
sentative of particular agency.  
Agency no. 7: “[Interviewer: were there any situations that someone pretended 
to be a representative of your agency?] There still are such situations, till today. 
And for sure there is a group of candidates, who have bad experience of coop-
erating with agencies, not to mention the situations where someone just cheat-
ed on them, took some money in advance and they simply did not get the job. 
There are also situations, where the agencies didn’t play fair either.” 
Usually the recruitment process itself entails screening of the candidates 
according to their language skills, education, certificates, experience, 
references. Methods are as following – face to face interviews, often 
skype interviews, soft skills test, practical test where often potential 
employer participates in the worker’s skills verification, verification of 
certificate of no criminal conviction. Of course this list is not exhausted 
and only mentions the most important issues. As some of the agencies 
report, they usually try to examine the client in such a way as the client 
would do it – not only does it increase the reliability of the agency for the 
client, but it also ensures that the employee is a reliable person and will 
not cause the agency any problems. 
According to our respondents there are three most important criteria 
in recruitment process: language, experience and willingness to go 
abroad. Then, depending whether the recruitment is for highly skilled, 
specialist or low skilled position the requirements vary. As our respond-
ents puts it:  
Agency no. 3: “if a mechanic has to speak foreign language communicatively, 
then a civil engineer has to speak the language very well.” 
This basically means that fluency level should be generally higher when 
it comes to highly skilled persons. However, general impression is that 
most of the agencies mention difficulties in finding a person with a good 
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command of foreign language. Language is often the first barrier that 
stops many people from being recruited, and especially when it comes to 
English, still it is not common to find someone who meets the language 
requirements and especially when it comes to someone who speaks 
either German, French, or Norwegian. There are also quite significant 
country differences – some employers readily accept group of Poles 
where only one person speak the language communicatively (some re-
spondents referred to Belgium in this respect), whereas others, like in 
Great Britain expect everyone to have at least good command of English. 
Employers from Sweden or Norway on the other hand often take some 
of the costs of language training of potential employees (among our re-
spondents offered courses were of either French, German, English, Swe-
dish, Dutch or Norwegian languages).  
When it comes to experience the issue is equally complicated – agen-
cies mostly check the CV’s and the references from previous employers. 
This is a good method of screening potentially good candidates, but very 
often it excludes those who are unemployed (often for several years), or 
new graduates. Often also in many countries the criteria to work in par-
ticular profession are quite strict (such as an example of nurses in Swe-
den, who have to have minimum 2 years of experience and speak the 
language). Quite challenging seem to be recruitment projects of highly 
skilled persons, where a head hunting is necessary – it is so because 
many of those people are already in a labour market, usually satisfied 
with the earnings in Poland and not very willing to work abroad: 
Agency no. 1: “Especially when it comes to IT specialists, they are not very ac-
tive on the labour market, and the client has to actively reach them, and here 
agencies are useful. Because we start contacts directly with the candidates, 
calling them, organizing a meeting and so on.” 
It is difficult for the agencies to assess whether workers with previous expe-
rience abroad are valued over those without one. For sure it says lot about 
the psychological suitability to deal with emotional hardships of separation 
with family or friends (not always they go abroad alone, as, most of the 
times family may join those on a longer or permanent contracts). 
Agency no. 7: “Work abroad means departure for couple of months or longer. 
That means separation from family, completely different environment, culture, 
approaches to workers. And we need to know whether the candidate is ready 
for that. Sometimes our opinion is negative about the candidates who, in our 
opinion are too…psychologically vulnerable and doesn’t have what it takes, the 
personality (…) to us it is not most important criteria whether someone has al-
ready this experience, but as a matter of fact those candidates better sell them-
selves on the job interview, they have different approach, it helps.” 
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 191 
It is also truthe that some agencies prefer to recruit among those with-
out previous experience abroad, as was the case of an agency recruiting 
highly skilled persons: 
Agency no. 1: “it often happens that a person, who already has worked abroad 
knows the wages standards there, and can say, that “no, I want to get more than 
that”. Whereas a person who goes abroad for the first time may not have that 
knowledge. In general, though, employers prefer those with experience on the 
Polish labour market, but who haven’t been working abroad yet.” 
So it is difficult to definitely say who got preferences – those with or 
without previous experience of working abroad. In some of the agencies 
the candidates with previous experience abroad are not implicitly fa-
voured, but have some sort of privilege over those without one. Regard-
less of what Agency no. 1 has said, the indication is that a person most 
likely to get the job is the one who is most likely to handle problems and 
the stress of living abroad without his or her family. 
As before mentioned, recruitment processes involve also those can-
didates that have previously worked abroad. Nevertheless, in case of the 
post accession wave of Polish migrants, there have been examples of 
persons working in professions below their skills and qualifications. 
Consequently, this might have had a serious impact on their career de-
velopment. Example of this is also present in the stories of one of the 
respondents, who say that they face problems in recruiting qualified 
workforce, who had an episode of working elsewhere and want to re-
turn to previous profession:  
Agency no. 12: “some of them came up with an idea of giving up work in Poland 
and emigrating to the Britain, without job offer there (…) now when we talk 
with candidates we see they worked in a factory, on a production line, because 
they didn’t know the language, they couldn’t work with another person which 
shattered their chances of working in their profession, which they didn’t know 
back then (…) Later when they learned the language they started looking for 
job offers in hospitals but they were turned down, so what that you speak the 
language if you stopped working in your profession, for the last two years or so. 
So some of them had to come back to Poland and work here in a hospital to re-
new their qualifications and try again for work in Great Britain.” 
This situation seriously reduces the employability potential of the work-
ers who did not make use of their skills during their first stay abroad, and 
who then have to spend more time and effort in finding satisfactory em-
ployment. This is also a problem for the agencies, which reached persons 
who on the one hand have – often valued – experience of working abroad, 
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but on the other hand – lost the continuity of employment in one’s profes-
sion, which is crucial for instance in medical jobs.  
When the agency has finished screening of the candidates and prese-
lection has been done, the prospective candidates are presented to the 
potential employer, who then makes the final decision.  
11.13 Preparation and monitoring 
Most of the time, as mentioned above, good command of a foreign lan-
guage is a prerequisite for applying for most of the positions abroad. 
Some respondents mentioned that importance of this requirement has 
risen during the crisis and the employers are even more demanding 
when it comes to judge the suitability of particular person. That is why 
many agencies do have a special language training prior to departure 
(especially regarding countries such as France, Germany, Norway and 
Sweden). Often those courses are prepared specifically for the kind of 
job one is going to perform, with specific vocabulary and intensity of 
lessons, so they differ much from those offered in typical language 
schools. For this kind of training are invited those who have already 
positively gone through initial selection and have been approved by the 
employer. In general, employees do not pay for this course, or only part-
ly. Language training is often given in very intensive few week courses 
or longer when it comes to professions such as nursing, where fluency of 
communicating is essential for good job performance. Usually at the end 
of such a course the participant has to pass the test that shows his/hers 
progress and the level of motivation to learn and to work in particular 
country – if the person fails the final test, his or hers placement may be 
suspended or even cancelled. As one respondent said, during these 
courses they also have a chance to get to know the candidates better:  
Agency no. 13: “these exams are more for us, to know on what level they are 
so to match them in groups accordingly to it, those who speaks better with 
the weaker ones, so if someone scores badly it is more for our information. 
But if someone for three weeks of language course doesn’t show any effort 
we say thanks to this person. It is information to us that someone is not at all 
motivated and we understand if someone doesn’t have the language skills, 
but they have to show that at least they try.” 
Employers hope that investment made in future employees will pay off 
when they will start working. As a matter of fact this is also a chance for 
the workers to improve their skills and employability factor, as 
knowledge especially of Norwegian or Swedish is not very common on 
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the Polish labour market and possibly can bring further benefits for the 
employee. On the other hand, not all candidates are very willing to take 
part in a language course because it delays the moment they can start 
working (hence earnings) for a for couple of weeks to months, while 
they also have to suspend their other economic activities to take part in 
language classes (sometimes it means travelling or spending some time 
– few weeks to months – in a training centre, far from home). 
When it comes to employment, many agencies operate on a success 
fee basis, meaning that only when a person is hired then the agency gets 
the profits for the service. Another reassurance of the solid service of the 
agency is the probation period for the employees – it seem to be a wide-
spread practice to replace the worker with another candidate in case 
something has gone wrong or if a personal situation of an employee 
requires termination of the contract. However it is much easier to do so 
when the preparation to departure is not so time-consuming as it is in 
case of recruitments were language training is included.  
If it is not a duty of employer, most of the time work agencies help 
candidates with issues regarding the journey (especially for the temp 
workers, however most of the times help comes as an advice on cheap-
est and reliable means of transport), or to find suitable accommodation. 
Also, agencies, both recruitment and temporary, are in touch with the 
workers during their assignment abroad, monitoring the situation or 
sometimes mediating when required.  
Agency no. 12: “either we help or the employer [with the accommodation]. If 
not employer then we try to help to find one. However the costs of renting are 
on employees. (…) And we are always in touch with the client, so if from the 
first day something goes wrong, we always know about it. As for the workers, 
we give them some time to settle down. If after about a week we have some 
signals, that something is not right, then we try to find out the reason, what re-
ally is a problem. Then we ask the client, what is his opinion, can he do some-
thing to help us out. We try to be mediator, because situation is different – it is 
not a client and candidate anymore, it is employer and employee, it is different 
relation and we are the third element, where both sides know we want to help, 
because we spend so much time in matching two parties (…).” 
The workers are prepared for departure when they have been informed 
about the length of time they are expected to spend abroad, their duties 
and responsibilities during the time of assignment. The delivery of this 
information is the agencies responsibility (meaning that all the infor-
mation must be given in their native language). Also, conveying the 
knowledge about culturally specific norms in different countries is often 
considered as a part of preparation:  
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Agency no. 12: “so this what is welcomed in Spain, when everyone greets 
everyone, smile, talk about family (…) so for instance in Great Britain, where 
these relations at works aren’t that close, and even if someone tries to get 
closer to one another, everyone there is so busy , do what they have to do and 
go home. They do not integrate much there at work. In Germany those more 
sociable ones are considered to be kind of lazy, who don’t want to work, 
while there is so much to do.” 
When it comes to the wages usually the employees are paid according to 
the minimum wage standards in particular countries or to the collective 
labour agreements. Having said this, it is also true that not many local 
workers would have agreed to work for a minimum wage. What is also 
important, some respondents noticed that Poles, unlike perhaps few 
years earlier, now are not that willing to work for a minimum wage: 
Agency no. 4: “What I value is that Poles started respecting themselves. Be-
cause of their skills they value themselves, and then also our contacts with 
clients are more demanding, because we have to explain the employer that 
they will not work for the bowl of rice [laughing] but one has to adjust the 
wages to the expectations. Because, let’s say on the German market, one can 
employ locals, but they already live there, have their families there, every-
thing is on place. And Poles have to emigrate, either temporary, or perma-
nently, he has to organize his stay abroad, so it is not that easy.” 
Agencies have to obey the regulations in the countries of their activity, 
however, some of them notice important differences between the coun-
tries they operate in. In the Scandinavian countries for example, high 
business culture dominates, whereas in places such as the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom agencies "sell people" and there are many cases 
of agencies operating below set standards and not complying with regu-
lations. It is also strongly related to the contacts with the employer, since 
the market of work agencies is highly competitive:  
Agency no. 20: “In the Netherlands there are more recruitment agencies than 
client firms. And there are solid agencies, smaller, bigger, never mind, but they 
are good. (…) but there are plenty of those which are springing up like mush-
rooms after rain and they shut down equally fast (…) they get the money, go out 
of business, and run to another city to do the same. And that is how they work.” 
In relation to this, some respondents mentioned the ambiguous practic-
es of some agencies and the dumping prices they offer for their services, 
which clearly is a sign of some possible infringements and unfair compe-
tition. Also many of them mentioned that this kind of practices would 
destroy their brand and reputation and no serious agency that wants to 
continue operating in this particular country can afford this to happen:  
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Agency no. 8: “the Finnish market is good if and only if an agency take all the 
regulations seriously, comply with all these collective agreements, that is 
why I think if an agency wants to enter this market and doesn’t have pure in-
tentions it will be their failure, sooner or later.” 
11.14 Impact of the crisis 
It has been generally experienced that the economic downturn affected 
work of employment agencies. However many respondents stressed 
different aspects of this, also their experience differs according to the 
type of the agency – recruitment or temporary work agency. 
Employers who decide to turn to an agency in order to recruit a suit-
able person for the job does not want to spend money unless the suc-
cessful candidate has been appointed. The “success fee” rule of recruit-
ment that has been mentioned before, seem to apply more during the 
crisis than before it, as one of the respondent mentioned: 
Agency no 1: “in general, when one cooperates with a client firms, one has 
some entry fee, before the recruitment starts, because our recruiter puts con-
siderable effort, he makes calls, meet candidates, and the final settlement of 
the costs is after the person is employed. And now during the crisis they want 
to use our services but only under the success fee condition, they didn’t want 
to cooperate when the entry fees apply. So this has been the only thing that 
changed for us, but when it comes to recruitments, then I think their number 
has even risen.” 
It is important to note that mportantly this has been an agency that re-
cruits highly skilled persons, especially engineers and IT specialists and 
it seems that this sector has not been affected by the crisis as much as 
construction or manufacturing. The agencies operating in the two latter 
sectors mentioned the inflow of CVs from people with previous experi-
ence abroad. This again reminds us about the post EU enlargement mi-
gration wave from Poland towards the West. Hence, it is also a reminis-
cence of the crisis, which hit the countries of destination for Poles, such 
as Ireland Great Britain Spain, or Italy and the respective sectors of in-
dustry there:  
Agency no. 13: “here in 2009 everything collapsed, there was no demand for a 
single person, it was just enough for those who had already been recruited (…) 
after 2009 more CVs we received from Poles form Europe than from Poland, 
meaning from England, Ireland, from another European regions.” 
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Not all of these workers, however, had good chances of finding employ-
ment through the employment agencies, because their qualifications 
were not as good as required, especially during the crisis, where the 
bargaining power was more on the employers’ side than on the workers.  
Agency no. 11: “there were many Poles with, so called, Spanish episode in 
their life, so they came through our agency, pity that most of them have very 
few skills.” 
In some cases the crisis resulted in visible preference for workers of 
particular age, such as in the example of the Netherlands and the agency 
there who recruits specifically for the seasonal work in agriculture. 
Workers up to age of 22 are in the group with lowest taxation rate, 
which is more beneficial for the employer. Hence the stress is on re-
cruitment from this age group: 
Agency no. 20: “At the moment the most wanted group are boys and girls up 
to 22 years old (…) because they are from this age group where employer 
pays the lowest taxes. And unfortunately most of the agencies are turning 
this way, because the market forced this upon us. Crisis made this that em-
ployer is looking for some savings and unfortunately starts employing 
younger persons. And you know how it is with youths, some of them go to 
work but some of them to have fun, to drink, to do sightseeing.” 
Perhaps this is also a way to increase employability among youths and 
newly graduates, as according to Eurostat young people face serious 
difficulties in entering the labour market. This is also confirmed in the 
interviews conducted for this research, where many respondents men-
tioned lack of experience of youths and graduates, hence difficulties in 
finding employer who would be interested in employing such person.  
Also there has been observed an ambiguous impact on the demand 
for services for employment agencies. On the one hand there was often 
an increase in demand for temporary agency workers but on the other 
hand less demand for workers overall:  
Agency no. 18: “the Norwegian market is built in such a way, that direct em-
ployment for Poles is very difficult. There are huge restrictions (…) and the 
company, when it hires typical Kowalski, they can’t afford to fire him just like 
that, because there is no work for him anymore. They have to keep him, pay 
him wages and all the benefits and so on. So it is more convenient for them to 
turn to temp agency (…) and rent this worker for two, three months and then 
return him. They don’t have to worry about the accommodation, don’t pay rent 
deposit, don’t do the paper work, don’t do work permits, don’t open an ac-
count.” 
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Most of the respondents mentioned that when the crisis hit they experi-
enced downturn in number of recruitment projects, however most of the 
respondents also mentioned that they have noticed the signs of econom-
ic recovery and most of them are back on their feet after the difficult 
times. As they report, the 2009 and 2010 was a time where they had to 
survive through the difficult time and as a result some of them have gone 
or were close to bankrupt:  
Agency no. 10: “yes, it was very strong [the crisis], up to such extent that I 
nearly closed down the business, it was completely unprofitable, in fact I had 
to top it up with my own money to cover the costs, pay wages and so on. And 
I am glad I did it because now I am doing very well, but it was difficult back 
then in 2009 and half of 2010.” 
Meanwhile, many employers in search for cheap labour turned towards 
the countries that could provide them with cheap labour, which often 
meant that the workers were coming from countries outside the EU. 
Service providers of such workers are not trusted among the other 
agencies, who claim they violate the law and abuse the reputation of 
work agencies in general. Moreover, despite the fact that Polish workers 
are generally found very reliable, they are not considered to be the 
cheapest workers, at least not as cheap as workers who come from Asia, 
or Africa – according to information gathered during the fieldwork.  
Agency no. 20: “wages took a nosedive, employers do everything to reduce 
their costs (…) In the Netherlands they started looking more towards the 
work agencies from Turkey, or Algeria, and so on.” 
This trend has also been observed in the maritime industry, where the 
Polish seamen often have to compete with cheap labour especially from 
the Asian countries: 
Agency no. 16: “in general, due to the crisis, agencies look for the savings and 
for the cheaper crew, and these are the crews from Asia, mainly the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, Burma, these countries.” 
11.15 Conclusion 
The market of work agencies in Poland has been growing and changing 
substantially since the change of the political and economic regime in 
the early 1990s. Part of the growth of the market is due to foreign agen-
cies penetrating the Polish market. Moreover, as this research has 
proved, many Polish recruitment agencies also cooperate with sister 
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agencies from abroad, for whom they recruit workers (then employed as 
temp workers). This in turn affects the typical triangular relation that 
has been established between agency, employer and worker, because 
the worker signs an agreement with both – recruitment agency and 
temporary work agency and eventually work for a third party.  
This study has observed the different ways agencies operate in the 
market and seen that they most certainly act as migration facilitators. 
They are in possession of knowledge on both sides – supply and demand 
and are aware of the qualities of potential migrants (workforce in send-
ing country) and characteristics of the structure of demand on the la-
bour markets of receiving countries. They also have established business 
contacts and hence their work in finding clients and matching them with 
employees is significantly faster and more efficient than an average mi-
grant or company from abroad would do independently.  
There are examples of malpractices among agencies, however as we 
have pointed out, well reputed agencies, or those who operate in some 
specific sectors, which have earned trust among their clients, cannot af-
ford these, as it could be harmful for their brand (for example allowing for 
underpayment of migrant workers or offering a contract with description 
of work that differs from the candidate real qualifications in order to gain 
more profits for his employment). Nevertheless, in general employment 
agencies seem to work more efficiently when it comes to matching the 
worker (with certain qualifications) with potential employers than mi-
grants networks. The latter are more likely for the migrant to take up any 
job offer (as many Poles in Britain experienced after the EU accession), for 
jobs that does not match their education and skills, hence leading to de-
preciation of it and further influencing the employability potential of par-
ticular person (case of medical workers). Because employment agencies 
pay much attention to recruit persons that fit into the job description, the 
risk of not recognizing adequate skills for the position is very little. 
When it comes to destination countries that have an attractive labour 
market for Polish migrants, but where they do not have established mi-
grant networks, agencies have a scope for action there. This also con-
verge with the information given by respondents involved in recruit-
ment for Scandinavian clients, claiming that this labour market requires 
certain people with certain skills, unlike for example Great Britain, 
where many adventurous migrants from Poland headed to, without a job 
offer. The employment agencies stream the migration flows of qualified 
manpower to certain industries, where there is demand for migrant 
workers. Popularity of Scandinavia has grown as knowledge has spread 
among the migrant workers that conditions of employment are often 
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more generous there than in other European countries. Also the busi-
ness culture seems to be high and restrictive towards those who do not 
comply with the standards, as respondents in this research projects 
mentioned – agencies that do not comply with regulations and law in 
particular Scandinavian country quickly fall out of the business. 
What often has been mentioned in this research and was perhaps bit 
omitted in discussing the role of employment agencies in facilitating mi-
grations from Poland to European countries, is their role in improving the 
qualifications of workers, hence influencing their employability potential 
in the future. Here, the language courses that many agencies organize are 
of great importance, especially for the professions which are difficult to fill 
unless employees have a certain level of command in the foreign language 
(medical jobs are a typical example), but this also refer to builders, manu-
facturers, etc., where at least the basic language skills are required).  
It is important to note that employment agencies could also prevent 
the return migration on a big scale by preventing unqualified persons 
from migrating through their channels. Firstly those units that operate on 
more than one labour market have potential to shift migrant workers 
from markets under crisis to ones that still demand workforce. Secondly 
by delivering a detailed work description to potential migrants (about 
working conditions, culture of work, etc.) and well developed screening 
process of the candidates, they are able to match right persons with the 
employer and send to work only those who will not resign before the end 
of assignment. In other words it is more likely that those going abroad are 
not the less skilled but rather the ones who are employed according to 
their qualifications and whose skills are needed on the foreign labour 
market. This is also valued by the customers of the agencies, as it mini-
mizes the risk of migration (since the agency takes the burden of finding 
employment, paper work, contacting potential employer finding accom-
modation, etc). 
Nevertheless, it also has been recognized that often migrant workers 
would prefer to have a direct contact with employer, without an inter-
mediary, however the situation is complex as we have noticed. Some 
migrants may only want to migrate for few months, so work through the 
agencies is a flexible way for them to adjust to their and their employer’s 
needs, which then suggests that temporary work agencies may in partic-
ular influence an increase in cyclical migration. However, there are also 
situations of migrants lacking social networks or language skills in the 
country of destination, who then have to turn toward the agencies, de-
spite the fact that their preference would be to work directly for the 
employer. The good news here is, that without skills recognition and 
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with language difficulties, most likely they would end up in employment 
that does not match their qualifications, whereas agencies generally put 
an effort in finding the right person for the position (which also may 
include special language training for the prospective candidates). 
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12. Temporary staffing and 
labour migration to Norway 
Jon Horgen Friberg , Fafo 
 
 
Norway has been the main destination among the Nordic countries for 
new labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. The temporary 
staffing industry has played an important role in the initiation, facilita-
tion and sustainment of migration flows from new EU member states to 
Norway over the last few years, through the recruitment and employ-
ment of large numbers of Central and eastern European labour migrants.  
This chapter explores the closely intersected relationship between 
the temporary staffing and labour migration to Norway. First we elabo-
rate on the development of the temporary staffing industry in Norway, 
from the liberalisation of restrictions on temporary staffing in 2000, 
through the Eastward expansion of the European labour market in 2004 
and subsequent economic boom, to the financial crisis in 2008 and the 
following recovery. Using available registry based data from Statistics 
Norway and the employers’ organisation NHO Service, we trace how the 
industry has grown in numbers, changed in composition, and expanded 
into new sectors by recruiting migrant workers. We find that these 
changes are all closely intersected with the active recruitment of mi-
grants from the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe.  
We then go on to describe the specific development within the tradi-
tional “office sector”, health care and education. The office sector has tra-
ditionally been an important client sector for the temporary staffing in-
dustry, but recruitment of migrant labour does not play any significant 
role in this area, and its growth over the last decade has been limited. 
Health and education are two sectors where temporary staffing has be-
come increasingly widespread over the last few years. Much of this is 
based on recruitment of Swedish migrants. We then devote the most of 
our analysis to the industries where temporary staffing and labour migra-
tion is most closely interrelated – the construction industry and manufac-
turing. In these industries we analyse in more detail how temporary staff-
ing and labour migration has been related to structural changes in labour 
202 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
demand and work organisations; how different agencies go about recruit-
ing migrant workers; the rise of a new ethnic division of labour within the 
industries; to what extent temporary staffing works as a stepping stone 
into regular employment; the kinds of contracts and assignments that are 
common; their working conditions; and the ways agency work is adapted 
to legal regulations and collective bargaining. 
The data used in these analyses comes from several different sources. 
Numbers obtained from Statistics Norway and NHO Service is used to 
describe the macro development of the industry, while the analysis of 
the construction industry and manufacturing is based on qualitative 
interviews with managers and employee representatives (where such 
exist) in a number of temporary staffing agencies and expert interviews 
with representatives of the social partners.41  
12.1 Temporary staffing and migration in the 2000’s 
12.1.1 Liberalization of regulations 
Up until 2000, Norway had a general ban on temporary staffing. The ban 
was first introduced in 1971, but with the opportunity of applying for 
temporary exceptions. From 1983 a general exemption from the ban on 
temporary staffing was extended to commerce and office work, canteens 
and warehouses in relation to commerce (“the office sector”), and a 
number of subsequent amendments eased the access to dispensations 
from the ban. In the period before 2000, there were nevertheless con-
siderable restrictions on temporary staffing. The most important excep-
tions were the office sector and specific allowances for regular produc-
tion firms who were allowed to hire out parts of their staff in down peri-
ods (Nergaard et al. 2011). Despite restrictions temporary staffing grew 
as a phenomenon in Norwegian work life during the 1990s, from about 
2,500 registered man-years in 1991 to more than 10 ,000 in 1999 – most 
of which was within the traditional office sectors.  
────────────────────────── 
41 These data were partly collected by and/or in collaboration with other researchers at Fafo involved in a 
different project about temporary staffing in Norway. The report from this project was published as Nergaard et 
al (2012): Utleie av arbeidskraft 2011. Fafo Report 2011:33. Analyses presented in this short chapter rely to some 
extent on more extensive analyses presented in this report from Nergaard et al. Interested readers are referred 
to this report for a more extensive analysis of the situation within temporary staffing in Norway. 
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In 2000, based on the recommendations of a government appointed 
committee (NOU 1998:15), extensive liberalizations of the regulations 
on temporary staffing were introduced. The ban on hiring out labour 
was lifted. Instead, the access to hire in labour was limited to instances 
when temporary employment was also allowed or instances where the 
hiring of temporary workers is agreed upon through collective bargain-
ing. In practice, this meant that firms were allowed to hire workers 
through temporary staffing agencies if there was a temporary need for 
labour or if the local trade union in the client firm agreed. The liberaliza-
tion of rules regarding temporary staffing did not seem to have any im-
mediate effect on the general level of temporary staffing in Norway. It 
took time for agencies and potential customers to change their business 
strategies, and labour demand was in a down period with relatively high 
unemployment until 2003.  
12.1.2 The growth of temporary staffing 
From 2004 onwards, however, this was about to change dramatically. 
Figure 3.4.1 shows the number of reported FTEs (man-years) in tempo-
rary staffing according to NHO Service and Statistics Norway (the differ-
ence is due to not all staffing agencies being organized) from 1991 to 
2010. From 2004 to 2008 the number of FTEs rose from about 17 to 40 
thousand. With the impact of the financial crisis, temporary staffing hit a 
slump in 2009, but from 2010 the industry was once again on the rise. 
Although the entire Norwegian economy has expanded in the same peri-
od, temporary staffing has increased its relative importance as well as its 
total size. Nergaard et al. (2011: 43) has estimated that employees in 
temporary staffing amounted to 2.6% of the total Norwegian workforce 
in 2008, and shrunk to 1.9% in 2010. This estimate includes all employ-
ees in the temporary staffing industry. If we detract a generous estimate 
of 15% administrative staff, hired temporary staffing personnel 
amounted to 2.3% of all employment in Norway in 2008 and 1.7% in 
2010. If we recall table 3.1.1 in the introduction, we notice that the num-
ber stated for the penetration rate of temporary staffing in Norway in 
CIETTs Economic Report for 2011 is far lower – only 1.0% in 2008. The 
reason is that the numbers from Statistics Norway also include migrant 
workers on temporary stay and not just settled residents.  
 
 
204 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
Figure 3.4.1 Number of FTEs reported in organized temporary staffing agencies 
(NHO Service) and number of FTEs reported in Statistics Norway structural sta-
tistics for temporary staffing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SSB Strukturstatistikk for næringslivstjenester and NHO Service, Årsstatistikk for 
bemanningsbransjen. 
 
How do we explain the rapid growth of temporary staffing in Norway? 
First of all, the liberalisation of regulations on temporary staffing was a 
necessary, but – as the slow growth in the first years after 2000 shows – 
not a sufficient condition for the subsequent rise in temporary staffing.  
A second reason for the rise in temporary staffing is related to the 
general economic upswing which occurred from 2004 and onwards. 
Since 2004 the total number of employed in Norway has increased by 
10% or 280,000, from 2.3 million to almost 2.6 million in 2010. 
Migration was an important part of the increased labour force output. 
Immigrants counted for more than half (56%) of the increase in the 
labour force in this period. Immigrants from EU10 alone constituted one 
forth of total increase. 
This brings us to the third reason behind the exceptional growth in 
temporary staffing in Norway: the EU enlargement in 2004, and the ac-
cess to recruit migrant workers from the new member states. Tempo-
rary agency work usually provide lower pay, less financial stability, few-
er opportunities for training and promotions and infer lower status than 
regular employment. It has therefore been considered difficult to staff 
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large numbers of temporary staffing positions in periods when labour 
markets are tight and unemployment low. This is especially true outside 
of the traditional office sectors which typically get by using students, 
young workers and people with a marginal commitment to work (such 
as part-time stay at home mothers).42  
12.1.3 Changing composition of the workforce – new 
migrants in temporary staffing 
The Eastward enlargement of the EU in 2004 provided employers with 
access to a huge reservoir of workers from countries with a fraction of the 
Norwegian wage level and thus far less “picky” about their employment 
conditions. The link between the rise of temporary staffing and migration 
is even clearer when we look at the development in the composition of the 
workers in terms of immigration status within the industry. Figure 3.4.2 
shows the number of employed persons within temporary staffing during 
the five-year period from 2005 until 20010. First of all, the number of 
employed persons in temporary staffing rose from about 30 thousand in 
2005 to well over 70 thousand in 2008, before decreasing to less than 60 
thousand in the two following years. If we look at the country background 
of the workers, we find that the increase in the numbers of native workers 
employed in temporary staffing is quite moderate; from 27 thousand in 
2005 to a high point of 37 thousand in 2008. The number of migrant 
workers, on the other hand has increased from less than seven thousand 
in the middle of the decade to almost 35 thousand three years later. In the 
same three year period, the immigrant share of employees within tempo-
rary staffing went from 20 to 50%. 
Migrant workers from the new EU member states comprise about 24% 
of all employees in 2010, with Poles being the largest group, followed by 
Lithuanians. The majority of other immigrant temp workers are from 
Sweden. People from outside the EU/EEA constitute only 4% of the work-
force in temporary staffing, which is not any higher than their general 
representation in the total workforce. When looking at the settlement 
status of migrant workers in temporary staffing we find that the majority 
are registered as non-settled workers. This is particularly the case among 
Swedish workers, while the Central and Eastern Europeans are more 
equally divided between non-settled and settled residents. 
────────────────────────── 
42 http://www.econ.no/stream_file.asp?iEntityId=4552  
206 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
Figure 3.4.2 The number of employed persons in temporary staffing. Native workers, 
EU8+2 workers and other immigrants. Both settled and non-settled migrants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SSB/Fafo.  
12.2 Expansion into new sectors and occupations 
Along with its growth, the business of temporary staffing also expanded 
into new sectors and segments of the economy. The registry based em-
ployment statistics from Statistics Norway includes information about 
the nationality of workers employed in temporary staffing, but it does 
not say anything about which client industries they are working in. Sta-
tistics provided from NHO Service about their members provide infor-
mation about the number of FTEs billed to different client industries, but 
says nothing about the nationality of the workers. Based on these num-
bers it is therefore impossible to explore exactly how immigrants are 
recruited and distributed between different sectors compared to native 
workers. A closer examination of the data, as well as information from 
the qualitative interviews, suggest that there is a close link between mi-
gration and the expansion of temporary staffing into new sectors. In 
short we find that the traditional office sector is still one of the major 
markets for temporary staffing. However, its volume is not much bigger 
than it was ten years ago, and recruiting migrant labour is not common 
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in this sector. Health and education on the other hand, is both a new 
emerging sector of temporary staffing and the recruitment of migrant 
workers do play an important role in this market. However, the numbers 
are quite modest compared to the larger sectors, and the migrant work-
ers in question are primarily from Sweden (and not Central and Eastern 
Europe which is the main focus of this study). As we shall see, it is within 
construction and manufacturing that temporary staffing has expanded 
most rapidly and extensively. In these sectors, the workforce is made up 
almost entirely of migrant workers recruited from the new EU member 
states in Central and Eastern Europe, although many Swedes and some 
Germans also have found their way into temp jobs in these sectors. We 
will therefore present a more in-depth analysis of temporary staffing 
within these sectors in the next section. First however, for the purpose 
of comparison, we will provide a brief discussion of the main trends 
within the traditional office sector and the markets for health and educa-
tion personnel. 
Figure 3.4.3 9.7 mill man-hours billed by temporary staffing agencies organized 
by the National Federation of Service Industries, divided by client industries. 
First quarter 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NHO Service – Bemanningsbarometeret 1
st
 quarter 2012. 
Note: Since relatively fewer operations within construction and manufacturing are organized 
through NHO Service, it is likely that these numbers severely underestimate the relative importance 
of these sectors. 
 
 
208 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
12.2.1 The traditional office sector 
Before 2000, the so-called “office sector” which includes commerce and 
IT services, was the only legally accessible market for temporary staff-
ing. With a relatively long history of using temporary staffing, this is the 
only “mature” market for this type of personnel services. In 1999 NHO 
Service’s members reported that they had provided a total of 10,800 
FTEs to their clients – which were all within traditional office sectors. By 
examining the numbers for 2011 – and exclude all new sectors such as 
construction, manufacturing and health – we find that the number of 
reported FTEs is only moderately higher, about 11,600. Although these 
numbers are not directly comparable, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the growth in temporary staffing has primarily occurred elsewhere. Be-
ing a mature market for temporary staffing, the large staffing agencies in 
Norway such as Adecco, Manpower and Proffice are heavily involved in 
the traditional office sectors, and have been so for many years. So are 
also a large number of smaller firms – either locally based ones or firms 
specializing in particular occupations. Their customers are found in both 
public and private sector, and they have both long-term framework-
agreements with client firms as well as provide smaller ad-hoc person-
nel services. Regarding the motive for hiring temps, earlier research 
suggests that numerical stability – the need to recruit individual temps 
in order to fill temporary absence in relation to holidays, sickness, ma-
ternity leaves etc – rather than numerical flexibility, is of primary im-
portance for client firms in traditional office sectors (Nesheim 2003). In 
addition to hiring traditional temps – filling in for absentees – recent 
studies suggest that the practice of “try and hire” – using temporary 
staffing as a way of screening the market for new potential permanent 
employees – has become more common in recent years (Nergaard et al. 
2011). Guaranteed pay between assignments are not common and nei-
ther are local collective agreements. However, according to agency man-
agers, wages usually follow those of the client firms’ own employees or 
collective agreements if they exist. Most important for our purposes, 
however, is that temporary staffing agencies involved in traditional of-
fice sectors hardly recruit migrant workers. As we in this report are con-
cerned with the recruitment and hiring out of migrant workers we will 
precede to other sectors.  
 
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 209 
12.2.2 Health and education  
Temporary staffing of health care personnel, and in particular nurses, was 
one of the first new markets to emerge after the liberalisation in 2000 
(Nergaard & Nicolaisen 2002). In 2001, 16 firms renting out nurses were 
registered in Norway. Although two of the large players – Adecco and 
Manpower – were positioning themselves in this market, most were small 
firms specializing in temporary staffing of nurses. These firms were both 
Norwegian firms recruiting mainly Norwegian nurses and Swedish and 
Danish firms mainly recruiting nurses from their homelands. The use of 
temporary staffing agencies was quickly institutionalized and accepted in 
the Norwegian health sector as a way to accommodate shift work, fill 
temporary vacancies in relation to holidays and absence, as well as get 
access to necessary competence. At first, the Norwegian Nurses’ Federa-
tion (NSF) was sceptical and tried to oppose the liberalisation. After nego-
tiating a number of collective agreements with these firms – with wages 
well above what was common in the public health care system – NSF 
started using temporary staffing as leverage in their general wage negotia-
tions (Skjælaaen 2010). At this point nurses employed by temporary staff-
ing agencies were paid far better than publicly employed nurses and they 
were usually also guaranteed pay between assignments. However, as a 
result of a favorable general wage settlement for nurses in 2002 – which 
made it less profitable for nurses to work for staffing agencies – and a 
process of professionalization of how public tenders were being conduct-
ed – exerting a downwards pressure on the prices of temps – the market 
for temporary staffing of nurses collapsed in late 2002. It took more than 
five years to recover, and this time it was to a much larger extent based on 
the recruitment of foreign workers.  
From 2006, the market for temporary staffing of nurses started re-
covering quickly, and Swedish nurses were the dominant group of em-
ployees. At this point many of the larger players had consolidated their 
position by buying up smaller independent specialist firms. Profit mar-
gins were considerably smaller than in the first boom between 2000 and 
2002, but one of the reasons why the bigger agencies focussed on this 
market was that it is much less sensitive to economic cycles than for 
example construction and manufacturing. From 2004 to 2009 the total 
number of registered nurses employed through temporary staffing in-
creased from 568 to 3,313 – covering about 4% of all employed nurses 
in Norway. This increase was almost entirely made up of Swedish nurses 
– from 93 in 2004 to 2,530 in 2009. By 2009, Swedes constituted 76% of 
all nurses employed by temporary staffing agencies. Norwegian nurses 
made up only 16%, while other groups – mostly Poles, Lithuanians, 
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Danes and other Europeans only made up about seven percent (Alsos et 
al. 2012). While there has been some increase in the number of nurses 
from new EU member states coming to work in Norway through tempo-
rary staffing agencies, the numbers remain small. In 2009, about 40 
Polish and 30 Lithuanian nurses were employed by staffing agencies in 
Norway. Most agencies emphasize that language barriers make it diffi-
cult to recruit outside the Scandinavian countries. According to Berge et 
al. (2011), the use of temporary staffing agencies is not considered to be 
a desirable labour strategy among leaders or employee representatives 
in public health care. Nevertheless it is recognized as necessary in order 
to fill gaps in shift and rotation systems.  
The wage level for nurses in temporary staffing is no longer as favour-
able as it was in the beginning of the decade, but the majority follows the 
standard wage regulative in public health. Many of Berge et al.’s respond-
ents reported of instances where foreign nurses employed through tem-
porary staffing agencies were offered wages far below local standards, 
and most of these cases was related to non-nordic nurses from the Philip-
pines or Eastern Europe. Guaranteed pay between assignments are no 
longer common among nurses in temporary staffing. Agencies often re-
cruit nurses directly from Sweden and many of them commute between 
the two neighbouring countries. Assignments are often quite short – typi-
cally a couple of weeks – and many nurses have several different employ-
ers in Norway and/or Sweden. Among the disputes and controversies 
related to temporary staffing of nurses, working hours rank as the top 
contender. Since many of the Swedish nurses commute for longer or 
shorter periods of time, they often have an interest in working long hours. 
Similarly, problems filling gaps in shift and rotation systems often gener-
ates a demand for people to work extra hours or take double shifts. Ac-
cording to the informants in Berge et al. (2011) breaches of the working 
environment acts regulation of working hours is very common, especially 
when hiring nurses to state health care institutions. The use of temporary 
staffing is related to another highly contested phenomenon in Norwegian 
health care, namely the increasing trend of outsourcing municipal health 
care services to private firms. The argument for outsourcing public ser-
vices is usually an expectation that private actors may run public services 
cheaper, more effectively and provide better quality than public providers. 
Critics argue that there is little scope for improving the quality and effec-
tiveness through organisational and technological change in labour inten-
sive care work, and that the profit margin will depend entirely on lower-
ing the standards on wages and working conditions. Berge et al. (2011) 
suggest an additional reason why municipalities outsource parts of their 
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services, and that is problems related to labour shortages. Recruiting nec-
essary manpower is often seen as one of the most demanding tasks of 
municipal health care administration. By outsourcing the entire operation, 
municipalities are freed from the daunting effort of recruiting manpower. 
On this backdrop, it is not so surprising that some of the large players in 
temporary staffing in recent years have gone from providing personnel to 
taking over the daily operations at several formerly municipal care institu-
tions for elderly.  
One of the most recent new markets for temporary staffing is the ed-
ucational sector – for teachers and preschool teachers and assistants. In 
2008, this market was so new that NHO Service did not report on this 
sector. In 2011, it constituted about 1,000 FTE’s. As in health care, we 
find both small specialist firms and larger staffing agencies operating on 
this market – which is also less sensitive to economic cycles than many 
of the larger private sector markets. This became especially important 
when the market for temporary staffing in construction and manufactur-
ing collapsed in 2008 after the financial crisis that year. Exact figures on 
the national composition of employees are not available, but according 
to the respondents in Nergaard et al. (2011), the majority of employees 
are recruited in Norway or Sweden. Some firms, however have special-
ized in recruiting Polish kindergarten teachers. Among the first to invest 
in this market was Adecco, the largest staffing agency in Norway, who 
started recruiting trained preschool teachers in Poland by setting up a 
three month Norwegian language training course in Poland. Those who 
passed were offered work through Adecco in Norway – first as assis-
tants, but as their language skills improved they would move on to pro-
fessional positions. By 2011, Adecco had recruited 75 Polish kindergar-
ten teachers, most of them with higher pedagogical education and many 
of them had already been permanently employed in the kindergartens 
where they were first placed.43 Difficulties in meeting the requirement of 
professionally qualified staff is the main reason why kindergartens use 
temporary staffing.  
────────────────────────── 
43 http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article4009071.ece  
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12.2.3 Temporary staffing in construction and 
manufacturing – the rise of a migration industry 
Nowhere have the use of temporary staffing expanded more over the 
last decade than in construction and manufacturing. This is clear from 
the statistics provided by NHO Service – from zero man-years in 1999 to 
over seven thousand in 2008 (Nergaard et al. 2011). However, because a 
large number of staffing firms in these sectors are not organized, these 
numbers severely under represent the temporarily staffed workforce in 
construction and manufacturing. Reliable numbers on the nationality of 
workers is not available, but according to our informants the temporary 
staffed workforce in these industries is almost entirely made up of mi-
grant workers from Poland, the Baltic States and to a lesser extent Swe-
den. This is where labour migration and temporary staffing is most 
closely intersected: The use of migrant workers in these sectors can 
explain a very large part of the increase in temporary staffing in recent 
years. Recruitment to temporary staffing in construction and manufac-
turing has played an important role in facilitating recent years’ labour 
migration to Norway.  
Immediately after the liberalisation in 2000, only one firm – Adecco – 
started investing in construction and manufacturing. Activity was very 
low during the first few years, but even before the Eastward EU en-
largement in 2004, Adecco had established an infrastructure for re-
cruitment in Poland, and would soon be a key player in this market. In 
2004 the market for temporary staffing of migrant workers in construc-
tion and manufacturing exploded and several new firms got involved. 
Some of them were large established firms with experience from other 
sectors, while many were new firms specialising in hiring migrant work-
ers to one particular sector: 
The EU enlargement in 2004 was crucial for the growth of the staffing indus-
try in Norway. It gave us access to a huge market of people who wanted to 
work. There were of course many Poles here before, but they were in the in-
formal market. The expansion made it easier to use cheap foreign labor in a 
legal way (Manager, staffing agency). 
In addition to regular staffing agencies we find a plethora of small firms 
– often registered as so-called NUFs (Norwegian registered foreign com-
pany). According to registry based employment statistics 58% of all CEE 
workers on temporary stay in Norway are employed by so-called NUFs. 
As these firms often operate in a grey area between hiring out workers 
and labour intensive subcontracting, the distinction between temporary 
staffing and posting often seems quite fuzzy in both construction and 
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manufacturing. This means that the real number of migrant temps is 
probably higher than suggested by official numbers. 
Our informants in both construction and manufacturing point out 
that the market for temporary staffing of migrant workers is divided 
between a “serious” part consisting of established firms hiring workers 
to mostly larger client firms, and a “not-so-serious” part willing to cut 
corners in order to save costs. These firms usually target smaller con-
tractors where price is the key competitive factor. Larger firms are on 
the other hand more concerned with avoiding bad publicity and trouble 
with labour authorities. Some of our respondents – who all place them-
selves in the “serious category” – complain about unfair competition 
from these “not-so-serious” firms, while others contend that they oper-
ate in different markets: 
We are a serious player with a collective agreement. For example, we are not 
an alternative for building cabins and summerhouses and the like. Because of 
our prices, we are not an alternative in the market for that kind of projects. 
But we are a good alternative for the big, serious players 
For example, several of our informants emphasized that because they 
were not able to compete with many smaller firms on the price level, 
they would have to specialize in sector or production specific 
knowledge, professional human resource management and close follow-
up of their clients. 
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Illustrative cases  
Here follows a description of three different temporary staffing agencies, illus-
trating the variation in size and operations among typical firms. One Norwe-
gian branch of a major global staffing corporation operating across all sectors 
of the labour market, one large Norwegian agency with a narrower specialisa-
tion on certain markets, and one small firm based solely on recruiting migrants 
to key clients.  
Case 1: This is the Norwegian branch a major transnational staffing agencies, 
where we have interviewed the general manager, the human resource manager and 
the employee representative of the company’s division for construction and manu-
facturing. This agency has a long history in providing personnel in the traditional 
office sectors and was among the first to expand into new sectors after the liberaliza-
tion in 2000. Its division for construction and manufacturing – established in 2001 – 
started expanding rapidly after the EU enlargement in 2004, and their staff is made 
up almost exclusively of labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe, with 
Polish workers constituting more than 90 percent. Specializing in different kinds of 
both skilled and non-skilled workers, and with 40 local offices all over the country 
they provide services to customers nationwide. The length of assignments can vary 
from one day to several months. The construction sector is their largest market, but 
they also provide painters and welders to the manufacturing and ship building indus-
try. In October 2008 they employed 3,300 workers. In the wake of the crisis, this 
number was reduced to around 1,600–1,700 workers, and today they have 2500 
employed workers. Since 2004 they have run their own training camps in Poland 
where new recruits are given three week courses in basic Norwegian language, 
health and safety regulations and technical standards. They also recruit among mi-
grant workers already in Norway. The workforce is divided approximately 50/50 
between migrants settled in Norway with their families and people commuting be-
tween work in Norway and their families in Poland. It is among the relatively few 
staffing agencies that have entered into a collective agreement with its employees, 
and has an elected employee representative. Formally, they have a system for wage 
promotion according to skills and seniority, but according to the employee repre-
sentative, this system is rarely used. Until recently it was also among the few agencies 
providing guarantee pay between assignments to its employees, but has now moved 
away from this arrangement and started offering the standard ‘permanent employ-
ment without guarantee pay’ contract to its new employees. Given their relatively 
high cost level, they are unable to compete in the most price sensitive segments of the 
market, and rely mostly on framework agreements with larger customers. This agen-
cy is generally positive to any government attempts to regulate the industry more 
tightly, as this would only level the playing field vis-à-vis their competitors and raise 
the level of respectability of the industry. 
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Case 2: This is an agency built up of three different agencies which started up 
in 2005 and 2006, and was merged into one company in 2011. In this agency we 
interviewed the general manager and the human resource manager. They spe-
cialize in different types of labour: electrical fitters, skilled masons and non-
skilled general construction workers as well as some carpenters. While the 
electrical fitters are primarily recruited from Sweden, masons, non-skilled con-
struction workers and carpenters are mainly Polish. They recruit most of their 
workers directly from Sweden and Poland, but also hire migrant workers al-
ready in the Norwegian market. At the time of our interview they employed 
about 700 workers, making them one of the largest players in the Oslo area. 
Most of their Polish workers have families in Poland, but there is an increasing 
trend towards bringing their families to Norway for settlement here. They do 
not have a collective agreement, but pay according to the minimum provisions 
in the generalized agreement for the construction sector. A few of the workers 
are members of a trade union, but they do not have a trade union representative 
among their employees. Assignments vary from a few hours or days to several 
months. This agency does not provide guarantee pay between assignments to 
any of their employees. They argue that this would be impossible due to the fact 
that many of their workers alternate between several different employers. They 
regard themselves as a serious player in the industry and, like many of the big 
players they focus on quality and accountability rather than low prices. 
Case 3: This firm was originally registered as a Lithuanian company, started 
by a Norwegian businessman in 2006. However, because of the bad reputation 
which foreign registered companies had acquired among clients, the firm was 
recently registered in Norway. The owner has recently bought into a new firm 
focusing on different client industries, but this is still in the making. The firm 
still has a personnel director located in Lithuania responsible for recruitment of 
workers. They provide personnel primarily for the fish processing industry, but 
also do some assignments in construction. The majority of their workers are 
relatively young and do not have any particular skills. They are recruited 
through newspaper ads in Lithuania or through personal networks and word-of-
mouth. The fish processing industry is characterized by seasonal variations and 
the typical assignment lasts a few months. At the time of our interview, they had 
22 people on assignments, but in peak season they have up to 130 employees. 
Workers are given temporary contracts for each new assignment, but many 
have been with them for several years employed on different consecutive as-
signments. Some of them stay in Lithuania between seasons, while others do 
different kinds of work in Norway. Neither the workers nor the firm is organized 
and there are no employee representatives, but all their workers receive the 
minimum wage according to the collective agreement within the industry. Ac-
cording to our informant, price is of vital importance to their customers. 
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12.3 Organisational change and labour demand in 
client industries 
The expansion of temporary staffing into new sectors and segments of 
the labour market has gone hand in hand with changes in labour de-
mand and organisational structure among firms in the new client sec-
tors. The causal relationship between these two is not clear cut. On the 
one hand, there is no doubt that many client industries over the last 
decade have gone through extensive changes in terms of competitive 
structure, labour demand and organisation of work, opening up new 
spaces for labour market intermediaries. On the other hand, the staffing 
industry itself is not just a collection of neutral intermediaries that simp-
ly match the supply of labour with demand from employers. As purvey-
ors of particular forms of labour market flexibility, agencies play an ac-
tive role in the construction and making of markets. Through their cor-
porate strategies as well as by their very existence, agencies reshape the 
norms and expectations of both firms and workers, transforming labour 
relations along the way. The changes in client industries that we de-
scribe here are therefore both a cause and a consequence of the growth 
in temporary staffing. 
In the construction industry – which is often project based and highly 
sensitive to business cycles – labour demand have always fluctuated. 
Twenty years ago, contractors would perform all parts of production 
themselves using their own employees, but since then a gradual process 
specialization have occurred. At first this was done through the use of 
specialized subcontractors and “labour pooling” among construction 
firms. After the liberalization in 2000, temporary staffing agencies start-
ed to play a role, but until 2004 it was difficult finding workers who 
were willing to work through agencies. After 2004 followed a period of 
rapid growth largely fed by migrant workers from new EU member 
states reaching a peak in 2008. Then, the financial crisis led to a rapid 
fall in the activities of temporary staffing firms. Several respondents 
reported that the workforce was more than halved in 2009. However, by 
2011 the market had largely recovered. According to numbers provided 
by NHO service, construction now constituted a larger share of total 
revenues in the staffing industry than before the crisis.  
According to our respondents, many construction firms now adapt 
the size of their core permanent staff to their lowest level of activity, 
while the remaining labour demand is covered using a combination of 
specialized subcontractors and temporary staffing agencies. According 
to our interviews, this trend was forcefully accentuated after the finan-
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cial crisis, as firms did not hire new internal staff but instead increased 
the use of agencies and subcontractors once labour demand picked up 
after the crisis. In other words, the financial crisis seems to have result-
ed in permanent structural changes in corporate staffing strategies in 
these sectors, and boosting the market for temping agencies: 
In 2008 there was a sudden stop. The contractors prioritized their own. They 
cut out all hired agency workers and had to downsize from their own employ-
ees as well. But this meant that we now receive more orders in the wake of the 
crisis – they don’t employ new workers, but prefer to hire through the agen-
cies... So even if the crisis hit us hard, we gained from it in the long run. (...) We 
have increased our market share after the financial crisis. The strategy for most 
client companies now is to sharpen their skills with a small core staff, and then 
hire everything else through agencies (manager, staffing agency). 
This picture is confirmed by the employee’s representative in one of the 
larger firms: 
On the project I’m working on now, there are 10 self-employed workers from 
Slovakia, 20 agency workers [from Poland] and 3 internal employees [of the 
contractor]. This is a very common way to do it now. Then you don’t have to 
think about sick leave and so on (Polish union representative, staffing agency). 
The claim that temporary staffing agencies have strengthened their posi-
tion within the construction industry after the crisis is supported by sev-
eral sources. According to Statistics Norway’s statistics on the volume of 
orders within the industry fell by 33% from the 3rd quarter of 2008 to the 
3rd quarter of 2009, but by the 2nd quarter of 2011, the total volume was 
back to 2008 level. In the same period, the total number of internal staff in 
the largest construction firms was reduced by 30%, while the number of 
construction workers employed in the eight largest staffing agencies dou-
bled from 2009 to 2011. In October 2011, Oslo Construction Workers 
Union conducted a mapping of 36 large building sites throughout the city 
belonging to the eight larger building contractors. They found that among 
a total of 1,534 workers, 28% were employed directly by the main con-
tractor, 21% were employed by subcontractors and 51% were hired 
through temporary staffing agencies (Eilertsen 2011).  
In the food industry, a similar but slightly different change has taken 
place over the last few years. Seasonal fluctuations, labour shortages and 
recruitment of migrant workers are nothing new in the food industry. 
Usually located in remote settlements along the coast where the local 
labour supply is limited, fish processing plants along the coast have for 
example recruited Tamils and Russians for many years. But until recent-
ly they did so within their own organizations.  
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No one in the temporary staffing industry had even thought about the food 
industry in 2004/2005. The companies had their own personnel depart-
ments, and managed everything themselves. But I think they struggled. This 
created the foundation for our business (manager, staffing agency specializ-
ing in food industry). 
After the EU enlargement, a number of staffing agencies specialized in 
recruiting workers for the food industry, and this market is considered 
to be growing 
The Norwegian ship building industry – another corner stone of 
many Norwegian coastal communities – is cyclical, labour intensive and 
highly sensitive to international competition (Hervik et al. 2005). 
Thanks to a high level of specialisation Norwegian shipyards had man-
aged to stay competitive, but by the mid 2000’s, Norway’s extremely 
high labour costs and the difficulties in maintaining a labour force that 
was flexible enough to fit the cyclical pattern of production was driving 
the industry into outsourcing more and more of its production to low 
cost countries – like Poland or Rumania who also have a long tradition of 
ship building. Before 2004 the trend seemed to be that engineering, de-
sign, coordination and administration soon would be the only part of 
ship building projects to be performed in Norway, while the actual la-
bour intensive production would have to move to Central and Eastern 
Europe or Asia where workers were more accessible and less expen-
sive.44 After 2004, the opposite suddenly became possible: moving 
workers while maintaining production in Norway. And that is exactly 
what happened. Since 2004 Norwegian shipyards have maintained a 
high level of production based largely on Central and eastern European 
workers hired through staffing agencies and foreign subcontractors. In 
many yards, it is common to hire large numbers of employees – often 
more than half of the workforce – to complete projects. Temporary la-
bour shortages, combined with lower risk, are the two most important 
reasons for using temporary workers in the shipyards. (Ødegaard & 
Andersen 2011). Key informants say that the situation is now quite 
complex. There is a mixture of sub-contracting, production lease and 
temporary staffing. In some cases subcontractors may be given the re-
sponsibility for certain tasks, while at the same time, many of its em-
ployees are rented out to the contractor firm. 
────────────────────────── 
44 For references see: http://www.fafo.no/Oestforum/Kunnskapsbase/Temasider/allmenngj.htm 
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12.4 Recruitment practices among staffing agencies 
There is considerable variation in the way temporary staffing firms re-
cruit workers from Central and Eastern Europe. The leading actor on 
this market first established a training and recruitment center in Poland 
in 2004. They now have three different campuses in different locations 
in Poland. Here, applicants are put on a four week intensive course in 
Norwegian language, skills testing as well as health and safety training. 
Those who pass are offered a job in Norway. While this firm is the only 
one to have set up extensive training camps in Poland, many firms have 
either set up subsidiary firms in Poland, or cooperation with Polish 
agencies responsible for advertising and recruitment of workers: 
We have a subsidiary in Poland, who takes care of recruitment. They do eve-
rything, from advertising, interviewing, screening, checking qualifications 
and references, etc. It is impossible for us to do this from Norway, so it’s cru-
cial to have a company in Poland. They can do it because they speak Polish 
and are close to the market. We have previously been involved with middle-
men and intermediaries who took a “fee” from those who were recruited. It 
was a kind of pimping, so we have tried to avoid that by having our own peo-
ple down there. (Manager, Staffing agency) 
Others contend that active recruitment in sending areas is not really 
necessary, and that informal networks and word of mouth is the best 
way to recruit.  
Those who want a job in Norway find us. We’ve made a name for ourselves 
among those who are interested in working in the industry, so we don’t really 
need to be active in this area. If we put out an ad, we get thousands of appli-
cations. No, recruitment is mostly based on word of mouth and networking. 
There is an initial selection through an interview online. Then the most ap-
propriate candidates are invited for a personal interview in Norway. Re-
cruitment through the informal networks of our own employees is actually 
the best. Because if someone recommends a friend or a relative, they will 
want to make sure that they perform. They don’t want us to think that they 
recommended a bad worker or someone not to be trusted. 
Most firms, however, follow a combination of different strategies – re-
cruitment among migrant workers already in Norway as well as in origin 
countries, through active and passive recruitment and through advertis-
ing as well as informal networks. Although it is difficult to quantify any 
such tendencies, our interviews suggest that direct recruitment activi-
ties in sending areas played a very significant role in the first years after 
2004, but as larger numbers of migrants have established themselves in 
Norway informal recruitment through personal networks and infor-
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mation channels play an increasingly important role. Recruiting workers 
directly from abroad, many firms offer housing facilities for new em-
ployees. Usually in barracks and workman sheds, but sometimes in regu-
lar apartments. Workers usually have rent deducted from their wages. 
Some of our respondents say, however, that they are trying to move 
away from this practice and prefer their employees to take care of hous-
ing themselves, because it is expensive and requires too much admin-
istration. In the larger cities this is usually no problem, but those who 
dispatch workers to smaller communities still need to provide housing 
to some of their workers. 
12.5 Who are the workers? Towards an ethnic 
division of labour 
There is now a clear ethnic division of labour within the supply chain in 
both construction and manufacturing. The permanently employed core 
staff tends to be dominated by native Norwegians; while temporary 
staffing agencies are dominated by migrant workers. Many of our in-
formants point out that domestic labour shortages and the need for mi-
grant workers has become structural and enduring in many sectors. As 
the manager of a staffing agency providing workers for fish processing 
plants in coastal Norway explained:  
It doesn’t matter how high unemployment there is in these communities – the 
locals do not want these jobs. Young people prefer to leave and go to the cities. 
Working for temporary staffing agencies hold a low status within these 
occupations and almost all of our informants agree that Norwegians are 
not interested in these kinds of jobs.  
There is actually no one who wants to work in the staffing industry. You can 
just look at the ones who do. It’s almost exclusively migrant workers. You 
have to realize that we are the B-team of the labour market (employee repre-
sentative, staffing agency). 
Central and eastern European construction workers employed in the 
staffing agencies often describe themselves as a secondary workforce 
within the industry. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that this 
strict division between native in-house employees and migrant temps 
will change or evolve in the near future, at least in the construction in-
dustry. According to trade union representatives, increasing numbers of 
native Norwegian workers are forced to take up work in the agencies. At 
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the time of our interviews this did not appear to be very widespread, but 
a quick search in Norway’s largest websites for job ads reveals that the 
huge majority of vacancies are found within temporary staffing agencies, 
suggesting that this is becoming more common, not just for migrant 
workers. If we break temporary staffing down into different occupations 
we find a more fine grained ethnic division of labour between different 
nationalities. Specialists in electro montage are typically recruited from 
Sweden; specialists in masonry are recruited from Poland; and special-
ists in meat carving from Slovakia. Carpenters, painters and non-skilled 
workers are recruited from Poland and to a lesser extent the Baltic coun-
tries. Fish processing workers are to a large extent recruited from Lithu-
ania, and to a lesser extent Poland. Most parts of construction and manu-
facturing is heavily male dominated, and so are the migrant workers in 
temporary staffing positions. The exception are workers in fish pro-
cessing, where a significant share of the workforce are females. This 
clustering of certain national groups is a result of several converging 
factors. First of all, different countries and regions may have particular 
traditions and skills related to particular trades. Slovakian meat work-
ers, Polish masons and Rumanian yard workers are just three examples. 
Second, staffing agencies who invest in training camps and infrastruc-
ture for recruitment will necessarily specialize in certain countries 
where they have the necessary links and infrastructure, creating a sort 
of path dependency. Third, employers often have preferences for certain 
nationalities for particular kinds of work based on real or imagined 
characteristics of different national groups. Polish construction workers, 
for example, have acquired a reputation for hard work and compliance 
among Norwegian employers. Finally, network recruitment through 
kinship, friendship and acquaintance tend to reinforce national cluster-
ing. Combined, these mechanisms give rise to ethnic clustering in the 
labour market in general, and in temporary staffing in particular.  
12.6 Does temporary staffing work as a stepping 
stone into regular employment? 
The international literature provides conflicting evidence about to which 
extent temporary staffing agencies actually work as a temporary step-
ping stone into regular employment or not (von Simson 2009). There is 
reason to believe that there are differences depending on the sector of 
the client firms, since their motives for using temporary agency workers 
may differ. Our study cannot conclude about the extent to which migrant 
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workers employed in temporary staffing agencies tend to become per-
manently employed over time. However, in combination with other 
studies, we may offer some suggestions about how common this is and 
to what extent there are differences between sectors. A study of Polish 
migrant workers in Oslo suggests that very few Polish construction 
workers gain permanent employment despite several years of working 
in Norway. Instead, they seem to rotate between different kinds of tem-
porary work within agencies and subcontractors (Friberg & Eldring 
2011). Our interviews suggest that many migrant workers would prefer 
permanent in-house employment over temporary staffing, but that it has 
become increasingly less common to be offered such jobs: 
It is not common to be offered a job with the client firms anymore. 3–4 years 
ago there were some workers that were offered permanent jobs, but now 
most contractors prefer to just use agencies. They don’t recruit internal staff 
anymore. [Name of employer] does not like that people are recruited to the 
client. But among those who get such an offer, I think that 90% would say 
yes. (Employee representative, Staffing agency). 
Our informants among agency managers confirm that it is not very 
common for agency workers to be employed directly by client firms: 
“Try and hire” is not so common in the construction industry because the 
contractors are no longer interested in employing new workers in their own 
organization. This is probably a larger problem within the office sector. 
The terms of when worker takeovers are allowed is regulated in the 
contract between agency and client firm. Normally, a worker can be re-
cruited without any charge after a certain period has passed, usually 
about as six months. If the client company wants to recruit some of the 
agency workers before this period they must pay a recruitment fee. Our 
informants in the food industry, has a slightly different take of the ques-
tion of client takeovers. According to them, the practice is both more 
common and more accepted in this sector: 
We don’t recruit for our clients – just for ourselves. But sometimes it happens 
that our people are being recruited to permanent positions in the client firm 
– even before the contract period expires. Last year, we had about 35–40 
workers who went over to client firms. Being temporarily staffed can be a 
test-station for both parts. This is not quite clear cut – legally I think we are 
moving into a gray area here. Sometimes a worker can be released from the 
contract before time in order to go to work for the client firm. We do a bit of 
match-making there. If the client firm is looking for a particular type of work-
er, we can give them a hint about which candidate they should talk to. Many 
firms may actually be in need of permanent position when they use our ser-
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vices. (...) We have no problem with client firms recruiting our workers. On 
the contrary, I am happy when we can deliver such high quality workers that 
they are offered a permanent job. (Manager, staffing agency) 
As the last quote hints at, the practice of “try and hire” is illegal according 
to the Norwegian Working Environment Act. Nevertheless, this seems to 
happen in varying degree in different industries. Register based data sug-
gest that although some Central and Eastern European migrant workers 
who are recruited by temporary staffing agencies later find employment 
in other industries, many stay on as temp workers for many years. Of the 
approximately 12,000 workers from new EU member states who were 
employed in the temporary staffing industry in Norway in 2007, 45% had 
left Norway by 2010. Of those still present, 44% had found employment in 
other sectors – mostly construction and manufacturing. Nine percent 
were registered as unemployed, while 47% were still registered as being 
employed by a staffing agency. The comparable number for Norwgien 
citizens was much lower, only 23%. 
Figure 3.4.4 EU10 citizens employed by temporary staffing agencies in 2007, and 
sector of employment in subsequent years until 2010. (N=11,960) 
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12.7 Assignments, contracts and financial stability 
There is considerable variation in how long a typical assignment may 
last, both within and between firms. The shortest ones may last only a 
day or a few hours, while the longest assignments may last up to a year. 
Typical assignments last for a few days or weeks up to a couple of 
months. There are mainly three different kinds of contracts that are 
common among migrant workers employed by the larger temporary 
staffing agencies. Some agencies use temporary project contracts which 
last for one assignment at the time. Workers who do several different 
assignments are then given new temporary contracts for each time, and 
the agency does not have any responsibilities towards the workers be-
tween assignments. The most common type of contract among the larger 
firms is called “permanent employment without guaranteed pay”.45 This 
contract is recommended by NHO Service, but highly controversial 
among Trade Unions representatives. This contract may cover a series of 
consecutive assignments, but workers are not obliged to take on as-
signments and they do not receive pay between assignments. Employees 
on such contracts shall be given priority when new assignments are 
allocated, and they also have some rights regarding sick leave and fol-
low-up beyond each assignment period. However, when there are no 
assignments for them, they do not receive pay. Finally, some workers 
may have permanent employment with guaranteed pay. Only one larger 
staffing agency has used this type of contract as a standard contract, but 
this firm recently moved away from this practice and started using the 
standard contract of “permanent employment without guaranteed pay” 
for new employees. For a period of time this firm was also the only one 
to have a collective agreement, and our informant claim that until one of 
their competitors entered into a collective agreement without guaran-
teed pay, they were under the impression that guaranteed pay was a 
prerequisite for having a collective agreement. Although no firms use the 
guarantee pay contract as a standard any longer, some may offer this to 
certain employees in order to retain workers with particular skills or 
people whom they have invested in through extensive training. In such 
cases agencies may seek to tie workers closer to the firm through offer-
ing guarantee pay contracts. However, a recent survey among all em-
────────────────────────── 
45 http://www.nhoservice.no/getfile.php/Filer/Juridiske%20dokumenter/ 
DM-%23312087-v1-Fast_ansatt_uten_garantil%C3%B8nn%281%29.pdf  
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 225 
ployees in temporary staffing (not limited to construction or manufac-
turing) found that only 18% of the workers have guaranteed pay be-
tween assignments.46  
To what extent workers have to go involuntarily unemployed between 
assignments depends largely on the state of the economy. Until 2008, 
agencies usually had few problems allocating enough assignments to their 
workers. According to our informants some workers would also use peri-
ods between assignments to go to their home countries. In the period 
since, it has, according to our informants, become more common to go 
unemployed between assignments. In such cases, workers are sometimes 
referred to NAV (the unemployment office) in order to claim benefits.  
In down periods employees alternate between assignments with us and go-
ing to NAV. We help them with that. This has been a growing trend among the 
Polish workers as they learn the rules. They don’t exploit the system – they 
just learn how to use it. (Manager, staffing agency). 
Analyses of registry data have shown that migrant workers recruited 
through temporary staffing agencies are far more likely to become un-
employed and in need of social benefits than those working in other 
sectors (Friberg & Djuve 2013). Some workers may have an employment 
relationship with several different agencies, in order to increase their 
chances of getting assignments. To some extent workers compete with 
each other for assignments – something which according to our inform-
ants the agencies may have a disciplining effect: 
We have a disciplining effect on the workforce. Our staff is more efficient and 
less sick, because we can be much tougher. If a person shirked their duty or 
shows up drunk on the job – then we just take them out of rotation. We listen to 
what our clients have to say. If the client is not satisfied, we don’t give them 
new assignments. This sharpens the workers. (Manager, staffing agency) 
That client firms decide who gets work and who doesn’t is confirmed by 
the employee representatives. As an employee representative in a staff-
ing agency catering to fish processing factories told us:  
 
 
 
────────────────────────── 
46 http://www.econ.no/stream_file.asp?iEntityId=4552  
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The factory decides who to fire among the agency workers. If the agency 
brings someone who is not good enough, the factory can say that they won’t 
have him. The agency is not here, so they don’t really know. They come once 
or twice per month to talk to the employees. But it is the factory who decides 
on a day to day basis. So they also decides who gets work or not.(Employee 
representative, Staffing agency) 
Among the workers themselves, this uncertainty of not having a regular 
predictable income is described as the biggest problem for workers in 
temporary staffing agencies. According to one of the employee repre-
sentatives – who himself was employed on a permanent contract with 
guaranteed pay – this was one of the most important demands of the 
local unions. 
It is very difficult to work without guaranteed pay. For example, it is impossi-
ble to get a loan from the bank. We disagree with management about this. We 
think that everyone should have guaranteed pay between assignments. (Em-
ployee representative, staffing agency in construction) 
12.8 Wages and working hours  
The collectively bargained minimum wage for workers in the food indus-
try has not been extended to unorganised workers, and is therefore only 
applicable to organised firms. Collective agreements in the construction 
sector were generalised in 2007, making minimum wage provisions 
legally binding for all workers within the sector. In the 2010 Polonia 
survey, construction workers employed by temporary staffing agencies 
earned an average 26% less than the average earnings of all Norwegian 
construction workers. However, this was still above the extended mini-
mum wage. A small minority among the temp agency workers made 
considerably less. Compared to other groups of Polish construction 
workers, temporary agency workers did quite well. They made slightly 
less than those who were permanently employed. On the other hand, 
their earnings were significantly better than those of posted workers 
employed by Polish subcontractors and workers temporarily employed 
by Norwegian firms. This corresponds well with the information provid-
ed by our informants. In the firms where we conducted interviews, em-
ployees typically earned minimum wage or slightly more. In some firms 
wages would vary depending on the type of assignment, while others 
had fixed wages. Workers were typically not given credit for skills or 
experience obtained abroad. Some firms have a system of wage promo-
tion according to skills, language training and seniority, but this was 
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usually not being put into practice in any systematic way. As there is 
considerable wage span within the construction and manufacturing in-
dustries – meaning that the minimum provisions in collective agree-
ments are substantially below the industry average – our general im-
pression is that staffing agency workers earn considerably less than the 
permanent staff in client firms.  
Making sure that working hours are kept within the provisions of the 
Working Environment Act has proven to be a major challenge for the 
temporary staffing industry. The topic has figured high on the agenda in 
the wake of a series of negative media coverage during 2011, and sever-
al of the staffing firms as well as their clients have implemented 
measures to ensure that the statutory requirements are met. This was a 
priority for the Labour Inspection Authorities in 2011. On the one hand, 
client firms who may use temporary staffing in peak production may 
have an interest in keeping workers on long shifts. On the other hand, 
many migrant workers commuting between work in Norway and fre-
quent visits to their home country are often interested in working long 
hours – especially when their contracts make it difficult to predict future 
income. Many firms use different ways of calculating averages, implying 
that workers can work long hours in return for taking time off, either 
based on exemptions from the Labour Inspectorate or through an 
agreement with the union. However, since many employees work for 
several different employers, it is not always easy to control their total 
number of working hours. Inspections carried out by the Labour Author-
ities in 2011 confirm that not all firms or clients have sufficient routines 
to make sure that the provisions of the Working Environment Act is fol-
lowed on this point. 
12.9 Regulations and adaptations 
One of the key findings from international research on temporary staff-
ing has to do with its institutional embeddedness, or the ways in which 
the activities of temporary staffing agencies are heavily shaped by the 
labour market contexts in which they operate. Although the temporary 
staffing industry is a global industry, dominated by a handful of transna-
tional corporations, the product they are selling is labour – a commodity 
which to a varying degree is regulated by national legislation and collec-
tive bargaining. On the one hand there is considerable variation in the 
degree to which the industry itself is subject to direct regulation by ei-
ther government regulations of collective bargaining. On the other, the 
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activities and nature of temporary staffing markets are of course heavily 
shaped by the ways in which mainstream employment relations are 
coordinated and regulated (Coe et al. 2010). If, for example, there are 
generally quite liberal regulations on temporary employment firms in 
need of flexible staffing solutions will have fewer incentives to use ex-
ternal staffing agencies. Strict regulations of temporary employment on 
the other hand, may increase demand for external flexible solutions.  
Very few temporary staffing agencies in Norway are covered by col-
lective agreements, and agency employees are not covered by the 
agreements at the client workplace. There are a couple of exceptions 
among the larger agencies which have signed agreements with local 
unions, but for the most part, the temporary staffing agencies are unreg-
ulated by collective agreements. The main source of regulation is there-
fore the Working Environment Act (WEA), and those collective agree-
ments which have been extended or generalized.  
Regarding minimum wages, this is the case in construction and ship-
yards. In these sectors, larger staffing agencies usually pay minimum wage 
or slightly more. They face competition, however, from a significant num-
ber of smaller and less accountable firms which may offer wages below 
the minimum provisions. In the food industry, it is – according to our in-
formants – quite common to offer wages that are below the minimum 
standard set in the collective agreement. This is, however, fully legal since 
collective agreements in this sector has not been generalized. 
There is no legal provision regarding guaranteed pay between as-
signments, and there are no such provisions in the few collective agree-
ments which exist. There is considerable variation in to which extent 
different agencies offer guarantee payment between assignments – a few 
of the larger agencies have used guarantee pay, but have recently moved 
away from the practice. Some offer guarantee pay to certain key em-
ployees, while most firms do not offer this at all. Some firms claim that 
this would ruin their business: 
We don’t pay between assignments. Guarantee pay would be completely im-
possible. It would destroy the mobility between assignments. It would kill a 
firm like ours. The workers would claim guarantee pay from us and go to 
work for other employers at the same time. Then we would have to claim it 
back. There would be endless legal disputes. And if we tightened our control 
they would just go into the illegal market. (Manager, staffing agency) 
Other firms seem less skeptical of guarantee pay, and seem to view this 
more as a question of competitive conditions – as long as their competi-
tors don’t take such a financial responsibility, they are hesitant to do so 
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themselves. Guarantee pay between assignments appear to be the most 
important issue for employee representatives.  
According to the WEA, it is illegal to demand payment from employ-
ees for offering work. Some of our informants told us that they had been 
involved with middle-men and recruiters who demanded payment from 
the workers, but this is something which the larger firms try to avoid.  
12.10 Conclusions 
The is little doubt that the rapid growth of temporary staffing in Norway 
is closely intersected and causally linked to extensive labour migration 
from Central and Eastern Europe – particularly in labour intensive seg-
ments of construction and manufacturing. In these sectors temporary 
staffing agencies have actively facilitated and promoted the use of mi-
grant workers and through their activities they have contributed in low-
ering the bar for going abroad to work for migrants and employing mi-
grants for Norwegian firms. For the temporary staffing agencies, access 
to migrant workers in new low cost EU member states have made it 
possible to expand into new sectors and segments of the labour market, 
actively transforming labour relations along the way. 
There is considerable variation between different sectors in the mo-
tives of client firms and the functions. In traditional office sectors as well 
as health care and education, the need for numerical stability – covering 
for absentees and making shifts – in combination with difficulties in 
finding qualified staff – seems to be the most important reason for using 
temporary staffing. Labour shortages are also an important reason why 
construction and manufacturing firms turn to temporary staffing agen-
cies. However, numerical flexibility – adapting the size of the workforce 
to changing production cycles – appears to be the main motive in these 
industries. Lower costs also appear to be quite important for many client 
firms – as a motive for using temporary staffing or at least as a conse-
quence. Migrant temp workers in construction and manufacturing are 
not “temps” in the traditional sense of the word. They do not substitute 
someone else. Instead using temps have become integral to business 
strategy, and part of the permanent way of organizing labour. 
In the period we have studied, the temporary staffing industry in 
Norway has remained relatively unregulated. Very few agencies are cov-
ered by collective agreements, and government regulations have been 
quite liberal. This probably contributed to the expansion of the industry 
based on flexible and cheap migrant workers. Some restrictions existed 
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on the access to hire workers, but these restrictions were rarely en-
forced in practice. There were no regulations regarding equal pay as in-
house employees, and no demands on guarantee pay between assign-
ments. This has to some extent changed with the implementation of the 
EU Temporary and Agency Workers Directive (2008/104/EC) which 
came into force in January 2013, introducing a norm of equal pay as in-
house employees. Our data which was collected in 2011 and 2012 can-
not say anything about the practical implementation of the directive. 
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13. Temporary staffing and 
labour migration to Denmark  
Ingvill Stuvøy and Søren Kaj Andersen, FAOS 
 
 
The temporary staffing industry in Denmark has within the last ten 
years experienced considerable increase and growth in employment and 
turnover, but also rapid decline with the arrival of the worldwide finan-
cial and economic crisis in 2008. Moreover, the composition of the work-
force in the industry has changed substantially. In particular the share 
and number of temps from the new EU member states in Eastern Europe 
has increased within this period; a development that has received much 
attention among the different actors in the Danish labour market.  
Moreover, the temporary staffing industry seems to play a particular 
role in employing migrant workers (Andersen & Karkov 2011). This is 
illustrated by the relatively large share of foreign nationals working in 
the temp industry; a share twice as high as in the Danish workforce 
overall (DI 2011). Additionally, we know that about ten per cent of the 
Eastern European labour migrants, who came to Denmark between 
2004 and 2009, were employed as temps (Pedersen & Andersen 2007).  
The development of the temporary staffing industry, as well as its 
central role with regard to migrant workers, have not gone unnoticed, 
and have also, according to some, put the Danish system of collective 
bargaining to the test. The liberalization of the temporary staffing indus-
try in 1990 created new possibilities for starting a temporary staffing 
agency without a pre-authorization from state authorities; and thus 
marked the beginning of the expansion of the industry. Although tradi-
tionally sceptical towards the use of temps, fearing a trend of more pre-
carious employment, the trade unions started throughout the 1990’s to 
work for an inclusion of the temps in the collective agreements (Kudsk-
Iversen & Andersen 2006: 20; Scheuer 2011:11). However, the recent 
changes in the composition of the workforce in the temporary staffing 
industry have led to a revived concern among the trade unions as new 
issues and challenges to the Danish system of collective bargaining have 
arisen (see e.g. Hansen & Andersen 2008). The temporary staffing indus-
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try has been subject to much attention due to concern for social dump-
ing and a lack of compliance to the collective agreements when hiring 
migrant temps (Pedersen & Andersen 2007:41). References are made to 
agencies as “bad apples”47 contributing in giving the industry a tarnished 
reputation. Indeed, many of the agencies conceived as bad apples, are 
among those recruiting and offering Eastern European manpower to the 
Danish labour market (Pedersen & Andersen 2007; Kudsk-Iversen & 
Andersen 2006).  
This recent development raises questions regarding the changing 
roles of the temporary staffing agencies – and what consequences this 
might have on recruitment strategies and the wages and working condi-
tions for temps. Seeking to shed light on these questions, the following 
section will first describe and assess the recent development within the 
temporary staffing industry in Denmark, as well as in the client indus-
tries. Thereafter, the role of the temporary staffing agencies will be put 
under scrutiny, where focus will be on what role the agencies play in 
mediating movement of workers from Eastern Europe to Denmark; how 
they affect a Danish market, and how they act in relation to the Danish 
system of collective bargaining. First, however, we will briefly account 
for the empirical data substantiating this study. 
13.1 Data material and cases 
The study is based partly on statistical sources, describing the develop-
ment within the temporary staffing industry, and partly on qualitative 
interviews with social partners as well as temporary staffing agencies. A 
main statistical source is data provided by Statistics Denmark for this 
study specifically. These data afford information on the number of 
workers in the temporary staffing industry in Denmark from 2001 to 
2010, and the distribution of different nationalities within this group of 
workers. Statistics Denmark’s Databank is moreover used to obtain in-
formation on client industries and the extent to which they use tempo-
rary agency workers. We will also introduce data from industry analyses 
made by The Economic Council of the Labour Movement, AE, 
────────────────────────── 
47 A reference repeated in many of the interviews made for this study, by social partners and temporary 
staffing agencies alike.  
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(Baadsgaard & Breck 2011) and The Confederation of Danish Industry, 
DI, (DI 2011) when relevant.  
The qualitative interviews compose the other main empirical source 
for this study. A total of ten interviews have been made with representa-
tives of trade unions, employers’ organizations, and temporary staffing 
agencies. The informants from the trade unions have been chosen due to 
the relative high number of temps and/or migrant temps in the indus-
tries where their members are employed. The two representatives of 
employers’ organizations interviewed represent respectively the tempo-
rary staffing agencies specifically and the employers’ more generally. On 
the trade union side, we have interviewed a representative from a major 
confederation of trade unions, and trade union representatives within 
the construction industry, the agricultural sector, and transport, supply 
and logistics; as well as a representative for the commercial and clerical 
employees. We have also talked more briefly with representatives from 
two central trade unions with members in the cleaning sector, and a 
central trade union representative from the manufacturing industry. We 
have thus focused on the private sector, as this is where there are con-
ceived to be challenges with regard to the use of migrant temps.  
The four temporary staffing agencies have been chosen on a more 
case-oriented background. Seeking to represent different types of agen-
cies, we have sought a certain diversity with regard to size, client indus-
tries, and importance of migrant temps for their business strategy. Some 
have also been contacted due to known conflicts with the trade unions, 
having been under suspicion for social dumping. These case studies are 
not meant to be exhaustive of all different types of temporary staffing 
agencies in Denmark, but rather represent a selection of different and 
concrete examples of agencies acting in a Danish context. Before moving 
on to these concrete examples of agencies, and their perspectives and 
descriptions, we will in the following provide a profile of an industry of 
increasing importance in Denmark, in general as well as with regard to 
migrant workers, but also with a somewhat turbulent few years behind it.  
13.2 Ten years of economic boom – and crisis 
The temporary staffing industry in Denmark has had both its ups and 
downs throughout the last ten years. This development can be captured 
by looking at the employment and number of workers in the industry 
throughout this period. From 2001 to 2008, the number of people em-
ployed in the temporary staffing industry increased from 17,175 to 
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43,803.48 The number of temps was thus multiplied two and a half times 
within a period of eight years. As the financial and economic crisis set in, 
however, employment dropped dramatically and counted merely 16,820 
temps at the beginning of 2010. That equals almost two thirds of the 
temps losing their employment in this period (see figure 3.5.1). The in-
crease in employment throughout eight years of boom was thus dimin-
ished within the next two years.  
Figure 3.5.1 Number of workers in the Danish temporary staffing industry, 
2001–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark for FAOS, 2011. 
 
A calculation of full-time equivalents illustrates the same tendency in the 
employment rates. When the temporary staffing industry peaked in the 
first quarter of 2008, employment counted 25,000 full-time positions 
(Andersen & Karkov 2011:157). By the third quarter of 2009 it counted 
merely 13,500 (Ibid.). Hence, calculated as full-time equivalents the 
number of positions had been reduced nearly by half within a period of 
one and a half year. Compared to the drop in the general employment 
rates in the Danish labour market, which was five per cent from 2008 to 
2009, one can conclude that the temps are among the first to lose their 
jobs (Ibid.:158). This is in spite of the easy access to lay off permanent 
────────────────────────── 
48 Source: Danish Statistics for FAOS, 2011.  
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employees in the Danish collective agreements. Furthermore, it is worth 
commenting on the disparity between the reduction in numbers of 
workers and in number of full-time equivalents, as it indicates that many 
temps work less than full-time. A study of Polish workers in Copenhagen 
in 2009 similarly showed that it was a problem for those working as 
temps to secure enough hours of work (Hansen & Hansen 2009: 79).  
Also in terms of turnover, the last ten years can be talked of as 
somewhat of a rollercoaster ride, as is illustrated in figure 3.5.2. From 
2003 to 2007 the domestic turnover in the temporary staffing industry 
increased 300%; from 3 bn. Danish kroner in 2001 to 10 bn. in 2007. 
This was succeeded by a major drop in turnover from 2008 to 2009, 
with a decrease of as much as 4 bn. Danish kroner. Turnover then stabi-
lized around six bn. in 2010.  
Figure 3.5.2 Domestic sale for Danish temporary staffing agencies, 2001–2010. 
In milion Danish kroner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark.  
 
A third way of charting the last ten years’ development is to profile the 
number of temporary staffing agencies; a number that similarly has been 
multiplied and later reduced. From 2006 and until the crisis in 2008 the 
number of agencies increased significantly. As such, the spirit of entre-
preneurship seems to have been high within the temporary staffing in-
dustry during the years of economic boom (Pedersen & Andersen 2007). 
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This increase was succeeded by a drop from 1,340 in 2008 to 1,280 in 
2009 (DI 2010). Although the number of agencies closing down is now 
diminishing, the crisis has still not let the industry completely out of its 
grip; more than half of the temporary staffing agencies were running 
with a deficit in 2010, which is in fact more than in 2009, where the per-
centage was 43 (DI 2011). Recent analyses give however reasons for 
cautious optimism in the industry, as employment in 2010 was more or 
less stable, with only a minor loss of employment (Baadsgaard & Breck 
2011). Similarly, in terms of turnover there are also signs of improve-
ment after turbulent years. Turnover seemed to stabilize in 2010, and 
the industry itself expects an average increase in turnover of about 13% 
in 2011 (DI 2011).  
The turbulence reflected in these statistical data could be seen as il-
lustrating the “cyclical character” of the temporary staffing industry, as a 
representative from a central employers’ organization expresses it. Alt-
hough the industry was going strong for a number of consecutive years, 
the crisis hit the industry hard and more so than in other industries. The 
representative from the employers’ organization regrettably admits that 
the industry is still dependent on economic upturns, as temps are still 
not the Danish employers’ first choice when looking for manpower: “A 
lot indicates that companies still do not think temps as a strategically part 
of the work force to the extent that we had hoped”. As such, he under-
stands the development in the business to reflect economic factors ra-
ther than actual structural changes in how to recruit employees.  
The importance of the economy for the recent development within 
the temporary staffing industry is stressed in practically all the inter-
views, including in the interviews with the temporary staffing agencies. 
However, as the social partners attempt to give a comprehensive de-
scription of the development within the last ten years, the economic 
explanations are supplemented with considerations regarding the struc-
tural changes that have taken place – and how these interact with the 
economic development (see also Andersen & Karkov 2011; Kudsk-
Iversen & Andersen 2006). The liberalization of the industry in the early 
1990’s is mentioned as one important regulative and structural change. 
Moreover, several trade union representatives emphasize a change in 
the Danish labour market with regard to the workers’ employment sta-
tus. The increased use of temps, and in particular migrant temps, is in-
terpreted as an increased use of more flexible and precarious employ-
ment forms, as well as contributing to a division between core and pe-
riphery employees in the firms. This is seen as a threat to the individual 
worker, but also understood as challenging the trade union; its relative 
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strength and its opportunities to make demands in their bargaining with 
the employers, as one representative from the trade union assesses it. 
The trade union representatives stress moreover what is conceived to 
be employers’ constant search for new ways of ensuring cheap labour, 
and how the use of temps for years has been lucrative in that respect.  
13.3 A changed workforce – and social dumping as 
new challenge 
During the course of the last ten years the composition of the temporary 
workforce has been altered, inter alia with regard to the use of migrant 
workers. Throughout the last decade there has been an increase in the 
share of foreign temps; referring here to temps with other origin than 
Danish, including also migrant temps. In particular the increased im-
portance of Eastern European temps has received much attention. Turn-
ing to the official data on the number of Easter European temps, the fig-
ures seem however to be aiming too low.  
According to Statistics Denmark, there were 1,346 temps from East-
ern Europe (EU10)49 in 2008, which was the year with the highest num-
ber of temps – in general as well as from abroad. In contrast, there were 
merely 73 temps from the Eastern European countries registered in 
2001. Moreover, the number of temps from EU10 dropped to 927 in 
2010, due to the crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
────────────────────────── 
49 EU10 includes in this case the ten new EU members from Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.  
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Figure 3.5.3 Temporary workers in Denmark from EU10, 2001–2010. Number 
of persons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark for FAOS, 2011. 
 
Despite the relative high increase – followed by decrease – illustrated by 
these numbers, the actual numbers are small. This impression is restat-
ed when we look at the largest single supplier of foreign temps to the 
Danish labour market, Poland. The figures from Statistics Denmark show 
that, at the most, there were 950 Polish temps working in the country in 
2008. This figure dropped to 539 persons in 2010, maintaining however 
the position as the largest group of foreign temps in Denmark. However, 
these numbers are notably lower than what is indicated by the trade 
unions as well as the temp agencies themselves.  
One possible explanation for potential under-registration of in particu-
lar migrant temps is the criteria for registration. The statistics include only 
those temps, who have employment in November one year and are regis-
tered with an address in Denmark in January the year after. This will ex-
clude inter alia – and in particular – migrant temps, who work only short-
er periods, e.g. hold seasonal employment. In the green sector, for in-
stance, temps are widely used for seasonal work. They are often sent 
home for the winter, as this is a time with less activity in the sector. Thus, 
they will not be in Denmark at the time Statistics Denmark makes their 
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registrations. Moreover, temps working in Denmark for a foreign tempo-
rary staffing agency will not be counted in this statistics, as it only include 
temps employed in a Danish temporary staffing agency.50  
The trade union 3F’s newsletter has monitored the development in 
the industry for a number of years, and made inquiries among tempo-
rary staffing agencies about the number of temps they have had working 
for them. On that background, the newsletter estimate the number of 
temps from Eastern Europe to be at least 3,100 in 2011; counting only 
the larger companies, like Vikargruppen Danmark, Adecco and 
TeamVikaren, as well as seven companies, which were been under the 
scrutiny of the trade union. This number is likely to have been higher in 
2008, which was a top year for the temporary staffing industry, although 
there is, according to the newsletter, little that indicates a major drop in 
the number of Eastern European temps due to the crisis. Notwithstand-
ing, the newsletter’s estimate indicates that the number of Eastern Eu-
ropean temps in Denmark is higher than what the figures from Statistics 
Denmark suggest.  
Following up on the newsletter’s information, we have made a small 
inquiry among seven temporary staffing industries with Eastern Euro-
pean temps affiliated, focusing on their number of temps in 2008.51 Re-
capitulating the agencies’ number of temp; Adecco had 200 in 2008; 
Vikargruppen Danmark had 500; PolandForest had 500; JSV Concept 
had at least 400; EuroWorkers had 70, and Rainer had 70. Additionally, 
JobServer had in 2008 about 400, according to 3F’s newsletter. This 
agency was taken over by BlueCollar in 2009, who now inform us they 
have had between 200 and 300 temps per year from 2009 to 2011. Bal-
tic Workforce had about 200 temps in 2008, while Danstaff had between 
200 and 300; information obtained from 3F’s newsletter. These numbers 
from a total of nine agencies sum up to a minimum of 2,540, compared 
to the 1,346 Eastern European temps registered by Statistics Denmark.52 
────────────────────────── 
50 A third possible source of error is that temps working in Danish agencies will not be included in the figures 
if their employer is registered with a different main activity than temporary staffing. This will apply to 
Danish as well as migrant temps, and will as such not explain the indications that the foreign temps are 
under-registered in these figures.  
51 We have made a telephone inquiry to 14 agencies, out of which we have been able to get in touch with – or 
get numbers from – seven. We asked about their number of temps in 2008, counting all the temps having 
worked for them in that year, thereby taking into account the staff turnover throughout the year. The num-
bers are their own estimates, and not exact numbers.  
52 Furthermore, it should be recalled that there is an additional number of smaller agencies, which are likely 
to have Eastern European temps affiliated, and are not counted in this assessment. The exact number of 
agencies with Eastern European temps is unknown, but most likely appreciable.  
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As such, the figures from Statistics Denmark can be used to indicate a 
tendency with regard to a growing share of foreign temps, but the actual 
number of foreign temps seems not to be fully covered by these figures, 
neither is the relative increased importance of foreign temps in the Dan-
ish labour market. 
Notwithstanding, the general impression among the social partners is 
that a larger proportion of the foreign temps in Denmark now originate 
from Eastern Europe; first and foremost from Poland, but also from 
Lithuania, Rumania and Bulgaria. While Germany, Sweden and Norway 
succeeded Poland as the largest providers of foreign temps in Denmark 
in 2008; Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria represented the three most 
important single providers after Poland by 2010 (Baadsgaard & Breck 
2011).53 As such, the relative importance of Eastern European temps 
seems to be increasing.  
This is also indicated by the numbers from Statistics Denmark. The 
figures from Statistics Denmark show that in 2001 Danish citizens com-
prised as much as 93% of the temps in Denmark. Nine years later, the 
relative importance of the Danish temps had decreased with nine per 
cent, with the relative share of foreign temps increasing accordingly (see 
figure 3.5.4).54  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
────────────────────────── 
53 These data is similarly based on data from Statistics Denmark, although using a different data set. The 
tendency indicated here can thus again be faulted with some errors, although perhaps in another way and to 
a different extent.  
54 Descendants of immigrants to Denmark are defined here as a group of its own. This group has had a slight 
relative increase throughout the last ten years; representing 1.56 per cent of the total temp workforce in 
2001, this group represents 2.12 per cent in 2010. 
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Figure 3.5.4 Composition of workforce based on nationality, 2001–2010. Percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark for FAOS, 2011 
 
In particular the number and share of temps from Poland and Eastern 
Europe increased in this period. Temps from the new EU member states 
in the east accounted for almost one third of the foreign temps in Den-
mark in 2010 (figure 3.5.5). This is contrasted to a mere six per cent ten 
years ago, in 2001.  
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Figure 3.5.5 Share of temporary workers from EU10 of the total number of fore-
ign temporary workers. Percent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark for FAOS, 2011. 
 
It is interesting to note in that regard that the relative share of the for-
eign temps, as it is accounted for in these figures, has not decreased con-
currently with the crisis. As such, the share of foreign temps, as well as 
Eastern European temps more specifically, increased in a time of boom, 
but this share does not seem to have decreased to the same extent when 
the prosperous times were exchanged with crisis, although the increase 
rates were slowing somewhat down. 
The altered image of the temporary workforce in Denmark is basically 
caused by the combined effects of a booming economy in the early 2000s 
and the opening of the labour markets to the east. Denmark experienced a 
record low level of unemployment in this period, creating labour shortage 
in a number of industries. The high demand of manpower and shortage of 
workers is repeatedly mentioned in the interviews with social partners 
and temporary staffing agencies as the most central reason for why the 
agencies started recruiting migrant workers from Eastern Europe. As 
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such, the role of the migrant temps is described by a consultant in a major 
employers’ organization as “a stabilizer of economic fluctuations”.  
The expansion eastward generated new opportunities with regard to 
recruitment, and following in the wake of these new opportunities was 
the emergence of new types of agencies and new ways of using the 
temps – with social dumping as a main problem, seen from the trade 
unions’ point of view. Among the new agencies appearing, a segment did 
not work in compliance with the rules set down in Danish collective 
agreements. These agencies have specialized in cheap migrant manpow-
er, earning them characterisations like “bad apples” and “frivolous” from 
representatives on both employers’ and trade unions’ side. In a study of 
Eastern European workers in the construction sector employers stated 
that some of the temps they had hired were paid no more than 30 DKK 
per hour – less than a third of the minimum pay stipulated by the collec-
tive agreement (Hansen & Andersen 2008). In the interviews trade un-
ion representatives describe agencies appearing and disappearing, only 
to reappear again, as a way of escaping the trade unions’ awareness and 
avoid their demands. Examples of agencies going bankrupt up to as 
much as nine times are given. Other examples are agencies with branch-
es in several countries, attempting to transfer responsibility crosswise 
the borders, as well as owners with two agencies with almost identical 
names, making it appear as if the temps are hired in an agency with a 
collective agreement, but in reality having them employed in the other 
agency at salaries below the collectively agreed minimum wage.  
Until spring 2009 the transitional arrangement applied according to 
EU-regulation demanded that migrant workers from Eastern Europe 
obtained wages and working conditions which were in accordance with 
the relevant collective agreements. Even though trade unions continual-
ly complained about violations of the rules it probably to some degree 
sheltered migrants in the temp industry against social dumping. Howev-
er, as the arrangement was phased out in 2009 there were no longer any 
legislation regulating wages or working conditions for migrant workers. 
Since then it has solely been a matter of being covered by the collective 
agreements. According to trade union representatives some agencies – 
“bad apples” – have tried to take advantage of the situation and system-
atically bypassed the collective agreements.  
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13.4 The development in client industries 
Turning the focus from the temporary staffing industry to the client in-
dustries, some industries distinguish themselves as more frequent users 
of temporary staff. In Denmark, almost two thirds of the turnover in the 
temporary staffing industry is earned in the private sector, while one 
third is earned in the public sector, mainly within health and care. About 
ten per cent comes from NGO’s. The health sector is the largest single 
client of temp services in terms of turnover, although its share has de-
creased rather drastically from 31% to 21% in the period from 2009 to 
2010.55 In the same period, the manufacture and construction industries, 
put together, have increased their relative importance from 14 to 19%, 
and are thus at level with the health sector in terms of importance.  
To get an idea of where the temps work, however, it is pertinent to 
look at the number of hours worked by temps in each client industry. 
Looking at the number of sold hours, the manufacturing and the con-
struction industries stand out as the main recipients of temp workers in 
Denmark. Their joint relative significance has moreover increased from 
20% to 29% from 2009 to 2010 (see figure 3.5.6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
────────────────────────── 
55 The data are from Statistics Denmark’s publication “Product statistics for temporary staffing agencies and 
other employment agencies 2010”, released 8.12.2011, and from the related statistical tables in Statistics 
Denmark’s Databank.  
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Figure 3.5.6 Distribution of client industries. Percentage of number of sold hours, 
2009 and 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark, 2011.  
 
The second largest recipient of temp services is the health sector. Again, 
the sector’s relative significance has decreased from 2009 and 2010. The 
sector has gone from consuming 34% of the total number of hours 
worked by temps to 22% within one year. This is due to cuts in public 
spending and a stated objective within the public sector to reduce their 
use of temps. Another large industry, whose relative importance has in-
creased from 2009 to 2010, is transport, supply and logistics. Additionally, 
clerical jobs represent a relative important customer for the temporary 
staffing industry, although its relative importance has dropped significant-
ly the last two decades (Kudsk-Iversen & Andersen 2006:8). 
With regard to the distribution of foreign temps in these client indus-
tries, we do not have much quantitative information. Interviews with the 
social partners and the temporary staffing agencies indicate that temps 
from Eastern Europe work mainly in the manufacturing industry, the 
construction industry and the agriculture sector, as well as in supply and 
logistics, and in the cleaning industry. This is due in part to different 
requirements with regard to language. As such, although temps in gen-
eral are often used as for instance commercial and clerical employees, 
there are seldom foreign temps in these functions, as they require that 
one speaks Danish. Similarly, the health and care sector as well as the 
hotel and restaurant sector are areas of the Danish labour market where 
the temps are predominantly Danish or of other Scandinavian origin, 
often Swedish.  
246 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
Another distinction can be made between those industries where the 
use of temps from Eastern Europe seems to offer challenges and those 
industries where it is more or less unproblematic. One reason for this, 
according to the social partners, is the difference between stationary and 
non-stationary workplaces. Another distinction is between skilled and 
non-skilled manpower, as well as the strength of the union in the differ-
ent trades. As such, according to a central trade union representative in 
the manufacturing industry the entry of Eastern European temps does 
not pose challenges related to social dumping in the industry, as the 
temps in general obtain the same pay and working conditions as the 
permanent staff. In the manufacturing industry the workers are often 
skilled, the workplace is stationary, and moreover, the trade union and 
the employers’ organizations agreed already in 1995 on a protocol ad-
dressing the conditions for temps. Furthermore, this representative 
points out that in the manufacturing industry there is a well-functioning 
structure of shop stewards on the workplaces, making it easier to solve 
any potential problems. This relates to the strength of the trade union 
and the coverage of collective agreements in the respective industries, 
which again affects the extent to which the use of migrant temps is seen 
as problematic (Pedersen & Andersen 2007).  
As such, the focus on social dumping with regard to Eastern European 
temps is more pronounced in certain industries or sectors. The agriculture 
sector is often mentioned as a sector in which Eastern European temps 
are frequently used, and according to both trade union representatives 
and employers’ organizations; a sector in which the migrant temps are 
often working under other and worse conditions than those defined in the 
collective agreements. The employers’ organisation in the sector has earli-
er declared that they see it as a necessity for the survival of the sector to 
find ways of recruiting manpower that accepts to work for less than what 
is defined in the Danish collective agreements (Kudsk-Iversen & Andersen 
2006). A recent court ruling from 2011 in the trade union’s favour is how-
ever making the representative from the trade union in the sector hopeful 
with regard to the temps’ employment conditions in the future. He stress-
es, however, that the use of temps is only one means alongside others 
used by the employers in the sector to drive down the prices and the sala-
ries. In fact, he already sees the use of temps decreasing concurrently with 
the increased focus on regulation of temp work, and substituted with oth-
er ways of having flexible and cheap migrant manpower employed. He 
mentions the increased use of apprentices in the sector as a reflection of 
this recent development, as the apprentice arrangement allows the em-
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ployers to pay their workers less. The apprentices are brought in from 
countries outside EU, in particular from Ukraine. 
Likewise, in the construction industry there is a heightened focus on 
social dumping with regard to migrant temps as well as other forms of 
temporary flexible employment. A main problematic here is whether the 
migrant workers, often from Eastern Europe, are to be conceived as 
temps, posted workers, or self-employed – and thus, what kind of pay 
and working conditions ought to be applied. The trade union representa-
tive from the construction industry expresses this as problematic and as 
a matter of employers always looking for new ways of obtaining cheap 
labour; when one way is increasingly regulated, another way is sought 
for. The use of migrants in temporary and flexible employment is thus 
seen as a way of circumventing the collective agreements (Kudsk-
Iversen & Andersen 2006). This is also an issue raised in the cleaning 
industry, although the trade union representing the employees in this 
industry explains that they have not yet given it the same kind of atten-
tion as they have in the construction industry. Recently, however, the 
press, including the trade union’s newsletter, has started writing about 
the conditions of foreign and in particular Rumanian, workers in the 
cleaning industry; indicating that problems related to social dumping in 
this sector are now higher on the agenda.  
In that regard, it is relevant to reflect on the need the migrant temps 
are seen to fill. Temp work is often seen as either meeting needs of nu-
merical stability, in the case of absenteeism due to illness, or numerical 
flexibility; as a means to adjust the labour force as the demand vary. 
Regarding Eastern European temps on the Danish labour market we can 
identify differing trends. During the economic boom Eastern European 
temps were hired in particular in construction and manufacturing in 
order to ensure numerical flexibility. Labour shortage in these industries 
was the driving force behind this development. Since the economic 
downturn and subsequent increase in unemployment trade union rep-
resentatives have argued that Eastern European temps are no longer 
contributing to numerical flexibility, but are used to substitute Danish 
workers. This is mentioned by the trade union representatives in con-
struction as well as representatives from the supply and logistics indus-
try. They talk of the substitution of permanent employees with migrant 
temps, often with consequences for pay and general conditions on the 
workplace as well as problems of social dumping. Reference is here 
made to for instance one Danish transport company, who earlier had 
400 Danish permanent employees, and are now operating solely with 
temps from Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Moreover, employers in 
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agriculture, cleaning and other low pay sectors have over the last decade 
been arguing that they have difficulties in recruiting Danish workers and 
therefore have turned to migrant manpower. Following the argument of 
the employers the migrant workers have in a sense contributed to the 
numerical stability. It is worth commenting here that in Denmark there 
are no rules for when it is allowed to use temps; whether to use temps or 
not is a decision belonging to the managerial right.  
With this brief summary of the recent development in the temporary 
staffing industry in Denmark, including some of the most pertinent chal-
lenges and problems emerging in the wake of this development, we turn 
now to the temporary staffing agencies and their way of acting as well as 
their perspectives on the Danish context they find themselves in.  
13.5 Qualitative case histories 
We have talked to four agencies that represent different perspectives 
and approaches to the use and recruitment of migrant workers from 
Eastern Europe. Some central characteristics are however shared by all 
the four agencies; for instance regarding foreign manpower they pre-
dominantly recruit from Poland. Furthermore, they are all members of 
employers’ organizations, and as such, obliged to pay in accordance with 
the collective agreements. It is pertinent to comment that these four 
agencies do not exhaust the range of agencies in a Danish context. There 
are for instance several examples of agencies that market themselves as 
providers of cheap migrant manpower and explicitly emphasize their 
non-commitment to the collective agreements, allowing them to offer 
manpower to prices below the level agreed upon by the social partners. 
In the following, we present each case one by one.  
Case 1: The temporary staffing agency, which in the following will be 
referred to as case 1, is a small agency specializing in manpower from 
Eastern Europe. The agency was established in 2006, as the owner at the 
time, who had worked in the agriculture sector, saw the extensive need 
for manpower in Denmark. While they at one point had as many as 400 
temps working for them, they have in the wake of the crisis been re-
quired to downsize their business. Today they have 2½ full-time posi-
tions in the agency, alongside 20–30 temps doing work for them. The 
two full-time employees speak Polish as well as Danish.  
The temps mainly come from Poland and Lithuania, as well as a small-
er number from Rumania and Bulgaria. The agency has a branch office in 
Poznań, Poland, from where they recruit Polish workers. Affiliated temps 
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from Lithuania, Rumania and Bulgaria have made contact with the agency 
on their own initiative. Before the crisis the agency offered both skilled 
and unskilled workers, but today they specialize in unskilled manpower to 
the agriculture sector, the fish processing industry, as well as supply jobs. 
They send temps to different locations in the country.  
The agency is a member of the employers’ organization The Danish 
Chamber of Commerce. However, the company has earlier been under 
the trade union’s scrutiny, as there has been suspicion of social dumping, 
hereunder cheating with how much of the salary that was taken as set-
tlement for rent, underpayment as well as bankruptcy fraud. The com-
pany was also mentioned as an example of a “bad apple” in our inter-
views with trade union representatives, where it was commented on 
how the company had gone bankrupt only to reappear soon after in the 
name of another family member and with the same temps affiliated. The 
conflicts with the trade union took in particular place during the first 
years after the company was established. We have interviewed a con-
sultant employed at the office from 2008, who explains the conflicts with 
the trade unions as owing to “misunderstandings”. She informs however 
that the company today seeks to have the temps taking charge of rent 
payment themselves in order to avoid conflicts about the charged 
amount. She underlines moreover the company’s membership in an 
employers’ organization and the appertaining commitments with regard 
to pay and working conditions.  
Case 2: The second agency is a larger nationwide temporary staffing 
agency, with offices in eight different locations in Denmark. We have 
interviewed the head of the department situated close to Copenhagen, 
and two of the chief consultants employed in this department. The agen-
cy was established in 2006, and this specific department was established 
in 2008. The department had a quarterly turnover of 18 million Danish 
kroner in the third quarter in 2011, and is the second largest depart-
ment in the agency. In total around the country the agency has about 
800–900 temps affiliated, and in this specific department they have 
about 150 temps affiliated, out of which approximately 125 were on 
assignments at the time we spoke. The department has roughly equal 
shares of Danish and foreign manpower, which means about 75 of their 
affiliated temps are migrant workers at the current moment.  
The foreign manpower is predominantly unskilled workers from Po-
land. Additionally, they have skilled manpower from Germany. The 
agency offers temps to all kinds of industries and jobs, from manufactur-
ing to mid-level managers. The Polish temps work mostly in supply and 
in manufacturing companies. They have some Polish temps in the clean-
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ing and agriculture, but this is minimal. The Danish temps are mostly 
skilled manpower, and work in construction or as clerical employees. 
The agency is a member of the employers’ organization DI.  
Case 3: The third case is a medium size agency, with temps located 
around the country, but with their office in Lolland. The agency was estab-
lished in 2006, and specialized at the time in manpower from Central and 
Eastern Europe. In 2009 it merged with another agency, specializing in 
Danish temps. Today the composition of their workforce is approximately 
80% Danish temps and 20% foreign temps. However, at the time of the 
interview, the agency had approximately 40 migrant temps, which com-
prises merely 10% of the total temps working for them at the time. The 
agency had a turnover of about 60 million Danish kroner in 2010 as well 
as 2009. Noteworthy, they have not experienced the crisis as a downturn 
period; if anything, they have had more work, the manager reports.  
The foreign temps are skilled workers; welders and other craftsmen 
within shipbuilding, while the Danish workers are mainly unskilled 
workers in all kinds of industries. The company is a member of the em-
ployers’ organization DI. The foreign temps are told to join the union, as 
this is seen as a requirement to avoid problems with the regular em-
ployees in the shipbuilding industry. The agency is the only one in this 
study that hires their temps permanently, guaranteeing their temps a 
minimum of seven and a half hours of work per week.  
Case 4: The fourth case is the largest agency among the four; and 
among the largest in Denmark. In Denmark, the agency sends between 
1,000–2,000 temps out every day to work for client companies in a wide 
range of industries. Their yearly turnover is about 400 million Danish 
kroner, and they have about 120 internal employees distributed among 
the 14 subdivisions settled around the country. Noteworthy, they had as 
many as 330 internal employees before the crisis, but were required to 
downsize their staff substantially.  
In 2006, the agency started a recruitment program from their sister 
branch in Poland to service the Danish construction industry with Polish 
workers; skilled as well as unskilled. At the most, the company had 200 
Polish workers in Denmark. With the crisis, the program was suspended, 
and the number of Polish temps was reduced to as few as ten. In 2011, 
however, they have slowly restarted the program, and are again recruit-
ing manpower from Poland to the Danish construction industry. The 
agency is a member of the two major employers’ organisations; The 
Danish Chamber of Commerce and DI.  
Based on this, a tentative typology of different temporary staffing 
agencies in Denmark can be indicated: 
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Firstly, there is the classic agency, which is Danish or international, 
larg in size and with a majority of Danish temps. They offer a number of 
services, such as temps, recruitment and outsourcing, and market them-
selves with reference to quality as well as a code of ethics, hereunder 
commitment to the Danish system of collective bargaining. Case 4 in this 
study is a typical example of such an agency.  
Secondly, there are Danish agencies with a large percentage of mi-
grant temps. These are established rather recently, within the last five 
years or so, and hold efficiency and price as earmarks. With regard to 
this type of agency, one can distinguish between those who are commit-
ted to the Danish system of collective bargaining and those who are not; 
as well as between those who have repeated conflicts with the trade 
unions and those not. Case 1, 2 and 3 could be categorized as such a type 
of agency, with differences among them inter alia with regard to con-
flicts with the trade unions.  
Thirdly, there is a type of agency not represented in this study, name-
ly the foreign temp agencies operating in Denmark. These are typically 
not committed to collective agreements, and some offer both temp 
workers and posted workers.56 Price is a central earmark for these 
agencies, seen for instance on web pages where the price is mentioned 
as a first thing. Although the agencies are registered abroad, they might 
have Danish owners.  
We have been in contact with a number of agencies of the third type, 
but they declined proposed interviews. One of these agencies explains 
that pay is made in accordance with the collective agreements, although 
they are not a member of an employers’ organization and as such, not 
obliged to. Another agency emphasizes on the other hand their ability to 
provide manpower for prices below the level agreed upon in the collec-
tive agreement. This agency offers unskilled manpower for 80 DKK per 
hour and skilled manpower for 125 DKK; a price that also covers their 
own overhead, which often is around 50% of the price, suggesting that 
payment per hour is approximately 40 DKK and 65 DKK respectively. By 
comparison, the minimum wages according to the collective agreements 
in the manufacturing industry and the construction industry are 106.25 
and 112.75 kroner respectively. Both agencies have been under the scru-
────────────────────────── 
56 Posted workers refer in this regard to workers, whose agency holds all employer’s responsibilities, as well 
as economic responsibilities for the job to be done. As temp work is becoming more regulated, through e.g. 
the EU-directive, there are agencies marketing with a change in their services from being temp services to 
now being posted workers.  
252 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
tiny of the trade union in connection with bankruptcies and social 
dumping. We will in the forthcoming analysis, when relevant, make ref-
erence to statements given by the latter agency in an interview with a 
national newspaper.  
The typology provides an indication of how each of the case agencies 
in this study can be understood in relation to a larger array of agencies, 
as well as an understanding of the context in which the cases operate. 
This is relevant to keep in mind as we now turn to how these case agen-
cies specifically relate to their recruitment of migrant temps.  
13.6 The recruitment of migrant workers 
A main question in this report is what role the temporary staffing agen-
cies play in mediating movement of workers from Eastern Europe to the 
Nordic countries, and in this case, Denmark. Looking at the agencies’ 
recruitment strategies, there are not only differences between the agen-
cies, but also diverse strategies within the individual agency. Moreover, 
the fact that the crisis has affected the recruitment, both in dimension 
and approach, is inescapable. The crisis’ somewhat dramatic effect on 
the temporary staffing industry has thus caused a rethinking of the re-
cruitment strategies.  
All four cases in this study recruit foreign manpower directly from 
abroad, and more specifically, from Poland. While case 1, 2 and 4 all 
have a branch office or sister branch in Poland, from where recruitment 
is taking place, case 3 recruits through network in Poland. However, in 
the wake of the financial and economic crisis, case 1 and 2 find them-
selves recruiting more among migrant workers already established in 
Denmark than from their branch offices abroad. In fact, case 2 does not 
recruit from abroad at all for the time being, but rather use their net-
work of Polish workers in Denmark when they are in need of manpower. 
This is also a strategy used by case 1. Although they still recruit Polish 
workers from their agency in Poznań, they recruit many of their new 
temps through the temps already affiliated, via advertisements on a web 
site for Poles in Denmark or at social meeting points like for instance the 
local Catholic Church in Denmark.  
For the largest agency, case 4, the crisis resulted in a cease in their 
recruitment from abroad as well as use of Polish manpower. In 2011, 
they started recruiting from Poland again, due to new activity in the 
construction industry in Denmark, which is the sector to which they 
recruit Polish temps. Their Polish temps are almost solely recruited in 
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Poland, as the agency prefers to have the foreign temps go through the 
agency’s recruitment program there, where the interviews can be made 
in their mother tongue, rather than just showing up at their office in 
Denmark. This distinguishes them from the other agencies, and in par-
ticular case 2, for whom the Polish workers making contact directly with 
them comprise a majority of their Polish temps.  
The differences between the agencies depend on how the agencies 
use the foreign temps, as well as how they profile themselves as agencies 
and the services they provide. Case 4 recruits skilled and unskilled 
workers for mainly long-term jobs in the construction industry in Den-
mark, and make a point of having a recruitment process, which follows 
specified steps ensuring quality in the recruitment. Before the crisis, 
they also had a school teaching Danish set up in Poland, where their 
candidates were given a 160 hours Danish course, equivalent to one 
month of full-time work. As they have recently restarted their recruit-
ment from Poland, they have not reintroduced this course. There are 
however possibilities for Danish courses when in Denmark for those 
wishing to learn the language, although the consultant we have inter-
viewed comments that the interest is low as English is the working lan-
guage at the relevant construction sites. The agency provides accommo-
dation and help to meet official requirements to live and work in Den-
mark; getting a social security number, a bank account etc. The 
consultant accentuates moreover the agency’s follow-up of the migrant 
temps the first three months, as a manner of providing them with extra 
care and attention as they are new in the country. Case 4 appears as such 
as someone investing rather much in the recruitment process as well as 
in the workers they recruit.  
Case 2 has a somewhat different approach to their recruitment pro-
cess. At the time being, most of their foreign temps have themselves 
made contact with the agency in their search for a job, or as the manager 
in the agency describes it; “It has rumoured that our clients want Polish 
manpower, so people come in on their own account. It passes from mouth 
to mouth.” The agency uses its Polish temps as unskilled manpower 
within the manufacturing industry as well as for supply jobs; the jobs 
being mainly jobs they find it difficult to recruit Danish workers to do. 
Their recruitment is as such less strategic, in the sense they do not ac-
tively go out to recruit certain types of temps, but focus rather on finding 
jobs for those making contact. They do not provide any extra services for 
their temps, like for instance help to find a place to live, to obtain a social 
security number or find language courses etc. Before the crisis, they had 
one person hired to help their migrant temps in e.g. the contact with 
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public authorities, but this is an extra service they have had to cut back 
on. Compared to case 4, they do not appear to invest as much in their 
temps and in a strategic recruitment practice, but emphasize rather their 
role as someone providing contact between highly motivated Polish 
workers and Danish companies.  
Thus, the way the agencies use the migrant workers as temps when 
in Denmark has consequences for how they approach the recruitment 
process to begin with. This is significant for the role the agencies come 
to play with regard to mediating migration flows from the Eastern Euro-
pean countries to Denmark; it is significant for who they choose to re-
cruit and how they recruit them. Moreover, the different ways of ap-
proaching the recruitment process relates to the motives the agencies 
have with regard to recruiting from abroad.  
At the outset, the shortage of Danish manpower was, according to all 
the agencies, the main reason and incentive to start recruiting from Po-
land. Case 1, 2 and 3 were in fact all established in 2006, at a time when 
the Danish economy was booming and, as we have seen, the Danish 
temporary staffing industry was growing rapidly. Case 1 was set up by 
an employer working within the agricultural sector, where he saw there 
was a great demand for manpower. Similarly, the former owner of case 3 
was an employer within the shipbuilding industry, himself using many 
temps in order to meet the demands. He therefore set up the agency, 
which at the time specialized in skilled Polish manpower for the ship-
building industry. Case 4 started recruiting from Poland in 2006 due to 
the shortage of manpower, and, as the consultant puts it; “that one could 
sense that supply and demand wasn’t balanced well”. He describes a pres-
sure on Danish salaries, causing what he conceives as a distortion of 
expenses in the Danish construction industry. The company’s recruit-
ment from abroad was thus assessed in relation to market relations – 
and the balance between demand and supply.  
One could ask, however, why the agencies still recruit from abroad 
today, as the economic situation has shifted and the demand for man-
power has decreased. To this question, the answers are more diverse. As 
mentioned, case 4 actually stopped recruiting Polish manpower in the 
wake of the crisis and has only recently started recruiting again. This is 
straightforwardly explained as being a consequence of lacking demand: 
“We went down to having perhaps ten men left in Denmark after having 
had as many as 200. It was simply because the market was no longer de-
manding it, and neither were the clients.” As they now have restarted the 
recruitment from Poland, this is done with reference to a revived opti-
mism. Case 1 has similarly experienced a substantial drop in the de-
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mand, but has nevertheless stayed loyal to their original business model 
of using only foreign temps as they see it as their niche in a market 
where most agencies offer Danish manpower. The consultant does how-
ever not deny that times have been hard for the agency, and still contin-
uous to be so.  
Case 2, on their hand, solely uses Polish temps as unskilled manpow-
er, and emphasizes the high unemployment among Danish skilled work-
ers as a reason why. This is inter alia an ascertainment of the demands 
in the labour market, where Danish workers are conceived as most often 
preferred over foreign manpower. Moreover, it can be understood as 
mirroring ideas concerning the agencies responsibilities as actors in a 
Danish labour market; emphasizing their commitment to the Danish 
society more generally. This is most clearly voiced by the manager in 
case 3, as he states that he is of the conviction that he ought to use Dan-
ish manpower to the extent it is possible, in order to keep the Danish 
society going. He states: “If I know that I can recruit Danes, then it is my 
duty as a citizen to make sure the Danes are employed.” Thus, he express-
es loyalty to the Danish labour market as part of the larger national soci-
ety, for whom it is important that its members are employed.  
His agency recruits Polish workers for jobs to which there is, accord-
ing to the manager, a shortage of Danish workers with the required 
skills. However, it is relevant to question whether the recruitment of 
migrant temps to the shipbuilding industry is merely a matter of short-
age of manpower, as the unemployment rates within shipbuilding are 
higher than the average unemployment rates in Denmark.57 In debates 
on migrant temps, an often-mentioned motivation ascribed to the agen-
cies as well as the client firms is the access to cheap manpower (see e.g. 
Kudsk-Iversen & Andersen 2006). In the interviews with the trade un-
ions, price is pointed to as a main motive for using migrant temps, and as 
such, relates to one of their main points of criticism against the tempo-
rary staffing agencies and their clients; namely undercutting the wages 
levels stipulated in the collective agreements – often referred to as social 
dumping. In this study, all the agencies deny that price is their motive for 
recruiting migrant temps. The migrant temps are described as a desira-
ble type of manpower not due to an issue of price but rather an issue of 
────────────────────────── 
57 Source: Dansk Metal. Accessed 2.01.2012: 
http://www.danskmetal.dk/Nyheder%20og%20presse/Analyse%20og%20fakta/Ledighedstal/ 
Arbejdsloesheden%20i%20Dansk%20Metal.aspx and Statistics Denmark. Accessed 2.01.2012: 
http://www.dst.dk/pukora/epub/Nyt/2011/NR564.pdf  
256 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
quality. The four case-agencies substantiate this argument by referring 
to their commitment to the collective agreements, which obliges them to 
pay accordingly, making price less relevant as a motivation. They do 
however all make reference to other agencies, to which price is a central 
motivation for why to recruit temps from Eastern Europe, and accentu-
ate the tough competition from these agencies. These agencies could be 
described as the third type of agency in our typology; explicitly market-
ing their services with reference to cheap labour, and often using the EU 
directive on posted workers as a means to circumvent the Danish sys-
tem of collective bargaining.58 
Consequently, the case-agencies’ motives to recruit and use migrant 
temps have changed somewhat due to the drastic shift in the economic 
situation. The high demand was the main incentive to begin with, during 
a time of economic boom, and the agencies aspired in that situation to 
contribute to match supply and demand in the Danish labour market. In 
the wake of the crisis, the agencies have more varied motivations for 
why they use migrant temps, related to their business model and strate-
gic considerations. They express commitment to the Danish labour mar-
ket as well as the larger society, as they articulate their considerations 
on matching supply and demand without contributing to a situation 
where Danish workers are outmatched in their home market. In that 
respect, all the case-agencies accentuate that price is not a central moti-
vation for them, although they feel the competition from agencies to 
which it is.  
13.7 Which needs do migrant temps fill in the client 
firms? 
There is no way around the fact that client firms, as the paying custom-
ers, and their needs are of vital importance for the agencies. As such, the 
agencies’ motives to recruit foreign temps are closely related to the 
needs the agencies conceive the client firms to have. This relates to the 
────────────────────────── 
58 Temps sent from a foreign temporary staffing agency are considered "posted workers" according to the 
posted workers directive; however, not in the same sense as workers posted by a foreign service-providing 
company. Thus the country of destination is entitled to enforce general national legislation regarding tempo-
rary workers, also on foreign temps and their employer agency. In Denmark regulation of temporary work is 
left to the social partners through collective bargaining and collective agreement, possible installed by way of 
industrial conflict.  
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question of how the agencies affect the market – and the relations be-
tween workers and client firms. In that regard, it is again interesting to 
look at how supply and demand is matched, as well as how risk and un-
certainty for the client firms is reduced.  
Commencing with an aspect that all the agencies emphasize, it is note-
worthy that the migrant temps are referred to in very positive terms. All 
the agencies have overriding positive experiences with the migrant temps, 
who distinguish themselves by their heightened motivation and high work 
effort. The migrant temps are seldom sick, they work longer hours, and 
they are more efficient in the hours they work; characteristics all the 
agencies accentuate as being of importance for their clients. One of the 
needs the agencies fulfil is thus related to the type of manpower the mi-
grant temps represent. The positive evaluation of the migrant manpower 
relates to a certain work culture, which is seen as outperforming the work 
culture among the Danish workers. As one of the consultants in case 2 
puts it, the migrant temps have “a different work moral, and they are not 
sick as frequently and they don’t complain as much.” Reversely, trade union 
representatives accentuate how the competition from migrant manpower 
makes the Danish workers more modest in their demands, and accept to 
work a little harder in order to keep their job.  
In continuation hereof, it is worthwhile looking at the way the mi-
grant temps are used as manpower in comparison to the Danish temps. 
In three out of four agencies, the temps are recruited for specific tasks – 
and other tasks than the Danish temps. In case 2, they recruit the Polish 
temps for solely unskilled jobs, while the Danish and German temps are 
mainly recruited for skilled jobs. In case 3, the migrant temps are used in 
specific skilled jobs, to which the agency does not use Danish temps. 
Case 4 recruits migrant temps for specific jobs in the construction indus-
try; jobs to which they do not recruit Danish temps. Case 1 is somewhat 
different, as the agency solely recruits migrant temps. Before the crisis, 
they were recruited for both unskilled and skilled jobs, while today they 
are mainly used as unskilled manpower. As such, there is a pattern that 
the fact that the temps are migrants matters for the way their manpower 
is sold – and thought to fulfil the needs of the client firms. Moreover, this 
is interesting with regard to the question of the temps’ working condi-
tions. The use of the Eastern European temps as unskilled workers could 
indicate that they to little extent are able to fully use their qualification; a 
problem earlier raised by Polish temps in a study of Poles in Copenhagen 
and their pay-, working- and life conditions (Hansen & Hansen 2009).  
So far having focused on a need for migrant manpower, the agencies 
also focus on how to accommodate specific needs among the client firms 
258 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
due to the fact that the temps are migrants. Among these are relief of the 
relatively larger administrative burden involved when using migrant 
manpower. This can be help to get a social security number and bank ac-
count, housing as well as sorting out the different tax rules, in addition to 
more general administrative burdens related to employing. Notably, relief 
of administrative burdens is also relevant when the temps are Danish (see 
e.g. Kudsk-Iversen & Andersen 2006). Nevertheless, the agencies empha-
size that this issue is even more prevalent when the manpower is not Dan-
ish, something also indicated by the social partners. This circumstance is 
pointed to as one explanation for why client firms can be prone to hire 
migrant workers as temps rather than permanent employees to a higher 
extent than what the case is with Danish workers.  
Similarly, the agencies seek to relieve the client firms from any poten-
tial communicative challenges due to a lack of language skills. The client 
firms are relieved of communicative challenges in the sense that they 
only need to instruct the temps with regard to the concrete work, and do 
not bear responsibility for communication about issues of pay and work-
ing conditions. Moreover, most of the agencies require from their temps 
that they speak English. At times, however, their level of English is not 
very good despite such requirements, something which is often solved 
by sending temps in groups of at least two to the client firms, ensuring 
that at least one understands and speak English well.  
Price is another relevant aspect as the agencies talk of their clients’ 
needs. Although the agencies, as we have seen, deny that they recruit 
migrant manpower in order to offer cheap labour, they do stress that 
price is a very central parameter in the competition for clients. All four 
agencies emphasize their problems of keeping up with the low prices 
that some agencies offer. In that regard, it is interesting to note the dif-
ferent ways the case agencies relate to price as an important parameter 
of competition. Case 1 accentuates the tough competition from agencies 
that do not pay according to the collective agreement. As their own 
competitive edge is implied in the ability to procure mostly unskilled 
foreign manpower, they feel the pressure from those offering the same 
manpower for less money. The agency seeks to compete on price by not 
having a high contribution margin, being located less centrally and in 
modestly priced premises. Nevertheless, they find it hard to compete, 
particularly in the agriculture sector, where many employers do not 
wish to pay according to the collective agreement. Case 2 likewise re-
flects on how price and pay is an issue that makes it hard to compete in 
some industries and sectors. They mention in particular the cleaning 
sector as an area they cannot compete in due to a large market share 
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held by agencies paying below the level agreed upon in the collective 
agreements. Hence, the importance of price depends on the industry in 
which the agencies seek to sell their services.  
Another difference among the agencies related to the industry or sector 
in which they operate is the extent to which the agencies accentuate their 
commitment to the collective bargaining system – and what advantages 
they see in that regard in relation to the client firms. The agriculture sector 
is highlighted as a sector where the client firms do not bother with the col-
lective agreements, and as expressed by case 1, being committed to the 
collective agreements is not necessarily an advantage for the agencies. Dif-
ferently, case 3 and 4 accentuate their commitment to the Danish system of 
collective agreements when they market their services to the clients, and 
see this as an important competitive advantage. Although abiding to the 
collective agreement makes the agency a little more expensive, the manager 
in case 3 sees it as “paying off”, inter alia because it invites the client firms to 
trust the agency. This is similarly emphasized by case 4, where the consult-
ant states; “It is very much trust and confidence we sell to our clients”.  
Hence, the agencies strive to offer the client firms a good manpower that 
is often used to perform specific tasks different from the tasks to which 
Danish workers are used for. In that light, the agencies contribute in match-
ing supply and demand, but also in shaping the market (ref. Coe et al. 2010). 
The tendency that Eastern European temps are recruited to specific tasks 
indicates a particular positioning of these temps in the Danish labour mar-
ket, where they are either solving tasks the Danes do not want – or to fill in 
gaps, where the supply in the Danish workforce is not sufficient. Moreover, 
by working strategically to lift administrative burdens for the client firms, 
the agencies reduce the risks associated with finding manpower outside of 
the Danish workforce. Price is another important factor for how the agen-
cies’ fulfil the client firms’ needs. In this area, competition is tough, and the 
agencies in this study accentuate their difficulties in matching the cheapest 
agencies, with some difference among them with regard to how much they 
exert themselves in order to keep up. The competition in the temporary 
staffing market can be seen as affecting the broader labour market, as price 
is made a crucial parameter of competition. However, treating one’s temps 
in a good way can also be a competitive advantage, according to some of the 
agencies. Having so far focused on how the agencies accommodate to their 
clients’ needs, as well as how they seek to compete in the market against 
other agencies, it is relevant to look at how these four agencies conceive 
themselves as accommodating for the migrants and their needs. 
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13.8 Working conditions for temp agency workers 
A key question in this study is how the temporary staffing agencies come 
to shape the working conditions for the migrant temps as they arrive in 
the receiver country, in this case Denmark. The question is whether the 
agencies accept being covered by the collective agreements and fur-
thermore obey to existing laws regarding taxation and health and safety 
or if they rather lock the migrant temps to a less beneficial position in 
the labour market. In this regard, pay and working conditions are central 
issues, as well as the contractual conditions the agencies offer their 
temps. In order to create an overview the agencies can roughly be 
grouped in three different categories with regard to how they position 
themselves in relation to the regulation of wages and working condi-
tions; i.e. the collective agreements. To some degree these categories are 
building on the tentative typology presented above. 
 
 Agencies being covered by collective agreements and fully complying 
to the rules of the agreements. They may also actively take steps in 
order to encourage migrant workers to join the unions and thereby 
specifically emphasizing the need for dialogue between labour and 
management and more generally expressing the support for the 
collective bargaining system. 
 Agencies “balancing on the edge of the collective agreements” in the 
sense that they at a first glance respect the collective agreements e.g. 
paying minimum wages according to the agreement, but having a 
closer look they might be ignoring overtime work, bonuses, etc. as well 
as various social elements in the collective agreements (pensions, 
payment during sickness, paid holidays, etc.). Consequently, such 
agencies will in some cases violate the agreements; in other words 
they so to speak “stay at the bottom of the agreement” meaning that 
they by respecting an absolute minimum of the stipulations – 
regarding pay and working conditions - stay within the framework of 
the agreement. 
 Agencies bypassing the collective agreements meaning that they 
clearly do not want to follow the existing agreement, and for instance 
advertisements and web-pages emphasize that they are offering 
cheap labour.  
 
It needs to be emphasized that these categories only reflect the policies 
of the agencies with regard to approval/non-approval of collective 
agreements. Further issues often raised by trade unions concerns tax 
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evasion and violation of health and safety laws; the argument often be-
ing that agencies ignoring the collective agreements in some cases also 
neglect tax and health and safety rules. An official in the Working Envi-
ronment Agency (WEA) comments that there is a tendency that foreign 
companies to a larger extent than Danish companies have problems 
complying with health and safety regulations (Pedersen forthcoming). 
This relates however not to foreign temporary staffing agencies alone, 
but more generally to foreign companies in Denmark. The Danish tax 
authorities have similarly uncovered problems with regard to tax and 
Eastern European workers in Denmark, although there has not been a 
specific focus on temps or temp agencies in that regard. The impression 
is that incorrect guidance is most often the reason why these workers 
have problems to pay the correct tax. Moreover, there have been a few 
cases of client firms not paying the 30% tax rate applied for foreign 
temps, who are hired out by a foreign temp agency to carry out work in 
Denmark. These were however only a handful cases in 2011, and not 
necessarily related to Eastern European temps.  
Pay and working conditions are among the most controversial topics in 
the Danish debate on migrant workers, as well as migrant workers in the 
temporary staffing industry more specifically (Kudsk-Iversen & Andersen 
2006). This is confirmed in the interviews with the social partners, as both 
representatives from the trade unions and the employers’ organizations 
refer to wages below the level agreed upon in the collective agreements as 
one of the main problems in – and for – the industry. The four case agen-
cies similarly confirm that pay is a hot topic in the industry.  
All the agencies in this study are members of employers’ organiza-
tions; a membership that binds them to comply with the collective 
agreements. Depending on the sector in which the client firms operate, it 
is determined whether the agency is to follow their own collective 
agreement or the collective agreement in the sector.  
Regarding pay, a special feature of the Danish system of collective 
agreements is the difference between minimal pay systems and normal 
pay systems. In minimal pay systems, the sector collective agreement only 
sets the level of minimum pay, meaning that actual pay levels are negoti-
ated at company level. Conversely in the normal pay systems, where the 
actual wage is settled at sector level negotiations. The minimal pay sys-
tems today covers around 85% of the workforce covered by collective 
agreements in the private sector. One of the sectors covered by this pay 
system is construction. Today the minimum pay in the sector is approxi-
mately 115 DKK per hour, however, the average pay is around 170 DKK 
per hour. If migrant workers in construction are paid the minimum wage, 
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trade unions claim that this is evading the intensions of the collective 
agreement as there are no company-level negotiated top-up of wages. The 
employers on their side tend to argue that this is not the case, but simply 
the flexibility of pay-levels build into the agreement. Accordingly, this also 
creates controversies regarding how to understand and define “social 
dumping”. In that regard, it is worth mentioning that none of the agencies 
provide the migrant temps with de facto opportunities to bargain on the 
issue of pay. The agencies do however stress that they go by the local 
agreements and not merely the sector agreements.  
All the agencies account in the interviews for the process they under-
take to determine what the pay is in each case. There are however dif-
ferences in how the agencies express themselves in this regard; to some 
degree reflecting the categories above. The consultant from case 4 elab-
orates meticulously on how they compare the temp’s pay with that of 
the employees in the client company; how they examine the temps’ edu-
cation, experience and relevant certificates; how they look at the specific 
task and its characteristics; and how they study the different collective 
agreements to find the correct hourly wage and pay supplements. He 
underlines that the agency always pays more than the minimum pay 
defined in the sector collective agreements. Moreover, he stresses that 
the temps get pension, bonuses if it is relevant and three paid days of 
unemployment, as well as accumulate seniority and obtain longer notice 
period over time. Additionally, the agency pays to a maternity/paternity 
fund for each of their temps. Case 4 is clearly a category 1 agency.  
As for case 2 and 3, they can similarly be characterized as a category 
1-agency, although their description of how they approach the issue of 
pay and retribution differs somewhat from case 4. Most notably, case 2 
describes that the main principle is to give their temps the same as the 
regular employees in the client firm. In the cases where the client firm 
has decided to pay minimum-pay, they will do the same. In that regard, 
they could be said to “stay at the bottom of the collective agreement”, 
which is a characteristic of what we here define as category 2-agencies. 
Moreover, they do not necessarily encourage their temps to be in dia-
logue with the trade union, as they emphasize that the Eastern European 
temps are appreciated for not making demands depending on what the 
trade union tells them.  
An agency that by and large appears to be a category 2-agency is 
case 1. The consultant in case 1 states that the agency ensures minimum 
wage at the least, and explains that they take the minimum wage in the 
collective agreement as their starting point, and discuss thereafter with 
the client firm what would be a sensible level to fall down on; whether 
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the minimum pay suffices or whether it should be higher in order to 
better match the pay given to the permanent staff. Asked into whether 
this means they are complying with both sector agreements and local 
agreements on the workplace, she confirms this. Her description of how 
they do it is however not always very precise, creating some doubt with 
regard to how they relate to the issue of pay. Adding to this is the trouble 
the agency has had with the trade union and the many accusations of 
social dumping levelled at the agency. The consultant states that the 
agency has lost a great deal of clients, particularly within the agriculture 
sector, as these clients do not want to pay what it requires to comply 
with the collective agreements. The reference to having lost clients could 
sound as if the agency earlier did not pay according to collective agree-
ments, and that the decision to do so had consequences for the amount 
of clients they get. The consultant declares when asked, that they have 
paid according to the collective agreements for a long time, without 
specifying that any further.  
The differences in how the agencies present their procedures regard-
ing how to settle pay do not necessarily mean there are differences in 
the end result – or that there is anything wrong, in the sense that it is not 
in compliance with the collective agreements, in any of the approaches. 
Moreover, one could argue that paying the migrant workers less than 
the Danish workers is not necessarily wrong, as both workers and client 
firms can be happy with the deal. While Danish employers get cheap 
labour, migrant workers get more than they would get at home. Never-
theless, the differences in how pay is settled is worth mentioning, as it 
illustrates that there might be variations among agencies with regard to 
how they shape the migrant temps’ pay and working conditions, alt-
hough the agencies have the same formal obligations. Moreover, it is 
relevant with regard to the question of whether the agencies contribute 
in creating a labour market b-team, where the migrant temps work un-
der less beneficial conditions than Danish temps or permanent employ-
ees. The Danish trade unions have recently started pointing to a tenden-
cy of minimum pay becoming the norm, in particular for migrant work-
ers. Apart from representing a challenge for Danish workers and their 
level of pay, such a development is also seen to be causing a segregation 
in the labour market between those with better and worse conditions of 
work – and between Danish and migrant workers.    
Another important aspect with regard to the migrant temps’ working 
conditions, as well as their level of security, is what kind of contracts the 
agencies offer their temps. Of the four cases in this study, only one agen-
cy offers what can resemble a permanent employment contract. The 
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manager of case 3 offers his temps a contract guaranteeing a minimum 
of 7.5 hours per week. The other agencies offer their temps contracts of 
the length the specific task is meant to last. It is noteworthy when talk-
ing about permanent contracts for temps that it is not an issue stressed 
by the trade unions in Denmark. Rather, the demand for permanent con-
tracts is seen as coming from the agencies themselves.  
Related herewith is the issue of guaranteed pay. In Denmark, the 
temps are not entitled pay between assignments. In the transitional ar-
rangement (2004–2009) there was a requirement that the Eastern Eu-
ropean workers in Denmark were to have the equivalent of 30 hours a 
week in order to obtain a working permit, and as such, a guarantee of 
income. Today this is no longer the case. Case 1 and 2 explain that for 
this reason their Eastern European temps are often affiliated with sever-
al agencies. Case 4 seeks for the same reason to ensure long-term con-
tracts for the migrant temps in order to provide them with a certain 
security of income when they decide to leave their home country to 
come work in Denmark.  
13.9 The triangular relationship between client firms, 
agency and workers 
The triangular relationship that characterizes the temps’ employment 
relations, where they have two employers rather than one, is another 
characteristic of temp work, relevant in order to grasp what kind of 
work situation the temps are offered as they are introduced to the Dan-
ish labour market. This relates inter alia to how the agencies contribute 
to reduce risk and insecurity for the temps. It is noteworthy in that re-
spect that the agencies differ somewhat with regard to how they inter-
pret their role and function in relation to the temps.  
One main function the agencies have is to find the temps a job. This 
function is stressed by the consultants in case 2, as they talk of being an 
intermediary for migrants coming to Denmark without speaking Danish 
and with few or no prior contacts to employers. As such, they accentuate 
reduction of risk and uncertainty for the migrant workers when they 
arrive in Denmark as part of their task. Their goal is to get these people 
out in the labour market, and they describe it as a matter of success if 
any of their temps get permanent employment in the client firm. They 
also have several examples of this taking place, for both migrant and 
Danish temps. They emphasize thus their role of recruiting and mediat-
ing contact between workers and client firms. The consultant in case 4 
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makes a somewhat different point, as he describes the agency’s role as 
being an employer for the temps rather than merely a mediator between 
client firms and workers. He mentions in that regard that the agency 
prefers to talk about the temps as external employees rather than temps, 
and explains that the agency seeks to ensure long-term project employ-
ment of up to several years for the migrant temps. Additionally, they 
have events in the agency for all their temps, as a way of creating a feel-
ing of community and belonging to the agency as a workplace. On a dif-
ferent scale, but somewhat similar, case 3 prefers a stable crew of temps, 
which he sends out to different client firms. This goes for both his mi-
grant and Danish temps.  
It is in that regard worth mentioning that neither case 3 or 4 has ex-
perienced that any of their migrant temps have obtained permanent 
employment in the client firms. They explain this by reference to a lack 
of aspiration among the migrant temps in this respect, as many of their 
temps come to Denmark for a limited time period in order to earn mon-
ey and then go back home to Poland. Moreover, neither in the shipbuild-
ing industry nor the construction industry is permanent employment 
seen as an applicable issue. According to the manager in case 3, the 
Polish temps are taken in to work at projects, where they need their 
specific knowledge for a period of time – or need additional skilled 
workers to finish this particular project. In the construction industry, as 
the consultant in case 4 describes it, temps are not used to the intention 
of permanent employment, as the industry is organized in a way that the 
contractors are in charge of the overall project, and then have smaller 
companies or temp agencies to procure manpower.  
However, none of the agencies in this study have any downright bar-
riers in the case the temps are to get permanent employment in the cli-
ent firms. They charge a recruitment fee or have rules on when the client 
firms may take over, e.g. that the temps can only be transferred to the 
client firm after three months. According to a representative from an 
employers’ organization, this is a usual strategy and also something that 
is regulated. Notably, however, the manager of case 3 tells that the 
temps deciding to go for permanent employment in the client firm are 
not welcomed back in his agency on a later occasion. He prefers to have 
temps who are motivated to be temps, and sees such a move as an indi-
cation of the contrary. However, this is not a big issue with regard to the 
migrant temps, for whom permanent employment is not as relevant, 
according to the manager.  
Another relevant issue with regard to reduction of risk and insecurity 
for the temps is union membership. While all the agencies we have 
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talked to are members of employers’ organization, the level of unioniza-
tion among their temps is low. In the interviews with the trade unions 
the organization of in particular migrant temps is mentioned as trouble-
some. The temps’ work situation is characterized by moving from 
worksite to worksite; complicating the trade unions’ possibilities to or-
ganize the temps. Moreover, the migrant temps, as well as migrant 
workers more generally, are conceived as being more reluctant than 
Danes to be recruited as members. This is confirmed in studies looking 
into union membership in Denmark, where migrants from Eastern Eu-
rope are shown to be significantly less likely to join the union than Dan-
ish workers (Ibsen et al. 2011). Another study shows that merely about 
ten per cent of the Polish temps were members of a union in 2009 (Han-
sen & Hansen 2009); compared to a general level of unionization in 
Denmark at about 67% (Ibsen et al. 2011). This pattern is confirmed by 
the agencies, who explain that most of their migrant temps are not 
members of the trade unions. The explanation given by the agencies in 
that respect relates to the migrant temps’ short term prospects for their 
stay in Denmark, where the need for the security offered by the trade 
union is not conceived as being as relevant. Case 3 stands out in that 
matter; they oblige their migrant temps to become members of the trade 
union. This is due to the relative strength of the trade union in the ship-
building sector, where any non-members “will not last long”, as the man-
ager in case 3 puts it. His clients demand therefore that the temps are 
organized; as a way of avoiding conflicts with the trade union.  
Decisively, the relationship between the migrant temps, the agencies 
and the client firms is on the one hand characterized by the agencies role 
as a mediator between the two other parties, but also by some of the 
agencies’ wish to be more of an employer for the temps. There are thus 
moves towards more stable and fixed relations between the temps and 
the temporary staffing agencies. This is reflected in the different atti-
tudes among the agencies with regard to permanent employment, alt-
hough the rules on this matter are generally the same in all the agencies. 
As such, the agencies contribute in different ways to shape the working 
conditions for the temps, and in reducing risk and insecurity for the 
temps. It is interesting to note, moreover, the agencies strategies with 
regard to organization of the temps. This relates inter alia to the ques-
tion of how the agencies’ relate to the Danish system of collective bar-
gaining, to which we now turn.  
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13.10 Adaptations to national and supranational 
regulations 
The rather significant increase in the number of temporary agency 
workers during the economic up-turn from around 2000 to 2008 
showed that agency workers contributed to solve problems of labour 
shortage in a period characterised by a historical low level of unem-
ployment. Recruitment of workers abroad was a logical consequence of 
this situation, which also means that the opening of the labour markets 
to the East in 2004 obviously provided new opportunities for recruit-
ment. Both the more well-known and established as well as new types of 
agencies took up recruitment in Eastern Europe – especially Poland. 
Concerning wage and working conditions for the eastern European 
agency workers we can roughly identify three categories of agencies; 1) 
agencies covered by collective agreements; 2) agencies “balancing on the 
edge of the collective agreements” and 3) agencies bypassing collective 
agreements. When the use of migrant temps has been so high on the 
agenda in Denmark it is in part due to how this is seen as challenging the 
Danish regulation of the labour market, which is characterized by the 
pre-dominance of collective bargaining. Thus, the agencies’ use of mi-
grant temps is seen as having system-wide consequences (Coe et al. 
2010:1064). While the trade unions stress the possibly dire conse-
quences for the Danish labour market regulation, the employers’ organi-
zations point to challenges for the industry due to “bad apples”. In that 
regard, it is interesting to look into how the agencies themselves con-
ceive the Danish system of collective bargaining and their commitments 
to this system, as well as their relation to in particular the trade unions. 
Additionally, as the new EU directive on temporary work was due to be 
implemented in Denmark before long at the time of the interviews, the 
supranational regulation was also broached in the interviews.  
First, it is interesting to note the way the agencies express their 
commitment to the Danish system of collective bargaining. Three of the 
agencies express a taken for granted-attitude towards the collective 
agreements, as something they naturally are committed to as agents in 
the Danish labour market. Moreover, it is expressed as being a moral 
commitment. This is explicitly voiced by the manager in case 3, as he 
talks of underpayment of migrant temps:  
“I don’t want to enter into dialogue about it. We just don’t do it. I don’t want 
our name to figure – that [case 3] pays only 80 kroner per hour. Even if it is 
legal […] It’s just all wrong. All wrong. You can’t do that – you can’t treat peo-
ple like animals. And that is what I feel that one is doing.” 
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In this quote, he states firstly that the commitment to the collective 
agreements is not up to discussion, and as such, rather a matter of fact. 
Secondly, it is noteworthy how he dissociates himself and his agency 
from underpayment, where he links such a practice to treating humans 
like animals, and as such, defines it as being an immoral practice. Alt-
hough it in principle is legal to pay for instance 80 kroner per hour, 
which is what his example suggests, the Danish system of collective 
agreements holds a strong position as the morally right way to approach 
the issue of pay and working conditions. Hence, the regulation of the 
labour market through collective bargaining is promoted as morally 
committing. This is similarly seen in case 2 and 4, as the gap between the 
agencies’ own standards and the practice of paying below the level 
agreed upon through collective bargaining is made explicit. This can be 
seen as reflecting how the agencies’ – and their way of acting – is territo-
rially embedded (Coe et al. 2010:1065); shaped not only by economic 
rules of supply and demand, but also by the societal context in which 
they work, hereunder the values in the Danish society.  
A somewhat different way of relating to the Danish system of collec-
tive agreements can be found in case 1, where the commitment to this 
system appears not as taken-for-granted, but rather as a choice they 
have made; a choice that moreover can be changed depending on the 
circumstances. As such, the consultant in case 1 stresses the difficulties 
the agency has in competing with agencies who have chosen otherwise, 
and states that their commitment to the collective agreement might be 
re-evaluated if the Danish implementation of the EU directive allows 
also foreign collective agreements in the Danish labour market. She 
states: “If it becomes legal to pay other salaries to people, we need to con-
sider what direction we want to go”, and clarifies that this means they 
will need to reconsider their commitment to the collective agreements 
as they otherwise will risk going out of business. Here the tension be-
tween the Danish system of collective agreements and legislative regula-
tion, coming e.g. from EU, is made visible, as is the possibility to choose 
between the two. This contrasts to the other three agencies’ dismissal of 
the idea of following the less comprehensive law rather than collective 
agreements. In continuation hereof, it is interesting to note how the con-
sultant in case 1 evaluates the Danish system of collective agreements as 
she says: “[t]he rules are not really set yet”. The collective agreements are 
not conceived as having the equal status of a law, and, possibly, without 
the same binding character.  
Considering the membership in the employers’ organisation and the 
commitment to the Danish system of collective bargaining a choice that 
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can be opted out of, it is also relevant to ask why the choice has been 
made in the first place. Case 1 has in particular throughout the first few 
years had many problems with the trade unions. The consultant de-
scribes the trade unions as “very aggressive”, stating that “[t]hey go after 
the agencies and try to make life sour for them”. She describes the trade 
unions as being very powerful and the ones dictating how things ought 
to be done, and remarks: “So those you don’t want to become unfriendly 
with. So we just comply with whatever is coming along”. In this descrip-
tion of the agency’s relation to the trade union, one could read a certain 
resignation, indicating that the choice is made in order to avoid prob-
lems. The aggravation associated with not abiding to the trade unions’ 
demands is also expressed by case 2. The manager in case 2 describes 
the trade unions as being tough and constantly manning the barricades, 
and explains that when the agency started recruiting from Poland she 
invited the trade union to come talk to her, in order to avoid any prob-
lems. She states: “I would rather want to comply with everything there is 
to comply to, because you do not want to make yourself unpopular”. These 
statements from case 1 and 2 indicate that it can be conceived as being 
more convenient to follow the collective agreement than to fight the 
trade union. Again, the labour market context the agencies find them-
selves in could be seen as shaping the agencies’ way of acting.  
A different take on this context and the importance of the collective 
agreements in that regard, is expressed by the two other agencies; case 3 
and case 4. They express concern with regard to the industry’s overall 
reputation due to some agencies’ negligence of the collective agree-
ments, which they find not only wrong, but also problematic for the en-
tire industry. As such, the consultant in case 4 says: “There have been a 
lot of unfavourable cases for the industry because there have been many 
agencies starting up, running for a little while, in order to close down and 
start up again. And that puts the whole industry in a bad light.” The bad 
reputation caused by some agencies’ behaviour; consisting inter alia of 
what could be described as bankruptcy fraud, makes it harder for the 
industry in general to sell their services, as their clients grow sceptical to 
what they are in fact buying. Hence, some agencies’ behaviour is seen as 
undermining the trust between the agencies and their clients, and more-
over, affecting the other agencies’ possibilities to do business.  
The comments made by the consultant in case 1 with regard to the EU 
directive on temporary work addresses another issue, namely how the 
agencies relate to supranational regulation. While all the agencies at some 
point express a certain commitment to the Danish system of collective 
bargaining, most of the agencies are less concerned with the supranation-
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al level. In fact, case 1 is the only one being concerned with what the EU 
directive might result in, and in particular whether it will allow foreign 
collective agreements to be considered equal to the Danish agreements. 
This fear is not expressed by any of the other agencies. It is however a 
concern raised by a legal consultant from a major trade union confedera-
tion, who explains that worst case scenario is an implementation that 
allows foreign collective agreements in Denmark. It is worth emphasizing 
that this is not the most likely implementation of the directive, which is 
meant to ensure equal conditions for temps. Such an implementation 
would entail a major challenge to the Danish system of collective bargain-
ing, and in terms of real politics it seems thus to be unlikely.  
The other agencies in the study express rather indifference with re-
gard to the EU directive, trusting they will have few problems as long as 
they follow the Danish collective agreements. They do not foresee any 
changes with regard to their own strategies due to the EU directive. The 
impression is moreover that they believe the Danish collective agree-
ments at least, if not more, satisfy the standards of the directive coming 
from EU. From the employers’ organizations’ perspective, however, 
some concern is raised due to the EU directive and its implementation in 
Denmark. A representative from a major employers’ organization ex-
plains their objections to the directive as a possible challenge to the Dan-
ish system of collective bargaining, which is their preferred way of regu-
lating the Danish labour market. This is a concern also raised by a repre-
sentative for the trade union on the transport, supply and logistic area. 
Although he has had success using the EU directive to put pressure on 
agencies and employers in cases of social dumping, he would much pre-
fer regulation to have its origin in the Danish system collective bargain-
ing rather than at a political and legislative level; whether it is on a na-
tional or supranational level.  
Overall, the Danish system of collective bargaining still stands as the 
crucial institution to understand what is setting the terms for the agen-
cies in this case study. This is not to say that this model might not be 
under a certain threat, as illustrated by the descriptions of a temporary 
staffing industry where some players ignore this model; a description 
given by both social partners and the case-agencies. Moreover, case 1’s 
approach is a concrete illustration of how the Danish system of collective 
bargaining can be positioned in relation to the supranational regulation 
as the agencies are to set their business model.  
Finally, several of the trade union representatives emphasize the ten-
dency that other forms of flexible employment have been replacing temp 
work in recent years. It is argued that this is the effect of the up-coming 
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implementation of the EU-directive on agency work. The underlying as-
sumption is that the group of employers and agencies looking for strate-
gies to bypass the collective agreements foresee that the directive might 
force them to comply with the collective agreements. Therefore they turn 
to other forms of flexible employment first and foremost posting of work-
ers, but they might also use self-employed workers. Looking at web-sites 
it is clear that some agencies are not only offering temps, but are also me-
diating contacts to employers in e.g. Poland, evidently on a legal basis as 
service providers bringing their posted workers to Denmark. In these 
cases it is up to the trade unions to ensure that collective agreements are 
signed and thereby cover these workers and in the case of self-
employment ensure that this is not cases of bogus self-employment.  
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The temporary agency sector has in most countries a relatively short 
history. Until the 1990s, temporary employment agencies and private 
for profit employment agencies were prohibited in many countries or 
regulated in such a way that their activities remained at a very low level. 
A deregulation of the sector was made in many countries during the 
1990s including Sweden, which has very few rules for temporary agen-
cies and private employment services besides those that apply to all 
employers. The main exception is that temp agencies are not allowed to 
charge workers for finding them a job.  
Agency work existed before deregulation. The penalties were low for 
those who broke the rules. But the sector has increased substantially 
after the deregulation. The expansion of the industry has also meant a 
widening of the types of workers that client firms can hire from the temp 
agencies. Previously the industry was primarily a big city phenomenon, 
but it is now to be found in most parts of the country. The gender com-
position among temp agency workers has also changed. Previously, the 
industry employed mostly women, but this has now changed into a ma-
jority of men among temp agency workers. Another change is that temp 
agency workers are hired out to more segments of the labor market, 
which can be seen by changes in the occupational composition among 
temp agency workers.  
In Sweden, as in many other countries, there has been an idea that 
temporary agency work can be a stepping stone into the regular labor 
market for workers who have had a weak attachment to the labor market, 
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such as youth and foreign born workers.59 For Sweden data shows that 
foreign born, in particular those from non-Western countries, are 
overrepresented in the industry, i.e. their share of the workforce in the 
temp agency sector is larger than their corresponding share in the total 
workforce. About 17% of temp agency workers were born in a non-
Western country compared to 9% in the total workforce. This should, 
however, not be seen as evidence of the stepping stone hypothesis; a more 
sophisticated analysis is needed. No studies have, however, focused on the 
representation of EU10 immigrants in the temp agency sector. This group 
is assumed to primarily consist of labor migrants and the stepping stone 
hypothesis has been mostly concerned with the role played by temp agen-
cies for groups that have difficulties to get a job as refugees.  
In this project we are, however, more interested in the role played by 
temp agencies in recruiting and not only employing, workers from Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries, primarily Poland. The national data 
registers allow us to investigate the number and characteristics of tem-
porary agency workers employed in Sweden. It is possible that some of 
these workers have been recruited directly from another country but it 
is probably more common that they get their job after they have already 
settled in Sweden. In the period May–July 2011 and June–August 2012 
several interviews were conducted with representatives for the indus-
try, the labor unions and other organizations to try to gain more insights 
into how often temporary employment agencies recruit directly from 
abroad and the wages of those employed in the sector. We find that this 
does not appear to be a very widespread form of recruitment in Sweden. 
Our knowledge about other recruitment channels and employment ar-
rangements involving foreign temporary employment agencies hiring 
out personnel to Swedish firms to work in Sweden is very scarce. There 
is anecdotal evidence that this is happening, but very limited knowledge 
based on data. We know, for example, that it is common in the berry 
picking industry, and that this foreign recruitment has led to problems 
for the migrant workers. In some cases posted workers could also be 
included in this group if they are employed by a foreign temp agency and 
then sent to Sweden to perform a certain job. Even though we know that 
this is not uncommon on the Swedish labor market, it is very difficult to 
get an estimate of the size and importance of it.  
────────────────────────── 
59 See e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008), Ichino et al. (2008), Andersson et al. (2009), Heinrich et al. (2009), 
Kvasnicka (2009) and Jahn and Rosholm (2010) for analyses of the stepping-stone hypothesis. 
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The outline of the rest of this chapter will be as follows. In section two 
we describe the emergence of the temporary agency sector in Sweden and 
the role played by collective agreements. In section three we describe the 
composition of the workforce in the sector and how it has changed over 
the period 2001 to 2008, with focus on the representation of immigrants 
from Central and Eastern Europe. We also describe changes in the occupa-
tional composition among temp agency workers. In the fourth section the 
results from the interviews are described and the results are presented. 
Section five summarizes and concludes the chapter.  
14.1 The development of the temporary agency 
sector in Sweden 
14.1.1 Deregulating the industry 
A deregulation started in several countries during the 1980s. It led eventu-
ally to a reassessment of a new international level of regulation. The then 
valid ILO Convention that in practice meant a prohibition of private fee-
employment services including temporary work agencies was succeeded by 
new convention which made it possible for this type of companies to oper-
ate. But the convention contains some restrictions for the temp agencies. 
ILO Convention 181 only applies to countries that ratify it and most coun-
tries have not yet done it. For other countries, the ILO has issued a recom-
mendation with the same content (Recommendation No.188).  
Also the EU has taken an interest in the staffing industry and the Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council issued a Directive in December 2008 
dealing with labor relations, including wages for those working in the 
agency. By 5 December 2011, all EU countries have adapted their legisla-
tion to the Directive. The Swedish government appointed on 24 Septem-
ber 2009 an investigation, “Implementation of the European Parliament 
and Council directive concerning temporary agency workers (Dir. 
2009:85)”, to investigate how the application of the Directive should be 
designed for Sweden.  
The fact that the industry is less regulated than in the past does not 
mean that it is unregulated. Some countries have special laws, while 
others have rules within the general labor legislation that contain re-
strictions on the occupations and industries to which temp agency 
workers can be hired out to and the duration of a temp hiring period. 
The industry is also in some countries like Sweden regulated through 
collective agreements. They generally relate to wages and other terms 
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for those who are employed by an agency. But there are also collective 
agreements for other parts of the labor market regulating the possibili-
ties for client firms to hire temp agency workers. These agreements are 
concluded between unions and employers’ organizations in other indus-
tries. Policies of this type were in focus of collective bargaining in Swe-
den in the spring of 2010 and various restrictions on the possibility to 
hire personnel have also been included in those collective agreements.  
14.1.2 The temp agency sector and the labor unions: 
collective agreements and bargaining 
Before 2001 only white-collar trade unions had collective agreements 
with the temporary employment agencies employer association, Almega. 
In 2001 a collective agreement was also agreed upon by the different 
blue-collar (LO) unions and Almega. This meant that it became easier to 
hire out blue-collar workers and the temp agencies expanded in those 
occupations.  
The agreement states that full-time work is the standard working time 
but that it is possible to reach agreements on the local level on part-time 
work. Special rules are valid for employing and hiring out those who have 
retired and want to combine pension and work and for students. 
Wages are paid for contracted time irrespective of if the employee is 
hired out or not. For each employee an individual wage is decided that 
cannot be lower than the minimum wage stated in the agreement. The 
minimum wage differs according to skill level and age (the minimum 
wage is lower for young people). The wage should be at the same level 
as for those being employed at the workplace the temp is hired out to 
(but not lower than the minimum wage according to agreement). For 
hours not hired out while employed by the temp agency an hourly wage 
corresponding to 90% of the average personal wage during the last 
three months is paid. 
For white-collar workers there is a similar agreement regarding pay 
for hours not worked but the employee has to be ready to take on work 
immediately if contacted by the employment agency. The payment is 
considerably lower for those hours than for hours actually worked. 
Only certified temp agencies can be members of the employer organ-
ization. This rule applies to all firms that have been active for twelve 
months or more. There are several requirements to be fulfilled for a 
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company that wants to be certified: They must for example sign the col-
lective agreement for the sectors which the temp agency is active in.60 
The employer organization reports that about 450 temp agencies are 
members of the organization in 2011. They do not, however, report how 
many temp agencies that are active on the Swedish labor market that are 
neither members nor certified. According to the data from Statistics 
Sweden workers that were employed in a firm defined as a temp agency 
in 2008, were employed in 990 distinct firms.61 Since the number of 
employees does not differ much between the statistics provided by Sta-
tistics Sweden and that provided by the employer organization, as can 
be seen from Figure 3.6.1, most of the firms that are defined as tempo-
rary employment agencies by Statistics Sweden but not members of the 
employer organization are probably firms with relatively few employ-
ees. In general it can be said that the industry is dominated by a small 
number of large firms. For an extended discussion about the industry 
structure, see Andersson Joona and Wadensjö (2010).  
14.2 Changing patterns in the temp agency sector 
14.2.1 An expanding industry: the size of the workforce and 
its composition 
The number of temp agency workers has increased substantially over 
the last ten years. In this subsection we use both micro data from Statis-
tics Sweden and statistics from the employer organization for temp 
agencies in Sweden, Bemanningsföretagen. The numbers from the two 
sources differ, since the underlying population of temporary employ-
ment agencies is not the same and the methods of measuring the num-
ber of employees differ. Firstly, the employer organization has infor-
mation about the number of workers at temp agencies that are members 
of the organization, while Statistics Sweden reports the number of em-
ployees in firms that by their industry code (SNI-code) are defined as 
temp agencies. Secondly, in the employment register administrated by 
────────────────────────── 
60 For a description of all the requirements to become certified see http://www.bemanningsforetagen.se/.  
61 To calculate the number of unique temporary employment agencies in the data we exclude the self-
employed, firms with no registered employees, and all movable personnel (workers who have not been 
assigned to one particular firm). In the raw data it looks like each worker corresponds to one unique firm 
which is not the case in reality. 
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Statistics Sweden, only residents are included, and employment is de-
fined as earning income during November. In the administrative data we 
also have another definition of temp agency workers, namely if a person 
has received any income from a temporary employment agency during 
the year independently of whether he or she was employed in the indus-
try in November. As in almost all administrative data, we cannot distin-
guish temp agency workers from the administrative personnel at the 
temp agency. The number of temp agency workers presented by the 
employer organization is also divided into two groups; number of em-
ployees during the year and the number who get a paycheck sent out 
during the year.  
Figure 3.6.1 Number of temp agency workers between 2002 and 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The employer organization Bemanningsföretagen, www. bemanningsforetagen.se, and 
Statistics Sweden.  
 
In Figure 3.6.1 the development of the number of temp agency workers 
between 2001 and 2008 (2010) is presented using the different measures. 
Although the actual numbers differ the development over time shows the 
same pattern. After an uneventful period between 2002 and 2005 we see 
that the number of temp agency workers, both measured as the number 
employed in November according to Statistics Sweden and the total num-
ber of paychecks, increased from 2005 to 2008. This coincides with a gen-
eral improvement of the economy. Following the financial crisis in 2008, 
the number of workers decreased between 2008 and 2009 but in 2010 
the number of workers in the industry was about the same as in 2008 
according to the statistics from the employer organization.  
Another important measure of the size of the industry is the share of 
temp agency workers among all employed workers. In 2011, 1.4% of all 
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employed workers worked in the temp agency sector. This is still at a 
low level compared to other countries. See Table 3.6.1 for an overview of 
the share employed in the sector in some countries. In almost all coun-
tries there has been an increase of the share between one and two per-
centage points and for 2007 it was estimated that the industry was larg-
est in Great Britain were 4.8% of all employed of active age worked in 
the sector.  
Table 3.6.1 Penetration rate (percent) among all employed of active age 
Country 1997 2007 Changes in the penetration rate between 1997 and 2007  
Sweden 0.4 1.3 0.9 
 
Denmark 0.2 0.8 0.6 
Finland 0.4 1.1 0.7 
Norway 0.4 1.0 0.7 
 
Belgium 1.3 2.2 0.9 
Ireland 0.3 1.7 1.4 
France 1.6 2.5 0.9 
The Netherlands 2.3 2.8 0.5 
Switzerland 0.6 1.7 1.1 
Great Britain 2.9 4.8 1.9 
Germany 0.5 1.6 1.1 
Austria 0.5 1.5 1.0 
 
The USA 1.5 2.0 0.5 
Japan 0.5 2.8 2.3 
Source: ILO (2009). 
 
One drawback with the statistics presented by the employer organiza-
tion is that the data cannot be divided by gender, age or country of birth. 
This is however possible to do by using micro data from Statistics Swe-
den. To get an overview of the total foreign born representation in the 
temp agency sector and how it has changed over time, we present the 
share of foreign born in different groups as a percent of all immigrants 
in 2001 and 2008. Natives have in other words been excluded. As a 
comparison the same figures are presented for all workers who were 
employed in November these years, the temporary agency sector being 
excluded. Foreign born are defined based on country of birth and not 
citizenship. This also means that workers who were born in Sweden but 
whose parents were born in another country are not included since they 
are defined as natives according to their country of birth.  
Polish workers and workers from other CEE countries are about as 
represented in the temp agency sector as they are on the whole labor 
market while immigrants from Asia and Africa are slightly overrepre-
sented in the temp agency sector. Immigrants from the other Nordic 
countries and from Western Europe, USA, and Canada are underrepre-
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sented in the sector. As regards changes in immigrant representation 
between the two years, we see a slight increase in the share of Polish 
and other CEE workers. There is however nothing that suggests that 
workers from Central and Eastern European countries have become a 
dominant immigrant group in the temp agency sector after their coun-
tries have become members of the European Union. 
Figure 3.6.2 Distribution over country/region of birth for temp agency workers 
who were employed in the sector in November (1) and for all workers, except 
temp agency workers, employed in November (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Temp agency workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) All employed, except those employed in temp agencies. 
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In Figure 3.6.3 we give a more detailed picture at of the number of temp 
agency workers born in Poland and other CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). Compared to other immigrant groups, these nationalities are 
not very well represented in the temp agency sector. The number of 
Polish foreign born working in the sector increased from 470 in 2002 to 
1,300 in 2008 corresponding to an increase from 0.63 to 1.04% of the 
total temp agency workforce. The development over time seems to cor-
respond very well to the general development of the sector. Since the 
large increase in the total number of temp agency coincides with Poland 
and most of the other countries in the CEE-group joining the EU, it is 
very difficult to say if EU-membership has had any effect on the number 
of immigrant workers in the temp agency sector.  
The fact that foreign born from Poland and other CEE countries are 
not very well represented in the temp agency sector can also be seen 
from Figure 3.6.4, where the percentage of foreign born working in the 
temp agency sector as a share of all employed foreign born in that group 
is presented. In 2008, about 3.4% of all employed Polish foreign born 
workers received some income from the temp agency. For CEE foreign 
born this share was 3.8%. This can be compared with foreign born from 
the Balkan where 4.3% worked in the industry in 2008. Foreign born 
from this region arrived to Sweden mainly as refugees in the beginning 
of the 1990s and have been a group that in general is believed to have 
been performing quite well on the Swedish labor market in terms of 
employment. The fourth group is foreign born from Iran which is the 
largest immigrant group among temp agency workers, besides foreign 
born from the Nordic countries. In 2008, 5.4 of all employed foreign 
born in this group worked in the temp agency sector. 
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Figure 3.6.3 Number of temp agency workers between 2002 and 2008 born in 
Poland and other CEE countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czechoslovakia) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6.4 Temp agency work among selected groups of immigrants as the 
share of all employed immigrants in the group 
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14.2.2 Temporary migrants in the temp agency sector 
We have some data from Statistics Sweden over temporary migrants, 
workers that come to Sweden and work and pay taxes for 1 to 12 
months. Workers coming for a period shorter than six months pay a 
special income tax which is lower than the normal tax rate. Immigrants 
who declare an intention to stay more than six months but less than one 
year pay the normal tax rate but receive a special id-number with the tax 
authorities. This is a unique number that resembles the Swedish person-
al number, a coordination number. These workers are not included in 
the population registers and by that do not have a Swedish personal 
number. The information we can get about them is therefore very lim-
ited and only originates from the tax authorities. The information we can 
retrieve is: gender, age, taxable income and some characteristics of the 
workplace, for example, industry and location which in our case is at the 
county level. For some individuals there is information on country of 
birth but for a large share this information is missing.  
Figure 3.6.5 shows the number of temporary migrants working in the 
temp agency sector 2003–2010. In 2008 only about 600 temporary mi-
grants worked in a Swedish temp agency. In the same year almost 
46,000 temporary migrants worked and paid taxes in Sweden. These 
figures include migrants from all countries. Temporary migrants seldom 
work in temp agencies. 
Figure 3.6.5 Number of temporary migrants who has received an income from a 
temp agency, 2003–2010 
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14.2.3 Changing composition of temporary agency workers 
We have seen how the number of foreign born in different groups has 
developed over the period but now we study changes in the gender 
composition and the regional distribution of the industry. Changes of 
the industries of the client firms are presented and discussed in the 
next section. Changes in the gender composition among temp agency 
workers can to a large extent be related to changes in types of jobs for 
which client firms hire temp agency workers. Figure 3.6.6 shows that 
the share of women in the sector has decreased. In 2001, 55% were 
women and in 2008 44%.  
Figure 3.6.6 Gender composition among temp agency workers, 2001–2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another change in the structure of the temp agency sector is how it went 
from existing predominantly in the big city areas to be spread all over 
Sweden. In Figure 3.6.7 the distribution over four different geographical 
areas is presented for (1) all temp agency workers and (2) for all CEE 
foreign born working in the industry. In 2001, 41% of all workers lived 
in the Stockholm area and in 2008 this had decreased to approximately 
30%. CEE foreign born were even more concentrated to this area in the 
beginning of the period. Almost 50% lived there in 2001 but in 2008 this 
share had decreased to 37%. The biggest difference between CEE for-
eign born and all workers in the industry is that a large share of CEE 
foreign born lives in the Malmö region (Skåne county), 22% compared to 
13%. Looking at all employed CEE foreign born 23% lived in this region 
compared to 13% among all employed in 2008 which means that the 
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CEE foreign born in Skåne working in the temp agency sector are not 
overrepresented compared to all employed workers of this group in 
Skåne. 
Figure 3.6.7 County of residence for temp agency workers, 2001–2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) All temp agency workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (2) All CEE immigrants in the temp agency sector. 
14.2.4 Which industries hire temporary agency workers? 
The employer organization for temporary agencies annually presents 
which sectors their employees are hired out to. We are also able to give a 
description of the types of occupations that temp agency workers have. 
By inspection of the statistics presented by the employer organization 
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for the years 2001–2008 we see that in the beginning of the period, of-
fice and clerical work was the occupational area in which the largest 
share of temp agency workers worked. Since 2004 warehouse and in-
dustry work had become the dominating occupational area.62 One ex-
planation for the expansion of the industry into the manufacturing in-
dustry is that the employer organization signed a collective agreement 
with the labor unions in this area in 2001. For an overview of how the 
distribution of turnover across occupational areas has changed between 
2001 and 2008, see Figure 3.6.8. The importance of the health sector has 
declined. Hiring out personnel to the construction sector has become 
more common over the period but is still of minor importance.  
Figure 3.6.8 Distribution of turnover across occupational areas within the temp 
agency sector, 2001 and 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bemanningsföretagen. 
 
 
 
────────────────────────── 
62 From 2009 Bemanningsföretagen present turnover separately for “Warehousing and logistics” and 
“Industry and manufacturing” which makes the comparison to previous years a bit difficult. It however 
remains clear that these two categories combined is the largest occupational area also in 2009, 2010, 
and 2011.  
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The occupational composition of temp agency workers63 is shown in 
Figure 3.6.9 for (1) all male temp agency workers, (2) all male CEE temp 
agency workers, (3) all female temp agency workers, (4) and all female 
CEE temp agency workers. It should be noted that the number of CEE 
temp agency workers is small, particularly in 2001. Only about 110 men 
and 243 women from these countries worked in the temp agency indus-
try that year. The general conclusion is the same as when looking at the 
statistics over turnover presented in Figure 3.6.8: office and customer 
service work has declined in relative importance both among men and 
women. Among men, craftsmen and machine operators have increased 
in relative importance while among women the share of temp agency 
workers who were employed at a position for which a shorter university 
education was required increases. Looking at the whole group of CEE 
foreign born, male foreign born share of temp agency workers working 
as craftsmen has increased from about 5% to almost 40% of all temps.  
Figure 3.6.9 Changes in the occupational composition among (1) all male temp 
agency workers (2) male CEE workers (3) all female workers, and (4) all female 
CEE workers between 2001 and 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) All male temp agency workers. 
 
 
 
────────────────────────── 
63 To analyze the occupational composition we only use information about those who were employed in a 
temp agency in November each year. Workers who have received an income from a temp agency during the 
year but who were not employed at such a firm in November are possibly matched to another employer in 
November and the occupation held at this firm is the one reported in the registers.  
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(2) Male CEE workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) All female temp agency workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) Female CEE workers. 
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14.3 Migration and temporary agency work – 
evidence from an interview study 
14.3.1 Cases and method 
This section is based on interviews with people at employer organiza-
tion, unions, temporary employment agencies and authorities. The in-
terviews are in Petersson (2012). See also Petersson (2013). 
14.3.2 The extent of recruitment of migrant workers 
among temporary agencies 
Something that has been mentioned in almost all interviews is that labor 
migration, and thus the foreign recruitment, in the EU is difficult to esti-
mate because of rule of “free movement” and that therefore immigration 
is not registered on arrival in Sweden. The estimation of labor migration 
from third countries to Sweden is much easier, as the Migration Board 
must approve applications for work permits from non-EEA citizens. But 
even non-EU/EEA labor migration is hard to estimate, since there are a 
number of exceptions. For example, people who come to Sweden to do 
an internship for three months, or specialists who will work there tem-
porarily, do not have to apply for a work permit if the employer is an 
international group and the practice or work performed is at a Swedish 
company in the group. Overseas sellers and journalists who come to 
work temporarily are also exempt from the requirement to apply for a 
work permit. The number of work permits therefore underestimates 
international recruitment to Sweden also from non-EU/EEA countries. 
To this we may add that all who receive a work permit do not arrive, 
which is a source of overestimation. 
The difficulties of estimating foreign recruitment makes it difficult to 
estimate the temporary employment agencies’ and recruitment compa-
nies’ role in foreign recruitment. Not only this sectors’ recruitment com-
pared to the total recruitment is hard to estimate, but also the number of 
workers recruited by temporary employment agencies and recruitment 
firms. A method for estimating these flows is to let the companies them-
selves report how many they recruit to Sweden within the occupational 
sector they operate. This is also the method used in this part of the chap-
ter. Such an approach, however, gives for several reasons not a compre-
hensive picture of the importance of the agencies in the recruitment 
process. This is partly because the definitions of employment and staff-
ing agencies are somewhat unclear. Furthermore, there are companies 
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and contractors that partially recruit labor from abroad but do not call 
themselves temporary employment agencies.  
The impression of the interviews is that recruitment from other Euro-
pean countries to Sweden in general is quite low. It also appears to be 
concentrated in certain specific occupational sectors: healthcare, con-
struction, IT, agriculture, cleaning and hospitality industry. These sectors 
include a wide range of specialties and specializations. Workers who pri-
marily are recruited to Sweden seem to be doctors in the health sector, 
wood and concrete workers in the construction industry, engineers and 
computer specialists in the IT sector and berry pickers and other seasonal 
workers in agriculture. Below are approximate estimates of recruitment 
in each sector except for the cleaning and hospitality industries. 
As a physician must have a Swedish license to practice medicine, the 
register of the number of issued Swedish licenses serve as a rough esti-
mate of how many people are recruited here to work as doctors. Accord-
ing to the National Board of Health in 2009 819 Swedish doctors’ IDs 
permits were issued to people from EU/EEA. Of them, 416 persons had 
been educated in Denmark, Germany, Greece and Hungary (in order of 
magnitude). It is not possible to determine who has been recruited be-
fore arrival and who have found an employer after arrival. In recent 
years, young people who were born in Sweden who have trained as a 
doctor abroad, including Poland and Denmark, have started to return to 
Sweden. The Swedish Medical Association estimates that this group is 
likely to increase to 150–200 people per year. The employer association 
of municipalities and counties, SKL, believes that many foreign born 
doctors who are in Sweden today have probably not been recruited to 
Sweden but have obtained the residence permit after having come here 
as refugees during the 1980s. According to SKL about 200–250 doctors 
from non-EU/EEA countries arrive to Sweden every year. In 2009 253 
work permits for non-EU/EEA doctors were granted. In 2011, according 
to the Immigration Service database 237 work permits were granted for 
“health and social care staff”, 42 for other “health professionals ”, six for 
“nurses” and one for “midwives, nurses with special expertise”. The 
Swedish Medical Association believes that employers generally choose 
to recruit doctors from other EU countries because the process of trans-
lating a European license to practice medicine is considerably simpler 
than a license from other countries. 
Unlike in the health care sector a Swedish professional qualification 
is not required to practice their profession in the construction industry 
in Sweden; employers decide on worker credentials. The number of for-
eign-recruited construction workers cannot be estimated by the number 
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of issued Swedish professional certificates in the same way as the num-
ber of recruited doctors can be estimated by the number of permits is-
sued for medical doctors. According to the unions, it is difficult to esti-
mate how many foreign workers are recruited to Sweden every year. 
However, they believe that today there are around 20,000 recruited 
from other countries in the construction industry, about half work in 
Stockholm and about 5,000 in the Skåne region. In Gothenburg and 
northern Sweden there are also many foreign-recruited workers. Many 
of those recruited to Skåne commute to Denmark to work. Approximate-
ly 40–50% of the workforce for infrastructure projects in Stockholm is 
according to the union posted workers. Many of crew members are 
posted by a foreign company. The union argues that there are many 
workers who they never see, for example, people who do work for pri-
vate clients in their homes. 
According to the Trade Union of Engineers, about 2,000 work permits 
are granted annually in the IT sector. According to the Immigration Ser-
vice database 2,551 work permits have the same year been granted for 
“computer specialists”. This is the second largest occupational group in 
the year, after workers in the category of “helpers in agriculture, horti-
culture, forestry and fishing.” It has also been granted 575 work permits 
to “civil engineers, architects, and others” and 296 permits to “engineers 
and technicians.” It is reasonable to assume that most of the work per-
mits are granted to Indian computer specialists. 2,100 work permits 
were granted to persons of Indian nationality. Immigration Service fig-
ures give an underestimate of the actual number of migrant workers 
who come to Sweden to work in the IT sector. This is because many 
computer scientists and engineers continue to work in a company in the 
same international group and are exempt from the rule that non-
EU/EEA nationals must apply for work permits. Foreign recruitment in 
EU/EEA is according to the union very hard to estimate. Bemannings-
företagen believes that the shortage of engineers in Sweden may lead to 
future recruitment from for example Germany. 
On 5 August 2011, the Immigration Service Work Permit Unit had 
granted 2,500 work permits for berry picking. This is a decrease of about 
half the number of permits in 2010. The decrease depends according the 
Unit on more stringent rules concerning the working conditions that em-
ployers from this year have to guarantee their workers. Temporary agen-
cies have found it difficult to meet the requirement of “guaranteed salary”. 
One person at one of the berry picking companies believes that still some 
non-European citizens will come to Sweden to pick berries on a tourist 
visa. According to the Immigration Service database 2,821 work permits 
292 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
were granted in the professional category of “helpers in agriculture, horti-
culture, forestry and fishing.” According to the media debate and LO most 
berry pickers are recruited from Thailand and China. However, it is diffi-
cult to know the origin of labor migrants and when they will come as they 
only work for a short period. Furthermore, according to LO some Romani-
an and Bulgarian workers try to establish themselves. It makes the esti-
mation of the actual number of foreign recruits to the berry picking indus-
try in Sweden difficult to make. 
According to Bemanningsföretagen there was not a sudden increase 
in labor migration following the EU enlargement in 2004 or 2007, but 
the demand for labor is governing the companies’ recruitment patterns. 
If there is a shortage of labor within a sector in Sweden one turns to 
other countries to find workers, but if the required work force is in the 
country they do not do it, irrespective if the rules for foreign recruitment 
are simplified or not. 
SKL says that the recruitment of doctors from Poland started already 
before 2004 and stresses that it is primarily the economic situation of 
the Swedish county councils that governs the scale of foreign recruit-
ment and not the simplicity of the recruitment process. Moreover it is 
very difficult to assess whether the recruitment of doctors has increased 
with EU enlargement. Although more may have acquired permit to work 
as a doctor after 2004, it is not certain that that person is actually em-
ployed in Sweden. The CEO of one of companies argues that Poland’s 
accession to the EU has simplified the recruitment of Polish doctors, but 
the recruitment has not increased.  
Foreign recruitment in the IT industry had according to the union not 
any noticeable effect, because it recruits engineers from outside 
EU/EEA. None of the interviewed thought that foreign recruitment to 
the berry picking industry had been affected by the enlargement. This is 
reasonable in that it recruits berry pickers, mostly from China and Thai-
land but the Romanian and Bulgarian workers entering the berry pick-
ing industry had perhaps not been possible if the countries had not 
joined the EU in 2007. SKL says that liberalization has had no discernible 
effect on the size of recruitment in the healthcare sector partly because 
the economic crisis dampening effect on labor migration. The union also 
believes that the effect was small.  
The construction workers´ union says that foreign recruitment in the 
construction industry from non-EU/EES countries increased substantially 
after the liberalization of labor migration from 15 December 2008. In 
2007 and 2008 about twenty persons were recruited from such countries 
to Sweden, including the Stockholm area. On 23 August 2011, about 500 
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people had been recruited from third countries to Sweden, with 420 peo-
ple enrolled in the Stockholm area. Most of the applications for work per-
mits have come from Serbia, Uzbekistan, Bolivia and Bosnia Herzegovina. 
The liberalization affected according to LO overseas recruitment 
mainly in the hospitality industry, the cleaning industry and the IT-
industry. Bemanningsföretagen believes that the number recruited like-
ly increased in the IT-industry after 2008. The union does not agree and 
argues instead that it was possible to identify an increase already 
around 2007 and that the predicted doubling of recruitment from non-
European countries is already done.  
14.3.3 Recruitment processes in practice 
The country where individuals are recruited is strongly linked to the 
sector in which they will be employed. The interviews indicate that phy-
sicians and other health professionals are recruited mainly from Poland, 
but also from Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Some recruits 
have also been made in Germany until 2009. According to SKL the Ger-
man Employment Office wanted then to terminate the cooperation with 
the Swedish County Councils, as the nursing staff was needed at home. 
Even in the construction sector most recruitment seems to be from Po-
land, although some recruitment occurs in Latvia. In the IT sector the 
recruited workforce is, primarily from India and China. According to the 
union the mobility of engineers in Europe is hard to estimate, so re-
cruitment from EU/EEA countries could be large. In agriculture most 
recruitment has been made from non-EU/EEA countries, mainly Thai-
land and China. European countries have, as mentioned in the previous 
section, in 2011 sought to establish activities in the industry, as a result 
of stricter regulations on Thai and Chinese staffing company’s business. 
The reason for the strong correlation between recruitment country 
and occupational sector appears to largely be about the benefits that es-
tablished recruitment patterns provide. The longer an employer has re-
cruited labor from a given country, the deeper is the contact between the 
employer and its partners in the recruiting country. A Polish recruitment 
firm that helps a Swedish staffing company with the recruitment of Polish 
construction workers says that Swedish employers stick to the recruit-
ment of construction workers from European countries. They also believe 
that this is the reason why the liberalization of labor migration only has 
had a small effect in the construction sector. Furthermore, according to a 
staffing company that specialize in the construction sector, the employers 
like to work with the Poles because they have learned the way to work 
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here and the employers appreciate their way to relate with the employer. 
The Construction worker union and a Polish company mention “friend 
recruitment” being important in both construction and the care sector. 
Such recruitment will be reasonably efficient and more important the 
stronger the relationship between recruitment country and occupational 
sector becomes. The relationship between occupational sector and re-
cruitment country working in the IT sector have more to do with the in-
dustry structure. Indian consulting companies often choose to locate their 
operations in Sweden and the Swedish international companies often 
choose to locate their production in India.  
In 2000, SKL initiated in collaboration with the medical chamber in 
Hamburg “recruitment travels” in order to find especially general practi-
tioners and doctors in psychiatry that could not be found within the 
country. Recruiting trips were made to Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
Germany and Hungary. The county councils had to before the recruiting 
trips to express their interest to state the demand for health profession-
als in their particular county. Demand for labor was announced, then in 
German newspapers, which according to SKL was enough to find the 
requested medical staff. Project manager for AF (Labor Market Admin-
istration) and SKL then arranged recruitment days in the country, where 
the interested doctors could come. Recruitment Days began with a 
presentation of how the Swedish labor market works, which was fol-
lowed by personal stories of doctors who previously had been enrolled 
in Sweden. SKL argues that the subsequent process functioned as a regu-
lar recruitment process in Sweden, where interviews were conducted 
with each one and then a letter of appointment was given 
Another strategy is the use of recruitment agencies, which act as 
partners in the recruiting country. A Polish recruitment agency helping 
the Swedish County Councils through a Swedish parent company finds 
doctors to recruit. The Swedish parent company has direct contact with 
the Swedish county councils. After the county has made contact with 
that company and announced their labor demand it is matched with the 
Polish doctors’ CVs from the Polish company’s database. After the 
matching process, the Polish doctors undergo stress tests, aptitude tests 
and tests of their language learning ability, individual interviews are 
made, either in Poland or Sweden. After that, the doctors who have got a 
job undergo a course in Swedish in about 27 weeks in Sweden. The 
Polish company also helps with the organization of the move to Sweden. 
SKL says that when the county councils are recruiting physicians them-
selves to Sweden they make it at the EURES website. Individual counties 
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have also used the example Spanish temporary employment agencies to 
assist in the recruitment. 
Not only in the health sector have Swedish employers used their 
partners to get help to find the required labor force. This also occurs in 
the construction industry. One Swedish staffing company, specializing in 
the construction industry, has since 2010 been using a Polish recruit-
ment company to help with the local announcement after construction 
workers. Like SKL the Polish company says that the recruitment of labor 
has been a classic recruitment process. The applicant’s qualifications 
and criminal records are reviewed, after which the most qualified are 
interviewed. Some recruits are also made via the company’s personal 
contacts. The company says that it is quite common that Swedish em-
ployers in the construction sector make use of partners in the countries 
from which to recruit labor. However, it is probably not as common that 
cooperation is based on the Swedish labor market model and that the 
foreign-recruited working conditions are in accordance with Swedish 
collective agreements, as it is in this case. Unlike the health care sector 
the use of temporary employment agencies is common in construction, 
often foreign ones. In addition, the construction union says that there 
are construction companies that are members of the Swedish Construc-
tion Federation engaged in a form of agency business, without in the 
formal sense being a temporary employment agency. 
The interviews at LO and the Migration Board give the impression 
that most berry pickers are employed by foreign, mainly Thai and Chi-
nese, recruitment agencies, and that they usually are posted to Sweden. 
After the human tragedy that was portrayed in the newspapers in the 
summer of 2010, the Immigration Service tightened the requirements 
for the companies recruiting berry pickers from countries like Thailand 
and China to Sweden. The Migration Authority does not allow a foreign 
agency to be an employer only on the application form; the employer 
must have a branch in Sweden and the employer must guarantee the 
workers a certain wage. After the introduction of stricter rules, the 
number of non-EU/EES workers declined in berry picking industry. 
Many of the companies could not guarantee the salary.  
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14.3.4 The working conditions of the foreign-recruited 
workers 
The reasons for willingness to leave the homeland to start working in 
Sweden seem to be relatively independent of the professional sector 
which is recruiting. For people who are recruited to the healthcare sec-
tor, construction industry and berry picking industry make a compari-
son between working at home and in Sweden as a basis for the decision. 
It should here be emphasized that although the foreign recruits in these 
sectors seem to have in common that their working conditions are 
somehow better in Sweden than in their home countries, there are sig-
nificant differences between the working conditions for a Thai berry-
picker and a Polish doctor in Sweden. 
Both SKL and the representative of a recruitment company think that 
the pay difference between Swedish and Polish doctors has affected the 
Polish doctors’ decision to move here. However “soft values” have 
served as perhaps even stronger “pull factors” such as the ability to 
combine work and family due to the eight-hour day and the high quality 
of day-care. The Swedish countryside and the opportunity to work in 
teams has also been mentioned as important factors. Both SKL and the 
union believe that the hierarchical system in the healthcare sector in 
Poland has acted as a “push factor”. 
The construction union believes that there are companies in the con-
struction industry which base their activities on the foreign-recruited 
workers’ vulnerability and the fact that their working conditions are 
worse in their home countries. For engineers, according the Union of 
Swedish Engineers, it is a natural part of working life to work a certain 
period in another country. It is mainly the structure of the industry 
which is the basis for the decision to move to Sweden and not the desire 
to improve their working conditions. In addition, foreign-recruited engi-
neers in Sweden, often have work experience from other countries.  
Even within the berry picking industry there are indications that em-
ployers base their activities on the foreign-worker vulnerability. Thai 
workers are promised that they for a few months of work get a pay 
which represent a full year’s salary in Thailand. Once in Sweden, howev-
er, they are forced to spend the night in tents or cars in the woods or in 
the morning return to work. It is reasonable to assume that salary is the 
only reason that the Thai labor force is willing to travel to Sweden to 
work. The construction union argues that foreign-recruited construction 
workers employed by temporary work agencies very often do not get 
the wages they are entitled under their employment contract, partly 
because deductions for journeys to Sweden are made from their contrac-
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tual wages. The construction union says that the foreign recruits rarely 
know about working conditions under the agreements until they are 
actually in Sweden, and even if they are aware of the contractual work-
ing conditions, they often sign another agreement with the condition 
that they should not tell union.  
The union and media discussion of unacceptable working conditions is 
centered on the posted berry pickers. Although the requirement for 
“guaranteed salary” was introduced, the union representative believes 
that Thai berry-pickers sign two agreements, the other of the agreement 
meant that the berry pickers abstain from the guaranteed salary and ar-
gues that even if the guaranteed salary of about 16,000 per month is actu-
ally paid, it is not sufficient after agencies fees for the trip to Sweden are 
paid. Berry pickers have also been forced to rent cars in such poor condi-
tion that it involved a security risk to run them. Employers have often not 
informed pickers on Swedish traffic rules. It appears that the differences 
between workers’ contractual and actual salary is more obvious in the 
construction and berry picking industries, than in the IT and healthcare 
sectors. This difference seems to be greater in those occupational sectors 
where the demand for academic qualifications is low and where the wage 
level is low also for natives. It is also in the construction and berry picking 
industries that foreign workers appear to be most prevalent.  
It is reasonable to assume that there is a difference in the working 
conditions as well as between workers employed by authorized and 
unauthorized temporary employment agencies in Sweden. According to 
Bemanningsföretagen the 35 largest member companies stand for 85% 
of the total industry turnover. Membership in Bemanningsföretagen 
means that companies must meet twelve authorization requirements, 
for example that one must have been operating the business for twelve 
months, and that one must abide by the collective agreement applicable 
in their sector. The activities of the members companies are examined 
every year. A membership and an authorization may only be made after 
the staffing company in question has itself requested this. Some con-
struction companies chose, after the mandatory authorization was in-
troduced in 2009, to not apply for authorization. Furthermore compa-
nies in the food industry failed to prove that their partners were suffi-
ciently serious to be granted an authorization. Against this background, 
it is reasonable to assume that workers who are employed by the au-
thorized agencies generally have better working conditions than work-
ers employed by non-authorized agencies.  
According to all persons interviewed, the only reason for recruiting 
workers from abroad using a temporary employment agency instead of 
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recruiting in Sweden is that the required competence is not available in 
Sweden. A large temporary agency company recruited Polish construc-
tion workers to meet the demand for such workers. The choice between 
recruiting domestically or from abroad is according to the company 
completely “cost neutral”. A representative of a recruitment company 
believes that foreign recruitment in the construction industry will in-
crease in the future for this very reason. Another recruitment company 
believes that the lack of particular types of specialist doctor in Sweden 
has meant that the county councils have had to turn to foreigns coun-
tries, in this case Poland. Only one company in the construction sector 
indicated cost advantages of recruiting foreign workers. 
14.4 Summary and conclusions 
In Sweden, the temp agency sector seems to play only a minor role in 
recruiting and employing workers from Poland and other Central and 
Eastern European countries. Other immigrant groups are much better 
represented in the industry. This also seems to be the case regarding 
temporary workers (staying less than one year in Sweden). In this 
way, Sweden differs from both Norway and Denmark were CEE for-
eign born constitute a much larger proportion of the total workforce 
employed in the sector.  
Another difference between the Nordic countries is that hiring temp 
agency workers to the construction industry appears to be less common 
in Sweden than in for example Norway. The statistics on turnover upon 
which this conclusion is based cover only temp agencies that are mem-
bers of the employer organization and not all temp agencies. It is possi-
ble that we underestimate the importance of the construction sector as a 
customer for temp agencies in Sweden. The labor union in the construc-
tion sector has traditionally been a very powerful organization and it is 
likely that it has had a say about to what extent construction firms 
should hire workers from temp agencies. One caveat to the conclusion 
about Sweden is that it is limited to evidence from Swedish temp agen-
cies and our knowledge about migrant workers coming to Sweden via 
foreign temp agencies and posted workers is still scarce due to lack of 
reliable data. 
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15. The rise and fall of temporary 
staffing agencies in Iceland  
Frida Thorarins (a.k.a.Hallfríður Þórarinsdóttir), MIRRA 
 
15.1 Introduction  
Temporary staffing agency – TSA- has a short but intense history in Ice-
land and only made a significant appearance in the new millennium.64 
However, the entrance of temporary staffing into the Icelandic labor 
market was characterized by sudden very noisy and sharp increase and 
almost as sudden and sharp but quiet decline. Moreover, the develop-
ment of temporary staffing is marked by severe conflicts that reached 
the highest levels of political, economic and social power in the country. 
At the core of these conflicts were disputes over the need for regulatory 
framework embracing the operations of temporary staffing agencies on 
the one hand and allegations of social dumping and other workers abuse 
on the other. 
The development of the temporary staffing industry in Iceland differs 
radically from both the other Nordic countries and other countries in the 
Western world where its operations have steadily risen over the last 
decades (Coe et al., 2009 Eurofound 2008; Mitlacher 2007; Neugart and 
Storrie 2002). Notwithstanding their gradual increase the share of tem-
porary staffing and temporary staffing agencies varies however from 
country to country, from being under 2% of the total workforce to 4% at 
the highest in the industrial countries in the West (Knox 2010).  
The tumultuous shifts in the development of temporary staffing in 
Iceland go hand in hand with the economic expansion that began in early 
2003 and ended abruptly with a near national bankruptcy in the fall of 
────────────────────────── 
64 Temporary staffing agency TSA, a.k.a. temporary work agency or TWA.  
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2008.65 The economic boom generated an unprecedented need for 
workers which was met by international migrants many of whom came 
from Poland and other new member states in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE). The workers coming to Iceland were part of the great flow of 
workers streaming to the expanding economies in the West, such as the 
UK, Ireland and the Netherlands, as well as to some of the other Nordic 
countries (Black et al. 2010 Dølvik & Eldring 2008; Krings et al. 2011). In 
Iceland however, the boom turned into a bust when the financial sector 
and the construction sector spun out of control causing severe ramifica-
tions not only for the national economy but Icelandic society as a whole 
(Benediktsdottir et al. 2011). The crisis brought about unemployment 
higher than ever seen in the country before where Poles have been hit 
the hardest. The national average of unemployment went from less than 
2% before the crisis to 8% in 2009 when it peaked and remained around 
6–7% to date (2012) whereas unemployment amongst Poles jumped 
from 1.4% in 2007 to 16% in 2009 and stood at 20% in 2011 (Vinnumá-
lastofnun 2012).  
During the economic expansion era, the physical manifestation of the 
boom could be seen in dozens of building cranes adorning the skyline all 
over the greater Reykjavik area and nearby regions during that time. 
Large portions of the manpower needed for these building projects came 
from abroad. During the height of the expansion on estimate close to 
40% of all workers within the construction industry were foreign mi-
grants. Many of those workers were hired through temporary staffing 
agencies whose operations were to a large extent confined to the con-
struction sector. Hence, temporary staffing workers in Iceland during 
this period were exclusively foreign migrants and mostly males. Polish 
workers outnumbered other nationalities among the temporary em-
ployees in Iceland in that period. Within the construction sector the state 
sponsored construction of a hydroelectric power plant in eastern Ice-
land called Kárahnjúkar proved to be a catalyst for economic expansion 
in the country. Moreover, this project played a key role in the develop-
ment of TSA and the conflict over social dumping. Forms of abuse, not 
seen in the Icelandic labor market before, were exposed at the work site 
causing fierce conflicts where the trade unions fought hard against al-
────────────────────────── 
65 Before the economic expansion began, the use of TSAs’ was not entirely unknown. It had been practiced for 
a few years to a small degree in the health care sector in nursing, in the aviation business, recruiting pilots 
and engineers and in couple of instances welders had been recruited for specific building projects. On these 
occasions the workers were recruited from abroad to meet temporary labor shortages. 
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 303 
leged social dumping and called for legal framework on the operations of 
temporary staffing agencies. Similar exploitation and abuse was to be 
detected later with TSA’s operating within the construction in industry 
Reykjavik and other areas. The conflict over TSA’s lasted several years 
causing tremendous controversy that reached the highest levels of polit-
ical power on many occasions and rendered lawsuits and concomitant 
litigations between struggling parties, some of which lasted for years. 
The disputed construction project of Kárahnjúkar and the concomitant 
massive arrival of migrant workers recruited by temporary staffing 
agencies, figures highly into our analysis as it was critical for subsequent 
development of temporary staffing agencies in the country.  
Labour market research is a relatively underdeveloped field in Ice-
land, including the major changes brought about in recent years with the 
increased presence of migrant workers. Hence, research analysis on the 
operations of temporary staffing agencies is also largely an unchartered 
territory. This paper will explore that territory and examine the devel-
opment of temporary staffing in Iceland in order to clarify why it has 
differed so radically from the neighboring countries. Why did their op-
erations cause such heated disputes, what caused them and who were 
the disputing parities? Moreover, how were the disputes solved and 
what impact did that have on the consequent development of temporary 
staffing? Last but not least, how and in what way did these disputes af-
fect foreign migrant workers on the Icelandic labour market? 
The structure of the paper is as follows, after the introduction is a 
short description of methodology and data, followed by a briefing on the 
main characteristics of the Icelandic labor market in the section, Highly 
regulated labour market, yet no rules on TSA´s. Next we turn to The con-
flict over TSA and social dumping begins at Kárahnjúkar hydroelectric 
power plant, where we explore the intense fight over the use and abuse 
of temporary workers that broke out at the work site. Here we shed light 
on the fighting parties in the highly inflammable and political conflict – 
the trade unions, supported by politicians from the left on the one hand, 
and the main contractor Impregilio, supported by the Confederation of 
Employers (SA) and the Icelandic government on the other. The practice 
of social dumping by TSA’s at Kárahnjúkar brought to light the absence 
of regulatory framework for the operations of TSA’s making it very diffi-
cult for both legal authorities and the trade unions to have the TSA’s 
follow through with responses to the complaints. The lack of regulation 
became a bone of contention between the struggling parties as we dis-
cuss in From no rules towards a regulatory framework on temporary 
staffing agencies and social dumping. From the fight over TSA at Ká-
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rahnjúkar we follow their spread in other parts of the country, and high-
light the concomitant practice of social dumping amongst migrant work-
ers in the section Social dumping and Gold Rush: two sides of the same 
coin? In spite of tremendous resistance by the employers association and 
the government towards regulatory framework, the trade unions went 
ahead with a campaign called Equal rights – No Exception – Jendo Prawo 
– zadnego oszustwa where workers and employers were informed about 
their rights and duties. Slowly but surely the tides turned and the Con-
federation of Employers and the government changed their stance, re-
sulting in an implementation of an act regulating the operations tempo-
rary staffing agencies, in effect from 1 February 2006 which we discuss 
in the section From obscurity to light. The paper concludes with a sum-
mary from the previous discussion.  
15.2 Methods and data  
The paper is based on a qualitative explorative and descriptive study of 
the short but intense history of TSAs in Iceland. Around eight structured 
interviews, lasting from one up to three hours, were conducted with 
major actors within the labor unions, the Confederation of Employers 
(SA), the Directorate of Labor, and the one and only client company cur-
rently using a temporary staffing agency. In spite of repeated attempts it 
remained impossible to track down a representative from the only TSA 
still active. Likewise, was it impossible to reach managers or owners of 
formerly active temporary staffing agencies. Sources for further data 
were the Gazette of the Icelandic Parliament (Althing) newspaper arti-
cles, reports and other publications from ministries, the unions, The 
Directorate of Labour, Landsvirkjun and more.  
15.3 Highly regulated labour market, yet no rules on 
TSA´s 
The Icelandic labor market shares many of the same characteristics 
commonly found in the Nordic countries. It is for one thing highly orga-
nized both among employees in trade unions and employers in national 
federations. The Federation of Labor (ASÍ) is the equivalent of LO the 
confederation of labor unions in the other Nordic countries. “Overall, a 
great potential for centralised cohesion exists in the Icelandic labour 
market, even though the bargaining power resides in individual sectoral 
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and local unions. When the organisations arrive at a collective agree-
ment with national application, which is common, these agreements are 
based on a common understanding of shared interests in governing the 
labour market with as little interference from the state as possible.“ 
(Andersen et al. 2011:34). As is the case in the other Nordic countries, 
minimal wages are not bound by law but minimum-wage regulations are 
in effect. Iceland, like the other Nordic countries uses a form on mini-
mum wage collectively agreed minimum wages which is “negotiated be-
tween the parties to a collective agreement to reflect the employers” 
minimum ability to pay, but can be supplemented with local rates (El-
dring and Alsos 2012:8). In Iceland, the importance is such that honor-
ing of collective agreement on minimum wages for all workers regard-
less of nationality is ensured by law, in effect since 1980 (Alþingi 1980). 
In spite of these laws, there is ample room for flexibility that historically 
has characterized collective agreement where the lowest rates have only 
been used as a point of reference. In actuality de facto wages known as 
“market wages,” are based upon qualifications and ability of the worker 
and are usually considerably higher than minimum wages, (with various 
kinds of perks and bonuses figured in) (Andersen et al. 2010; Gunnars-
son 2005). Another characteristic of the Icelandic labour market is the 
high level of unionization which not only exceeds the relatively high 
participation in the other Nordic countries but places Iceland on top of 
all OECD countries, with 85% union density in 2008 (OECD 2009). Simi-
larly, employment participation has ranked amongst the highest in the 
OECD countries. In 2010 activity rates were 81% and percentage of ac-
tive workers was 75% (Statistics Iceland. 2011:3).  
In the literature on temporary agency work it has been pointed out 
that “the significance of national settings is related to the unique regula-
tory frameworks within nation states” moreover, “research suggests that 
the interface between regulation at the labour market and TWA industry 
levels affects the size, internal structure and rates of growth of the TWA 
industry as well as its implications for both the broader labour market 
and the economy” (Knox 2010:450). Peck and Theodore have also ar-
gued that temporary staffing industry “its structure and development 
must be understood in terms of the complex renegotiation of employ-
ment relations and regulations on a country-by country basis” 
(2002:145). Temporary agency work in Europe is on the whole, “largely 
highly regulated industry involving a mix of legislation, collective labour 
agreements and instruments of self-regulation at national level” (Euro-
found 2008:44). Moreover, due to different traditions of labor market 
regulation, and different policy preferences concerning the balance be-
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tween employment flexibility and security amongst the member states, 
agency work is also heterogeneously regulated across Europe. The Nor-
dic countries, including Iceland had on the contrary few restrictions or 
regulations on temporary agency work (Kvasincka 2005 quoted in Alsos 
2013). Mitlacher (2007) has also stressed the importance of regulations 
in determining whether employers use temporary agency worker or not. 
For example, strict dismissal protection rules can increase the use of TSA 
in order to avoid such rules. In Iceland dismissal protection rules are 
relatively lenient.  
Notwithstanding the highly regulated labour market in Iceland, it 
came clear at the time when the temporary staffing agencies (TSA) ex-
tended their scope to reach the construction industry, that neither a 
requirement for registration nor any legal framework existed, leaving 
their operations in obscurity and the authorities with few legal means to 
regulate their actions. Temporary staffing agencies whether Icelandic or 
based in countries outside of Iceland had no legal obligation to register 
in the country. As no registration was mandatory for their operation, 
data on their number, scope and manpower employed, is non-existent 
before an act regulating their undertaking came into effect in early 2006.  
Workers recruited from countries within the European Union (EU) 
were exempt from applying for work permits but citizens from the new 
member states accessed in 2004 were obliged to apply for a work permit 
until May 2006.66 Despite the aforementioned legislation from 1980 en-
suring the honoring of a collective agreement on minimum wages for all 
workers regardless of nationality, social dumping and grave violations of 
agreements were not prevented (Alþingi 1980; ASÍ, SA et al. 2004a).  
15.4 The conflict over TSA and social dumping begins 
at Kárahnjúkar hydroelectric power plant 
In an interview for this research one interviewee – a high ranking execu-
tive within the Icelandic administration that deals with the labor market 
- made a rather sarcastic remark relating to the sudden and intense con-
flict over temporary staffing agencies in Iceland. “The game was called 
on,” he said, “but once it started nobody knew what rules to play by and 
it seemed as if rules were being made as the game proceeded.”  
────────────────────────── 
66 Iceland did not open its borders towards free flow of labor from the new EU member states until 1 May 2006.  
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 307 
The start of the “game” and the background of the conflicts over the 
TSAs in Iceland can be located in time and space. As mentioned, the con-
flict is intertwined with another hotly debated dispute that rose over the 
construction of a hydroelectric power plant in eastern Iceland at Ká-
rahnjúkar. The plant was designed to produce 4,600 GWh for the Alcoa 
Fjarðarál aluminum smelter in Reyðarfjörður some 75 KM away to the 
east. Due to its enormous scope, the construction of the Kárahnjúkar 
power plant was dubbed “the largest construction project in the history 
of Iceland.” Preparation for the power plant started in 1999, construc-
tion work began in 2002 and the plant formally opened in November 
2007. A cause for heated public disputes that lasted for years, the Ká-
rahnjúkar project was highly criticized mainly on two but entirely dif-
ferent levels: firstly, over its impact upon the natural environment and 
secondly, because of the use and abuse of foreign migrant workers. The 
laud and bitter criticism relating to environmental concerns set aside, 
the abuse of foreign workers was no less fierce.  
Allegations of social dumping and other forms of workers abuse, ap-
peared first among temporary workers at the Kárahnjúkar plant later to 
be detected elsewhere. These allegations severely tarnished the TSA’s 
reputation in the country. The term temporary staffing agency in Ice-
landic “starfsmannaleiga” became highly associated with exploitation, 
social dumping and abuse, in particular in relation to foreign migrant 
workers. 
The Kárahnjúkar project was funded by the state owned power com-
pany Landsvirkjun, but separate subprojects were carried out by indi-
vidual contractors. In December 2002 the Italian contractor Impregilo 
made a successful bid for construction of dams and headrace tunnels in 
fact the largest part of construction work of the power plant. Impregilo’s 
bid was close to one fifth lower than original Landsvirkjun plans had 
called for. Shortly after negotiations with Impregilo started, the alleged 
tainted reputation of the company began appearing in the Icelandic me-
dia – the company was suspected of having paid bribes related to dam 
projects in Africa and South America – allegations Impregilo steadfastly 
denied (Morgunblaðið; 2003a; 2003c). While the Prime Minister was 
focused on the long term economic gains of the project, critics within the 
Parliament were concerned that Impregilo was unreliable, that their low 
bidding was usually followed by final costs far exceeding the original 
budget, that the company was known for scandals and finally that Im-
pregilo had all intentions to recruit most of the labor needed from 
abroad which went against the original plan of increased employment 
opportunities in the region (Morgunblaðið 2002;2003b).  
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Road construction and other preparation work conducted by Iceland-
ic contractors with Icelandic workers begun in late 2002 and Impregilo 
started their work in April 2003 stating the company planned to hire 
several hundred Icelandic workers in due course (Morgunblaðið 2003d). 
In reality only a fraction of Impregilo‘s workers were Icelandic, all the 
others were foreign migrants. Most plans made for the construction of 
the Kárahnjúkar power plant and the aluminum smelter in Reyðarfjör-
ður had seriously underestimated the need of foreign labor predicting it 
to be from less than twenty percent and up to thirty percent at the high-
est. The reality turned out to be very different as most of the workers 
hired for the projects were foreign laborers who came to work tempo-
rarily and exclusively at these two worksites (Jóhannesson 2008). Data 
on the absolute number of foreign workers working at the Kárahnjúkar 
site is hard to come by. The main reason for this lack of information can 
be explained by the fact that temporary staffing agencies were exempt 
from registration in Iceland (Jóhannesson 2010). 
At the beginning Impregilo hired Icelanders to some extent but most-
ly Portuguese migrant workers through a Portuguese temporary staffing 
agency along with other migrant workers. The share of foreign workers 
at Kárahnjúkar steadily increased in the period, starting at 65% in the 
spring of 2003 and going up to 92% on estimate in July 2007 when the 
project was nearing its end. The recruitment of foreign workers was in 
line with practices in the booming construction industry that occurred in 
many European countries at the same time (Fellini et al., 2007; Krings et 
al. 2011). Decisions to recruit foreign workers rather than indigenous 
ones is as Fellini et al., have pointed out usually guided by two main yet 
interconnected aims i.e. coping with labor shortages and minimizing 
labour cost (2007). In the beginning most of the foreign workers were 
Europeans but their number decreased as the project went on, and they 
were replaced by Chinese workers who came in large numbers. In the 
summer of 2007 on estimate nine out of every ten worker on site was a 
foreign migrant. At the height of the construction of the aluminum smel-
ter in Reyðarfjörður 77% of the workers were Polish and other migrant 
workers were 15% and Icelanders 8%. The main contractor of the con-
struction of the aluminum smelter, the American company Bechtel, con-
ducted a clear but very different recruitment policy – based on safety 
reasons – which was to hire only workers from Iceland, Poland and/or 
English speaking workers (Jóhannesson 2008; 2010). Bechtel hired their 
workers directly, whereas Impregilo used temporary staffing agencies to 
recruit their workers.  
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For the Kárahnjúkar project a specific collective agreement was put in-
to effect between the partners involved. On behalf of companies the nego-
tiators were the state run power plant company Landsvirkjun and The 
Confederation of Icelandic Employers (SA). On behalf of the workers were 
the big trade unions and their confederations, The Icelandic Confederation 
of Labour (ASÍ), The National Federation of General and Special workers 
(Starfsgreinasambandið), The Union of Icelandic Electrical Workers 
(Rafiðnaðarsambandið and The National Association of Craftsmen 
(Samiðn). The contract usually referred to as “Virkjunarsamningur” or 
“Power Plant Contract” was in effect until 1 February 2004 then replaced 
by another in effect from April 2004 to the end of year 2007 (ASÍ 2003: 
ASÍ et al. 2004). In the bid documents between Landsvirkjun and Impre-
gilo, the company agreed to follow Icelandic collective agreement, to pay 
all workers regardless of nationality accordingly and as much as possible, 
hire Icelandic workers and subcontractors (Morgunblaðið (2003j).  
Impregilo had not been operating for long in Iceland when com-
plaints started appearing regarding despicable working conditions, un-
acceptable sanitation, insufficient dining facilities, camps that leaked and 
could neither stand the weather conditions in Iceland, nor fulfill fire 
safety (Morgunblaðið 2003g; 2003f). In short, working conditions were 
by all standards appalling. Moreover, and of no less importance was the 
rumor of social dumping practiced by the company. Impregilo was ac-
cused of underpaying the Icelandic workers as well the foreign TSA 
workers and not honoring the contract it had made with Landsvirkjun 
(Morgunblaðið (2003e). The contract called for full observation of the 
Icelandic collective agreement which in practice meant that all workers 
working in Iceland should be paid according to Icelandic collective 
agreement and no other.  
The trade unions expressed worries over the conditions at the work 
site and sent inspection teams to the premises to examine the working 
conditions who were appalled at what they saw (ASÍ 2003). Subsequent-
ly the unions held meetings at project site where they met with the all 
workers (Morgunblaðið 2003i). The foreign migrant workers expressed 
discontent over their salaries, insisting on receiving the same payment 
for their work as the Icelandic workers received. Upon these meetings, 
the trade unions expressed great concern over the impact of social 
dumping which Impregilo was accused of practicing, maintaining that if 
left unchecked, it would have serious negative effects on the Icelandic 
labor market in general making Icelandic workers far too expensive to 
be able to compete (Fréttablaðið 2003a). In spite of these allegations 
Impregilo refused to reveal working contracts and pay slips thus pre-
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venting the unions from monitoring remunerations on the project site. 
Before long the disputes grew into a serious conflict dubbed by the me-
dia “the war at Kárahnjúkar” where the trade unions fought on one side 
and Impregilo on the other. From the beginning of the conflict, the trade 
unions policy was to defend the rights of all workers, regardless of na-
tionality (Morgunblaðið 2003h). The unions accused Impregilo of 
breaching the collective agreement and insisted that SA, Landsvirkjun 
and the government ensured Impregilo would honor the agreement. 
These partners were however reluctant to show the cause a direct sup-
port and the conflict hardened, eventually reaching the parliament 
where the government was blamed for condoning the company’s shame-
less actions and disrespect Icelandic law (Fréttablaðið 2003b; Morgun-
blaðið 2003l; Alþingi 2003). 
At the core of the dispute was the question of whether social dumping 
was practiced by the Italian contractor (that hired staff through foreign 
based TSAs). By all accounts it was (Fréttablaðið 2003a; 2003b). In spite 
of repeated pleas from trade unions as well as The Directorate of La-
bour, Impregilo was reluctant to reveal what wages the migrant workers 
they hired were receiving (Morgunblaðið 2003m). Led by a consulting 
committee, meetings between partners were held without rendering any 
solution to the conflict. Impregilo showed only limited interest in reach-
ing an agreement. Only after the trade unions threatened with strikes 
and ASÍ insisted on asking Landsvirkjun to withhold payments to the 
contractor to meet unpaid salaries was the company willing to negotiate 
(Fréttablaðið 2003c). An agreement was signed, calling for all the for-
eign migrant workers to be paid according to Icelandic collective agree-
ment to ensure they would receive the minimum salaries. In addition, it 
called for their pay slip to be issued in Icelandic and that all their salaries 
would be paid directly into a banking account. Shop stewards were 
granted access to all this information regarding all the workers 
(ASÍ 2003; Morgunblaðið 2003n). By this agreement things were settled 
at Kárahnjúkar, at least for a while.  
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15.5 From no rules towards a regulatory  
framework on temporary staffing  
agencies and social dumping  
In wake of the conflicts at Kárahnjúkar, trade unions issued resolutions 
condemning social dumping, pressing authorities to provide a regulatory 
framework for the operations of TSAs in Iceland (BSRB 2003; Rafís 2003; 
Morgunblaðið 2003k). In April 2004 the plea was followed by a parlia-
mentary resolution on foreign employment agencies aimed at granting all 
foreign workers coming to the country through TSAs the same rights as 
Icelanders on the labor market. Moreover, the resolution aimed at pre-
venting hidden social dumping and thereby ensuring that Icelandic com-
panies were compatible with the companies that hired staff through TSAs 
(Skarphéðinsson 2004). The bill was supported by a report, containing 
cases of abuse and exploitation committed by temporary staffing agencies, 
hardly seen in the Icelandic labor market before (ibid.).  
The reaction towards the need for specific regulatory framework 
concerning operations of TSAs was divided along the lines of the social 
partners with the trade unions and politicians to the left on one side and 
employers and their interest groups and the Icelandic state on the other. 
The conflict over operations of TSAs and Impregilo at Kárahnjúkar and 
the request for law to regulate the operations of TSAs was highly politi-
cal. In interviews with representatives from the trade unions, conducted 
specifically for this research (Nordisk Ministerråd) all commented on 
how the government and the Confederation of Employers (SA) had 
worked against them. Stakes were high both financially as well as politi-
cally. As one interviewee put it “we met tremendous adversary in our 
struggle. Adversary from the authorities that had invested heavily in the 
project and in all the other things related to the project, we clearly felt 
that the authorities worked against us and the same could be said about 
SA. They were concerned that nothing would impede the operations of 
the project” (interview 29 November 2011). 
Although, time was not ripe for specific law on TSAs, a watershed was 
marked in the conflict when in relation to a renewal of the collective 
agreement in early 2004, the trade unions and SA made an agreement 
called: Agreement Concerning Foreigners in the Icelandic Labor Market” 
(Samkomulag um útlendinga á íslenskum vinnumarkaði) signed 7 March 
2004 (ASÍ and SA 2004b). The agreement contained a common under-
standing where both parties agreed to honor the arrangements based on 
collective agreement ruling on the Icelandic labor market. The agree-
ment marked a shift in attitude on the behalf of SA which later served as 
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basis for an agreement between the social partners in pushing the au-
thorities to regulate by law the operations of temporary staffing agen-
cies in the country. 
Almost two years passed from the initial joint Agreement on Foreign-
ers on the Icelandic Labor Market was reached between the social part-
ners, until the Act on TSA came into effect 1 February 2006. This time 
period was marked by unprecedented economic expansion and likewise 
by continuous and hardening conflicts over the undertakings of TSAs. In 
September 2004 the government formed a committee, consisting of rep-
resentatives from the social partners and the government, to explore the 
need for legal framework for TSAs (Morgunblaðið 2004b). Complaints – 
especially from the trade unions – over lack of action on the behalf of the 
political authorities became louder but the government was neverthe-
less reluctant to respond (Fréttablaðið 2005b).  
At Kárahnjúkar, conflicts between the trade unions and Impregilo 
subsided for a while but resurfaced in the fall of 2004 (Morgunblaðið 
2005a; 2005b). Disputes with state and local authorities over taxes fig-
ured into the picture (Morgunblaðið 2005f; 2005e; 2005d). Workers 
went on strike because of substandard facilities, lack of working clothes, 
and low wages. Trade unions accused the company of breaching the 
agreements it had made earlier and emphasized that the roots of the 
conflict lay in the bid Landsvirkjun made with the contractor. It was 
clear in their eyes that the bid would never hold if the company was to 
pay according to Icelandic collective agreement. Likewise, was it clear to 
the unions that the company was to use migrant workers from impover-
ished areas. Political authorities denied these allegations. “The conflict is 
turning into a political fight of defense where everything is sacrificed in 
order of defense,” one trade unionist leader said (Gunnarsson 2004).  
Trade unions voiced their disapproval of social dumping and discrim-
ination against poor foreign workers in no uncertain terms but were 
accused by employers (Impregilo) and the Icelandic authorities of the 
power plant (Landsvirkjun) of being racist and prejudiced against for-
eigners, an accusation they strongly denied (ibid; Morgunblaðið 2005b). 
Conflicts over treatments of the workers at Kárahnjúkar hardened and 
reached the parliament where the opposition called for meetings with all 
partners involved. The unions feared that if social dumping and sub-
standard working facilities were condoned at Kárahnjúkar, then other 
companies would follow suit, which they claimed was a direct assault on 
Icelandic companies and workers (Gunnarsson 2004). Before long that 
turned out to be the case.  
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15.5.1 Social dumping and Gold Rush:  
two sides of the same coin? 
The increased growth of the Icelandic economy called for increased la-
bor demand, especially within the construction industry and later in 
other industries and services. The number of foreign migrant workers, 
increased by the day not least in the Reykjavik area. In line with the mi-
gratory flow to Western Europe at the time most of these workers were 
coming from the new member states in the EU, mostly Poland and the 
Baltic states (Fellini et al. 2007; Krings et al. 2011). Moreover, as had 
been the case in other countries such as Norway, the practice of social 
dumping amongst these new workers was a great concern (Alsos and 
Eldring 2008). 
Due to Iceland’s suspension of the EU’s stipulation of free flow of 
workers until May 2006, the employers were still obliged to apply for 
work permits for their migrant laborers at The Directory of Labour 
Work permits for migrant workers were issued to the employer issued 
not to the individual. To begin with most workers were hired directly by 
the employers as the tradition called for but employers complained that 
the work application process was too time consuming – taking from two 
to three months to process – and thus halting the pace of their work 
projects and hurting their business. By using the temporary work agen-
cies, workers could be provided in a matter of days. The use of tempo-
rary work agencies was also fit to meet the mobile character of construc-
tion where workplaces change from one project to the next, requiring a 
“degree of flexibility that can be solved by using temporary agency 
workers” (Ødegård et al. 2012:463). In response to the need of the con-
struction industry work permit regulations were changed in September 
2005 thereby shortening the delivery process down to two weeks (Vin-
numálastofnun 2005; Morgunblaðið 2005k). 
The economic expansion grew faster and generated a kind of gold 
rush atmosphere where the hope of a quick profit became the guiding 
light of many employers according to many interviewees for this re-
search whether from the rank of trade unions or employers. In this 
“Klondike” like environment, temporary employment agencies foreign 
based and domestic alike mushroomed overnight. Soon rumors and sus-
picions about illegal workers particularly within the construction indus-
try began circulating, later to be substantiated by the trade unions 
through their own investigation (Morgunblaðið 2005h). Cases of sub-
standard working conditions and severe social dumping were exposed 
where workers were receiving wages as much as four times lower than 
the lowest wages agreed upon in the collective agreement (ibid; 
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Morgunblaðið (2005j;2005i). The media published accounts of these 
illegal activities with indicative headlines: White slavery left untouched 
while politicians turn a blind eye”, stating that:  
“Up to thousand ghost workers from the Baltic states and Poland are sus-
pected to be on the Icelandic labor market. These men do not pay taxes and 
their wages now threaten the market wages in many trades. More than one 
agent is suspected to be behind the illegal import of these workers. Due to 
mild penalty more and more are tempted to participate. Political authorities 
remain indifferent and regulations on the operation of temporary employ-
ment agencies are still to be seen” (DV- Dagblaðið 2005).  
The trade unions denounced this development and fought hard against it. 
The unions were supported by opposition parties in the parliament in 
their condemnation of social dumping allegedly practiced by the TSAs 
Skarphéðinsson (2005a). A plea for a regulatory framework for the opera-
tions of TSAs and regulations that would hold TSAs users accountable for 
the activities of the TSAs became ever louder (Hermannsson 2005). In a 
memo issued in late February, ASÍ protested against “out of control impor-
tation of foreign workers” insisting the authorities to do whatever it took 
to hinder social dumping and any underground economic activities based 
upon abuse of foreign migrant workers. ASÍ also insisted, that companies 
involved in this kind of activities would be reprimanded by any means 
necessary. Last but not least ASÍ called for regulatory framework for TSAs 
operating in Iceland (Fréttablaðið 2005b). The Confederation of Employ-
ers – SA – also condemned social dumping and any kind of illegal activities 
conducted by employers and claimed that: it was totally unacceptable for 
law-abiding companies to have to compete with partners that disobeyed 
laws and regulations, paid wages under what the collective agreement 
stated and did not even pay any tax or duties. Such activities have no right 
to exist and should be banned.” (Stefánsdóttir 2005). 
In late 2005 up to one thousand underpaid workers were found in 
the great Reykjavik area alone, according to estimates made by ASÍ, 
which meant large sums lost in payment to the workers themselves and 
in revenues for tax authorities (Fréttablaðið 2005e; 2005a) The trade 
unions filed several law suits against TSAs suspected of illegal activities, 
charging them and client companies with social dumping, breaches of 
collective agreement and other related matters of exploitation (Fré-
ttablaðið 2005c; Morgunblaðið 2005j; Blöndal 2005). The temporary 
staffing agencies and their client companies in turn filed charges of def-
amation (Blöndal 2005; Rafiðnaðarsamband Íslands 2006). Litigations in 
some of these cases lasted for years, whereas others were shortly settled 
(Morgunblaðið 2005k; 2005l). 
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Another aspect of the TSA conflict concerned taxes. Disputes rose on 
both local and state level over whether the TSAs or the client of TSA 
should pay taxes of the workers’ wages and whether the payment should 
be in Iceland or their home country (Morgunblaðið 2004a). Already in 
2004 Impregilo ran into a conflict with the tax authorities insisting it had 
been overpaying taxes and filed a lawsuit (Morgunblaðið 2005c). The 
case was in the courts for years. In 2010 the Supreme Court of Iceland 
ruled in the case where the state of Iceland was acquitted of accounts on 
the behalf of Impregilo SpA., to refund taxes paid of the wages of foreign 
migrant workers hired from two Portuguese temporary work agencies 
to work for Impregilo at the Kárahnjúkar power plant. The Supreme 
Court of Iceland ruled that the money the company had paid in taxes was 
not refundable as the Icelandic state was legally entitled to receive the 
payments (Viðskiptablaðið 2010; Hæstiréttur Íslands 2010). Moreover, 
trade unions alerted tax authorities and The Directorate of Labor about 
companies using illegal workers but complained about receiving little 
response (Morgunblaðið 2005h). Regardless of whether this complaint 
was justified or not, it was clear that official institutions suffered from 
lack of regulatory framework that took to the operations of TSAs.  
15.6 Equal rights – No Exception – Jendo Prawo – 
zadnego oszustwa 
In wake of increasing cases of social dumping, ASÍ and its member trade 
unions launched a campaign in May 2005 under the slogan Equal Rights 
– No Exceptions (Einn réttur – ekkert svindl), against social dumping and 
illegal work amongst foreign migrants in Iceland Equal rights – No Ex-
ception or Jendo Prawo – zadnego oszustwa in Polish. A subtitle read: Are 
you working? Do you know your rights? Everybody loses from social 
dumping. (ASÍ, 2005 May). 
The biggest challenge, not surprisingly, was the rapidly increasing 
temporary employment agencies. The campaign required a co-operation 
with authorities on different levels. Posters and brochures were pub-
lished in eleven different languages and distributed by the unions to 
employers all over the country along with adverts that appeared in the 
mass media. The objective of the campaign was to defend the rights and 
duties for all wage earners on the Icelandic labor market. The primary 
target groups were accordingly, employers who abused migrant work-
ers, in order to get an advantage on the market. The campaign empha-
sized that everyone would lose from social dumping and illegal employ-
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ment activities: The foreign migrant workers would lose because they 
were deprived of their rightful pay, remuneration, working facilities and 
conditions. All wage earners would lose because social dumping under-
mines their wages and rights on the labor market. The companies would 
lose because social dumping undermines the competitiveness against 
those that abide by the law and are the backbone of Icelandic economy. 
The society as a whole loses because social dumping undermines the 
welfare system and the society that people have built together (ASÍ 
2005; 2006 European Commission 2010). The campaign was a success 
and ASÍ argued that among the general public it had resulted in negative 
attitudes towards abuse of foreign migrants. Public institution had also 
improved their work procedures – because of commentaries made by 
the unions – regarding migrant workers. Yet in spite of these positive 
improvements a legal framework ensuring that foreign migrants would 
be guaranteed decent pay and rights, was still missing (ASÍ 2005). 
In wake of the campaign the conflict over the alleged illegal and abu-
sive activities of TSAs continued and cases of severe abuse came to the 
fore. Trade unions sued a TSA which in turn threatened to sue ASÍ and The 
Directorate of Labour (Samiðnaðarblaðið 2005; Visir.is 2005; Fréttablaðið 
2005d). ASÍ sent a plea to the government asking for an immediate re-
sponse regarding a legal framework for their activities (ASÍ 2005). SA was 
also adamant on insisting that all companies should abide to the collective 
agreement and condemned those companies that had abused their work-
ers or evaded the law one way or another. While emphasizing the im-
portance for companies to conduct business only with trustworthy and 
law abiding TSA’s, SA also lamented the negative reputation that was be-
ing attached to all TSA´s as a result of these activities. Therefore, SA de-
nounced that law abiding companies should be subject to harsh and unfair 
media coverings and even police interference, just because they had for-
eigners working for them (SA 2005).  
In October 2005 the Ministry of Social Affairs published a general re-
port on temporary staffing agencies and options for a legal framework in 
Iceland (Blöndal 2005). If the report was meant to quiet the discontent, 
it did not succeed. Once more the dispute hardened and the government 
was criticized for lack of action. MP’s in the opposition claimed that leg-
islation was long overdue and cited deplorable and criminal cases of 
social dumping. Running out of tolerance the trade unions made a legis-
lation on TSA a precondition for a renewal of collective agreements that 
was about to expire. The government responded promptly and submit-
ted a bill on temporary work agencies which was passed on December 9. 
The Act on Temporary Work Agencies. No. 139/2005 came into effect 
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1 February 2006 (Alþingi 2010).The act was based upon propositions 
from the working committee on TSAs – ordered by the Minister of Social 
Affairs – consisting of representatives from both social partners – i.e. SA 
and ASÍ – and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The law on TSAs, used the 
Act on Working Terms and Pension Rights Insurance, No. 55/1980 
(Alþingi 2012) as a point of departure, hence preventing the practice of 
social dumping amongst foreign migrant workers on the Icelandic labor 
market. It was the first comprehensive legal framework on temporary 
work agencies in Iceland. 
15.7 From obscurity to light  
Despite criticism of being long overdue, the passing of the special act on 
TSAs was embraced by the opposition in the parliament, the trade un-
ions (ASÍ), and the Confederation of Employers (SA). The initiative for 
the act came from the social partners – not the government – and the 
same associates acted in cooperation with the Directorate of Labour in 
preparing the implementation of the law and its execution (Morgun-
blaðið 2006). 
What changes did the act entail? From the government’s perspective, 
the aim of the act was to clarify rules in effect on the labor market so 
that the TSAs would be operating within a given legal framework. More-
over, the act was aimed at preventing the practice of social dumping on 
the Icelandic labor market where foreign migrant laborers had been 
paid less than the collective agreement called for. The act also empha-
sized the need to prevent unhealthy competition – from companies that 
practiced social dumping – with the vast majority of companies that 
were law abiding in their activities and paid their workers according to 
the collective agreement (Alþingi 2005).  
From the perspective of the trade unions and institutions within the 
civil administration, the law brought about three major changes. The 
first took to registration. The core of the law – according to one inter-
viewee from the trade unions – was the conception that a legal frame-
work was necessary in order to keep track of all undertakings of tempo-
rary staffing agencies whether they were foreign based or Icelandic. 
Absence of requirement for registration of temporary staffing agencies 
operating in Iceland, let alone a more extensive legal framework taking 
to their transactions, made it almost impossible to get a clear picture of 
the scope of their activities and to monitor how many people were actu-
ally active on the labor market. “Temporary staffing agencies could be 
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operating here with dozens or even hundreds of workers without us 
having any knowledge thereof because they were not subject to register” 
said Gissur Pétursson the chair of The Directorate of Labour in an inter-
view at the time the law came into effect (Morgunblaðið 2006). This 
obscurity was lifted by the law which made registration at The Direc-
torate of Labor obligatory.  
Secondly, a legal framework brought the TSAs operations to the sur-
face, making it clear who stood behind the undertakings and where. It 
became mandatory for them to have a representative based in Iceland 
regardless of whether their headquarters where based in Iceland or in 
another country. As the economy expanded, temporary staffing agencies 
s sprung up almost overnight – whether Icelandic or foreign based. It 
happened repeatedly, when the trade unions wanted to bring represent-
atives of these TSAs to the fore because of suspicion of social dumping, 
that no one was to be found, no one in charge could be reached.  
Thirdly, embedded in the law on TSAs was a requirement that made 
it possible to demand the employers to reveal what remuneration they 
were using. Implementation of the law gave the social partners the right 
– through official institutions such as The Directorate of Labour – to 
demand information regarding all wages paid.  
The act was much welcomed by The Directorate of Labour which was 
now granted the responsibility to monitor the implementation of the act 
by the TSAs. Moreover, the Confederation of Employers (SA) also wel-
comed the act and emphasized how penalty provisions of the law pro-
vided both the authorities, as well as the social partners, with tools to act 
towards those who did not abide by the law, whether they failed to sub-
mit contracts and other required data or violated the rights of their em-
ployees in another way.  
In cases of violation on the behalf of the TSAs, the act granted The Di-
rectorate of Labour permission to send the police on site to discontinue 
the TSAs operations immediately. In the beginning several cases ap-
peared where some temporary staffing agencies failed to formally regis-
ter their activities, the number of their employees and what kind of work 
contract they had. Lack of knowledge of the law and regulations, cultural 
difference and language barriers were the most common reasons for 
these violations. Upon request the TSAs were obliged to submit pay slips 
and contracts to the police and likewise they were obliged to register 
their employees at the Directorate of Immigration and to pay taxes and 
insurance (Fréttablaðið 2006a). 
The majority of the TSAs operated within the construction industry, 
albeit with few exceptions in the health sector, mostly in nursing. As the 
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TSAs were not obliged to register before the implementation of the law, 
absolute numbers on the scale of their operations are not available. With 
the implementation of the act on temporary work agencies 
(nr.139/2005) 1 February 2006, registration became mandatory. On 
1 May 2006, when restrictions on workers from the new EU member 
states was lifted, 21 TSAs were already registered with the Directorate 
of Labour. In November that same year the number of registered TSA 
was up to 31 thereof 24 active. In total 15 were registered as Icelandic 
and the other in eight different European countries. Of these employees 
35% were registered as unskilled workers with carpenters ranking in 
second place with 19% and all other groups of tradesmen 6% or lower 
(Verkalýðsfélag Akraness 2006a). Exact data on ownership of TSAs is 
not available but on estimate two thirds were foreign based the rest with 
Icelandic ownership in the period from 2006 to 2009. It is however cer-
tain that the workers were exclusively foreign migrants. On estimate 
around 10–15% of all foreign migrants on the Icelandic labor market 
worked for TSAs when their operations peaked between 2006 and 2008. 
Clients were both Icelandic and foreign based companies. In 2006 the 
number of employees registered at TSAs was 1,125 in total, thereof 534 
working for two Portuguese TSAs operating at Kárahnjúkar. Only 221 
Polish workers were registered that year. The number of TSAs employ-
ees peaked in 2007 when it reached 1,281 in total, with Poles the largest 
group counting 612. The following year the total number went down to 
501 with Poles counting 335. In 2009 active TSAs had with one excep-
tion all but disappeared (Sigurðsson 2011 June). In the fall of 2011 sev-
eral TSA were registered with The Directorate of Labour but only one 
was active with 17 employees who all were welders.67 
Both ASÍ and SA supported the decision to lift the ban on free flow of 
workers from the new EU member states on 1 May 2006. ASÍ had origi-
nally been against the free flow and insisted on postponement whereas 
SA was never in favor of restriction, maintaining that businesses had 
often been forced to use TSAs due to the long and costly procedure of 
processing work permits that lasted until September 2005.68 One of the 
arguments for lifting the ban was to reduce the operations of TSAs. Both 
ASÍ and SA agreed on that matter. A newspaper article on the subject 
────────────────────────── 
67 MIRRA/CIRRA interviewed a representative of the client company. However, in spite of numerousl 
attempts, connections with representatives of these registered TSA’s, was unsuccessful.  
68 The process took three to five months but was shortened to several weeks in September 2005;  
Árnason (2006).  
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titled: “Immigrants are now seeking their rights” stated; with the imple-
mentation of free flow of workers, foreign workers on the Icelandic la-
bor market have broken the fetters of serfdom of sorts and have become 
free men, according to social partners.” Migrant workers were also in-
creasingly becoming more knowledgeable about their rights and duties 
(Fréttablaðið 2006b). 
At the beginning it seemed as operations of TSAs had diminished and 
more workers were being hired directly by the employer. ASÍ leaders 
maintained that the wages of foreign migrants were thereby coming 
closer to market wages (markaðslaun), the most common wages paid in 
each occupation (ibid.).69 Other trade union leaders refuted that affirma-
tion (Verkalýðsfélag Akraness 2006). The trade unions maintained that 
even if the migrant workers were paid according to minimum wages as 
stipulated in the collective agreement, it was in fact an underpayment 
(i.e. under market wages) and therefore yet another form of social 
dumping. All the trade union leaders interviewed for the research 
agreed upon that. The act on TSAs did not eradicate this practice and 
some interviewees pointed out that during the height of the economic 
expansion, the gap between minimum wages and market wages was 
considerable (Hermannsson 2006:1; Gunnarsson 2005). The act on TSAs 
did likewise not prevent companies from evading the law and omit reg-
istration of their TSA workers. As late as August 2007, such a case was 
revealed (Morgunblaðið 2007; Vísir.is 2007). Neither did the act guaran-
tee that the foreign employees would not be exploited in one way or 
another. With that in mind ASÍ issued a publication in September 2007, 
regarding foreign employees on the Icelandic labour market, containing 
information on the employment rights of foreign workers and on em-
ployers’ duties toward authorities (ASÍ 2007).  
According to figures from The Directorate of Labour, TSAs operations 
slightly increased from 2006 to 2007 (Sigurðsson & Arnarson 2011). It is 
hard to maintain with accuracy whether the lifting of restrictions of the 
free flow of workers had considerable effect on the scope of TSAs opera-
tions as no data exists before 1 February 2006. It is clear however, that 
their registration started dwindling already in early 2008 when the 
building industry started slowing down few months before the crisis hit. 
It should thus not come as a surprise that TSAs just about disappeared in 
────────────────────────── 
69 One aspect of the labor market in Iceland is the practice of paying so-called market wages instead of going 
strictly by the rates given in collective agreements. Market wages do fluctuate according to demand and 
supply in specific sectors or occupations.  
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wake of the crisis as most of them had been operating within the con-
struction industry that practically collapsed overnight with the on-
slaught of the recession. While most – all social partners as well as public 
institutions dealing with the labor market – would agree that the crisis 
had a great impact upon their disappearance, they disagree on the extent 
it did, as well as on other causes of impact. If the aim of using TSAs was 
to evade paying according to collective agreement, as the union leaders 
claimed, the act on TSA undoubtedly had an effect towards reducing that 
practice. Some interviewees from the trade unions maintained that 
when all was said and done, i.e., wages and wage related cost paid ac-
cordingly – even if it was only minimal wages – in addition to benefits 
such as housing cost and travel, the equitation was not necessarily in the 
TSAs favor.  
It is fit to conclude this discussion with words from one interviewee, 
working on labor issues within the Icelandic administration, who said, 
that “finally when a regulatory framework for the operations of tempo-
rary staffing agencies had been put into effect and was up and running 
rather smoothly, they pretty much disappeared from the scene.” 
15.8 Conclusions  
This paper set out to explore the development of temporary staffing 
agencies in Iceland and clarify why it has differed so radically from the 
neighboring countries. Why did their operations cause such heated dis-
putes, what caused them and who were the disputing parities? What 
caused their disappearance? Are they gone forever or are they likely to 
reappear in the future? Our analysis showed that the conflict was highly 
political from the beginning with heavyweights from both the highest 
political ranks as well as all the major figures from the ranks of the social 
partners. At the core of the conflict was the issue of social dumping and 
concomitant workers abuse. 
Opposing blocks were on the one side, the trade unions backed by 
politicians from the left who fought against what they termed illegal and 
immoral actions of the temporary staffing agencies. On the other side, 
were the Confederation of Employers or SA (Samtök atvinnulífsins) and 
Landsvirkjun, a state owned energy company on the behalf of the Ice-
landic state that took sides with the temporary staffing agencies and 
their client companies. The temporary workers – the subjects of the 
abuse – were exclusively foreign migrants and mostly males. They did 
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not form a united block in the struggle but the trade unions fought on 
their behalf.  
The construction of the hydroelectric power plant at Kárahnjúkar 
and the fierce conflict that rose there over social dumping and other 
forms of labor abuse of foreign workers at the work site set the course 
for subsequent development of temporary staffing agencies and reputa-
tion. Political stakes were high for the project which undoubtedly was 
responsible for how slow Icelandic authorities and the public admin-
istration were to respond to the severe accusations brought forward by 
the unions. An absence of clear cut regulatory framework on the opera-
tions of temporary staffing agencies and an ever expanding economy in 
dire need of labour generated a “gold rush” mentality driven by a desire 
for big profits in a short time. In short the ideal ground for the practice 
of social dumping. The trade unions feared from the beginning that the 
unregulated temporary staffing agencies would capitalize on these con-
ditions. They proved to be right, hence the fierce resistance of the trade 
unions from the beginning. We saw how both political authorities and 
the employers (private and state) were united in their opposition to-
ward regulatory framework. After a yearlong bitter conflict and serious 
clashes, the trade unions led by ASÍ, managed to win the support of the 
Confederation of Employers and push for an act regulating the opera-
tions of temporary staffing agencies in Iceland.  
In light of the dramatic and unusual development of temporary staff-
ing agencies in Iceland it is tempting to contemplate on their future on 
the labor market. Are they gone forever or will they reappear? It is of 
course impossible to make any accurate predictions. We do know how-
ever, that due to the bitter conflict and the repeated disclosure of social 
dumping and other forms of exploitation, TSAs reputation and image 
suffered tremendous damages and some would say irreparable damag-
es. In the minds of some people, temporary staffing agencies equal social 
dumping and human trafficking. In the boom years some companies that 
had migrant workers on their payroll went out of their way to make it 
public that they were not using TSAs. Likewise directors of established 
firms – TSA’s and others – that did not participate in this exploitation 
and had an image to defend, contacted The Directorate of Labour in or-
der to make sure that their business was not associated with the villains.  
Our analysis has revealed that the practice of temporary staffing 
agencies pertained exclusively to foreign migrant workers and has so 
far, not reached employees from the ranks of native Icelanders. That fact 
did however, not diminish the militant demand of the trade unions to-
wards a regulatory framework and transparent practices of the TSA’s. 
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Our interviews revealed that all union leaders are in favor of direct con-
tract between employer and employee. Some are adamant against any 
operation of TSA, other see them fit on some occasions to deal with tem-
porary labor demand in specific projects or in fields/sectors where that 
occurs seasonally. We also saw how The Confederation of Employers 
(SA) shifted their attitude regarding regulation/act from opposing it to 
supporting it. Our analysis shows that employers are usually in support 
of the Icelandic tradition of direct contract but regard TSA also as an 
additional solution to other recruitment practices. (Stefánsdóttir 2005). 
However, irrespective of the local attitudes of the social partners, the 
future development of temporary staffing agencies in Iceland depends 
first and last on economic development both locally and globally.  
15.9 References 
Alsos K (2013) “The regulatory framework of temporary agency work” in this volume. 
(2012) Positive outcome for measures to combat social dumping. Eironline. Eurpean 
Industrial Relations Observatory online. 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2012/01/articles/no1201019i.htm 
Alsos K, & Eldring L, (2008) Labour mobility and wage dumping: The case of Norway 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(4):441–459.  
Alþingi (2012) Act on Working Terms and Pension Rights Insurance, No. 55/1980, as 
amended by Act No. 58/1985, No. 33/1987, No. 21/1991, No. 69/1993, No. 
129/1997, No. 145/2004 and No. 76/2010. Act No. 55/1980.  
(2010) Act on temporary-work agencies, No. 139/2005, as amended by Act No. 
45/2007 and No. 88/2008.  
(2005) Alþingi – Félagsmálanefnd Nefndarálit um frv. til l. um starfsmannaleigur. 
132. löggjafarþing 2005–2006. Þskj. 521 — 366. mál. Nefndarálit um frv. til l. um 
starfsmannaleigur. Frá félagsmálanefnd. Electronic document. 
http://www.althingi.is/altext/132/s/pdf/0521.pdf 
(2004c) Erindi nr. Þ 130/2020 komudagur 19.04.2004. 
(2004b) Erindi nr. Þ 130/1601 Alþingi komudagur 31.03 2004. 
(2004a) Innsend ummæli frá Verslunarráði Íslands innsent 29.03.2004. 
(2003) Kjör og aðbúnaður starfsmanna við Kárahnjúka. Umræður utan dagskrár. 
http://www.althingi.is/altext/130/10/l06154039.sgml  
(1980) 1980 nr. 55 9. júní Lög um starfskjör launafólks og skyldutryggingu lífey-
risréttinda. 
Andersen T, Hougaard K.F. and Ólafsson S (2011) Assessment of the Labour Market in 
Iceland. Contract no VC/2010/038. Final report. Aarhus: Danish Technological 
Institute. 
ASÍ Alþýðusamband Íslands (2007) Erlent launafólk á íslenskum vinnumarkaði. 
Reykjavík: ASÍ.  
(2005) SKÝRSLA FORSETA um störf Alþýðusambands Íslands árið 2005. Reykjavík: ASÍ. 
Ályktun miðstjórnar ASÍ um starfsemi starfsmannaleiga  
Equal rights – No Exception. Jendo Prawo – zadnego oszustwa A subtitle read: Are 
you working? Do you know your rights? Everybody loses from social dumping.  
(2003) SKÝRSLA FORSETA um störf Alþýðusambands Íslands árið 2003. Reykjavík: ASÍ.  
324 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
ASÍ SA, et al. (2004a) SAMNINGUR (a.k.a. Virkjunarsamningur) 
milli Samtaka atvinnulífsins vegna aðildarfyrirtækja og Landsvirkjunar annars vegar 
og Alþýðusambands Íslands, Starfsgreinasambands Íslands, Samiðnar og 
Rafiðnaðarsambands Íslands hins vegar um kaup og kjör við 
virkjunarframkvæmdir á vegum Landsvirkjunar. Gildir frá 19. apríl 2004 til 31. 
desember 2007. Reykjavik.  
ASÍ and SA – The Icelandic Confederation of Labour and the Confederation of Ice-
landic Employers (2004b) Agreement Concerning Foreigners in the Icelandic Labour 
Market – English version. ASI and SA: Reykjavik. 
Árnason, R. (2006) “After Enlargement, Employers’ Perspective”.  
EURES seminar in Reykjavik 29 September 2006. Electronic document 
http://www.vinnumalastofnun.is/files/Erindi%20Ragnar_1615842344.pdf, ac-
cessed 24 June. 
Benediktsdottir S, Daníelsson J and Zoega, G (2011) “Lessons from a collapse of a 
financial system” Economic Policy Vol. 26 (66), 183–231.  
Black R, et al., eds. (2010) A Continent moving West? EU Enlargement and Labour Mi-
gration from Central and Eastern Europe. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Blöndal, E (2005) Starfsmannaleigur – greinargerð unnin fyrir félagsmálaráðuneytið. 
Bifröst: Rannsóknarsetur vinnuréttar og jafnréttismála.  
BSRB(2003) Ályktun 40. þings BSRB um starfsmannaleigur. Reykjavik: BSRB. 
Coe MN, K Jones K Ward K (2009) Geographies of Temporary Staffing Unit. Working 
Paper 12. With assistance of U. K. University of Manchester. Edited by Coe et al. 
GOTSU - Geographies of Temporary Staffing Unit at the University of Manchester. 
Manchester, UK.  
Dølvik, JE and L Eldring (2008) Mobility of Labour from New EU States to the Nordic 
Countries –Development trends and consequences, TemaNord: 537. Nordic Council of 
Ministers. 
DV – Dagblaðið (2005) “Hvítt þrœlahald þrífst óáreitt meðan stjórnmálamenn líta 
undan” February 12: 4. 
Eldring L, and K Alsos K (2012) European Minimum Wage: A Nordic Outlook.  
Oslo: Fafo. 
Eurofound (2008) Temporary agency work and collective bargaining in the EU. Avail-
able at: http://www.ciett.org/fileadmin/templates/eurociett/docs/ 
EIRO_Foundation_Report_on_TAW_Dec_08.pdf 
European Commission (2010) Trade union practices on anti-discrimination Trade 
union practices on anti-discrimination and diversity on anti-discri and diversity. Elec-
tronic document, accessed 6 June 2012.  
Fellini I, A Ferro and G Fullin (2007) Recruitment processes and labour mobility. The 
construction industry in Europe. Work, Employment and Society 21(2):277–298). 
Fréttablaðið (2007) “Vilja kæra þýskt-pólskt fyrirtæki fyrir ólögmæta starfsemi”, 
3 September.  
(2006b) “Innflytjendur farnir að sækja rétt sinn”, 23 November. 
(2006a) “Eftirlitið komið ofan í grunnana”, 27 March.  
(2005e) “Ár erlenda verkamannsins”, 30 December. 
(2005d)“Ætla í mál við ASÍ og Vinnumálastofnun”, 30 October.  
(2005c) “Verkalýðsfélög kæra starfsmannaleigu”, 26 October.  
(2005b) “Vill að gengið verði fram af hörku”, 27 February. 
(2005a)“Starfsmannaleigunefnd aðeins fundað fimm sinnum á einu ári”, 22 February. 
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 325 
(2003e) “Svikamylla við Kárahnjúka“, 12 September. 
(2003d) “Gagnrýna aðgerðaleysi”, 7 October.  
(2003c) “Ísinn loks brotinn“, 2 October. 
(2003b) “Stríðið við Kárahnjúka”, 20 September. 
(2003a) “Svikamylla við Kárahnjúka”, 12 September. 
Gunnarsson, G (2004) “Um hvað er deilt við Kárahnjúka?” 31 December, Rafiðnaðar-
samband Íslands | Electronic document. http://www.rafis.is/ 
frettir-2004/696-um-hvadh-er-deilt-vidh-karahnjuka, accessed 4 June 2012.  
(2005) “Kárahnjúkar = “Endalok markaðslaunasamninga?”, 7 January. Electronic 
document, http://rafis.is/site/-i=75&f=7&o=485.htm, accessed 20 June. 
Hermannsson, F (2006) “Standast Íslendingar ekki alþjóðlega samkeppni? 
Samiðnaðarblaðið 2006:1. 
(2005) “Íslenskur vinnumarkaður er að breytast“ Samiðnaðarblaðið 2005:1.“Ólga á 
vinnumarkaðnum – Á ekkert að bregðast við? Samiðnaðarblaðið 2005:1.  
Hæstiréttur Íslands (2010) “Íslenska ríkið gegn Impregilo SpA. Nr. 142/2009.” Elec-
tronic document, http://www.haestirettur.is/domar?nr=6449&leit=t, accessed 
12 June. 
Jóhannesson, H (2010) (Ed.)  Rannsókn á samfélagsáhrifum álvers- og virkjunar-
framkvæmda á Austurlandi. Lokaskýrsla : stöðulýsing í árslok 2008 og samantekt 
yfir helstu áhrif 2002–2008 / 
Akureyri: Byggðarannsóknastofnun Íslands.  
(2008) Rannsókn á samfélagsáhrifum álvers- og virkjunarframkvæmda á Austurlandi. 
Akureyri: Rannsóknarstofnun Háskólans á Akureyri.  
Krings T et al. (2011) From boom to bust: Migrant labour and employers in the Irish 
construction sector. Economic and Industrial Democracy 32(3): 459–476 
Knox, A (2010) “Lost in translation”: an analysis of temporary work agency employ-
ment in hotels.Work, employment and society 24(3): 449–467.  
Landsvirkjun (2003) “Landsvirkjun agrees to sign contract with Impregilo“, 
http://www.landsvirkjun.com/Company/Mediacentre/News/Newsread/607_/ 
Mitlacher, L (2007) The Role of Temporary Agency Work in Different Industrial 
Relations Systems – a Comparison between Germany and the USA. In British Jour-
nal of Industrial Relations 45 (3), pp. 581–606.  
Morgunblaðið (2007) “Kjör sumra starfsmanna ekki í samræmi við samninga” 
28 August. 
(2006) “Starfsemin verði ofanjarðar”, 1 February. 
(2005m) “Ráðherra vonar að hildarleiknum fari að ljúka”, 4 November.  
(2005l) “ASÍ vill lögreglurannsókn á starfsemi 2 B” 25 October.  
(2005k) “Fyrirtæki oft knúin til að nýta sér starfsmannaleigur”, 26 July.   
(2005j) “Kærir bátasmiðju vegna starfa 5 Pólverja”, 23 July.  
(2005i) “Starfa ólöglega við byggingarvinnu”, 23 January.  
(2005h) “Nægt framboð hérlendis af ódýru og ólöglegu vinnuafli”, 22 January.   
(2005g) “Stukku fram af svölum og tóku til fótanna”, 18 January.  
(2005f) “Greiða skatta í Portúgal vegna tvísköttunarsamnngs”; 15 Januarya. 
(2005e) “Telja sig eiga inni skatta vegna 440 starfsmanna”, 15b Januaryb. 
(2005d) “Ótvíræð skattskylda hér á landi”, 15 Januaryc.   
(2005c) “50 milljónir greiddar í skatta mánaðarlega”, 15 Januaryd. 
(2005b) “Ágreiningur hefur verið frá upphafi framkvæmda”, 13 January.  
326 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
(2005a) “Vilja ekki og ætla ekki að virða íslenskar leikreglur”, 13 January. 
(2004b) “Erlendar starfsmannaleigur: Þörf fyrir lagasetningu könnuð”, 3 September.  
(2004a) “Öllum ber að greiða hér skatta og útsvar”, 27 February.  
(2003n) “Samningur sem á að geta leyst ágreiningsefnin“, 11 October.  
(2003m) “Vilja fá að fylgjast með útborgun launa”, 30 September. 
(2003l) “Virkjanasamningar og lágmarkslaun”, 22 September. 
(2003j) “Skuldbinda sig til að mismuna ekki eftir þjóðerni”, 19 September.  
(2003k) “Mótmælir framkomu Impregilo við starfsmenn”, 17 September.  
(2003i) “Lögfræðingar athuga hvort rifta megi samningum”, 10 September. 
(2003h) “Telja stöðuna við Kárahnjúka óviðundandi”, 2 September. 
(2003g) “Impregilo hlíti sömu skilmálum og íslenski fyrirtæki”, 16 August. 
(2003f) “Engar búðanna standast íslenskar kröfur”, 15 August. 
(2003e) “Íslenskir starfsmenn Impregilo krefjast úrbóta”, 14 August. 
(2003d) “Samið um fleiri verkefni við íslensk fyrirtæki”, 11 May. 
(2003c) “Impregilo neitar ásökunum um mútur”, 23 January. 
(2003b) “Ávinningur af fjárfestingunni er til langs tíma segir forsætisráðherra”, 
22 January. 
(2003a) “Impregilo oftar en einu sinni bendlað við mútur”, 16 January. 
(2002) “Lægsta boð 6 milljörðum undir áætlun”, 7 December.  
Ødegård AM, ØM Berge and K Alsos (2012) A case study of temporary agencies in the 
Norwegian construction sector: a growing informal market beyond regulation? 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 18(4): 461–470.  
OECD (2009) – http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.  
Peck J A and N Theodore (2002) Temped Out? Industry Rhetoric, Labor Regulation 
and Economic Restructuring in the Temporary Staffing Business. Economic and In-
dustrial Democracy 23 (2):143–175.  
Rafiðnaðarsamband Íslands. (2006). “Dómar falla yfir 2b”, 1 November. Electronic docu-
ment, http://www2.rafis.is/frettir-2006/429-domar-falla-yfir-2b, accessed 19 June. 
(2005). “Brot úr fundargerðum Odds Friðrikssonar trúnaðarmanns á Ká-
rahnjúkasvæðinu”. October 23. Electronic document,  
http://rafis.is/site/-i=75&f=7&o=688.htm, accessed 19 June.  
(2003). “Ályktun um erlendar starfsmannaleigur”. 2 November. Electronic docu-
ment, http://rafis.is/site/-i=75&f=7&o=254.htm, accessed 19 June.  
Ríkisstjórn Íslands – Forsætisráðuneyti. (2005).“Yfirlýsing ríkisstjórnarinnar vegna 
áframhaldandi gildi kjarasamningar”, 15 November, Electronic document, 
http://www.forsaetisraduneyti.is/frettir/nr/2008, accessed 7 June. 
SA – Samtök atvinnulífsins. (2005). “Útlendingaumræða á villigötum” Electronic 
document, http://www.sa.is/frettir/almennar/nr/3365/, accessed 7 June. 
Sigurðsson, K and V Arnarso (2011) “Erlendir ríkisborgarar á íslenskum vin-
numarkaði árin 2006–2009” Vinnumálastofnun.  
Sigurðsson, K (2012) Erlent vinnuafli og atvinnuleysi. Reykjavik: Vinnumálastofnun.  
Skarphéðinsson, Ö (2005)a. Félagsleg undirboð á vinnumarkaði Alþingi ræða. 131. 
löggjafarþing — 62. fundur, 27.1.2005. Félagsleg undirboð á vinnumarkaði. Elec-
tronic document, http://www.althingi.is/altext/raeda/131/ 
rad20050127T133102.html, accessed 7 May. 
(2005) b Alþingi ræða. 132. löggjafarþing — 14. fundur, 3.11.2005. 
Starfsmannaleigur. Electronic document,http://www.althingi.is/altext/raeda/132/ 
rad20051103T105839.html, accessed 8 June. 
  Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 327 
 (2004) Tillaga til þingsályktunar þskj. 125 # frumskjal ÖS, 130. lþ. 125. mál: #A 
erlendar starfsmannaleigur # þál. Electronic docu-
ment,http://www.althingi.is/altext/130/s/0125.html, accessed 30 May. 
Statistical Series – Hagtíðindi (2011) Laun, tekjur og vinnumarkaður. Wages, income 
and labour market. Hagstofa Íslands – Statistics Iceland. 2011:3. February.  
Stefánsdóttir, H (2005) “Af erlendu starfsfólki og svartri atvinnustarfsemi”, 3 March. 
SA – Samtök atvinnulífsins- Electronic document, 
http://www.sa.is/frettir/almennar/nr/3219/, accessed 6 June.  
Verkalýðsfélag Akraness (2006a) “Starfsmannaleigum hefur fjölgað um 10 frá 1. maí 
2006” – 16 November, Electronic document, http://www.vlfa.is/nr/43548/,  
accessed 24 June. 
(2006b) “Viðurkennum að vandinn sé til staðar” 23 November, Electronic document, 
http://www.vlfa.is/nr/43902/, accessed 25 June. 
Viðskiptablaðið (2010) “Hæstiréttur snýr við dómi héraðsdóms í máli Impregilo 
gegn íslenska ríkinu”. 25 Februrary, Electronic document, 
http://www.vb.is/frettir/2282/?q=For, accessed 6 June. 
Vinnumálastofnun (2012) Erlent vinnuafli og atvinnuleysi.  
(2005) “Breytt verklag við útgáfu atvinnuleyfa” 9 September, Electronic document, 
http://www.vinnumalastofnun.is/vinnumalastofnun/frettir/nr/902/ 
breytt-verklag-vid-utgafu-atvinnuleyfa/, accessed 8 June. 
(2005). Ársskýrsla Vinnumálastofnunar 2004. Electronic document, 
http://www.vinnumalastofnun.is/files/%7B7200B2C1-A6B2-428D-90D4- 
accessed 18 May. 
Visir.is (2008) “Dómur í máli gegn formanni Rafiðnaðarsambandsins mildaður” 24 
January, Electronic document,http://www.visir.is/ 
domur-i-mali-gegn-formanni-rafidnadarsambandsins-mildadur/ 
article/200880124089.  
(2007). “Vilja kæra þýskt-pólskt fyrirtæki fyrir ólögmæta starfsemi”, 3 September, 
Electronic document, http://www.visir.is/vilja-kaera-thyskt-polskt-fyrirtaeki-
fyrir-ologmaeta-starfsemi/article/200770903135. 
(2006) “2b ehf. greiði vangreidd laun”. 1 November, Electronic document, 
http://www.visir.is/2b-ehf.-greidi-vangreidd-laun/article/2006111010092. 
(2005) 26 October.“Verkalýðsfélög kæra starfsmannaleigu”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
16. Comparative analysis and 
conclusions 
Jon Horgen Friberg, Fafo 
 
 
The accession to the EUs internal market for labour and services of ten 
former east bloc countries in 2004 and 2007, not only led to significant 
flows of people in search of employment from the new to the old mem-
ber states, it also led to the establishment and growth of what migration 
scholars loosely refers to as a migration industry – a wide range of indi-
viduals, institutions and enterprises seeking to gain profit from the facil-
itation of such movements (see Spener 2009). In an expanded transna-
tional labour market there are obviously huge “transaction costs” in-
volved for both employers and workers in the form of language 
differences, lack of information and other barriers to mobility. In order 
to overcome these barriers and lower the cost and risk of migration, 
non-commercial informal and social networks connecting sending and 
receiving areas have been important in the facilitation of labour flows to 
the Nordic countries.70 But at the same time, major commercial interests 
have also been involved in the movement of workers, seeking to gain 
profit by offering services, brokerage and support to both migrant 
workers and their potential employers. According to Salt and Stein 
(1999), the concept of migration industry can be defined as “a system of 
institutionalized networks with complex profit and loss accounts, includ-
ing a set of institutions, agents and individuals, each of which stands to 
make a commercial gain” from migration. 
One particular category of commercial actors – namely formal re-
cruitment and temporary staffing agencies – have taken on a crucial role 
as facilitators of migration from the new to the old EU and EEA member 
────────────────────────── 
70 For example, the vast majority interviewed for the so-called Polonia surveys in Oslo, Copenhagen and 
Reykjavik stated that they knew someone who was staying in the country before they decided to go them-
selves, and most of the had recieved much needed information as well as social, practical and informational 
support (Friberg & Eldring 2011). 
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states after the accession in 2004. By recruiting migrant workers in their 
countries of origin and facilitating their movement, thereafter function-
ing as their employers and hiring them out to client firms in need of la-
bour in recieving countries, the temporary staffing industry has been 
able to grow and expand into new markets in the Nordic countries as 
well as in Poland and other sending countries. The present study shows, 
however, that this development has not been uniform in the different 
Nordic countries, partly reflecting overall differences between labour 
demand and inflows to the different receiving, partly reflecting the in-
dustry’s institutional embeddedness in each particular country.  
16.1 Recruitment of workers in Poland 
The present study of temporary staffing and recruitment agencies oper-
ating on the Polish market shows how recruitment and temporary staff-
ing agencies are part of an industry which involves chains of actors 
which facilitate and promote the emigration of workers. This industry is 
diverse, consisting of everything from individual brokers and small firms 
located in either sending or receiving countries, to large transnational 
corporations. From the initial recruitment of workers in Poland, to their 
placement with clients and employers in one of the Nordic countries, 
complex networks and numerous links of mediators, subsidiaries and 
subcontractors are typically involved.  
Polish administrative data on recruitment and temporary staffing ac-
tivities, based on registrations with the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy are incomplete, but nevertheless provide an insight into the de-
velopment in this market over the last decade. There are two main cate-
gories of actors: employment agencies, which operate as labour market 
intermediaries matching workers with employers for a fee, and tempo-
rary work agencies, which also function as employers and send workers 
on assignments for external clients. This distinction is, however, some-
what blurred, since many employment agencies actually match workers 
with Polish or foreign temporary staffing agencies (who then hire them 
out to other clients), sometimes operating as different branches under 
the same corporation. While the Polish market for employment agencies 
was liberalized in 1990, temporary work agencies were not incorpo-
rated into Polish labour law until 2002, reflecting that Poland is a rela-
tively new market for the global temporary staffing industry. The market 
for both employment agencies and temporary staffing agencies experi-
enced an explosive growth after the EU accession in 2004, specializing in 
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sending workers abroad. The industry reached a peak in 2008, when the 
financial crisis sent the industry into recession. All in all, between 2004 
and 2010, about 800,000 people were registered as being sent abroad 
through a registered agency. Of all registered labour emigrants from 
Poland, those “using” an employment or temporary staffing agency con-
stituted about 1/4th in 2008 and 1/3rd in 2010. Most of these registra-
tions were not workers being employed by staffing agencies, but work-
ers being matched with employers through private employment agen-
cies. However, foreign temporary staffing agencies appear to be the most 
important clients for private employment agencies – especially those 
specializing in semi- or low skilled workers. Small recruitment firms 
typically have a stable clientele consisting of temporary staffing agencies 
and other client firms located in destination countries. 
Obviously, none of the Nordic countries are among the top destina-
tion countries for those workers matched or employed by agencies. 
However, a greater share of those workers going to Norway appears to 
go through agencies compared to most other destinations, suggesting 
that the institutionalized commercial recruitment links between Poland 
and Norway are stronger than in many other important destination 
countries, such as the UK or Ireland, where large numbers of workers 
have gone, but relatively few have used agencies. In the other end of the 
spectrum we find the Netherlands, where a staggeringly high proportion 
of all Polish workers have been recruited through agencies.   
The qualitative interviews show that although employment and tem-
porary work agencies operating in Poland use a variety of different means 
for recruiting workers, including internet and newspaper ads, informal 
networks and contacts are extremely important. Many of the people who 
have invested in this market – especially those running smaller firms – 
have migration experience themselves and use their transnational base of 
personal contacts with workers and employers in both sending and re-
ceiving countries as their primary source of (social) capital when broker-
ing deals and accessing clients. Because there is a high level of uncertainty 
involved for both migrant workers and clients/employers, trustworthi-
ness and a good reputation is alpha and omega for those operating as in-
termediaries. In a booming market where big money could be made fast 
by crafty entrepreneurs, the industry has been marked by a fair share of 
rouge operators (which is also reflected in Reports from the National La-
bour Inspectorate), enhancing the need for a good reputation among 
those who intend to stay in business. Some larger agencies have branches 
in several countries and send workers to different industries and destina-
tion countries in Europe. Smaller agencies on the other hand, tend to spe-
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cialize in one particular market, using their inside knowledge to gain a 
foothold. Most agencies are engaged in some kind of screening of workers, 
including verifying skills and work experience, but only a few of them 
offer training and courses.  
The qualitative interviews with temporary staffing and recruitment 
agencies in the Nordic countries confirm the picture that is provided 
from the Polish study. Some of the larger corporations have their own 
system of recruitment and screening of workers in Poland, either them-
selves or through subsidiary branches. The most famous being the Adec-
co training camps (Adecco Campus Nordic) in Mrzezyno and Zakopane, 
where potential workers undergo intensive training and testing, before 
eventually being hired by Adecco Norway. Most agencies, however, use 
local subcontractors or subsidiaries to do the actual recruitment of 
workers. At the same time, many temporary staffing agencies in the 
Nordic countries say that the inflow of workers in recent years has be-
come increasingly self-sustaining, through informal personal networks 
and word of mouth, and that the need for active recruitment is diminish-
ing, since workers increasingly seek out the agencies themselves. 
16.2 Migrant temp workers’ position in the Nordic 
labour markets 
The migrant temp workers role and position in the workforce – as dis-
tinct from migrant workers employed directly in host country firms – is 
closely related to the reasons why firms choose to hire them as temps 
through agencies rather than to employ them themselves. The qualita-
tive interviews with agencies and employers in the Nordic countries, 
confirm that firms have a variety of motives for using temp workers 
rather than direct employment, including:  
 
 Numerical stability in the face of employee absence. 
 Numerical flexibility in the face of volatile shifting and/or seasonal 
fluctuations in product demand;. 
 Cost reduction due to lower wages, social costs, personnel 
administration and recruitment costs. 
 Avoiding risk in the face of legal liabilities and limited information 
when recruiting workers.  
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Depending on which motive is the most prominent being employed by 
an agency may have different outcomes for the workers. For example, 
using temps to obtain numerical stability implies that the temps will be 
included in the regular daily work operations of the firm, since the temp 
is filling in for one of the firms’ own employees, and performs a similar 
function as the absent. Using temps to obtain numerical flexibility, on the 
other hand, implies splitting the workforce into two distinctly different 
segments – one stable and internal, and one flexible and external – who 
perform different functions. Using temps to lower costs will imply low 
wages and/or reduced benefits (and thus the concern over social dump-
ing which in many of the Nordic countries is closely related to the tem-
porary staffing industry).  
For any particular firm, any combination of these motives may be 
important. And although all of these motives are familiar from the gen-
eral literature on temporary staffing (Coe et al. 2010), there appears to 
be some systematic differences between industries and depending on 
whether they are hiring migrant workers or not. Numerical stability 
appear to be the dominant motive for using temps within the traditional 
office sector in all the Nordic countries, but very few migrant from Cen-
tral and eastern Europe are found within this part of the temp industry. 
In those industries where hiring migrant workers through temporary 
staffing agencies is most common in all the Nordic countries – such as 
construction, manufacturing, food processing, warehouses etc – numeri-
cal flexibility, risk aversion and cost control/reduction appear to be the 
most prominent motives for using agency workers. Cost issues, time 
constraints and strong dependence on the state of the economy are all 
characteristic of these sectors. Food-processing is subject to strong sea-
sonal variations. And construction – probably the most important sector 
employing migrant temp-workers in the Nordic countries – is also mo-
bile in character, and workplaces vary from one project to another. All of 
this requires a certain degree of flexibility, which can be solved by using 
temporary agency workers. Migrants in these industries tend to function 
as a flexible buffer to the regular workforce. This means that the work 
situation of most migrant temp workers is typically characterized by 
uncertainty and short-sightedness. In this study we have not conducted 
any systematic study of the perceptions of migrant temp workers them-
selves, but some have nonetheless been interviewed as key informants. 
Almost every one of them told us that regular direct employment was 
much to prefer over temp jobs, and most of them emphasized lack of 
stability and precariousness in work situation as the main reason.  
334 Labour migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
In addition, the issue of wages and cost appear to constitute an im-
portant divide within the migrant temp industry. Larger well organized 
temporary staffing firms – which tend to dominate the markets in all 
countries – often claim that they cannot compete on low prices alone. In 
their shadow, a substantial market of smaller temporary staffing agen-
cies speculating in low wages and circumventing national labour regula-
tions appears to have emerged in some of the Nordic countries. In Nor-
way, a significant market for informal and undeclared temporary staff-
ing in the construction industry marked by tax-evasion, illegally low 
wages and regular breaches of working environment laws, is estimated 
to account for 15–20% of the temporary staffing market (Ødegård et al. 
2012). The present study suggests that a similar – although probably 
smaller – market exists in the Danish construction industry. 
16.3 Temporary staffing as a “migration industry”  
Historically there are some common themes when looking at the histo-
ries of temporary staffing in the Nordic countries: from having relatively 
strict regulations a couple of decades ago, a wave of liberalization swept 
the Nordic countries, Denmark removed their restrictions in 1990, Swe-
den in 1991, Norway had a major revision of the legal framework in 
2000, while Iceland did not have any regulation (nor any industry to 
regulate) until the 2000s. Deregulation was typically followed by growth 
and expansion of the industry, more or less connected to the recruit-
ment of migrant workers, and then by more or less successful national 
attempts to re-regulate the industry, either through law or collective 
bargaining. So far, this story ends with the (currently on-going) national 
applications of the EU Temporary Workers Directive, which will have 
somewhat different implications in the different Nordic countries, partly 
due to the ways it is being implemented and partly due to the different 
state of regulations before implementation. These developments roughly 
echo the global development in the temporary staffing industry. Howev-
er, when we look in more detail at the overall development of the tem-
porary staffing industry in the Nordic countries and in particular how 
and to what extent the industry is involved in recruitment and staffing of 
migrant workers, significant differences emerge.  
In Sweden, the temporary staffing industry experienced a significant 
period of growth quite early in the 1990s. After some time, the industry 
became incorporated into the Swedish framework of collective bargain-
ing, first white collar workers, and in 2000, blue collar workers as well. 
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This gave temp agency workers in Sweden stronger protection than most 
temp workers elsewhere. Swedish temp workers – probably as the only 
ones in the world – are guaranteed permanent employment with pay irre-
spectively of their individual assignments. Following a generally more 
favorable economic situation in the period after 2003, the industry went 
into another period of growth. However, this growth was not related to 
the recruitment of migrant workers. Migrants are overrepresented in the 
Swedish temporary staffing industry, but these consist of refugees and 
other immigrants from Asia and Africa who are already settled. There has 
been a certain growth in the number of Central and Eastern European 
workers employed in the industry, but this merely reflects the general 
increase in this population, and there is no evidence of staffing agencies 
actively recruiting migrant workers abroad in any significant numbers.  
The Icelandic story is very different. Here the industry was not pre-
sent before well into the 2000s. Then there was an explosive growth, 
based on large scale recruitment of migrant workers from Poland and 
other new EU member states, as well as some southern European work-
ers. This development was spearheaded by large international corpora-
tions who would supply foreign labour to, among others, a large scale 
hydroelectric power-plant in the country’s interior, but quickly spread 
to other parts of the economy. At this time the industry was largely out-
side the scope of Icelandic regulations and the operations of the industry 
was closely associated with low wages, substandard working conditions 
and social dumping. After a fierce political battle, new regulations were 
introduced that would bring the industry into the otherwise encompass-
ing system of Icelandic labour regulations. In combination with the dev-
astating effects of the international financial crisis upon the Icelandic 
economy, this led to the complete breakdown and disappearance of the 
industry on Iceland.  
The Norwegian temporary staffing industry has followed a quite dif-
ferent trajectory from both Sweden and Iceland. Until the year 2000, the 
industry was banned outside the so-called “traditional office sector”, 
where there had been a small but significant market for temps since the 
early 1990s. Although the industry made several attempts to expand 
into new sectors, these mostly failed during the initial years after liberal-
ization, due to difficulties in finding workers willing to work through 
agencies. A notable exception was a short period in 2001–2002 when 
the market for nursing temps produced exceptionally high wages, and 
then quickly collapsed. With the EU accession in 2004, however, a period 
of exceptionally high growth began, which was largely based on the ac-
tive recruitment of migrant workers from Poland and the Baltic states 
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who were hired out to the construction industry and later also to ship-
yards, food-processing and oil-refineries. In the same period increasing 
numbers of Swedish migrant workers were recruited, particularly to the 
health sector. This development was closely related to changing labour 
strategies in these sectors where demand for cheap and flexible labour 
was combined with a certain reluctance to employ migrant workers 
directly. The financial crisis of 2008 was only a temporary setback for 
the Norwegian temporary staffing industry. Today, immigrant workers 
comprise more than half the workforce, and the industry displays a clear 
cut national division of labour, as native Norwegians are almost exclu-
sively hired to the “office sector”, Swedes dominate the health sector 
market, while Poles and Baltics make up the bulk of workers hired to 
construction and manufacturing. During this period the Norwegian tem-
porary staffing industry remained largely outside the scope of Norwe-
gian collective bargaining structures and has been subject to quite liber-
al state regulations. As of today, however, it appears that the implemen-
tation of the EU Temporary Worker Directive will entail a stronger 
regulation of the industry.  
The development of the Danish temporary staffing industry has some 
similarities with the Norwegian case, but also the Swedish. The re-
strictions on the industry were liberalized earlier than in Norway, and 
also started growing a bit earlier. Its growth in recent years has neither 
been as strong as in Norway nor as clearly connected to the recruitment 
of Central and Eastern European migrant workers. As in Sweden, the 
industry has to a larger extent than in Norway been incorporated into 
the general framework collective agreements, but terms of employment 
are less rigorously regulated than in Sweden. Parts of the industry have 
been actively involved in recruitment of migrants, much to the same 
type of industries as in Norway, and the number of CEE migrant workers 
within the industry has increased sharply since 2004. It is also likely that 
Danish statistics underrepresent the number of temporary migrant 
workers within the industry, and there are also significant grey areas 
between temporary staffing and other forms of subcontracting. Many 
firms which recruit and hire out migrant workers may not be included in 
official registers, suggesting that the “migration-related” part of the in-
dustry is in reality larger than estimated. Reflecting the generally lower 
inflow of migrant labour to Denmark, it is nevertheless reasonable to say 
that the intersection between labour migration and temporary staffing is 
nowhere near the Norwegian situation.  
So, can this brief comparison of four Nordic countries tell us anything 
more general about the conditions of temporary staffing as a migration 
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industry? Making general claims based on only four cases is obviously 
difficult. However, we can make some preliminary hypotheses regarding 
which factors must be present in order for the temporary staffing indus-
try to emerge as a powerful migration industry, as it has in Norway in 
the years since 2004, as it to some extent has done in Denmark in the 
same period, and as it temporarily did on Iceland in the period between 
2005 and 2008. Based on our data it seems that the emergence of tem-
porary staffing as a significant “migration industry” has been dependent 
on the concurrence of four disparate conditions:  
 
 Relatively liberal regulations of the temporary staffing industry 
allowing for flexible adaptations. 
 Economic expansion and demand for flexible semi- and low skilled 
labour. 
 Tight domestic labour market with difficulties in recruiting native 
workers. 
 Access to willing and potentially “cheap” migrant workers.  
 
In Norway, all four phenomena have been present during the entire peri-
od after 2004: there were very little regulation of the industry (practically 
no collective agreements, no requirements of guarantee pay between as-
signments or equal pay to in-house employees),71 there was an economic 
boom with huge demand for labour in many industries; there were record 
low levels of unemployment and skilled natives could usually pick and 
choose among jobs that were far more attractive than temping assign-
ments; and the EU accession provided access to a new gigantic pool of 
willing and potentially cheap workers from the new member states. The 
result was the rise of temporary staffing as a large scale “migration indus-
try” facilitating labour migration to Norway. To some extent these condi-
tions have been present Denmark too, but much less so than in Norway: 
The industry was covered by collective agreements; the economic boom 
and demand for labour was slightly lower than in Norway; domestic un-
employment was low, but still a little higher than in Norway; and while 
Danish employers had the same access to workers from accession coun-
tries, the far more encompassing Danish system of collective agreements 
made the scope for low wage competition smaller. In Iceland, all of these 
────────────────────────── 
71 There were some “dormant” restrictions on the client firms access to hire in labour, but these were rarely 
applied. To what extent the implementation of the EU Temporary Workers Directive will change this remains 
to see. 
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conditions were highly present in the period between 2004 and 2008; an 
unregulated industry operating in a Klondike-ish economy in the years 
after the EU enlargement, which resulted in a booming migration industry 
completely outside the scope of Icelandic laour market regulation. When 
new regulations brought the activities of temporary staffing agencies into 
the existing framework of labour market regulations and the economic 
crisis at the same time devastated the Icelandic economy, conditions 1, 2 
and 3 evaporated, and the industry collapsed. In Sweden, these conditions 
have never been met simultaneously: the industry was subject to encom-
passing regulations and collective agreements long before the EU en-
largement; the Swedish economy may have had some periods of growth 
and rising demand for labour, but unemployment has remained high, es-
pecially among youth and settled immigrants, leaving the industry in no 
short supply of willing domestic workers. As a result, Swedish staffing 
agencies have had little scope and few incentives to invest in large scale 
recruitment of migrant workers.  
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